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CONFIDENTIAL.

SUMMARY  
OF THE  
PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES  
OF THE  
VICEROYALTY  
OF  
HIS EXCELLENCY THE EARL OF MINTO  
VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

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*From November 1905 to July 1910.*

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VOL. I.

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Afghanistan.  
North-West Frontier.  
Chinese Turkistan—Gilgit Agency.

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**AFGHANISTAN.**



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## AFGHANISTAN.

1. Shortly after his arrival in India, Lord Minto announced to the Amir his assumption of office on the 18th November 1905, and assured His Highness that it would be his earnest endeavour to preserve and strengthen the friendly relations existing between the British and Afghan Governments.

2. His Highness replied on the 10th December, congratulating and wishing His Excellency joy. His Highness endorsed what His Excellency had written, and expressed full confidence that His Excellency would be the means of improving and strengthening the friendship between the two Governments, since the present was not a time when any one could be appointed to the office of Governor-General of India, who was not extremely wise, experienced, and a well-wisher of the Afghan Government. His Excellency having been selected for this office, could not do anything but good to the friends and neighbours of his Government. His Highness, therefore, congratulated himself and his people on His Excellency's appointment.

3. The most noticeable event in regard to Afghan affairs after Lord Minto's assumption of office as Viceroy was the visit of the Amir Habibulla Khan to India, which opened an important epoch in the history of the relations of the Government of India with Afghanistan. His Highness had been repeatedly invited to India in the most pressing manner by Lord Curzon, but His Highness on every occasion evaded the invitation, sometimes in a captious and almost impolite manner; and ultimately Lord Curzon's two periods of office as Viceroy passed without any meeting between himself and the Amir.

4. But indications of a change in this attitude on the part of His Highness were forthcoming before Lord Minto had been long in office. Early in January 1906, i.e., less than two months after Lord Minto's arrival in India, the Amir visited Jalalabad, and reports were received indicating that His Highness might be disposed to take advantage of his proximity to the Indian frontier to pay a visit to the Viceroy. The Foreign Secretary accordingly authorised both the British Agent at Kabul and the Amir's Envoy in India to reply to any inquiries on the point, that should His Highness wish to visit India, he would certainly receive a warm welcome, though the Viceroy would not like to extend an invitation to His Highness unless His Excellency had reason to know that it would be accepted. In reply to a suggestion made by the Envoy to the Amir that His Highness should visit the Viceroy, His Highness wrote to the Envoy (March 15, 1906) that he quite recognised that he should come and see the Viceroy, and said that if Lord Minto was pleased to send him an invitation, asking him to pay a friendly visit, and without referring to any special discussions of business matters, he would certainly not decline it.

5. Relations with the Afghan Government at this time had been rendered most cordial by the conciliatory nature of Lord Minto's correspondence with the Amir since His Excellency's arrival in India, and it may not be out of place to allude here to an incident which signified the friendly disposition prevailing.

6. The incident was reported in the "Pioneer" of the 16th April 1906, and is repeated here as it appeared in that paper:—

"The Viceroy received an address of welcome from the Municipality and Provincial Darbaris at Peshawar on Saturday morning in the new Victoria Memorial Hall. The Viceroy in his reply, after alluding to the present prosperity of the district and the British border-land generally, went on to make a notable allusion to trans-frontier affairs—'The able and enlightened policy of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan,' said His Excellency, 'has also done much to increase the trade of British India with our neighbours to the north, a trade of great value to India not only commercially, but in respect to that friendly intercourse which it so naturally produces. We cannot but feel, too, that His Highness's recent visit to his border territories and his personal acquaintance with our mutual frontier will assist His Highness in the very friendly inclination he has shown to co-operate with us in securing the welfare and tranquillity of the frontier tribes.' These sentences are evidently meant as a public sign that the new Viceroy is personally willing to take up the friendly relations

established by treaty and tradition with the Amir in a spirit of cordiality. If his overtures are received in anything of the same spirit at Kabul, there is absolutely no reason why the formalities of diplomacy should not be drawn much closer to the benefit of both countries."

7. On the same day, *viz.*, the 16th April, as that on which the above article was published, His Excellency sent a verbal message to the Amir through the British Agent, Malik Khuda Bakhsh, Tiwana. The message was to the effect that His Excellency himself had the strongest desire to strengthen the friendship that happily existed between the two Governments; and it had given him the liveliest satisfaction to learn informally from the Afghan Envoy that the Amir might pay a visit to India in the autumn of 1906, when His Excellency hoped to have the great pleasure of forming a firm personal friendship with His Highness, which would greatly conduce to the removal of all doubts and misunderstandings that might arise in future.

8. After referring the proposal to the Secretary of State and obtaining his concurrence, Lord Minto, on the 9th June 1906, wrote to His Highness inviting him formally to visit India during the next cold weather, and adding "I shall cordially welcome this opportunity of forming a personal friendship with Your Highness, whose friendly intentions towards the British Government I have already been glad to recognise." After some slight delay, owing, it was reported, to the illness of his chief wife, the Amir on the 17th July 1906, replied to His Excellency's letter, pointing out that its terms were not the same as he had been led to expect from his correspondence with the Envoy, and he accordingly deferred an answer to His Excellency's invitation, pending a further letter "couched in the language and terms which have already been mentioned and exchanged". It transpired that the members of the Amir's State Council had pointed out to him that the Viceroy's letter of the 9th June did not contain an assurance that no fresh treaty was in contemplation, and, as a precautionary measure, it was necessary for His Highness to ask that such an assurance should be given before he sent a formal acceptance. Thereupon Lord Minto wrote again (August 6, 1906) repeating his invitation, and giving His Highness the assurance required by him that "there was no question of a treaty to be discussed, as this had been settled at Kabul, when the Mission was there."

9. The Amir replied on the 20th August accepting, in very friendly terms, His Excellency's invitation. He explained that his request for an assurance that treaty matters would not be discussed was not due to any want of confidence, but that he desired to receive a written assurance for the removal of possible suspicions of his people. On the 21st August, at a public Durbar at Kabul the Amir read letters that had passed between himself and the Viceroy, and announced his intention of going to India. He said that the visit would increase friendly relations, and that as his brother and son were remaining in Afghanistan, no trouble would arise owing to his absence. Those present in the Durbar said that there could be no possible objection to such a visit in the circumstances stated, and thanked the Amir for having made a public statement, as otherwise the people might have been suspicious about the objects of his visit.

10. On the 30th August, the Viceroy telegraphed to the Secretary of State the purport of the Amir's reply, and of His Highness's Durbar speech, and on the 31st His Excellency wrote to the Amir acknowledging the receipt of His Highness's letter of the 20th August. He said that he looked forward with lively satisfaction to their friendly meeting, and suggested the date on which it would be convenient for His Highness to reach Agra. Some further correspondence took place between the Amir and the Viceroy regarding His Highness's date of departure from Jalalabad and his arrival at Agra, and on the 26th December 1906 His Excellency wrote to the Amir a letter to be delivered to him on his arrival in British territory. Lord Minto expressed the great pleasure it afforded him to welcome His Highness on his safe arrival in British territory on his visit to India, and hoped shortly to meet him at Agra, and personally to greet and converse with him there. His Excellency trusted that His Highness would thoroughly enjoy his visit, and that all arrangements which had been made for his reception and comfort were satisfactory.

11. In anticipation of the Amir's visit, thus arranged, and of the possibility during the course of it, of his Highness departing from his expressed intention to ignore business on the occasion, and initiating discussion of certain matters, the

Secretary of State and the Government of India exchanged views as to the best line to be taken in this contingency in regard to the several questions that would be the more likely to be raised by His Highness. These questions were:—

- (a) the Kabul Treaty of 1905, or matters connected with it;
- (b) the Anglo-Russian Convention which was then under negotiation between the two powers, and of which His Highness would probably have heard rumours;
- (c) direct correspondence between Russian and Afghan frontier officials;
- (d) the Amir's relations with the Afridis;
- (e) the portion of undemarcated frontier in the western Khyber;
- (f) military co-operation between the British and Afghan Governments for the defence of Afghanistan, with its subsidiary questions of railways and telegraphs and the examination by British military officers of the country to the north and west of Kabul;
- (g) the Kabul River Railway and the roads in the Khyber;
- (h) the deputation of an Afghan representative to the Court of St. James;
- (i) outstanding border raid cases;
- (j) the boycott by Afghan traders of Chaman railway station;
- (k) the Afghan trade in arms from the Persian Gulf;
- (l) the Amir's style and title.

12. The keynote of the Secretary of State's instructions was that the attitude to be adopted during the Amir's visit should be one of friendly expectancy as to any proposals emanating from him, rather than one of active suggestion on the part of the Government of India. But the correspondence need not be further noticed here; the Amir only touched incidentally and very briefly on one or two of the subjects stated; while a full account is given elsewhere (Appendix I) of the matters he did discuss.

13. On the 27th December 1906, the Secretary of State telegraphed privately to the Viceroy that the King proposed of his own motion to send the following message direct to the Amir in English:—"The news of Your Majesty's visit to my Viceroy and Governor-General affords me great gratification as indicating the friendly relations between Your Majesty and my Government. I hope very cordially that your tour will be a pleasant relief from your cares of State." The Viceroy replied that the King's message would do excellently, and that there was no objection to the use of the title of "Your Majesty" in English.

14. On the 1st January 1907, the Hon'ble Colonel Sir H. McMahon, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., who had been appointed Chief Officer on Special Duty with the Amir in India, telegraphed, from Landi Kotal whither he had proceeded to meet His Highness, that the Amir had written to his Envoy enquiring what salute had been arranged for His Highness in India. His Highness considered that he should not receive less than that which he was accorded in Afghanistan, *viz.*, 31 guns. If less than this had been ordered for him in India, no salute at all was necessary. His reason for asking for 31 guns was, he said, "that the honour of a friend in the house of a friend should be to the same extent as the friend, who is the guest, has in his own house, and not less."

15. This question had already been mooted in a telegram from the Secretary of State, dated the 31st October 1906, in which he assumed that the salute would be "a royal salute of 31 guns." In view of this suggestion, and of the King's decision to style the Amir "His Majesty", Lord Minto considered that there was no option but to rule that the Amir's salute in India should be 31 guns. It also appeared that in the new edition of the Indian Army Regulations the old salute for an independent Asiatic sovereign of 21 guns had been omitted and that the only Royal Salute now recognised was one of 31 guns. Accordingly orders were conveyed by telegram to Sir H. McMahon, but were received a few minutes too late for action. The Amir arrived at Landi Khana at 11-45 A.M., on the 2nd January. He was received by Sir H. McMahon and staff, and was presented with His Majesty the King's message, and with messages of welcome from the Viceroy and the Foreign Secretary. A salute of only 21 guns was fired in

accordance with former precedents. The Amir was, however, informed immediately of the orders that had been received, and expressed great satisfaction. After a night's halt at Landi Kotal His Majesty proceeded to Peshawar on the 3rd January. He expressed himself much pleased with, and appeared to be thoroughly gratified by his reception there, and the preparations made for his comfort. During his stay at Peshawar the Amir created a most favourable impression and was extremely friendly and pleasant with all. On the 5th, he replied to the King's message of welcome. After a halt at Peshawar of four days, he left on the 7th January for Agra. *En route* he availed himself of the opportunity given him of seeing some British troops at Rawalpindi and Nowshera. On the 8th, he halted at Sirhind, and on the 9th January he arrived at Agra, where a State reception was accorded him. On the 10th, an exchange of formal State visits took place between His Excellency the Viceroy and His Majesty. On the 12th, he was present at a review of 30,000 troops and was greatly impressed by the spectacle. On the same night the opportunity was taken to invest the Amir with the decoration of Knight Grand Cross of the Most Hon'ble Order of the Bath, at the Chapter of the Indian Orders of Knighthood held in the Agra Fort. The ceremony was a most brilliant function, and the Amir comported himself with great dignity. After it was over he expressed his warm thanks to the Foreign Secretary and said that nothing could exceed the friendship, honour and dignity with which he had been treated. On the 13th, during the course of a banquet in the camp of the Commander-in-Chief he touched on the subject of his artillery. While avowing his allegiance to the British Government, he pointed out that to be of any use he must be strong. He admitted that the condition of his army left much to be desired, but pointed out that in the present state of feeling in his country he could not immediately ask for British officers to be sent as instructors though he was prepared forthwith to send his son, and as many of the sons of his Sardars as were necessary to be taught by British instructor. He was informed that the idea seemed promising, but that the matter would have to be referred for orders. His Majesty did not, however, again refer to the subject during his visit.

16. On the 16th January, the Amir left Agra and after visiting Aligarh, Cawnpore, Gwalior, Delhi, and Ajmer, arrived at Calcutta on the 28th. At Aligarh he paid a visit to the Muhammadan Oriental College and after examining the students in theology he professed himself thoroughly satisfied with the results of his examination. He then received an address from the College, and in replying to it promised a monthly subscription in addition to a gift of 20,000 rupees. At Delhi he granted an audience to several of the Afghan refugees in India, and visited various mills, and other places of interest, paying special attention to cotton mills, with a view to the erection of similar mills in Afghanistan. At Delhi he took the opportunity of impressing on the Hindus and Muhammadans the desirability of living in peace and amity and of respecting each other's religious feelings. He had announced his intention of doing this at Dhakka on his way down, and had given public utterance to his views first to a deputation from the Patiala State who waited on him at Sirhind. An attempt was made by the disaffected Hindus to make capital out of the Amir's attitude, but unless he is a consummate actor there is little doubt but that he cordially dislikes and despises the ordinary Indian and especially the Bengali. The Amir's arrival in Calcutta was at his own request a private one, and he spent most of his time at the capital sight-seeing and enjoying the hospitality of his European friends in whose company he obviously found the greatest pleasure.

17. On the 8th February, the day previous to his departure from Calcutta, the Amir had an interview with Sir Louis Dane.

18. What passed on the occasion is recorded as Appendix I. It was briefly as follows. The Amir expressed his very grateful thanks to the Viceroy and others concerned, for the kindness shown to him during his visit, which would closely cement his friendship to the British Government, and which he was sure would prove —

“more useful than any form of discussion that we could possibly have engaged in, and that in future he felt that he would be much better able to realise our position and our real wants than he had hitherto been when he had to depend entirely upon formal written communications.”

He added :—

“ You know I shall probably come again quietly, so I do not feel that I am leaving India for good, and I only trust that when I do come that nothing will have occurred in the interval to render my welcome less hearty and friendly than it has been on the present occasion.”

19. The Amir asked that the British Government would examine and test all arms and ammunition ordered by him from England, in the same manner as they tested their own purchases in that line; and the Foreign Secretary agreed to lay His Highness' request before the Viceroy. Sir Louis Dane also agreed, on the part of His Excellency, to arrange that arms purchased for the Amir in England should also before being packed and sealed at the factory be seen by British Customs officers, and then passed through the Indian Customs without further examination.

20. The Amir then went on to refer to his promise to have no dealings of any kind with the Russian Government except through the British Government; and was understood to say that he had no desire to alter this arrangement. He declared that he abstained from all dealings with the frontier tribes, and did his best to prevent his arms and ammunition falling into their hands; but they were very troublesome people, playing one Government off against the other, and being like a pigeon with two doves. His views had so changed since he came to India that he was determined to try and find a really reliable Envoy whom he could depute to India to dispose of petty frontier matters direct with the authorities in India and thereby obviate lengthy and unnecessary correspondence. The Amir then passed to the question of trade with Afghanistan; he had already largely reduced the Customs duties and state monopolies and would still further reduce them in the hope of encouraging trade.

21. The Amir left Calcutta for Bombay on the 9th February. At the time of departure, he was visibly affected, and said that whereas he had brought a little friendship, he carried away a heavy load of warm affection for the British. Before this, the Amir had repeatedly thanked the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Foreign Secretary for all that they individually, and the Government of India, had done for him. On the night of his departure, His Majesty conferred the Order of “ Izzat ” on Malik Khuda Bakhsh, Tiwana, late British Agent at Kabul, in recognition of the good work done by him while in Kabul. The Amir arrived at Bombay on the 12th February. At the State banquet given by the Governor of Bombay His Majesty, replying to the toast of his health, spoke in warm terms of the strengthened friendship between Afghanistan and India using the same metaphors as had been used by Sir L. Dane in his speech at Kabul in March 1905. He added that until the Government of India deserted Afghanistan, Afghanistan would never desert the Government of India. During his stay at Bombay, His Majesty visited the battleships “ Diadem ” and “ Hermes,” and was received with full naval honours. He took the opportunity of visiting Poona on the 17th February, returning the same day. The Amir halted at Bombay till the 25th February, spending most of his time in shopping and amusements; he then left by sea for Karachi, where he arrived two days later, after a very pleasant journey.

22. While in Bombay His Majesty enquired if he could purchase the house which he was occupying there. Owing to the very serious objections to which this proposal was open Sir H. McMahon was told that, in the event of the question being raised again, he should ascertain fully what His Majesty's object was with regard to the proposed purchase. The Amir left Karachi on the 27th February and arrived at Lahore on the 1st March. *En route* he inspected the bridge at Sukkur over the Indus. From Lahore His Majesty paid a flying visit to Amritsar on the 3rd March, visiting the Golden Temple. He returned to Lahore the same day, and laid the foundation stone of the Anjuman Islamia College. In reply to the address His Majesty spoke on much the same lines as at Aligarh, expressing gratitude to the British Government for allowing Musalmans of India to approach him freely, and exhorting the latter to grasp the benefits of European education. On the 4th, the Amir attended the reception held by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab on the occasion of the marriage of Miss Rivaz to Mr. Dobbs, and left the same night for Rawal Pindi, where he visited the defence works and arsenal. He arrived at Peshawar on the 5th March, and after a halt of two days, left on the 7th for Afghanistan.



23. At Jamrud, he presented decorations to the British officers who had been attached to him during his tour in India. His Majesty recrossed the Afghan frontier on the evening of the 7th March, after a stay of 64 days in India. The British officers accompanied the Amir, who was escorted by British cavalry, to the river-bed beyond Landi Khana. Here His Majesty dismounted and took leave of them. He then drew Sir H. McMahon aside and bade him a very affectionate farewell. The Amir showed much emotion. All the Sardars and the Afghan staff showed regret at the parting, and the demeanour of the whole Afghan party offered an extraordinary contrast to their behaviour on their arrival two months previously. Before making his final farewell, His Majesty handed Sir H. McMahon telegrams for despatch to His Majesty the King, the Viceroy, Lord Kitchener, Reuter, and others.

24. An account of the Amir's visit was sent to the Secretary of State, who in reply conveyed to Lord Minto the most cordial congratulations of His Majesty's Government, who were convinced that the visit had been a great success both socially and politically. The numerous friendships formed by the Amir with British officers from Their Excellencies the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief downwards, must have gone far to remove his past suspicions of their intentions, and to place his personal relations with them on a sound and satisfactory footing.

25. One of the questions connected with the Amir's visit to India was that of the wearing by British officers of the Afghan Orders or Medals presented to them by the late or the present Amir.

**Afghan decorations presented to British officers.**

26. In September 1906, there were thirteen officers serving in India who possessed Afghan decorations. Many, if not all, of these officers were likely to be brought into contact with the Amir during the course of his visit. The Government of India believed that the Amir would be much hurt if the decorations given by him were not worn in his presence, more particularly as he was aware that British officers were sometimes permitted to wear decorations conferred by the sovereigns of other States. These views were communicated to the Secretary of State, who replied (October 19, 1906) that His Majesty the King had been pleased to grant the necessary permission that the decorations might be generally worn.

27. On the 7th March 1907, before his departure from India, the Amir decorated the British officers, who had been attached to him, with Afghan Orders, as an acknowledgment of the services rendered by them during his tour in India; and these officers also received His Majesty the King's permission to wear the decorations conferred upon them.

28. In connection with the Amir's visit to India, a somewhat difficult situation was created owing to the presence of Sardar Muhammad Ayub Khan at Lahore, which was one of the places

**Visit of Sardar Muhammad Ayub Khan to Japan.**

to be visited by the Amir. Major J. F. Whyte, the Political Officer in charge of the Sardar, had reported in October 1906 that the latter was in a very discontented frame of mind. The Sardar was said to be so exasperated at his removal from Rawalpindi, which he declared to be a breach of faith, that it was believed that he would seize the first favourable opportunity to make his escape. A report had also reached the Director, Criminal Intelligence, that a man, suspected of being in Russian pay, had been endeavouring to help Sardar Ayub Khan to escape. There was thus evidence from two distinct and independent sources of an intention or inclination on the part of the Sardar to escape, which, in view of the approaching visit of the Amir, called for special attention.

29. The Government of India considered that it was improbable that Sardar Ayub Khan would make any attempt to escape, but, in order to avoid this risk of which there was always a possibility, and to save the Sardar from a position which might be fraught with humiliation for him during the Amir's visit to Lahore, it was decided to induce him to make a prolonged tour. It was explained to the Sardar that the Government of India had no wish to put any pressure on him regarding his movements during the Amir's visit, but that if he wished to take a trip to Japan accompanied by two Sardars and a few servants, arrangements would be made accordingly. The Sardar accepted the offer, and he with Major Whyte, who was in charge of the party, sailed from Bombay on the 17th January 1907.

30. In the meantime, the Amir, who was at Agra, wrote with seeming concern to Sir Louis Dane on the 9th January, enquiring whether Sardar Ayub Khan had been granted permission by the Government of India to go to Japan. The matter was explained to him, and he was assured that the action taken was entirely in his own interest, and that the Viceroy, his host, would do nothing that could possibly be contemplated as a slight on so honoured a guest. As a warm personal friend of the Amir, who was deeply interested in his health and safety at all times, and especially during His Majesty's visit to India, Sir Louis Dane added his own assurance that the action taken was likely in every way to redound to His Majesty's safety, comfort, and honour. His Majesty replied that, after reading Sir Louis Dane's letter, he was satisfied that there was no cause for anxiety.

31. Sardar Ayub Khan's experiences on his trip to Japan are believed to have been beneficial to him in every way. They taught him that there were interests in life beyond the politics of his native country, and it is hoped his former morbid and discontented frame of mind may give place to feelings of a brighter kind. The Sardar and his party returned to Lahore on the 8th March, the day after the Amir had recrossed the frontier on his way back to Afghanistan.

32. Scarcely had the Amir left British soil, when information was received from Kabul that a great deal of dissatisfaction had been aroused among the Afghan Mullahs and the more fanatical portion of the Afghan people by the proceedings of His Majesty during his stay in India.

The Amir's proceedings after his departure from India.

33. The chief points to which exception appears to have been taken were the Amir's dining with British officers, and the friendliness he had shown towards them; his adoption of European clothes and the large purchases he had made of English articles, including the material for a bridge, and, lastly, the admission of the Amir into the Masonic fraternity during his visit to Calcutta.

34. Reports were also current that the Amir would not long survive his return to his kingdom; that the conservatives and reactionaries would remove him. This belief, which was based on rumours communicated by travellers from Afghanistan, was found to exist in the Khyber and Peshawar, and in other parts of the North-West Frontier Province.

35. The Amir reached Jalalabad on the 9th March 1907, where he received a cordial welcome; and also an address from his people, in which they congratulated him on the title of "His Majesty" which had been conferred on him in India, and on the salute of 31 guns which had been accorded to him by the British Government. The Amir replied in a speech recounting with what honour and regard he had been treated by all officials, from Their Excellencies the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief downwards; and explaining how this honour to himself was ultimately an honour to the Afghan nation. Similar proceedings followed at Kabul; and the British Agent when forwarding an account of these to the Government of India observed that the Amir's speeches were making a very good impression on the mind of the public.

"Every body", he said, "seems to be pleased to hear the interesting accounts of His Majesty's visit to India. The Amir has talked so much of the friendly treatment of Their Excellencies Lord and Lady Minto that their names have become household words among the rich and poor, and much respected by all."

36. Early in May the Amir accompanied by several Sardars, the British Agent, and a mounted escort, left Kabul on a long tour of inspection in the outlying provinces of Afghanistan. His Majesty reached Kandahar on the 31st May.

37. An address of welcome was presented to him, and, in reply, he assured the people that, in future, Kandahar would not be out of sight or mind of the ruler of Afghanistan. The Amir left Kandahar on the 17th June, arrived at Herat on the 10th July, and held a Durbar there on the 22nd of that month. In the course of a speech, he said that he felt a greater interest in Herat than in any other part of his kingdom, and he advised the people to unite in defending their faith and country. The Amir left Herat on the 17th August and travelled *viâ* Bala Murghab to Maimana, and thence to Mazar-i-Sharif, where he arrived on the 4th September, and was well received. He held a Durbar there on the 29th Septem-



ber and expressed the great pleasure he felt in seeing the people and visiting their country, which he regarded with special interest. He continued his journey from Mazar-i-Sharif on the 20th October, and travelling *viâ* the Khawak Pass arrived at Kabul on the 25th November, where he met with an enthusiastic reception. The day before the Amir entered the capital, he held a Durbar at Bagh-i-Bala, about three miles from Kabul. His demeanour was most cordial towards the principal civil and military officers who were presented to him by Sardar Nasrulla Khan. The Durbar was attended by about 1,000 persons. The Sardar opened the proceedings by reading an address of welcome, in which allusion was made to the prolonged and arduous tour which the Amir had undertaken in the interests of the people. In reply, His Majesty expressed his thanks to the Sardar and to all the officials present for the service which they had rendered to the State during his absence. He referred briefly to the advantages derived from the tour, in the course of which he had made himself acquainted with the conditions of the country, its military resources, and the people, while the latter in all parts of his dominions had made themselves acquainted with their Sovereign. Sardar Nasrulla Khan presented Rs. 50,000 for the Amir's acceptance.

38. On the 7th December 1907, His Excellency the Viceroy, who was on tour in Burma, telegraphed the following message which was transmitted to the Amir by the Political Agent, Khyber:—

“ I have just heard here, on the extreme eastern frontier of India, of Your Majesty's safe return to your capital, and as a friend I telegraph my warm congratulations on this happy and successful conclusion of your long tour, in which you have seen so much of your country and people. I hope soon to hear of your welfare, and trust that you have in no way suffered from the fatigues of so long and arduous a journey.”

39. The Amir acknowledged the receipt of this message in a letter, dated the 31st December 1907, addressed to the Political Agent, Khyber.

“ In reply I write to say that the friendly message of His Excellency the Viceroy, which was actuated by friendship, has given me pleasure, and I trust you will send to His Excellency a message from me conveying my thanks for such a mark of his friendship.”

40. It may be mentioned here that in August 1907, reports were received of an impending revolution in Afghanistan. It was said that the Amir's tour in his country instead of increasing his prestige was having quite a contrary effect; the feeling of dread and respect with which the word “ Amir ” was associated during the time of Abdur Rahman Khan had almost worn off, and Habibulla Khan's subjects were now beginning to look upon him as a vain, stupid man without any idea of his obligation either to his country or his religion. Owing to the Amir having kept aloof, he failed to cultivate the love of his subjects. He was unable to make himself popular. During the course of the tour the people were subjected to the severest miseries in supplying provisions free of price, and they keenly felt the oppression and tyranny of local Hakims and other officials, whose acts were all laid at the Amir's door. The Amir was said to have issued orders that he was not prepared, while on tour, to hear any complaints. The tale of grievances was considerable, and the people, who had looked for redress from the Amir, were sorely disappointed.

41. During Lord Curzon's term of office, the Amir had confided in the Govern-

**Correspondence with the Russian Government regarding Afghan affairs at about the time of Lord Minto's arrival, and before the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention.**

ment of India certain facts concerning the proceedings of the Russian Government on the Afghan frontier. On the 2nd November 1905 His Highness addressed a further communication to the Viceroy to the effect that a Russian officer, with an interpreter, crossed the Afghan frontier on the 22nd September, and asked permission to visit the Governor of Afghan Turkestan at Mazar-i-Sharif, but that he returned on being refused permission by the Afghan frontier officials. His Highness also enclosed a letter from the Governor of Herat, complaining of the activity of the Russians on the frontier, and reporting that, on or about the 28th September, an Afghan Khassadar, while patrolling the borders, near Chahil Dukhteran, was shot dead by some Russian soldiers, who carried off his rifle. Lord Minto thanked the Amir for the information, and told His Highness (January 29, 1906) that in regard to the shooting of the Khassadar, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to present a statement of the

case to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to ask for an enquiry into His Highness's complaint. With regard to the attempt of the Russian officer to visit Mazar-i-Sharif, His Majesty's Government were glad to learn that His Highness's frontier officers, acting under his general instructions, refused to permit Russian officers to enter Afghanistan, or hold communication with them. His Majesty's Government believed that if this course were steadily followed, the Russian Government would be compelled either to abandon their attempts to open up such communications, or to disclose their real intentions to the British Government.

42. The Russian version of the shooting incident was that it arose in Russian territory from the provocative behaviour of unknown Afghans, upon whom the Russian soldiers opened fire only under conditions of necessary self-defence against armed persons, approaching with clearly hostile intentions. In these circumstances, the Amir was told that His Majesty's Government did not see their way to carrying the matter further, in the absence of any proof of the statement made by the Governor of Herat.

43. Shortly after the Amir left India, a question arose regarding the strength of his military forces. In the course of a conversation between Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador, and Sir E. Grey on the 25th March 1906, the former stated that considerable apprehension had been aroused in Russia by a report that it was proposed to develop the military forces of Afghanistan to a point far in excess of the number of any troops which Russia had in the neighbourhood; and that they were to be trained by British instructors. Sir E. Grey informed Count Benckendorff that he knew nothing of these arrangements in Afghanistan, but that he would make enquiries. He assured him, however, that what His Majesty's Government desired was repose on the Indian frontier, and that they had no intention of disturbing it themselves.

44. Telegraphic enquiries were addressed to the Government of India in the matter, who replied (April 7, 1906) that there were no British instructors with the Afghan Army, and that they had heard of no scheme for increasing its strength. In 1904, considerable additions were made to the Afghan regular forces, as reported to His Majesty's Government in August of that year, and their present strength was reported to be 95,000 regulars, with 578 guns with troops, and 34,000 irregulars. The arms trade between Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf had resulted in many rifles reaching Herat, and in the increase of arms in possession of the tribes; and it was suggested that these reports had probably been misinterpreted by the Russians as being in connection with an increase to the strength of the Afghan forces.

45. At the commencement of the period under notice negotiations had been for some time in progress between Great Britain and Russia with a view to the conclusion of an agreement regarding matters of mutual interest in Persia and Afghanistan. In the course of a conversation between Sir A. Nicolson, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and M. Isvolsky, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 19th February 1907, on the subject of the negotiations regarding Persia, the latter incidentally referred to the position as regards Afghanistan. The impression gathered by Sir A. Nicolson from the interview was that the Russian Government were sincerely desirous of arriving at an arrangement with His Majesty's Government; but that they were nervous lest our relations with Afghanistan should develop into such cordial intimacy as would lead to the Amir coming under our direct influence to an extent which neither he nor his predecessors had hitherto permitted. The Russian Government were, therefore, desirous of obtaining, if possible, some assurance that the general character of our relations with the Amir should undergo no radical change, and that they should, indeed, remain as they were.

46. On the 23rd February 1907, during another interview with M. Isvolsky, Sir A. Nicolson reminded the latter that on several occasions the Russian Government had given assurances to His Majesty's Government that they considered Afghanistan outside the sphere of Russian influence. He observed that His Majesty's Government were at the same time, aware that certain inconveniences were caused by the absence of recognised means of communication between Russian and Afghan frontier officials on questions of local and non-political interest, and that His Majesty's Government were prepared to take the question into consideration. M.

Isvolsky would understand that it would be necessary first to obtain the consent of the Amir before any arrangements were concluded on the subject, and that it would be necessary for His Majesty's Government to be acquainted with the views of the Russian Government, and the mode in which they proposed that they should be realised, before the Amir could be approached. Sir A. Nicolson added that the Amir was always sensitive on the question, and was not disposed to entrust much latitude to his officials. Sir A. Nicolson then handed to M. Isvolsky a paper containing the following views :—

- (1) His Majesty's Government would require the Russian Government to acknowledge Afghanistan as being outside the Russian sphere of influence and under British guidance in all matters of external policy ;
- (2) they would raise no objections to the establishment of direct communications between Russian officials and officials designated by the Amir of Afghanistan as to matters of purely local character, and of non-political complexion ;
- (3) they would require the Russian Government to abstain from sending agents into Afghanistan ; and
- (4) to discontinue giving bounties in subsidies to Russian trade in that country ;
- (5) His Majesty's Government would raise no obstruction in the way of the same facilities being accorded to Russian trade with Afghanistan as British and British Indian traders now enjoy in the territory of the Amir.

47. M. Isvolsky said that he must of course study the paper, and asked if he was to regard it as a draft project of a Convention. Sir A. Nicolson replied that it was by no means intended to be so ; that it merely represented in outline the views of His Majesty's Government ; and that he should be happy to receive full details of the views of the Russian Government in respect to Afghanistan.

48. On the 7th March, at an interview between Count Benckendorff and Sir E. Grey, the latter explained the impossibility of His Majesty's Government making any proposals about frontier officials and local communications till they had sounded the Amir, who would naturally be suspicious. Count Benckendorff referred to the Russian apprehension of any change in the status of Afghanistan. The Russians were afraid that an Afghan army commanded and trained by British officers would be a danger. They were therefore very anxious that His Majesty's Government should undertake some engagement on the subject. Sir E. Grey assured him that the British Government had no intention or desire of penetrating into Afghanistan, or changing its present status. They did not intend to send British officers into Afghanistan, nor had the Amir asked for any. During the Amir's visit to India no political proposals had been made to him, and he had made none to the Government of India. The object of the visit was to prove to the Amir that the British Government were very good friends to him, but friends who asked nothing from him, and that the Amir had not been asked to India in order that demands might be made upon him.

49. Sir E. Grey foresaw that it would be very difficult for the British Government to undertake any engagements about Afghanistan. There were very turbulent tribes on the Indian frontiers, such as the Afridis and Wazirs. There would probably be no trouble under the present Amir, but it was always possible that some Amir less wise might stir up the frontier tribes within the British borders, and assume an aggressive attitude which would require measures on the part of His Majesty's Government. Count Benckendorff admitted the force of this, and said that perhaps some form of words might be devised by which His Majesty's Government should engage not to do anything unless the Amir took action which rendered measures necessary. He admitted that the Amir could not be prevented from taking measures of his own to develop his country. He was aware of the general ideas of His Majesty's Government about Afghanistan on other matters, and seemed sanguine of an agreement.

50. On receipt of a copy of the correspondence, the Government of India expressed a doubt whether the Amir would agree to authorise formally direct communications between Russians and Afghans on local and non-political frontier matters, and they thought that the object in suggesting such an arrangement

might be misunderstood by him. At the same time he might tacitly allow such informal communications as now pass, and the Government of India considered that no objection need be taken to them so long as they did not assume more serious proportions or character. The 5th clause of the paper appeared to the Government of India to be open to misconception, as British and British Indian traders enjoyed no special facilities for trade in Afghanistan except those which the Amir granted to particular traders, and it would be most undesirable that any pretext should be given to Russia for urging that the Amir should be required to summon Russian traders or experts to Kabul, as he occasionally did in the case of British and British Indian subjects. The Government of India accordingly suggested the modification or omission of the 5th clause, even if it necessitated dropping clause 4, which was otherwise very desirable.

51. On the 20th March, M. Isvolsky told Sir A. Nicolson that he understood there would be a proposal to establish Commercial Agents in Afghanistan; that some security should be afforded against the Amir's troops being organised by Anglo-Indian officers, and against strategical railways being constructed with assistance from India. There were also questions in regard to frontier affairs, and other matters generally, which would reassure the Russian Government that Afghanistan would not be transformed from a buffer State into an *avant-garde* of the Indian Empire. Sir A. Nicolson observed that, in respect to Commercial Agents, the British Government had none in Afghanistan, and that proposals had already been made as to intercourse between frontier officials. He did not wish to enter then into other points, though he remarked that His Majesty's Government expected Russia to recognise, as she had already done, that Afghanistan was outside of the sphere of her influence.

52. Some further discussion of proposals took place during March and April between Sir A. Nicolson and M. Isvolsky, at St. Petersburg; and on the 15th May the Russian Minister communicated to Sir A. Nicolson a draft Convention regarding Afghanistan in seven articles, of which the two following, after being telegraphed home by Sir A. Nicolson, were repeated to the Government of India for opinion.

#### “ARTICLE III.

“Great Britain engages not to annex or occupy any portion of Afghanistan or its dependencies, or to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. The British Government will only exercise their influence in Afghanistan in a pacific sense, and will neither themselves take, nor encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures which may be considered as threatening the Russian frontier.”

#### “ARTICLE VII.

“Russian trade, traders, and subjects shall be placed on the same footing in Afghanistan as British or British Indian trade, traders, and subjects, and will profit by the same facilities as the latter enjoy at present, or may acquire hereafter. It is understood that an uniform customs tariff shall be established along whole of Afghanistan.”

53. These articles were strongly disapproved by the Government of India, who considered them an attempt on the part of Russia to alter the status of Afghanistan from that of a country under British influence as regards all external relations and entirely without the political orbit of Russia, into that of an independent buffer state in which both Russia and England would have similar rights and interests; but nevertheless they developed in the course of fifteen months through a series of stages and negotiations, recounted in detail in Appendix II, into the following Convention, which *inter alia* embodied their provisions (excepting that relating to an uniform customs tariff) and was signed on behalf both of the British and Russian Governments on the 31st August 1907:—

“The high contracting parties being animated with a sincere desire to assure the perfect security of their respective frontiers in Central Asia and to maintain there a solid and lasting peace, have decided to conclude a Convention to that effect.

*Article I.*—His Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan; His Majesty's Government further engage to exercise their influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense, and will not themselves take in Afghanistan, and will not encourage Afghanistan to take any measures threatening Russia; the Russian Government on their part declare that they recognise Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence, and engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of His Majesty's Government. They further undertake not to send any Agents into Afghanistan.

*Article II.*—His Majesty's Government having declared in the Treaty signed at Kabul on the 21st March 1905 that they recognised the Agreement and the engagements concluded with the late Amir Abdur Rahman, and that they have no intention of interfering in the internal government of Afghanistan, His Majesty's Government engage not to annex or to occupy, in contravention of that Treaty, any portion of Afghanistan, or to interfere in the internal administration of the country provided that the Amir fulfils the engagements already contracted towards His Majesty's Government under the above-mentioned Treaty.

*Article III.*—The Russian and Afghan authorities specially designated for the purpose on the frontier or in the frontier provinces may establish direct reciprocal relations with each other for the settlement of local questions of a non-political character.

*Article IV.*—The British and Russian Governments declare that they recognise as regards Afghanistan the principle of equality of treatment in matters concerning commerce, and agree that any facilities which may have been, or shall be hereafter, obtained for British and British Indian trade and traders, shall be equally applied to Russian trade and traders. Should the progress of commerce establish the necessity for commercial agents, the two Governments will agree as to the measures to be taken, due regard being had to the Amir's sovereign rights.

*Article V.*—The present arrangements will only enter into force from the moment when the British Government has notified to the Russian Government the consent of the Amir to the terms above stipulated."

54. It should be noticed that during the course of these negotiations the Government of India distinctly expressed the opinion that it would not be treating the Amir with the confidence and candour which he had a right to expect from Government and which Government undoubtedly expected from him, if this agreement affecting his dominions were signed between Great Britain and Russia without his knowledge. They considered that such action would vitally affect his adhesion to the agreement. His Majesty's Government, however, decided in spite of this advice, to settle terms definitely with Russia before making any communication to the Amir.

55. His Excellency the Viceroy, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, wrote to the Amir on the 10th September 1907, communicating to him a translation of the Convention, and explaining its objects. It was pointed out to the Amir that his prerogatives and interests had been jealously safeguarded, and he was asked to give his formal concurrence to Articles III and IV, with the least possible delay, in order that the Convention might be brought into force forthwith. His Majesty was informed that, if there were any points which appeared to him to require further elucidation, the Government of India were prepared, on hearing that this would be in accordance with his wish, to depute for the purpose an officer, who could hear His Majesty's views and explain matters more fully at any time or place that he might fix. A hope was expressed that, in spite of the pressure of business connected with His Majesty's tour, he would find it possible to favour the Government of India with a prompt reply.

56. On the 29th September 1907, the Amir sent a formal acknowledgment of the Viceroy's letter, and said that as he (the Amir) was touring in Afghanistan, he was unable to send an answer to His Excellency's letter "at present," but would do so as soon as possible after his return to Kabul, on the conclusion of his tour. The Amir returned to Kabul on the 25th November 1907, and as no reply to the letter in question had been received from him up to January 1908, the British Agent at Kabul (who was about to return to India on leave) was instructed to deliver a message to the Amir to the effect that as the question was sure to be put to him (the British Agent) by the Government of India, he would be glad to know whether His Majesty had any message on the subject to send by him.

57. In the event of the Amir sending no message, His Excellency the Viceroy proposed to write to him expressing a hope that he would shortly be able to send an answer to His Excellency's letter of the 10th September 1907, and referring to the Government of India's offer to depute an officer to explain matters to the Amir. The Secretary of State, in a telegram, dated the 30th January 1908, entirely agreed as to the importance of obtaining an answer from the Amir about the Convention, and he approved of the message which the British Agent had been instructed to deliver to His Majesty. He also generally agreed as to the terms of the letter which it was proposed to address to the Amir in the event of his sending no message on the



subject through the Agent; and enjoined that the utmost care should be taken to avoid any appearance of wishing to force on the Amir the visit of a British officer.

58. At an interview on the 11th February 1908, the Amir informed the British Agent that he (the Amir) had nothing to say about the Convention at present, and that owing to ill-health he was unable to attend to State business. His Excellency the Viceroy, in communicating this information to the Secretary of State on the 21st February, said that he thought it would be inadvisable at present to send a further communication to the Amir. Early in March a report was received that the Afghan Agent at Meshed, Abdulla Khan, had expressed the opinion that the Amir was determined not to allow any close intercourse either with India or Russia, and he doubted whether the Amir would give his adhesion to the Convention.

59. Under instructions from the Secretary of State, His Excellency the Viceroy wrote to the Amir on the 6th August 1908, referring to previous correspondence regarding the Anglo-Russian Convention. His Excellency observed that the interests of the Afghan and British Governments were identical, and that they had been consolidated by personal feelings of friendship. He felt confident that the terms of the Convention viewed as a whole must be for the benefit of the Amir's country. The guarantee by the Russian and British Governments of the integrity of Afghanistan was assuredly a great object. The terms of the Convention had already been explained to the Amir, and there was no necessity to repeat to His Majesty the sincerity of British friendship and support. It was in the hope that the friendship between the two Governments might continue and be strengthened, and with a high sense of the importance of the occasion, that His Excellency, asked for an early reply to his letter of the 10th September 1907.

60. On the 16th September, a letter, dated the 14th August 1908, was received from the Amir, by the hand of the new Afghan Envoy, Colonel Haji Shah Beg, with reference to His Excellency the Viceroy's letter of the 10th September 1907. His Majesty merely forwarded the opinion of his State Council on the Convention, and expressed no opinion on his own behalf. He requested to be informed of the Viceroy's views on the Council's opinion, in order that he might communicate them to the Councillors, and send to the Viceroy any further opinions they might express.

61. Briefly, the Afghan Council's views were as follows:—

The Convention not only destroyed the independence of Afghanistan, but had no advantages, and was equally harmful to Britain as it was to Afghanistan. Referring to the Conventions regarding Persia and Tibet (copies of which were not furnished by the Government of India to the Amir), the Council argued that, as the former provided for the construction of railways, while the latter provided that neither England nor Russia should make railways or telegraphs in Tibet, this proved that the two Powers reserved to themselves the right of making railways and telegraphs in Afghanistan.

Referring next to the British treaty with Japan, the Council contended that it provided for the protection of the Indian frontier, while the Afghan Convention provided for the extension of influence by way of trade. Since there was a clause in the Tibet Convention prohibiting the grant of land to either Russia or Britain, the omission of a similar clause in the Afghan Convention entitled Russia to buy lands in Afghanistan from fugitives from Herat. The Council pointed out the great responsibility that would be imposed by this on the Afghan Government, and cited certain examples. They expressed their belief that Britain had relinquished the idea of defending Herat, and now sought some other point from which India could be protected, and that this was some spot on the left bank of the Helmand.

The Council endeavoured to show that a position of defence on the Helmand was mistaken strategy, and that, if Herat fell into Russian hands, there were several roads for a Russian advance on India. The remedy consisted in preventing the loss of Herat, the establishment of settlements and erection of fortifications at suitable points, and the populating of the bank of the Helmand, which it was essential should be carried out through the Amir. England and Afghanistan should come to an arrangement between themselves "to provide for the evil day." The Council, referring next to the enlistment of Hazaras in the Indian Army, expressed the opinion that the effect might be very detrimental to British interests.

They then strongly animadverted on the Japanese alliance, saying that it meant ruin, and that, if the Japanese ever came to this country to aid the British in war, there would be no method of checking their political influence, and all trade would pass into their hands. They thought it "a thousand pities" that England should sacrifice a friend like Afghanistan for an enemy like Russia, who could not be relied on, and who violated all her engagements regarding Manchuria. They added that Russian perfidy was further shown by the efforts which that Government made to intrigue with Afghanistan at the time of the Japanese war. Finally, the Council said that they would never disregard the advice of the late Amir to the effect that it was necessary for the Afghans to maintain friendship with the British Government and enmity with the Russian Government.

62. On the 21st September, the Government of India telegraphed to the Secretary of State a summary of the Afghan Council's views, and, on the 28th September, they informed him that the British Agent at Kabul had reported that those views had been recorded some months back, and at the time were rejected by the Amir. They had been drafted by Sardar Nasrulla Khan and the Itimad-ud-Daula, the former of whom had said in Council that, according to Muhammadan law, the King had no right to use force to alienate his subjects' rights and interests merely on the strength of his own personal convictions. This was agreed to by all the members of the Council, who said that, if the Amir signed the Convention, they, the representatives of the people, were not prepared to agree to it. Afterwards, when the opinions of the Council were accepted and forwarded by the Amir, Sardar Nasrulla Khan and the other members of Council made the following remark :—

"The reply is most reasonable and is at the same time polite; we should hope that we will not be bothered with the question any more. The British will have to drop the matter."

63. The Government of India informed the Secretary of State that the British Agent's report was *prima facie* credible, and that information received from independent sources pointed to friction between the Amir and Sardar Nasrulla Khan. The position was, the Government of India remarked, delicate and difficult, and they trusted that, before coming to any conclusion, His Majesty's Government would await their views.

64. On the 28th September, His Excellency the Viceroy wrote to the Amir acknowledging His Majesty's letter of the 14th August. His Excellency said that before he could reply fully to the letter, the matter must be examined carefully in communication with the British Government; but he took an early opportunity, in a private and unofficial way, to thank the Amir for the friendly spirit in which His Majesty had invited an expression of His Excellency's opinion. The Amir was assured that that opinion would be given as soon as possible, in the same friendly spirit.

65. On the 29th September, the Secretary of State, in replying to the Government of India's telegram of the 28th, stated that His Majesty's Government regarded the Amir's letter as open to a favourable construction, and invited the views of the Government of India as to the line of argument best calculated to remove the objections which the Amir's Council had raised. The Government of India replied on the 3rd October that they found it difficult to suggest any rejoinder likely to remove the objections of the Afghan Council, which would not reopen the whole policy behind the Convention. The gravest objections of the Council centred on the policy of the Convention and the disregard of Afghanistan, rather than on the particular terms of the Convention. The Government of India were strongly of opinion that the opportunity of M. Isvolsky's impending visit to England should be taken to come to some arrangement with Russia, if possible, whereby Articles III and IV of the Convention might be cancelled.

66. Failing an arrangement with Russia which would clear away difficulties with Afghanistan, the Government of India suggested the lines on which a reply might be sent to the Amir's letter. The Secretary of State telegraphed on the 14th October that a discussion which had taken place with M. Isvolsky showed that it was impracticable to propose to the Russian Government that Articles III and IV should be cancelled. Satisfactory assurances had, however, been given, though not embodied in a formal document, that the Russian Government had no intention of making difficulties over the delay in obtaining the Amir's

consent, even if this should be protracted, and would meanwhile act entirely in the spirit of the Convention. The Secretary of State observed that His Majesty's Government were thus more than ever bound to make every effort to secure the adhesion of the Amir. They fully appreciated that the real difficulty with the Amir lay not so much in the provisions of Articles III and IV of the Convention as on the considerations of general policy indicated by the Government of India, and they desired to be furnished with the full text of the letter which the Government of India proposed to send to the Amir. A draft of the letter was forwarded to the Secretary of State on the 29th October, and on the 8th December 1908, His Excellency the Viceroy (with the Secretary of State's approval) wrote to the Amir in reply to His Majesty's letter of the 14th August. While the Amir was again thanked for the frank and friendly spirit in which he had referred to the Viceroy the doubts which had been experienced by the members of the Afghan Council in regard to certain aspects of the Convention, it was explained that there was no foundation for those doubts, and that the British Government had no intention to alter the spirit in which the external relations of Afghanistan were conducted, or to depart from their policy of non-intervention in its internal affairs. The Amir was assured that the British Government were not less fully appreciative now than they had been in the past of the common interests of Great Britain and Afghanistan, and that the whole object of the Convention was to secure the integrity of Afghanistan between India and Russia, and to avoid and prevent any pushing forward of the boundaries of Russia. It was stated that the desire of the British Government was to strengthen, not to weaken, the position of Afghanistan, and the Amir was asked to believe in the sincerity of Government's policy and the value of their friendship; and, in view of the assurances which had now been given to him, it was hoped that both he and his Council would not hesitate to secure the solid advantages which, by the guarantee now given by the Russian Government, the Convention conferred on Afghanistan.

67. It has just been shown how attempts had so far failed to get the Amir to give his formal concurrence to the Anglo-Russian Convention, which included *inter alia* a provision for the settlement of

Further correspondence with Russia, subsequent to the Anglo-Russian Convention.

frontier cases on the Russo-Afghan border directly between the local authorities of the two countries; and a frontier case now arose to illustrate His Majesty's attitude in regard to the arrangement.

68. In July 1908 a representation was made by the Russian Government to His Majesty's Government to the effect that nearly ten thousand Jamshedis, Afghan subjects, flying from Afghan persecution and imploring Russian protection, had crossed the Trans-Caspian frontier, and that twenty thousand more were preparing to cross the border. News received from Meshed showed that one Saiyid Ahmad Beg crossed the Russian frontier with five hundred Jamshedis and was persuading others to follow, and that five hundred troops had been sent to the frontier by the Governor of Herat. With the Secretary of State's approval, His Excellency the Viceroy wrote to the Amir on the 26th July asking His Majesty to communicate the facts of the case to the Government of India, and inform them of his wishes in the matter. It was added that the Amir would doubtless be able to make satisfactory arrangements which would prevent the incident assuming larger proportions.

69. On the 10th August, the Secretary of State telegraphed that the Russian Government had intimated that the number of tents of Jamshedis across the frontier was 1,500, that the Jamshedis were costing the Russian authorities one thousand roubles a day, and that a claim would be made on this account. The Russian Government requested to be informed if the Amir would send an emissary to negotiate with the Jamshedis, and they asked for an early reply to their previous representation. Under orders from His Majesty's Government, His Excellency the Viceroy wrote to the Amir on the 21st August, informing him of the complaint of the Russian authorities as to the expense of feeding the Jamshedis, and of their enquiry whether an Afghan emissary would be sent to negotiate with the Jamshedis, and asking for an early reply to the Viceroy's letter of the 26th July.

70. On the 16th September, a letter, dated the 31st August 1908, was received from the Amir in reply to His Excellency the Viceroy's letter of the 26th July.



The Amir made no reference to His Excellency's subsequent letter of the 21st August. His Majesty said that the exodus of the Jamshedis from Afghan territory had been brought about by descendants of the Jamshedi Chief, Khan Agha, who had been executed by the Afghan Government over 20 years ago for his rebellious conduct. Some of these people, after the fight at Panjdeh in 1885, were removed to Kabul, because they had worked in the interests of the Russians, and they had since lived at Kabul under surveillance. They had recently escaped, and with the intention of working in Russian interests, fled from Kabul and travelling to the Herat frontier, entered Russian territory, whence they returned with about 70 or 80 sowars to Afghan territory, at a place where Jamshedis known to be friendly to the late Khan Agha were settled, and taking with them as many families as they could gain over, migrated across the frontier. During these proceedings, they had killed three servants of the Afghan Government and wounded a sepoy. The Amir said that the stirring up of these tribesmen by the Russians was no new thing, but a repetition of former practice. He added that, if the tribesmen who had been misled by Saiyid Muhammad and Saiyid Ahmad returned to their homes, they would not be molested, and would be permitted to take up their lands since their conduct was due to ignorance; but, as the leaders named and the descendants of Khan Agha would never desist from working in Russian interests, he did not think it necessary that they should return to Afghanistan, and he suggested that the Russian Government should settle them away from the frontier, because, if they were allotted residence near the border, they would intrigue, and serious disturbances might result.

71. In communicating this summary of the Amir's letter to the Secretary of State on the 17th September, the Government of India observed that the Amir could hardly be pressed for more than the assurance which he had given that ordinary refugees would not be molested, and it was hoped that it might be possible to effect a settlement with the Russian Government on these lines. On the same day information was received that the Russian Government had announced the departure of the Jamshedi Khans for Samarkand, and that the withdrawal of the Jamshedis from the frontier would be shortly completed. On the 19th September, the British Consul-General at Meshed telegraphed a report by the Herat Agent that 600 Jamshedi families had returned from Trans-Caspia to their homes; and on the 24th September, in reply to the Government of India's communication of the 17th, the Secretary of State stated that the Russian Government accepted the arrangement that the Khans should be settled away from the frontier, and that the tribesmen should be permitted to return to their homes, and to take up their lands without being molested. The Russian Government asked to be furnished with a list of those to whose return the Amir could not consent. The Amir was informed accordingly and asked to furnish the list wanted by the Russian Government.

72. On the 28th September, the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Government of India that the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been asked by M. Tcharykoff, the Acting Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, whether His Majesty's Government would have any objection to the Russian Government stating in their official reply to the proposals, which they had accepted for the settlement of this matter, that "while they had confidence in the Amir's assurances, they were not quite so sure of the Governor of Herat acting up to any orders which he might receive, and that they would like the Amir to send some high official to see that the orders as to the safe return of refugees were properly executed, and that the tribesmen were permitted to settle down without fear of molestation." M. Tcharykoff added that "by this step there would be no danger of any mishaps occurring", and that, if any harm occurred to the tribesmen, His Majesty's Government would be in a sense responsible. As soon as a nominal list of the Jamshedi tribesmen who were not to return to Afghanistan was received by the Russian Government, the men who were prohibited from returning would be detained at Samarkand.

73. The Government of India replied on the 1st October that, as it was likely to prejudice a satisfactory settlement, they unanimously deprecated any action which might suggest to the Amir that his orders would not be carried out by the Governor of Herat. The Government of India knew of no foundation for the

somewhat belated apprehensions of the Russian authorities, on this point. The Amir had met Government in a frank and friendly spirit, and he had already been informed that the settlement proposed had been accepted by the Russian Government. The Government of India could not find any argument which would justify them in doubting the Amir's assurance; and if the Russians were to abide by the list, which the Amir had been asked to furnish, of persons to be detained in Russian territory, and, if they were otherwise to act in the spirit of the settlement, the Government of India had every hope that no *contretemps* would happen. They trusted that it might be possible to press M. Tcharykoff to abandon his proposal. Action was taken accordingly by the Secretary of State, and the proposal was dropped. M. Tcharykoff, however, made a fresh suggestion that a written document should be issued by the Amir guaranteeing the security of the Jamshedis returning to Afghanistan; but Sir A. Nicolson was instructed to explain to M. Tcharykoff the very strong reasons which His Majesty's Government had for not accepting the proposal, and to express the hope that the Russian Government would regard the assurances already given by the Amir as sufficient.

74. On the 9th November, the Amir communicated the names of six leading Jamshedis to whose return to Afghanistan he could not at that time consent, though he hinted that he might be prepared later on to consider their case "if they submit a petition and agreement." His Majesty repeated the assurance that the other Jamshedis, who had fled to Russian territory, would be allowed to go back to their homes and settle down in peace and comfort.

75. On the 18th November, the Secretary of State telegraphed that Sir A. Nicolson had received from M. Tcharykoff a report by the Chief of the Merv district, to the effect that the Jamshedis who had returned to Afghanistan had fallen into very grievous conditions. All the Sheikhs and more influential of them had been immediately placed in chains and sent to Herat; neither land nor property had been returned to any of them; and the whole band were being kept under strict surveillance. In these circumstances, M. Tcharykoff said, it was impossible for the other refugees to return to Afghanistan without some further guarantees than the assurances of the Amir. Sir A. Nicolson suggested to His Majesty's Government that, before he discussed further with M. Tcharykoff the question of guarantees, some means should be found for testing the accuracy of the information received by the Russian Government, and that it might be possible to induce the Amir to send a special officer to make enquiries, and supervise the remaining refugees. Such a measure would be in accordance with the original suggestion of the Russian Government, and the objections raised against it might perhaps, Sir A. Nicolson thought, be modified in view of the statements made as to the alleged ill-treatment of those Jamshedis who had returned to Afghanistan.

76. Inquiries were then made from the British Consul General at Meshed, who replied that the Russian statement was utterly false, and that he believed that such statements emanated from a Russian frontier official, a Caucasian, at Kushk. The Afghans were making every effort to conciliate the Jamshedis, and to secure the return of those remaining in Turkistan. In these circumstances, and in view of the repeated assurances given by the Amir that Jamshedis returning to Afghanistan would be well treated, the Government of India, informed the Secretary of State, that they thought it would be most undesirable to press the Amir for any further guarantee, or to ask him to send a special officer to make enquiries.

77. On the 28th December, the Secretary of State telegraphed that the Russian Government had sent Sir A. Nicolson a memorandum to the effect that they were instructing the Governor-General of Turkistan to inform the Jamshedi refugees that the Amir had decided that with the exception of six persons specially mentioned, "they may return to their homes and remain there in peace and tranquillity." In accordance with Article III of the Anglo-Russian Convention, the Russian Government proposed to instruct the Chief of the Trans-Caspian region to inform the Governor of Herat in writing of the order of the Amir regarding the return of the Jamshedis to their homes. The Governor of Herat would, moreover, be informed of the Amir's precise words as contained in his letter

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of the 9th November 1908 to the Viceroy ; and the Chief of the Trans-Caspian region would propose to the Governor that he should specify a previously agreed upon point on the frontier of his Government, and a date, for the handing over of the immigrants by the Russian Administration.

78. The Secretary of State was of opinion that the British Government could not object to direct communication between the Chief of the Trans-Caspian region and the Governor of Herat as to the procedure for final repatriation of the remaining Jamshedi refugees ; but the Russian Government would be asked to see that the communication was made independently of, and without any reference to, the Anglo-Russian Convention, and that the quotation of the Amir's order would be in the terms of the assurance which the Amir was told, in the Viceroy's letter of the 28th September 1908, had been communicated to the Russian Government. The Secretary of State enquired whether, in the opinion of the Government of India, there was any risk of difficulty in the proposal for the formal transfer *en bloc* at one time and place of the remaining refugees from the Russian to the Afghan authorities.

79. The Government of India replied on the 1st January 1909 that they recognised the difficulty of refusing permission for direct communication between the Russian Chief of Trans-Caspia and the Governor of Herat. In view, however, of the possibility of the Amir objecting, it would be well to make it clear that if he desired another procedure, the Government of India would wish to meet his wishes. Subject to these remarks, the Government of India agreed with the terms of the proposed communication to the Russian Government. Without knowing the number of emigrants to be repatriated, the Government of India could not say whether their transfer *en bloc*, as suggested, would be productive of difficulty, but if the number was as large as originally represented by the Russians it might be desirable to suggest their being handed over in batches of 500 or less. Before committing themselves to a definite and final opinion regarding this detail, the Government of India desired to consult the Amir.

80. In accordance with the Secretary of State's instructions, His Excellency the Viceroy sent a telegraphic communication to the Amir on the 15th January, informing him, with reference to his letter of the 9th November, that the Russian Government were prepared to arrange for the return to Afghanistan of the remainder of the refugees, with the exception of the six men mentioned by him, and that they had instructed the Chief of the Trans-Caspian region to propose to the Governor of Herat that he should specify a place and date for handing over the refugees. The Amir was asked if this met his views ; and he was told that, if the matter was not one which he would wish to be settled by direct communication between the Governor of Herat and the Russian officer, his views on the proposed arrangement would be conveyed to His Majesty's Government for communication to the Russian Government.

81. The Amir replied on the 24th January that he was ready to allow the return of the refugees, except the six men named ; but that it was unnecessary for the Governor of Herat to carry on correspondence with the Russian officer, as to the place and date of return, since it was probable that such communications might cause serious temptation to the inexperienced refugees. The Amir added that he would never subject himself to the restrictions of foreigners with regard to his subjects in the interior of his country. Seven hundred families had already returned without the Governor of Herat having exchanged a single word with any Russian officer, and the remainder, the Amir thought, could also do so. He did not consider it advisable to issue any orders to the Governor of Herat on the subject. The purport of the Amir's letter was telegraphed to the Secretary of State, on the 3rd February, by the Government of India, who expressed a hope that the remaining refugees might return, if they had not already done so, without the formality of a communication from a Russian officer to the Governor of Herat. It was added that information received by the Government of India continued to show that those Jamshedis who had returned hitherto were well treated by the Afghan authorities.

82. On the 25th February, the Secretary of State telegraphed that, in reply to ~~memorandum~~ from Sir A. Nicolson, the Russian Government stated that they

learnt with satisfaction that His Majesty's Government shared the opinion of the Imperial Government as to the necessity of preliminary correspondence between the Russian authorities and the Governor of Herat, and they took note of the desirability of postponing the correspondence in question until the receipt of the Amir's reply. They quite understood that no reference should be made to the Anglo-Russian Convention.

83. On the 23rd February, the Secretary of State telegraphed that Sir A. Nicolson had been authorised on the 16th idem, at his own suggestion, to limit himself to informing the Russian Government of the nature of the reply received from the Amir, and His Majesty's desire that the repatriation of the remaining Jamshedis should be completed in the same manner as hitherto. The Ambassador was instructed to express a hope that the Russian Government would be disposed to meet the Amir's wishes.

84. Soon after this, certain of the Jamshedi refugees in Russian territory (including two of the six leaders prescribed by the Amir from returning to Afghanistan) petitioned that their families might be allowed to join them; and the Amir was informed (April 1909) of these requests and asked if he were willing to comply with them. He replied in September to the effect that some of the Jamshedi refugees had been settled near to the Afghan border, which was an arrangement likely to lead constantly to disturbances; unless therefore the Russian Government would give a written pledge to settle the refugees away from the frontier, His Majesty proposed to keep their families as hostages.

85. The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg communicated the substance of this reply to the Russian Government, and, while explaining the difficulty felt by His Majesty's Government in the matter, impressed on the Russian Government the desirability of removing these refugees to a safe distance from the frontier. The Russian Government replied that instructions had already been given for the settlement in Samarkand of the six Khans, and for the adoption of necessary measures to preclude any interference on their part in Afghan affairs. Endeavours had also been made to facilitate the repatriation to Afghanistan of the remaining Jamshedis, but this measure could not be carried into effect, in consequence of the Amir's refusal to accept the proposals that had been made to him. Owing to the scarcity of vacant land, the refugees could only be settled near the frontier. This was admittedly unfortunate, as it was impossible to prevent all communication between these refugees and their fellow-tribesmen in Afghanistan. The only solution which the Russian Government could suggest was that the Afghan authorities should, by means of friendly relations with the refugees who had already been repatriated, promote the return of those still in Russia. Moreover, the Afghan Government should hasten to despatch to Russian territory the families of the six Khans who were at Samarkand, and thus finally break the link connecting the latter with Afghanistan. So long as the families were kept in captivity, it was evident that the Khans would, by every means in their power, continue to seek for their release, and this could not but reflect unfavourably on the state of things on the frontier. In view of the Amir's refusal to entertain the proposals made to him, the Russian Government did not deem it possible to give him any written guarantee with regard to the Jamshedi Chiefs who were settled at Samarkand; but they had no objection to the Amir being informed of their views, and also of the readiness of the Russian authorities in Central Asia to obviate all that might disturb the peace and tranquillity of the Russo-Afghan frontier.

86. At the request of the Secretary of State, His Excellency the Viceroy wrote to the Amir on the 29th December 1909, communicating for His Majesty's consideration the suggestions made by the Russian Government. His Excellency remarked that it was not probable that the Jamshedi Khans in Russian territory would remain quiet if their families remained in Afghanistan, and that, by sending their families to join them, the Amir would be taking the best means of preventing these men from intriguing on the frontier.

87. Meanwhile a somewhat serious raid had been committed in Afghan territory by one of the Jamshedi refugee Khans, and the Amir had addressed His Excellency complaining of the case, and asking the Government of India to make

“proper arrangements” for the removal of the refugees from the Afghan frontier. This letter crossed His Excellency’s letter of the 29th December, and on receipt of the latter, the Amir wrote again (February 6th, 1910) consenting, in view of the Viceroy’s advice, to allow the families of the six Jamshedi Khans to join them, but asking at the same time that the refugees in question should be removed from the frontier, “otherwise the consequence will be great anxiety, perturbation of mind, and bloodshed.” The purport of this letter was telegraphed to the Secretary of State, with the remark that the letter was as satisfactory as could be expected in the circumstances, and with the expression of a hope that it would be possible to induce the Russian Government to move, or to promise to move, the remaining refugees from the vicinity of the frontier, when the families of the six refugee Khans had reached Russian territory. On the 22nd June, the Secretary of State telegraphed that the Russian Government regretted that the removal of the refugees from the vicinity of the frontier was impracticable, owing to the entire absence of free water, land, and pasturage for cattle, and hoped that there would be no grounds for further complaints against the refugees, especially in view of the anticipated arrival of their families from Kabul in the near future.

88. The Amir was informed accordingly in a letter dated 1st July from His Excellency the Viceroy, which concluded as follows:—

“It is my earnest hope that Your Majesty will experience no further annoyance from the refugees, and that, with the departure of the families for Samarkand, the incident may be regarded as closed.”

89. The families were reported subsequently to have arrived at Samarkand, and to have been formally made over to a Russian officer.

90. The boundary near Landi Khana in the western Khyber had been fixed by Sir Louis Cavagnari in 1879 under arrangements made in connection with the conclusion of the Treaty of Gandamak. But the Amir Abdur Rahman, after his accession in 1880, persistently questioned the settlement; and although Sir Mortimer Durand negotiated with him in 1893 at Kabul a complete border line from Wakhan round to Seistan, nevertheless in the demarcation proceedings which followed, His Highness raised so many difficulties on the Khyber portion of the border, that ultimately an undemarcated gap had to be left on either side of Landi Khana; and all subsequent efforts to procure its demarcation have failed owing to the opposition during his lifetime of the Amir Abdur Rahman, and since then of his son the Amir Habibulla Khan.

The frontier at Landi Khana.

91. On the 30th December 1905, about one month after Lord Minto’s arrival in India, the Amir wrote to His Excellency on the subject of some improvements to the Khyber road which were being made near Landi Khana. The Afghans contended that these operations had been carried into Afghan territory; and the Amir asked that the work might be stopped, and followed up this demand three months later by a verbal message (through the British Agent) from Jalalabad, where His Highness happened then to be on tour, complaining that just at the time when he had come near the frontier for a change, a village was being built in Afghan territory by armed men, with the cognisance of the Government of India. His Highness observed that the place where the work was going on was situated within the undisputed boundaries of Afghanistan, but, if for the sake of argument, it was admitted that the site was doubtful or disputed, the matter should be decided in a suitable way.

92. His Excellency the Viceroy replied on 16th April 1906 by a verbal message (through the British Agent who was then returning to Jalalabad) to the effect that it had been ascertained that no village had been constructed in Afghan territory and that the improvement of the trade route through the Khyber (which had probably been misrepresented to the Amir as the construction of a village) had been carried out only up to the old fort at Landi Khana, within the limits of the cultivation of the Lowargai Shinwaris which is situated at a considerable distance from Far Kham, where, as was intimated to the late Amir in the year 1898, and specially in Lord Elgin’s letter of the 3rd September of that year, the British Government claim that the frontier lies. The boundary at this point was fixed by Sir Louis



Cavagnari in 1879, and there was nothing in the Durand Map or Agreement which in any way raised doubt as to the position of the boundary at Tor Kham. It was true that, owing to considerations of neighbourly courtesy no objection had been raised to Afghan guards and parties coming on beyond Tor Kham, where there was no water, to the stream at Landi Khana ; but His Excellency was sure that after reading the letters of Lord Elgin, His Highness would agree that the extension of such courteous friendliness could not be used as an argument to alter a boundary which had been fixed 26 years ago. At the same time, His Excellency mentioned that, as no boundary pillars had yet been erected on the actual frontier beyond Landi Khana, instructions had, from the beginning, been issued to the working parties not to proceed beyond the point of junction of the existing road with the Landi Khana stream west of the ruins of the fort at Landi Khana. His Excellency hoped that, in view of the explanation given, His Highness would be satisfied that there was no intention to encroach upon Afghan territory, and he concluded that, in the circumstances, no further answer on this point would be required to His Highness's letter of the 30th December 1905.

93. Over a year and a half later, in December 1907, on receipt of information that the Zakka Khel Afridis intended to attack *kafila* escorts in the neighbourhood of Landi Khana, the Political Agent ordered the Khyber Rifles to picket the hills in the vicinity. The Sarhang of Dakka took the opportunity to revive the old Afghan claim that the boundary between India and Afghanistan was at the Landi Khana stream, and he asked that the pickets might be withdrawn from Tor Kham (which has for many years been regarded by the British as their boundary). The Chief Commissioner considered that the pickets were indisputably within the British border, and accordingly directed the Political Agent to strengthen the escorts and pickets to such extent as might be necessary for purposes of protection, but to avoid causing irritation by unnecessary parading pickets and to abstain from correspondence with the Sarhang. The Chief Commissioner's action was approved by the Government of India.

94. The question was again revived in March 1908. On the 14th March it was reported to the Chief Commissioner that a feeling of hostility towards the British was becoming very manifest among Afghans, that the Sarhang had recently largely increased his *kafila* escort and that the officer in charge of the *khassadars* had adopted an aggressive tone, and hinted that the British claim to Tor Kham was ridiculous and would be disposed of by a very few Afghan regiments. The Political Agent, Khyber, accordingly asked for orders as to the line he was to follow. The Chief Commissioner told him that escorts should continue to go to Tor Kham, as heretofore, but that there was no need to discuss boundary questions with Afghan officials, and that every endeavour should be made to avoid a collision.

95. On the 21st March the Sarhang of Dakka came in person to Landi Khana with 200 *khassadars* and refused to grant the native officer in charge of the Khyber Rifles escorts a receipt for the *kafila* transferred, unless the name Landi Khana was marked on it as the place of transfer. Before the officer could obtain orders, the *kafila* was hustled off under an escort of 200 *khassadars*. It was stated that on the arrival of Lieutenant Clarke, Adjutant of the Khyber Rifles, the matter was satisfactorily closed ; but on the 27th March the Sarhang wrote to the Political Agent, protesting against the escort going up to Tor Kham, claiming the Landi Khana stream as the Afghan boundary, and complaining of Lieutenant Clarke's action in having asked that the receipt for the *kafila* might be dated from Tor Kham ; while the Amir a few days later communicated a complaint from the Sarhang of Dakka that British escorts had overstepped the fixed boundary, which he said was at the Landi Khana water, and requested His Excellency the Viceroy to direct the officer at Landi Kotal to act according to former custom, until such time as officers were appointed by the two Governments to settle the boundary.

96. The Political Agent, in reporting the incident, stated that Tor Kham had always been regarded as the boundary and that the Khyber Rifles escorts had always gone as far as that point, but not beyond, since the Afghan war.

97. On the 14th April, the Khyber Rifles escort accompanying a consignment of ammunition for the Amir was met by the Sarhang of Dakka at Lakhtai, about a quarter of a mile east of Landi Khana. The Sarhang informed the Subadar in charge that, if he advanced further, fire would be opened on his party. The Subadar remonstrated and reasoned, but the Sarhang insisted he was acting on direct orders from the Amir. To avoid a collision, the Subadar gave away, and made over the convoy at Lakhtai. As a result of this, the practice of escorting caravans beyond Landi Khana was suspended in pursuance of orders issued by the Government of India on the 27th April 1909.

98. On the 17th May, the Political Agent, Khyber, informed the Sarhang that the Government of India maintained that, in accordance with long practice, Tor Kham was the place for exchanging escorts of *kafila*, etc., that this must continue pending the delimitation of the frontier in that neighbourhood; that a communication in this sense was being addressed to the Amir; and that, if the Sarhang could assure the Political Agent that the old practice with regard to exchanging *kafila* escorts at Tor Kham would be continued without any interference or hindrance on the Sarhang's part, the passing of *kafilas* through the Khyber would be resumed. The Sarhang replied on the 22nd May as follows:—

“ I also accept the old customs, which is that your escorts bring *kafilas* to the limits of Tor Kham and consider it as the boundary of their Government, while our escorts have hitherto considered and are considering the head of the water of Landi Khana as the boundary of their Government and have escorted and are escorting *kafilas* up to the head of the Landi Khana water. Now in accordance with the past, I agree that the passage of *kafilas* may remain in force, *viz.*, your escort should bring the *kafilas* coming from the Peshawar side to Tor Kham, and our escorts should take the *kafilas* coming from Afghanistan up to the head of the Landi Khana water; and the arrangements for obtaining receipt for the *kafilas* should be this—that both parties should record their receipt at the limit of the soil of their respective Governments and should hand it over to each other and that this arrangement should remain in force until the boundary demarcation and the settlement of those limits are carried out by officers of both Governments and by the mutual consent of both the British and Afghan Governments.”

99. On the 2nd June, the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, was informed that, in view of the terms of the Sarhang's letter, the Khyber should be again opened to *kafilas*, and on the same date His Excellency the Viceroy sent a private telegraphic message to the Amir informing him that a civil letter had been received by the Political Agent, Khyber, from the Sarhang, and that *kafilas* would proceed as usual. His Excellency added the following words:—

“ Of course, Your Majesty understands that this has nothing to do with a final settlement as to the frontier of our countries, but is only an arrangement between friends. At some future time we can discuss officially about the frontier. In the meantime, I hope the delay about the *kafilas* has not caused Your Majesty any inconvenience, and am glad to think that peace has now come back to the tribes, and that communications between our two countries can now safely proceed as before.”

100. On the 5th June, the Political Agent reported that the Sarhang had again objected to the Khyber Rifles escorts proceeding to Tor Kham until they could produce written permission of the Amir to their so doing. This was in direct contradiction of the Sarhang's letter of the 22nd May, and the Government of India accordingly once more ordered the stoppage of *kafilas*. On the 12th June, His Excellency the Viceroy wrote to the Amir, with reference to His Majesty's letter of the 8th April, stating the facts of the case; observing that the change of front on the Sarhang's part was not understood; and expressing the hope that the orders which the Amir would now issue would prevent any further difficulties being raised. On the 21st June, the Amir wrote with reference to the Viceroy's telegraphic message of the 2nd June, and said:—

“ Of course, I am aware that, as written by Your Excellency, there was no remedy except to stop and close the road during the time of disturbances. But now that the disturbances have ceased, if the *kafila* traffic should hereafter be opened one day and closed the second day, this stopping of *kafila* will cause great loss to the revenues of both Governments. It will, however, lead to speculation and misinterpretation among the public. After perusal of Your Excellency's telegram I will not attribute the closing of the road to anything but the laziness or self-conceitedness of the frontier officers in carrying out Your Excellency's orders.”

His Majesty trusted that stringent orders would be issued for the resumption of the *kafilas* traffic.

101. In reply (2nd July), the Amir was told that the Khyber would be reopened to *kafilas*, when instructions were sent to the Sarhang to allow the British escort to go to Tor Kham unmolested. This letter crossed one, dated the 1st July, from the Amir stating that stringent orders had been sent to the Sarhang to act in accordance with old custom, and, if British escorts had been in the habit of accompanying caravans to Tor Kham, they should do so now, and, if Afghan escorts had been accustomed to proceed as far as the head of the water of Landi Khana, they should continue to do so, the word "sarhad" (boundary) being mentioned in the receipts instead of the name of any special place, pending the demarcation of the frontier. On receipt of the Amir's letter, orders were issued to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, authorising the resumption of caravan traffic at once, if the Sarhang was prepared to accept the change of escorts at Tor Kham and Landi Khana as before. On the 24th July, the Political Agent, Khyber, communicated a letter from the Sarhang agreeing to this arrangement, and the traffic was accordingly resumed.

102. The matter was, however, reopened in March 1909. The Sarhang, with an escort, visited Landi Khana on the 1st March; some sketching was done east of Landi Khana and notes were taken. On the 3rd March, a party of sowars and *khassadars*, and 200 labourers, with pickaxes and shovels, came again to Landi Khana and appeared about to begin road making operations east of Landi Khana at the point where the road ends. The Officer Commanding Landi Kotal, instructed the Subadar of the post at Michni Kandao to send word to the Afghans not to commence work without permission. The Afghans had, however, withdrawn to Pinda Khak before any communication reached them. A few days before the news of this incident reached the Chief Commissioner, he received reliable information that a number of Sangu Khel Shinwaris had visited Sardar Nasrulla Khan at Jalalabad, and asked him to reopen the question of the Tor Kham boundary, promising, in the event of his doing so, to attack the Khyber Rifle escorts.

103. Under the orders of the Government of India, the Political Agent, Khyber, wrote to the Sarhang of Dakka on the 8th March to the effect that the visit of Afghan troops and labourers to Landi Khana had been noticed; that the Amir had agreed to the question of the boundary remaining *in statu quo*, pending delimitation, and that it was therefore necessary to remind the Sarhang that the claim of the British Government included, as it had always included, the country east of Tor Kham as being within the limits of the Loargai Shinwaris.

104. On the 12th March, a party of Afghan labourers was seen working on the road east of Tor Kham. The Officer Commanding, Landi Kotal, proceeded to the spot and found that a good road had been constructed from Tor Kham in the direction of Landi Khana. The Officer Commanding was instructed to refrain from any action that might provoke a conflict.

105. On the 20th March, the Political Agent forwarded a letter (without date) from the Sarhang in reply to the one which had been addressed to him by the Political Agent. The Sarhang maintained the Afghan claim to the head of the Landi Khana stream; but said that the Afghans would undertake no more road-making beyond Tor Kham, until the boundary had been delimited, and he stipulated that the Government of India should also not extend the road beyond its present limits in the direction of the Afghan border.

106. On the 29th March, the Sarhang arrested some Zakka Khel British subjects in the Khyber, east of Lakhtai, well inside the British border, and, in spite of the protests of the Subadar of the Khyber Rifles, carried them off towards Dakka. During the discussion which took place, the surrounding heights were occupied by Afghan *khassadars*, and the Subadar of the Khyber Rifles was threatened.

107. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, subsequently reported on the 5th April that the party arrested consisted of two Hindus of Landi Kotal and three Pakhal Zakka Khels of the Khyber, with fourteen donkeys laden with grain. The men with their animals either escaped or were released, but the Sarhang took possession of the grain. Shinwaris of Landi Kotal made reprisals



and carried away four Afghan camels from Painkhak in Afghanistan. They were pursued and fired upon as far as Landi Khana by *khassadars*. When the Khyber Rifles caravan escort reached Landi Khana on the 4th April the Afghans created an unpleasant situation by again demanding that they should take over caravans at this point instead of at Tor Kham, as previously arranged. The Chief Commissioner stated that the situation was one of serious tension. On the 8th April the Government of India authorised him to close the Khyber to *kafila* traffic, and to despatch the following telegraphic message to the Amir :—

“ I am telegraphing to inform Your Majesty that a report has reached me that on the 23rd March the Sarhang of Dakka arrested two Hindus of Landi Kotal and three Zakka Khels of the Khyber, together with 14 donkeys laden with grain east of Lakhtai; i.e., in territory which is unquestionably outside Afghanistan. The men and the animals escaped later, but the grain has been detained by the Sarhang. Again, when the Khyber Rifles caravan escort reached Landi Kotal on the 4th instant, the Afghan local authorities demanded that they should take over the caravan there instead of at Tor Kham as agreed, and friction ensued. The present situation being one of serious tension which may at any time give rise to a conflict, I have decided to close the Khyber to traffic until I hear that Your Majesty has taken effective measures to restrain your subordinates from such improper and hostile acts. I feel confident that Your Majesty will take the necessary action at once to show your displeasure, and will recognise the risk involved in misunderstandings of this nature with Your Majesty's frontier officials.”

108. The Amir replied on the 14th April, communicating the Sarhang's version of the incident regarding the arrest of the British subjects, and stating that he had issued stringent orders to the Sarhang that “ hereafter he should act according to the practice and arrangement established for long years, and avoid doing anything which may give offence.” Should the Sarhang act in contravention of these orders, the Amir said that he would severely punish him; and His Majesty suggested that the British frontier officers should also be warned to act in accordance with the old arrangement and avoid committing any act that may give offence.”

109. On the 25th April, the Chief Commissioner was authorised to re-open the Khyber, if the situation was quiet, and the Sarhang was reasonable. The following day it was reported that all was quiet, and that arrangements were being made for re-opening the Khyber; and the next day the Viceroy wrote to the Amir, stating that, as His Majesty had issued stringent orders to the Sarhang of Dakka, and had undertaken to punish the Sarhang if he disobeyed them, instructions had been issued to re-open the Khyber for traffic. The Amir was assured that, if the Sarhang acted in a friendly spirit towards the British frontier officers, he would be met by them in a friendly spirit. If he showed hostility, His Excellency would be obliged again to close the Khyber.

110. The Amir, in replying (May 12) said :—“ It is a matter for great regret that Your Excellency should hint that the closing or opening of a main and ancient road depends on the behaviour of the Sarhang of Dakka.” The Sarhang “ will not think of objecting or showing an unfriendly spirit even if he observes any irregularity on the part of Your Excellency's frontier officials.” In the event of the Sarhang showing an unfriendly spirit, he would, the Amir added, “ undoubtedly receive severe punishment.” In these circumstances, the Amir trusted that the road would not in future be closed simply on account of the behaviour of a frontier officer; and he suggested that any “ irregularity ” that might hereafter be observed by the British or Afghan frontier officers should be reported to their respective Governments for settlement between the two Governments.

111. Another frontier case which the Amir brought to Lord Minto's notice at the

Conflict between Khyber Afridis and Afghans near Kam Dakka.

same time as the case just related, viz., the 30th December 1905, was a conflict which was said to have taken place in the vicinity of Kam Dakka in July 1905, between Khyber Afridis and certain *khassadars* and postal servants of the Afghan Government. The Amir's version of the occurrence need not be repeated here, but it may be noted that His Highness accused the British frontier officers of having prevented the return of certain rifles belonging to the *khassadars*, which had been carried off by the Afridis. In replying to His Highness on the 22nd February 1906, the Viceroy regretted to have to say that the facts had been misrepresented to His Highness. So far

from putting any obstacles in the way, the Political Agent, Khyber, had told the Zakka Khel Malik that, if any of his tribe had the rifles, they would do well to return them, and, subsequently on their being given up, the Sarhang of Dakka sent a verbal message of thanks to the Assistant Political Officer for the assistance rendered.

112. His Excellency trusted that His Highness would agree with him that the attitude of the Political Agent in this matter had been perfectly correct. His Excellency further observed that had the Sarhang been authorised to address the Political Agent when the regrettable incident first occurred, the matter would probably have been amicably settled without the necessity of intervention on the part of His Highness.

113. Yet a third matter connected with frontier dealings was referred by the Amir to Lord Minto at the same time as the two foregoing cases, viz., the 30th December 1905.

Levy of tolls on Afghan timber by the Mohmands of Michni.

114. It related to the levy of dues by the Mohmands of Michni on timber floated down the Kabul River. His Highness stated that, in accordance with the established practice in the past, a tax was levied on such timber at Peshawar, but that no tax was levied at Michni on wood from Afghanistan. In contravention, however, of the old established custom, certain rafts of timber, which were being taken from Afghan territory towards Peshawar in August 1905, were detained at Michni where a tax was demanded on them. His Highness had brought the matter to the notice of the British frontier officers, but the latter it was alleged, had paid no attention to His Highness's representations.

115. The Viceroy replied on the 12th February 1906, explaining the facts of the case, as appeared from the records of the Government of India, regarding the claims of the Tarakzai and Halimzai Mohmands to levy tolls on all consignments of timber brought down the Kabul River for the purposes of trade and sale. His Excellency hoped that His Highness would recognise the claims, and requested that His Highness would be so good as to instruct his local officers and timber agents not to withhold from the tribesmen the payment of their legitimate dues. In view of the friendship between the British and Afghan Governments, which His Excellency said it would always be his earnest desire to strengthen, one-fourth of each consignment of timber coming down the river would, as a matter of courtesy, be exempted from the payment of tolls, as was the custom during the life-time of His Highness's lamented father, the late Amir; but beyond this His Excellency did not feel that he could, in justice to the undoubted rights of the Mohmands, offer any further concession in existing conditions. Should, however, His Highness desire to raise the question of altering the method of levying, or even of abolishing these tolls as a means of facilitating trade between the two countries, His Excellency would be very glad to receive any proposals that His Highness might put forward with that object, so that they might be taken into consideration as occasion might offer in connection with the various trade and frontier questions that come up from time to time for settlement.

116. The above-mentioned frontier matters were, as already stated, brought concurrently to Lord Minto's notice, almost immediately after His Excellency's arrival in India. Some three years later a fourth frontier case was referred to His Excellency by the Amir. On the 11th February 1909, His Majesty forwarded to the Viceroy a petition from certain Suleiman Khel, Kharoti, and other tribes, complaining that certain of their fellow tribesmen had been imprisoned in the Tochi Agency and treated with neglect and hardship by British officials. After inquiry from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province in regard to these allegations, the Amir was informed that the facts had not been correctly stated. It was explained to His Majesty that many of his subjects visit India for about six months of each cold weather. Of these some commit crimes and thefts of various sorts, act as spies for the outlaws residing in Ghazni who raid in British India, sell them high class rifles, and assist them in their raids. Within the past four years, over eighty offences had been committed in Waziristan alone, including several murders, cases of kidnapping, wounding

of British subjects, and thefts of cattle, etc. It had been fully ascertained that these offences were committed by outlaws who live west of Urghun, assisted by some Afghan subjects. In order to detect the offenders, it was found necessary to inspect the Ghilzais, Kharotas, etc., who visit India annually for purposes of trade, and with whom these bad characters mingle. The majority, on giving evidence of their respectability, were allowed to proceed on their way without hardship or discomfort. A few were detained (being allowed to camp outside the British post or in an empty barrack) for a short time till enquiries could be made about them. A still smaller number, who were definitely accused of wrong doing, were detained till they furnished security to appear at a *jirga* to discuss the question of their guilt or innocence. His Majesty would readily understand that it was not possible that such persons, while they were travelling about India, should be treated in a manner different from the permanent residents of this country. These were the real facts of the case, and it was hoped that they would convince His Majesty that the action which had been taken was necessary and quite consistent with the friendship which subsisted between the two Governments. The Amir was further informed that the Political Agent in the Tochi reported that he had spared no effort to stop raids by tribesmen under his control into Afghan territory, and that in many cases he had exacted reparation from his tribesmen, and had returned stolen property to the Afghan officials.

117. One other matter owing its origin to a boundary dispute on the Indo-Afghan frontier may be conveniently introduced here. In the year 1888 work was commenced on an extension of the Khojak railway in the direction of Kandahar beyond the Chaman Fort, in order to get to level ground for the terminus of the line. The work was absolutely necessary in the interests of railway construction; and the point to which the rail-head was taken was held by the Government of India to be indisputably outside Afghan limits. The Amir Abdur Rahman, however, claimed that his frontier extended to Chaman Fort, and he probably believed that our claim to put the frontier at the foot of the slopes of the Khojak range was really an act of aggression threatening Kandahar, and not a movement forced on us by the exigencies of railway construction. He spoke of the extension as an attempt on the part of the Government of India to pick a quarrel with him; and ultimately in 1892, after contesting the matter with the utmost persistence, he thought to take his revenge by doing all he could to induce Afghan traders to boycott the railway terminus at New Chaman.

118. In May 1906, the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan reported that there was no reason to think that the prohibition which the late Amir had imposed against the use of the Chaman station had been relaxed by the present Amir. It had also been reported that the Governor of Kandahar had issued orders preventing the Tarakis, who were in the habit of passing through Chaman on their way from Afghanistan to Shorawak during the winter, from going towards Chaman where they used to sell their goods, consisting of wool, *ghi*, dried curds, and also flocks of sheep and goats, and then return to Afghanistan with grain and cloth purchased at Chaman.

119. On the 17th July 1906, the Viceroy wrote to the Amir, mentioning the report in regard to the Tarakis, and referring to certain correspondence which had taken place between Lord Curzon and the late Amir regarding the use of the Chaman station by Afghan traders. His Excellency observed that the action of the Governor of Kandahar appeared to be detrimental to the advance of trade, and said that he would be glad to know whether it had the approval of His Highness. His Excellency also asked the Amir to consider whether it would not be desirable in the interests of the trade of India and Afghanistan that the prohibition against Afghan traders using the Chaman station should now be formally revoked. There was reason to believe that although the export of fresh fruit through Chaman might be permitted by His Highness's local authorities, the majority of the exports by that route were smuggled goods. The existence of this contraband traffic undoubtedly caused a considerable loss to His Highness's revenues, and had also led to regrettable incidents on the frontier, the prevention of which seemed to lie in His Highness's own hands. The attitude which the Amir had taken towards trade between the two countries warranted the belief that His Highness was desirous

of encouraging its development, and it was suggested that a great step would be taken towards this end if His Highness could remove from the minds of traders the erroneous ideas, which apparently still prevailed, that they were not allowed to go to Chaman, and if His Highness would either transfer his agent from Killa Abdulla to Chaman, or would appoint another agent at the latter place, who would be in a position to check the evasions of customs dues, and so increase the revenues of Afghanistan. In making this suggestion, His Excellency assured the Amir that he had in view only the interests of trade between India and Afghanistan and the removal of restrictions which were equally detrimental to both countries. Should His Highness meet the suggestion in the spirit in which it was offered, it would be regarded as a conspicuous mark of the good-will which then happily subsisted between the two Governments.

120. The Amir never replied to the Viceroy's letter, but in October 1906, the British Representative at Kandahar reported that the Amir had issued a *firman*, which had been publicly notified to all Kandahar traders, that fresh fruit might be exported to Chaman, and that the export of all other articles was prohibited.

121. In 1908 the Baluchistan authorities reported that the restrictions at Chaman were being maintained with vigour, and that these were causing discontent among the tribesmen engaged in the *kafil* trade. In the same year octroi at rates similar to those levied at Chaman were imposed at Killa Abdulla, but this has had no effect in making Afghan traders use Chaman in preference to Killa Abdulla.

122. On the 25th November 1905, Major P. M. Sykes, C. M. G., His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General in Khorasan, Perso-Afghan boundary. reported that among the questions to which he had devoted special attention, during his recent tour to the Afghan frontier, was that of the boundary in the vicinity of Musabad. He did not consider it politic to visit the actual frontier; but he made indirect enquiries both as to the facts of the present state of affairs and also as to the manner in which the *status quo* was regarded.

123. Captain Winter, late Consul at Turbat-i-Haidari, who visited this neighbourhood in March 1904 reported that Musabad was in possession of the Afghans, and Khushab Ayubi in Persian occupation. Ali Jan Sultan, who was in command of the Karai sowars of Khaf, informed the Attaché of the Mehed Agency that in 1897, Muhammad Sadik Khan, who was referred to by Captain Winter, spent one thousand *tomans* in clearing out a ruined *kanat* and in populating Musabad, but that two years later he was expelled by the Afghans, who posted six sowars there. He also stated that Khushab Ayubi which is four or five miles due west of Musabad was populated by himself (Ali Jan Sultan), but that, owing to pillaging by the Afghan sowars, he had recently been compelled to abandon the spot. He stated that there was no cultivation at Musabad, and that Ayubi had not been occupied by the Afghans.

124. Major Sykes observed that there seemed to be no immediate likelihood of this question being raised by the Persian Government. At the same time he ventured the opinion, that although the present was by no means an opportune occasion for raising the question owing to the Seistan Arbitration Commission having scarcely concluded its labours, yet, with the development of Russian influence and peaceful penetration in Khorasan, it would be desirable to demarcate the remaining section of the frontier, *i.e.*, from Hashtadan to Siah Koh, within the next few years. The Government of India, replying on the 7th February 1906, concurred in this view, and requested the Consul-General to keep a careful watch and report in due course what the boundary of possession is. His Britannic Majesty's Consuls at Turbat-i-Haidari and in Seistan were requested to bear in mind the desirability of ascertaining the actual fact of possession when officers are travelling in that vicinity either on tour or relief, and that no opportunity should be lost of ascertaining the correct boundary between Siah Koh and the last boundary pillar in Hashtadan.

125. In February 1910, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran informed the British Consul in Seistan, Major W. F. O'Connor, that the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs had complained of certain alleged encroachments on the part of Afghans across the undefined boundary, and had urged that the necessity of

preserving the *status quo* should be pressed upon the Afghans, until such time as the two parties shall have taken the necessary measures with regard to the frontier questions.

126. The Consul in Seistan, in replying to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the 18th March, pointed out that similar complaints had been preferred almost yearly for a good many years past by the Persian Government, and that, without full details regarding the alleged encroachments, it would be difficult to say whether the complaints were well founded or not. Major O'Connor, however, expressed the opinion that a settlement of this boundary question was clearly desirable, and that no great practical difficulty should be experienced by a British arbitrator in bringing one about.

127. On the 1st May, the Government of India telegraphed to the Secretary of State that, in their opinion, until the demarcation of the tract in question was forced upon them by a joint appeal from Persia and Afghanistan, everything possible should be done to avoid undertaking delimitation. The Secretary of State replied by telegraph on the 24th May that he entirely agreed that delimitation should be avoided at present. Instructions were communicated accordingly to the Consul in Seistan.

128. Malik Khuda Bakhsh, Tiwana, who had been appointed as British Agent at Kabul in January 1904, was still in that position when Lord Minto arrived in India in November 1905. He accompanied the Amir to India in January 1907, and relinquished charge of his duties at Calcutta on the expiration of his term of office. With the Amir's approval, Fakir Saiyid Iftikhar-ud-din, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Punjab, and Revenue Member of Council, Tonk State, was appointed as successor to Malik Khuda Bakhsh, and accompanied His Majesty, on the latter's return from India to Afghanistan.

129. On the 4th October 1907, His Excellency the Viceroy wrote to the Amir that, owing to ill-health, Iftikhar-ud-din had been compelled to ask to be allowed to return to India before the severe cold weather set in. His Excellency desired to meet his wishes, and nominated as his successor the Hon'ble Malik Umar Hayat Khan, Tiwana, C.I.E., of the Shahpur district, Punjab. The Amir was informed that Umar Hayat Khan was an orthodox Sunni Muhammadan, the head of a branch of the well-known Tiwana family, and a good sportsman and that for so young a man he had seen much of the world, and had done considerable honorary service for Government. The Amir was reminded that he already knew Umar Hayat Khan, who was one of the principal Native Attachés employed under Sir H. McMahon throughout His Majesty's tour in India. It was, therefore, unnecessary to say more about him than that he would have the Viceroy's entire confidence. His Excellency added the following words :—

“ If you will treat him with the same confidence, and receive him in a friendly spirit I have every assurance that he will be of equal service to both Your Majesty and myself in the conduct of our official relations, which we mutually desire to maintain on the most friendly footing.”

130. The Amir in reply, however, wrote to say that he remembered the Malik and considered him too young and inexperienced for the work; and accordingly the Viceroy decided that Fakir Saiyid Iftikhar-ud-din should continue to hold the appointment; and no answer was sent to the Amir.

131. In January 1910, His Excellency informed the Amir that Fakir Saiyid Iftikhar-ud-din's term of appointment was drawing to a close, and that Malik Talib Mehdi Khan, at present Revenue Member in the Bahawalpur State, had been selected as his successor. In a letter of the 25th May, His Majesty accepted the nomination, and on the 17th June he was informed that the Government of India proposed that Malik Mehdi Khan should start from Peshawar for Kabul on the 5th July. On the 22nd June, the Amir granted an interview to Fakir Saiyid Iftikhar-ud-din, British Agent at Kabul, on the eve of the latter's departure to India, and conferred on him the order of “ Izzat ”. Fakir Saiyid Iftikhar-ud-din arrived in India on the 4th July. His successor, Malik Talib Mehdi, arrived at Kabul on the 18th July, and reported that the Amir was staying at Paghman, owing to the prevalence of cholera at Kabul; and that he had written to His Majesty announcing his arrival, but



that he had received no reply as late as the 27th July, and had consequently not been able to pay his respects to the Amir. He also reported that he had been told that a strict watch was being kept over the members of the British Agency.

132. One of the earliest matters referred by the Amir to Lord Minto, after

(2) *Kandahar.*

His Excellency's arrival in India, was a complaint against Abid Hussain, the British news-writer at Kandahar, who was accused of having smuggled two Kandahari women to India. Other serious charges of misconduct had been brought against Abid Hussain by the Governor of Kandahar during Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty.

133. On the 22nd February 1906, Lord Minto informed the Amir that he had heard of these charges against the British representative at Kandahar with very great regret. Abid Hussain had denied the truth of the accusations made by the Governor of Kandahar, and, evidence in support of them being inconclusive, the Government of India were unable to regard them as established. But in view of the relations between Abid Hussain and the Governor, and as it was thought desirable that the name of the British representative at Kandahar should be above suspicion, it had been decided to replace Abid Hussain by another representative. As regards the charge concerning the two Kandahari women, an enquiry was being made and pending the result, Abid Hussain had been suspended from the service of Government.

134. Later, on the 24th May 1906, His Excellency wrote again to the Amir, saying that Abid Hussain had failed to appear before the local authorities at Quetta to answer the charges brought against him, and had instead tendered his resignation of the service of Government. His attendance could not be compelled unless it were decided to institute criminal proceedings against him; but this it had been decided not to do, as the charges against him were not supported by evidence sufficiently strong to render a conviction in British law-courts probable. His resignation, however, would not be accepted, and he would be dismissed from Government service, and care would be taken that he should never again hold a Government post. Regret was again expressed that an officer of Government placed in a representative position in His Highness's territory should have so far forgotten his duties to both Governments as to behave in this discreditable fashion. His Excellency trusted that His Highness would recognise that the complaints of his officials at Kandahar had been examined with great care, and that the punishment inflicted upon Mir Abid Hussain, which was the severest of which the circumstances of the case, according to British law, admitted, was an indication that no effort would be spared to ensure that the officers representing His Excellency in His Highness's territory did not offend against the laws of decency and good conduct.

135. On the recall of Abid Hussain from Kandahar Muhammad Gul Khan was appointed to the post of British Representative there; but was obliged shortly after, owing to ill-health, to return to India. In May 1906, the Amir was informed, through the British Agent at Kabul, that Muhammad Gul Khan had been granted three months' leave and that Muhammad Ali Khan, Rana, a Sunni Muhammadan of respectable family at Hoshiarpur, had been selected to carry on Gul Khan's work for that period. The Amir had no objection to Muhammad Ali Khan's appointment; but he complained that Gul Khan had caused an Afghan soldier to be beaten because the latter did not salute him, and he hoped that Gul Khan would not be sent back to Kandahar. This charge of misconduct was emphatically denied by Gul Khan, whose explanation was forwarded to the Amir, with a message that His Excellency the Viceroy would be glad if His Highness would furnish a statement of the evidence on which the charge was based, and would make such further enquiry as might be possible, with a view to checking the accuracy of the report made to His Highness from Kandahar.

136. The Amir replied that he could not say whether the accusation against Gul Khan was well founded, but that there was no doubt that Gul Khan was a man of depraved morals and foolishly proud, and His Highness desired that he should not be sent back to Kandahar, as His Highness could not be responsible for his safety. The Amir added that he had no objection to a British news-writer being stationed at Kandahar, in accordance with previous custom, and requested to be informed of the antecedents of the man whom the Government of India proposed to appoint.

137. In view of this complaint against Gul Khan, the Viceroy decided not to send him back Kandahar, but to confirm Muhammad Ali Rana in the appointment; and His Excellency informed the Amir accordingly, and added that he hoped that, seeing that he had ordered the transfer of Gul Khan in accordance with the Amir's wishes, His Highness would, in future, cause very careful enquiry to be made before countenancing any complaints which he might receive from his officials at Kandahar against the British Representative, as His Excellency was not convinced that the accusation against Gul Khan was fully warranted. The Amir could not be more anxious than the Viceroy was himself that the conduct of the British Representative at Kandahar should be free from reproach; but His Highness would no doubt admit that the friendship between the two countries demanded that any charges made against him should be fully investigated. The Amir accepted Muhammad Ali Khan, Rana, as successor to Gul Khan; and assured His Excellency that, in the event of any misbehaviour on the part of the British news-writers at Kandahar and Herat, His Majesty would not write about it until he had made full enquiries into the matter.

138. About a year later, in November 1907, the British Representative at Kandahar, Muhammad Ali Khan, Rana, reported that a servant of the Agency, named Akbar, was assaulted by certain Afghans. Akbar's story was that on the night of the 24th November, while taking water at a canal in the town, he was warned by a *farsiban*, whose name he did not know, to abstain from using the canal; a quarrel ensued; the *farsiban* was joined by two other men, one of whom was named Mirza Haidar Kuli and they proceeded to beat Akbar. The British Representative stated that on proceeding to investigate the matter on the following morning, he found that the Afghan guard, which was ordinarily posted at the door of his house, had been replaced by a new guard from the *Kotwali*. He also learnt that a report had been made at the *Kotwali* that Akbar had attempted to commit a theft, and that he had been captured but subsequently escaped. Akbar, on being questioned by the British Representative, emphatically denied the charge. He afterwards absconded. On the morning of the 27th November, Muhammad Ali Khan, Rana, heard that his own name had been coupled with that of Akbar in connection with this incident, and he suspected that the *Kotwal* and the Governor of Kandahar were making up a case against him. The British Agent at Kabul reported that the Governor of Kandahar informed the Amir that Muhammad Ali Khan, Rana, had been accused of visiting the house of a woman at night, and a similar report was received from another source. Subsequently Muhammad Ali Khan reported that the Governor of Kandahar had compelled him to remove from the house, which by long usage had come to be regarded as the official residence of the British Representative, and which belonged to Muhammad Taki Khan, a pensioned servant of the Government of India, to whom rent for it was regularly paid. The Governor laid claim to the property, which he alleged had been forfeited to the Afghan Government. The quarters to which Muhammad Ali Khan had been removed were most unsuitable and unhealthy.

139. On the 31st December 1907 the Amir addressed the Viceroy in the matter, bringing grave charges of misconduct against Muhammad Ali Khan, Rana, and forwarding a petition signed by a large number of persons in support of these charges. After due enquiry, His Excellency informed the Amir that Muhammad Ali Khan Rana had denied the charges which had been brought against him *in toto*, and that, after a very careful consideration of the case, His Excellency found it impossible to regard the charges as proved. With reference to the action of the Governor of Kandahar in compelling Muhammad Ali Khan, Rana, to remove from the house which he had occupied, the Viceroy expressed surprise at the action, and explained that the Governor's claim to the house, as property forfeited to the Afghan Government, was wholly untenable. The unsuitability and unhealthy condition of the house to which Muhammad Ali Khan, Rana, had been removed was referred to, and the Amir was requested to issue orders that the British Representative should be allowed to return at once to the house which he formerly occupied, and that no obstruction should be placed in the way of its occupation by future holders of the appointment.

140. In view of the unfriendly attitude of the Governor of Kandahar towards the British Representative, and of the fact that the Amir desired that

another man should be appointed to the post, it was decided to recall Muhammad Ali Khan, Rana, to India and to replace him by Hussain Ali an official who was employed in the British Consulate at Turbat-i-Haidari in Persia. The Amir was informed that Hussain Ali was a Sunni by religion and a native of Sialkot, and that he was a man of excellent character. If His Majesty accepted this nomination, Hussain Ali would be directed to proceed to Kandahar. Some time must elapse before the new incumbent could reach Kandahar; meanwhile it was proposed that Muhammad Ali Khan Rana should remain there, and the Amir was asked to send instructions for his proper treatment during the interval.

141. In December 1908, a report was received from the British Representative regarding the arrest by the authorities at Kandahar of one of his messengers, named Abdul Nabi. On the night of the 5th-6th December, three sepoys were despatched to the house of the messenger with orders to effect his arrest. On hearing of this the next morning, Muhammad Ali Khan, Rana, wrote to the Governor asking if he had ordered the man's arrest, and what were the charges against him. The Governor replied that the man had been arrested in accordance with the orders of the Amir, and was being despatched to Kabul, and that it was probable that some persons had complained against Abdul Nabi at Kabul, and he had, therefore, been summoned to answer the charges in their presence. Muhammad Ali Khan, Rana, thereupon again wrote to the Governor pointing out that he (the British Representative) should have been informed before the messenger was arrested, or should have been given an opportunity of settling accounts with the man before he was despatched to Kabul; and asking for a personal interview with the Governor. The latter replied that, as the man was a subject of the Afghan Government, the British Representative had no right to make enquiries about him. The Governor added that had Muhammad Ali Khan, Rana, been previously informed, the latter might have contrived to conceal the man. The Governor declined to grant the British Representative an interview.

142. On the 5th February 1909, the Viceroy wrote to the Amir inviting His Majesty's attention to His Excellency's letter of the 8th July 1908, to which no reply had been received, and informing him of the report which had reached the Government of India concerning the arrest of Abdul Nabi. The Viceroy further said:—

“It is unnecessary to enter into the details of the correspondence, for I am confident that Your Majesty will agree with me that, no matter what may have been the offence of which Abdul Nabi was accused—and that is a subject on which I have no information—he should not have been arrested in a way which showed such disregard to my representative as almost to disgrace him in a public manner. I have no doubt that Your Majesty will issue suitable orders, and that I shall have no cause for complaint in future. But the incident brings into prominence the desirability of making new arrangements, and I take the opportunity of asking for an early reply to my letter of the 8th July.”

143. In reply, the Amir agreed to the recall of Muhammad Ali Khan, Rana, and asked for further particulars regarding the character and family of Hussain Ali Khan, nominated by the Government of India to succeed him. In regard to the house of Muhammad Taki Khan in Kandahar, His Majesty said that although he regarded the property as forfeited to the Government of Afghanistan, he did not wish to acquire it without paying for it; and he offered its value as fixed by the local officials viz., Rs. 9,134 Kandahari.

144. Thereupon further particulars were furnished to the Amir as to Saiyid Hussain Khan's family and tribe, but as His Majesty ultimately objected to the man on the ground of his being a Shia, the Viceroy agreed to nominate instead one Saifulla Khan, Tahsildar of Nushki in Baluchistan. And in regard to the other matters, it was explained to the Amir that Muhammad Taki Khan's house was reported to be worth much more than the sum offered for it; and it was stated that it was desirable that the British Representative should be accommodated in Kandahar in a manner becoming his position, and that he should either be allowed to continue to occupy Muhammad Taki Khan's property, or that His Majesty should, in exchange therefor accord a house and garden of corresponding value and extent elsewhere, in a suitable quarter of Kandahar, as a residence for the British Representative.



145. In a letter of the 25th May 1910 the Amir accepted the nomination of Saifulla Khan. On the 31st May Muhammad Ali Khan, Rana, arrived at Chaman; and on the 12th July Saifulla Khan left for Kandahar.

146. On the 5th September 1906, the Viceroy wrote to the Amir that Khan Bahadur Yakub Ali Khan, British Representative at Herat, was, owing to old

(3) *Herat.*

age, retiring from service, and it was proposed to select as his successor Muhammad Aslam Khan, who was at that time British Agent at Karez, and who had acted for Yakub Ali Khan for three months in 1905. His Excellency trusted that His Highness would accord his approval to Muhammad Aslam Khan's appointment, and would instruct the Afghan officials to treat him with the courtesy to which he was entitled. The Amir replied on the 20th December, accepting the appointment of Muhammad Aslam Khan, and saying that instructions had been issued to the Governor of Herat accordingly.

147. In August 1907, Muhammad Aslam Khan reported that the Amir had ordered that no one should be allowed to visit the British news-writer. This restriction was in pursuance of a policy, which had been followed in the time of Muhammad Aslam Khan's predecessor, when an Afghan guard had been placed over the house of the news-writer. In May 1910, Muhammad Aslam Khan reported that an additional guard had been stationed close to his house. He was unaware of the reason for this extra precautionary measure; but thought that it might be connected with the impending arrival in Herat of certain persons, whom the Amir had deputed to keep His Majesty informed of the state of affairs there.

148. In a letter, dated the 21st July 1908, the Amir informed the Government of India that Sardar Muhammad Ismail Khan, the Afghan Envoy in India, had been

New Afghan Envoy in India.

recalled and that Haji Shah Beg Khan had been appointed in his place. The Haji arrived in Simla on the 9th September, bearing a letter from His Majesty in which he defined the duties that devolved on Haji Shah Beg as Envoy. The letter, with some presents from the Amir, was presented to His Excellency the Viceroy by the Hajiat an interview which was accorded to the latter on the 19th September. His Excellency wrote to the Amir acknowledging the letter and presents.

149. Sardar Muhammad Ismail Khan, who was summoned to Kabul on relinquishing his duties in India, wrote to Sardar Abdul Kuddus Khan, the Itimad-ud-Daula, to the effect that no good would result from his returning to Kabul, and that he intended to settle in India, where he would continue to work in the interests of the Afghan Government by endeavouring to promote the good-will of the principal Muhammadans of this country towards the Afghan throne. The Amir manifested his displeasure with Sardar Muhammad Ismail Khan by confiscating his property in Afghanistan, and dismissing his relations from service.

150. The disturbances on the frontier, which culminated in the despatch of a punitive expedition against the Mohmands in 1908 (*vide* North-West Frontier Summary) synchronised with a state of unrest and fanaticism in Afghanistan and with a strong anti-European feeling. At the

Anxious situation in India due to a state of anarchy and unrest in Afghanistan combined with a rapid arming of the population and intrigues of the Kabul Court with the frontier tribes.

Afghan Court itself counsels were divided on the burning question of *ghaza*. A powerful party, headed by Sardar Nasrulla Khan urged on the Amir the inadvisability of resisting the wave of fanaticism, which impelled the majority of the people to cry for *ghaza*, while another party advised His Majesty that any immature action might result in his downfall, and that, if he resolved to embark on hostilities with the British Government, he should assure himself that he had the support of his own people, and of the more important trans-border tribes.

151. The spirit of fanaticism, which prevailed in the vicinity of Kabul, spread during August 1908 along the Afghan border to Khost, where the Afghan authorities were urging the people to attack Kurram. Sardar Nasrulla Khan's emissaries were at the same time intriguing with the frontier tribes on the British side of the border. An Orakzai Mulla, who had been attending tribal *jirgas* and meetings in Tirah, informed the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province that there was great activity among the Tirah Mullahs, who were well

provided with money, and declared that they were acting under orders from Kabul. They urged the tribesmen to prepare for war, and promised that they would be supported by Afghan troops. Information received from another source credited the Amir with having written to certain independent tribes, inviting them to join the *ghazis*. The Orakzai Mulla stated that there was no disagreement between the Amir and Sardar Nasrulla Khan, that His Majesty was convinced that the British and Russian Governments had agreed to crush Afghanistan on the first opportunity, and that he believed that war was inevitable: the Amir's policy was to rouse the frontier tribes, and trust to a rising of the seditious party in India. On the 2nd September 1908, Sardar Nasrulla Khan discussed the political situation with Mir Sahib Jan, Mulla, who had associated himself with the Afghans during the frontier disturbances of 1908, and suggested that a campaign against the British should be started simultaneously from different parts of the border. At an interview with the Amir in October, Mir Sahib Jan suggested that the presence of learned Mullas among the frontier tribes, or in the vicinity of independent territory, was essential to keep alive the feelings of animosity which had been engendered in the tribesmen against the British Government. The suggestion was approved, and arrangements were made to give effect to it.

152. The foregoing information was based largely on reports furnished to the Intelligence Branch, Army Head Quarters, and though of an alarmist nature, the Government of India in its practical treatment of the situation exercised a careful restraint, which judged by later events proved to be fully justified.

153. With the departure of the Amir and his Court to Jalalabad for the winter the scene of further intrigues with the trans-border tribes was transferred to that city, where *jirgas* of Mohmands, Afridis, Shinwaris, and of Khans from Ningrahar were received in Durbar by both the Amir and his brother, Sardar Nasrulla Khan, and adjured to unite under the banner of Islam against the Feringhis; while the Mulla faction, of which Sardar Nasrulla Khan was formally installed as leader, was publicly given a mandate to extend its influence over the frontier tribes. Disquieting concomitants of this political propaganda against the British Government were a great stimulus in the arms traffic in Afghanistan, and signs of general lawlessness and unrest in the country. The Amir on the eve of his return to Jalalabad referred publicly in Durbar to the arms trade, and said that it was incumbent on every man in the country to provide himself with a weapon; while report had it that all order was at an end, and that the people were becoming fearless of the Amir, who appeared to have become a mere puppet in the hands of the fanatical Mulla faction, which now occupied a very dangerous ascendancy in the country.

154. Meantime, while intrigues were being prosecuted at Jalalabad, under the very eye of the Amir, against the British Government, a plot had been discovered at Kabul on the 1st March 1909, which had for its object the assassination of the Amir and his sons Inayatulla Khan and Amanulla.

155. It appears that the conspiracy came to the knowledge of the Amir within a few days of the date planned for its execution. The chief informant was a Mulla, named Minhaj-ud-din. Public feeling at first favoured the belief that Sardar Nasrulla Khan was implicated, a theory which was subsequently discredited owing to evidence that the Sardar was enjoying the Amir's confidence, and was helping actively at Jalalabad in the interests of His Majesty. Suspicion fell on Bibi Halima, the mother of Sardar Umar Jan; and Doctor Abdul Ghani, Principal of the Habibiya College at Kabul, who was credited with having engineered the plot with the idea of instituting parliamentary government in Afghanistan, was arrested along with many others.

156. The Amir returned to Kabul on the 22nd April 1909, and forthwith held a Durbar, and delivered a speech in which he dwelt on the boons conferred by him on the country and the people since his accession—in making remission of revenue and fines which had remained unpaid for many years together; in bringing back to their country and restoring to their estates refugees who had long lived in exile; and in showing indulgence to the people in many ways. He remarked that, in the face of all this, he did not understand why attempts were being made on his life. Within his recollection he had never done evil to any person, whether an alien or a resident of Afghanistan. With regard to the suspected conspirators, he said that he had given the matter his consideration, and would do what he deemed best.

157. The Amir also inspected his troops, and was much pleased with their efficiency in drill and discipline on parade. He said that he was glad to see that the condition of the Afghan army showed considerable improvement, and he was confident that they would always maintain their reputation for bravery and devotion. His Majesty then referred to the conspiracy against the throne, and asked the troops whether they would stand by him. All declared that they were perfectly happy under his benign rule. The Amir praised the loyal conduct of his troops and dismissed them with many commendations.

158. Early in June it was reported that a Commission, which had been appointed to try Dr. Abdul Ghani and his relations on a charge of complicity in the plot against the Amir had found them not guilty, and recommended their release. They also represented to the Amir that the conspiracy was the outcome of the introduction of modern education into Afghanistan, and that in order to avoid such difficulties in future the study of English literature should not be allowed in the Habibiya College at Kabul.

159. The Amir, however, ordered that a thorough inquiry should be made, and that no one should be punished without a previous reference to a council of Mullas, who should give their decision according to Muhammadan law. Eventually an official account of the conspiracy was issued, stating that it had been much exaggerated and that it was merely the beginning of a reform movement; and the Bibi Halima was publicly exonerated from complicity in the plot.

160. On the 1st December 1909, His Excellency the Viceroy addressed a communication to the Amir on behalf of the relatives of a British Indian subject, who was being detained in prison, in connection with the conspiracy, and expressed a hope that His Majesty would see that this Indian family, who were British subjects, received justice, and that they were not treated with inhumanity. No reply has been received to this communication.

161. Reports continued to be received to the effect that Sardar Nasrulla Khan's intrigues with the frontier tribes, and the traffic in arms were both being prosecuted with great vigour. It would perhaps be tedious to notice these proceedings in any further detail here; it is enough to state that they assumed considerable proportions and constituted for the remainder of the period under review a great source of trouble and anxiety to Lord Minto's Government.

162. The illicit arms traffic was almost entirely carried on from Maskat and the Persian Gulf, and the subject is therefore treated in detail in the Persian Gulf section of the Summary. But notice may be taken here of certain correspondence which passed with the Secretary of State on the subject of the arms traffic, with particular reference to the Amir's connection with it.

163. On the 14th August 1908, the Secretary of State forwarded a copy of a despatch from Mr. Marling, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Tehran, regarding the arms traffic through Persian territory to Afghanistan. Mr. Marling referred to the case of a large Afghan caravan, conveying arms through Persian territory, having made attacks on officials of the Indo-European Telegraph Department. The Secretary of State remarked that it seemed desirable to arrive at some understanding with the Amir before the next caravan season, since the probability of attacks upon the officials of the Indo-European Telegraph Department and upon other British persons and interests in Persia could not be ignored. He did not suggest that any handle should be given to the Amir for controversial correspondence, but thought that it might be pointed out to His Majesty that, if arms were required for arming the people of Afghanistan with his permission, some other means might be devised for obtaining them which would not involve the traffic through Persia with the tribes on our side of the line, or the risk of violent conflicts in Persia between his own and British subjects. The Secretary of State thought that the matter was one in which a friendly exchange of views with the Amir regarding the illicit arms traffic might lead to a clear understanding as to the extent to which His Majesty really approved of the traffic with his own people, and to measures being devised for satisfying his wants by legitimate means.

164. The Government of India replied on the 19th September that it was beyond doubt that the traffic in arms had the Amir's approval. His Majesty in a letter, dated the 11th September 1907, had complained strongly of interference with his traders, who were arming the people of Afghanistan; the import of

arms into Afghanistan was allowed free of duty, and the trade at Kabul had been openly encouraged by Sardar Nasrulla Khan and the Afghan authorities. At least 30,000 breech-loading rifles and three million cartridges had been imported into Afghanistan and tribal territory during a period of 18 months which ended in August 1908, and the price of rifles and ammunition had fallen greatly. The Amir considered that he was entitled to import arms under the terms of the Durand Agreement, which laid down that the Government of India would "raise no objection to the purchase and import of munitions of war," and this view was accepted by Sir Louis Dane in his letter to the Amir, dated the 20th March 1905. The Government of India observed that the Amir evidently preferred that the arms should reach his country through Persia. They thought that it might become necessary shortly to draw the Amir's attention to the fact that the arms were reaching the tribesmen in independent territory; but they considered that it would be impolitic to raise the question at present, though they shared the Secretary of State's views as to the gravity of the situation.

165. The Secretary of State replied, on the 29th September, 1908, observing that there was an obvious difference between the purchase of arms by the Amir himself for distribution to his people under a system for which he would be responsible, and his permitting the population to procure arms in unlimited quantities by uncontrolled private enterprise. His Lordship, while further desiring the Government of India to consider whether a suggestion might be made to the Amir that he should concert measures with Government for substituting legitimate means of satisfying his wants and those of his people in place of the present illegal traffic, agreed that His Majesty should not be addressed at present.

166. The Secretary of State's wish, just alluded to above, to see measures taken to substitute legitimate means for supplying the Amir and his people with arms and ammunition, in the place of the existing illegal traffic already described leads to a consideration of the increased facilities which the Government of India had for some three years previously been according the Afghan Government for the import into Afghanistan of munitions of war. One of the first letters received by the Viceroy from the Amir, after His Excellency's arrival in India announced the appointment of one Azimulla Khan as an Agent for the expeditious carrying on of business connected with the purchase of arms and war materials for the Afghan State from British traders. His Highness observed that the Viceroy was aware that the Government of Afghanistan stood in great need of arms and materials required for the arms factory, and that it would be "impossible to safeguard that Government against danger from the enemy, without making any arrangements and strengthening the country". Accordingly, Azimulla Khan had been appointed, in order to avoid the delay that had occurred in the past in the transaction of the business in question. On the 7th December, Lord Minto thanked His Highness for the information and said that steps would be taken to make known the appointment to the officers concerned.

167. In a letter to the Foreign Secretary, dated the 4th February 1906, the Amir expressed his gratitude for the action taken; and, in compliance with a further request from His Highness, Azimulla Khan was permitted to despatch for His Highness's inspection and approval samples obtained from British firms in India of rifles and pistols of any kind up to a total number of 200 weapons, with 100 rounds of ammunition for each. The number of the latter was subsequently increased to 300 rounds. Permission was also accorded for the despatch to Kabul of 1,000 Mauser pistols, and 500,000 rounds of ammunition for them. Azimulla Khan was also allowed occasionally to try sample rifles on the Government range at Karachi.

168. In November 1905, the Government of India gave orders that all firms engaged in the business of supplying arms to the Amir should be warned that the export to Afghanistan of ammunition prohibited by the Hague Convention was forbidden. As it was practically impossible to enumerate all the types of bullets which might be held to be debarred under the articles of the Convention, it was decided in April 1906 that no small arms and ammunition for the Amir should be

detained on account of doubt as to its admissibility for use in war, except such as having bullets with a steel, copper, or cupronickel outer covering and of a greater diameter than .250, had not the point of the bullet completely covered by such envelope, or which had the envelope slit or pierced at the sides. In the meantime arms and ammunition were being supplied to the Amir by English firms, and consent had been given in June 1906, with the approval of the Government of India to samples of the Government short rifle being sent to him and, in the event of this pattern weapon meeting with his approval, to the subsequent supply of 10,000 to 20,000 of them for the Government of Afghanistan.

169. In consequence of a complaint made by the Amir that, owing to the cases containing arms and ammunition being opened at Bombay for examination by the Indian Customs authorities, arms imported by him through India arrived in a rusty condition, the Government of India addressed him pointing out that this examination was necessary to ensure that the consignments arriving in India actually comprised the arms which had been ordered by the Afghan Government and also, in the case of cartridges, that the exporters had not supplied bullets which might be held to be debarred under the terms of the Hague Convention. The Amir was informed that in communication with His Majesty's Government an arrangement had been proposed whereby consignments of arms and ammunition exported for the Afghan State would pass through India without the cases being opened in that country. But the Amir had not replied accepting this arrangement before he visited India early in 1907. On that occasion, as already stated (page 5) he spoke to the Foreign Secretary at Agra on the subject, and also asked that all arms and ammunition which he might purchase in England should undergo the same test and examination as was imposed in the case of arms made for the British Government; and he was informed that His Majesty's Government were willing to do what was practicable in the matter.

170. About two months later, March 20, 1907, the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Amir forwarding a memorandum, which had been drawn up by His Majesty's Government for the information and guidance of manufacturers and exporters with a view to ensuring that consignments of arms and ammunition exported for the Afghan State should pass through India without any opening of the cases in this country. In regard to the question of the testing in England of arms and ammunition intended for the Amir, he was informed that His Majesty's Government had been asked to arrange for the examination of 25 per cent. only, selected at random, as approved by him and that they had also been asked, in accordance with the Amir's wishes, to have the quality of the cordite used in the cartridges tested, as well as to make sure that the bullets were not of a prohibited pattern.

171. To this the Amir replied (April 27, 1907) accepting the arrangements made. But meantime His Majesty had entered into a contract with Messrs. Treacher & Co., of Bombay, for the supply to him of 10,000 short Lee-Enfield rifles of the British Government pattern, and ten million cordite cartridges; and in connection with this order the Secretary of State intimated that the manufacturers represented that, if the usual inspection was insisted on, even to the limited number proposed, they could not produce rifles up to the required standard at the price which had been arranged with the Amir. On this information being communicated to the Amir on the 28th April, he replied insisting on the rifles being tested according to the usual inspection in the case of similar weapons supplied to the British Government. Messrs. Treacher & Co. were informed of the Amir's views, and were told that the matter rested between themselves and him, and that the Government of India declined to accept any responsibility in connection with the contract, to which they were in no way a party. The Amir was informed of this decision in a letter from the Foreign Secretary (Sir L. Dane) on the 5th June 1907. Messrs. Treacher & Co. subsequently wrote to the Government of India stating that they had written to the Amir to the effect that they understood that the test which was required to be applied to the arms was not a detailed test comprising the examination of each separate part of the rifle, but only an examination of the complete weapon, and asking His Majesty to allow the arms to be made in accordance with this view, or to pay for the detailed test, if he really wished to have this. No reply was received by Messrs. Treacher & Co. from the Amir, and they stated that the makers had suspended operations, and that delay in complying with the Amir's order was likely to ensue. In these circumstances, the firm asked



the Government of India to assist them in the matter. In reply, their attention was invited to the communication in which they were informed that Government declined to accept any responsibility in connection with the contract, and that the matter was left to them to settle with the Amir.

172. The contract was not finally fulfilled until January 1908, but in accordance with the Amir's request, the Government of India paid in May 1907 the whole amount of the order to Messrs. Treacher, in advance, as a charge against the Amir's subsidy.

173. Other instances too were numerous of Government's generous policy towards the Amir, in his efforts to perfect the armament of his State. Hitherto it had in accordance with His Majesty's wishes, been customary to accept his signature only as authority for exempting consignments of arms from a road from restrictions under the Arms Act, and from the payment of customs duty. In May 1907 the Government of India allowed a consignment of cartridges to pass from Bombay under the signature of the Amir's son, Sardar Amanulla Khan. This action was taken in order to avoid possible inconvenience to the Amir, who was then on tour, and, in a letter, dated the 28th May 1907, he was asked whether he desired that similar orders for arms and ammunition should be complied with on the authority of any other signature than his own, or whether the practice approved by him in February 1906, under which his own signature or seal was required, should be maintained. No reply was received from the Amir; and a similar case having arisen in November 1907 in connection with some arms and ammunition ordered by Sardar Nasrulla Khan, the Amir was informed on the 9th November that this consignment had also been allowed to pass, and he was requested to send an early answer to the enquiry made in the previous letter.

174. But no answer came; and on the 2nd June 1908, the Bombay Government reported that a further small consignment of arms and ammunition had been imported by Messrs. Forbes, Forbes, Campbell & Co., under an order bearing the seal of Sardar Nasrulla Khan. The Government of India ordered the detention of the consignment, and wrote to the Amir on the 20th June, informing him accordingly. His Majesty's attention was invited to the previous correspondence, and he was told that, in the absence of any further expression of his wishes, it was necessary to adhere to the practice which was approved by him in 1906.

175. In August 1908, Messrs. Forbes, Forbes, Campbell & Co. were granted permission to clear the consignment from the Customs House, on condition that it would not be forwarded to Kabul, until receipt of further orders. In February 1909, the firm stated that they had been informed by Dost Muhammad Khan, the Afghan Agent at Karachi, that he had received advices from Afghanistan to the effect that orders were being signed by Sardar Nasrulla Khan, and that there should be no necessity for the Amir's signature. The firm also intimated that, when the Amir visited India, he permitted Sardar Nasrulla Khan to sign all orders on his behalf, which the Sardar had been doing up to the present. The Bombay Government were requested to inform Messrs. Forbes, Forbes, Campbell & Co. that the Amir had not replied to the reference which had been made to him, and that, until a reply was received, permission could not be granted to the firm to forward to Kabul the arms and ammunition in question.

176. In April 1908, Messrs. Treacher & Co. of Bombay reported that they had received an order from the Amir to obtain quotations for brass gun-cartridges made by the Polte Company of Magdeburg, and also for cartridge cases for Hotchkiss guns. The firm, having applied to the Government of India for permission to execute the order, were granted permission to import and forward to Kabul the following samples, *viz.* :—

1,000 3-pounder brass empty cartridge cases.				
1,000 5	"	"	"	"
500 6	"	"	"	"
500 9	"	"	"	"

177. The Government of India requested to be informed of any orders that might result.

178. On the 21st February 1909, the Amir wrote to the Government of India saying that he was "much interested in the holding of military manœuvres and

sham fights for the training of the troops" of the Afghan Government, and, for this purpose, he desired to be supplied, on payment, with 400,000 empty cartridges .303 bore, with caps mounted on them for magazine rifles.

179. The Government of India agreed to the request, and informed His Majesty that the cost of the consignment would be Rs. 15,600 exclusive of packing and transit.

180. The Amir expressed himself pleased; and was informed in September 1909 that the cartridges were ready for him at Peshawar. Subsequently the actual value of the cartridges and packing (the Amir's Agent paid the transit charges) was found to come to only Rs. 15,471-15-0; and His Majesty was informed accordingly, and told that the sum was being debited to his subsidy account.

181. Among the munitions of war, which the Amir purchased through Messrs. Treacher & Co., was a large quantity of cordite rifle ammunition. The risk attending the storage of this explosive were mentioned to the Amir during his visit to India; and on the 17th May 1907, the Foreign Secretary forwarded to His Majesty a set of rules, which had been drawn up by the Ordnance Department, on the subject. It was observed that some of the precautions might strike the Amir as being unnecessarily trivial; but it was explained to His Majesty that they were not so in reality, and that experience had proved how very desirable it was to enforce them. He was advised to introduce the rules wherever cordite was stored in Afghan territory.

182. The Amir replied on the 14th July, expressing his gratitude for the information which had been supplied to him; but he added that proper arrangements had already been made, and necessary precautions taken for the "protection and keeping of arms and ammunition entrusted to the arsenals of the Afghan Government." "Nevertheless," the Amir said, "the rules forwarded by you have increased the said precautions."

183. On the 4th March 1908, the Amir wrote to His Excellency the Viceroy regarding his (the Amir's) wish to have cordite and smokeless powder manufactured in the factories at Kabul, and he asked for the services of two workmen to instruct his people in this business.

184. After consultation with the military authorities, His Excellency the Viceroy informed the Amir on the 29th April 1908 that the production of these explosives required much skilled labour and technical knowledge, in addition to complicated machinery, and that it would be impossible to supply His Majesty with workmen, who would be of use to him. His Excellency said that he had been told that the erection of a cordite factory would cost 40 lakhs. If, however, His Majesty thought fit to send to India any Afghan expert he might select, His Excellency would be very glad to assist him to obtain instruction and information at our factories, or he would be furnished with samples of explosives for examination at Kabul. The Viceroy added that if the Amir sent a representative, Lord Kitchener would take care that he received a thorough instruction. The Amir replied that he would send workmen as suggested; but he never did so, and the correspondence in the matter ended.

185. In February 1909 the Amir wrote to the Viceroy, asking that permission might be granted to two Afghan traders to import sporting arms and ammunition for sale at Kabul; and His Majesty was informed that there was no objection to the proposal, provided that the class of arms and ammunition purchased in India for the purpose were restricted to smooth bore shot guns, powder, cartridges, and shot such as could be used in fowling pieces only; and he was asked to inform the Government of India of the persons or firms (who should be permanently residing in British India) with whom the dealers in Kabul proposed to transact business.

186. The Amir in reply intimated (October 25, 1909) the names of the two Afghan traders, and said that he had taken written agreements from them binding

them to restrict their dealings solely to sporting arms and ammunition. His Majesty further stated that these dealers would make their purchases from Messrs. Treacher & Co.

187. On this it was arranged that on each occasion when the two Afghan traders in question made a selection of guns, &c., they were to send full particulars to the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, and apply for an export license and that until they received this, their purchases could not be taken delivery of.

188. These conditions were fully explained to the Amir's Envoy, and by him to the two traders; and the Bombay Government were duly informed of the arrangement.

189. Subsequently, the two Afghan traders were allowed to extend their purchases of arms throughout India under certain restrictions, instead of being limited to dealings with Messrs. Treacher only.

190. The recruitment of Hazaras for the Indian army, which commenced on a definite scale in 1902, had always been viewed by the Afghan Government with much disfavour; and it led, in 1905, to attempts on the part of the Kandahar officials to repatriate the Hazaras serving in the regiments stationed in Baluchistan. In addition to grants of land, *takavi* advances, and service in the Afghan army, which were offered as inducements to Hazara deserters or emigrants, the Governor of Kandahar discontinued the issue of passports to the families of Hazara sepoys of the Indian army desirous of visiting India. This caused great inconvenience to the sepoys concerned; and the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, at the request of the military authorities, endeavoured to induce the Governor to recommence the issue of passports, but that official, in spite of the numerous precedents quoted to him, maintained that as his records were silent on the subject, he could not issue passports without orders from the Amir. Steps were taken through the Afghan Envoy to obtain the concession, but without success; and Sir Henry McMahon, when on tour with the Amir in India, was instructed to broach the subject to His Majesty if an opportunity offered, but was unable to do so.

191. On the 14th June 1907, the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan represented that under orders issued by the military authorities in 1897, native soldiers, who were subjects of the Amir, were not granted leave to visit their homes, unless they first obtained permits to enter Afghanistan, and that, moreover, they were obliged to obtain these permits themselves. In view of the want of success which had attended all attempts to obtain passes for Afghans serving in the Indian army and desiring to visit Afghanistan, and for their families in that country who wished to enter India, Sir H. McMahon considered that the men could not be expected to obtain passes themselves, and he suggested that the orders of 1897 should be cancelled, and that the men should be allowed to proceed to Afghanistan on leave at their own risk, each soldier being granted a certificate from his regiment showing who he was. It was also suggested that the time had arrived when some representation on the subject should be made to the Amir; otherwise recruiting for Hazara regiments would receive a severe check.

192. The Government of India, while agreeing with the Agent to the Governor-General that a representation to the Amir would be desirable, considered that the time was not opportune for addressing him in the matter, and they were also of opinion that, until a better understanding had been arrived at with His Majesty on the question of the enlistment of Hazaras in the Indian army, the orders issued by the military authorities in 1897 should be cancelled. It was decided that the position should be explained to Hazaras on enlistment.

193. With a view to encourage the enlistment of Hazaras in the Indian army, endeavours have been made since March 1907, to establish a colony of these tribesmen on the Anambar lands in Loralai.

194. While in India, the Amir asked for the loan of the services of Mr. H. H. Hayden, of the Geological Survey Department, with a view to the examination of the mineral wealth of Afghanistan. He also applied to the Government of India for

The Amir's wish to employ European experts.



the services of a railway engineer to lay a railway line from Kabul to the coal mine at Ghorband, with a branch line to his new fort at Jabl-ul-Seraj ; and he also asked for a canal engineer, a veterinary officer, a landscape gardener, a horse training and racing expert, an expert in canning fruit, and an expert in inoculating cattle for rinderpest and other cattle diseases.

195. On the 28th February 1907, the Secretary of State authorised the Government of India to promise assistance to the Amir in engaging for him suitable servants ; but with the exception of Mr. Hayden, Mr. Morley considered it undesirable to lend the Amir the services of officers of Government, and, in any case, he thought it would be well to supply them gradually, looking to the possible contingencies of the Amir's death, accidents, and disturbances, and the risk of arousing Russian suspicions. The Government of India represented that it was a matter of the utmost importance to them to ensure that the expert sent to advise on railway matters between the Hindu Kush and Kabul should be strictly British. If in consequence of their refusal to give him an expert, the Amir engaged, as he could do, a foreigner, the results might, the Government of India thought, be disastrous. As regards other experts, it was proposed gradually to provide non-officials or Indians, if the Amir would accept these, but as regards the Railway Engineer, the Government of India urged the appointment of Mr. W. A. Johns of the Public Works Department, Railways, in whose skill, judgment, and tact they had complete confidence. The Secretary of State assented to this proposal on the 4th March. The Amir in the meantime had engaged in India a non-official coal mining engineer, a chauffeur, and a wine expert.

196. Mr. Johns proceeded to Peshawar, on the 24th March, and, while waiting there to be summoned by the Amir to Kabul, a report was received that the coal mine at Ghorband which had been examined by Mr. Hayden had proved to be practically worthless on account of the poorness of the seams, and bad quality of the coal. Pending the result of a further search for coal by Mr. Hayden, the Amir decided that Mr. Johns should not take up his appointment under the Afghan Government. Mr. Johns accordingly returned to his ordinary duties.

197. Before the Amir started on his tour in Afghanistan in May 1907, he instructed Mr. Hayden to undertake the systematic examination of all the coal outcrops in Ghorband, Saighan, and Andarab, with a view to reporting on the quantity and quality of the coal, and the facilities for rail or other means of communications between the coal fields and Kabul. Mr. Hayden had already pronounced the Ghorband mine to be useless ; and so he now visited Saighan, and a place called Kamard, where he collected specimens of coal. He also discovered at Kalu, near Bamian, a hill range of iron-ore, which he described as the finest of its kind he had ever seen. He did not visit Andarab and Panjsher, as he was subsequently prohibited from going to these places. He returned to Kabul on the 29th July 1907.

198. During a period of nearly seven months' stay in Afghanistan, Mr. Hayden had been allowed to do only two months' work, and that not in new or unknown country. He thought that from the purely economic point of view, the results were perhaps satisfactory, or would be so in any other country ; but that from the scientific point of view, he had done little more than confirm and amplify the work of others ; and that from the exploratory point of view, his additions to the knowledge of the country were extremely small. This, Mr. Hayden said, was due to the suspicion and distrust with which a servant of the Government of India was regarded by all Afghan officials, not excluding the Amir himself. As a result, Mr. Hayden's short tour had been rigidly confined within the narrowest possible limits compatible with such investigations as appeared to the Amir to be specially necessary.

199. Mr. Hayden's report on his geological exploration was finished in September 1907, and handed to Sardar Nasrulla Khan ; and he was granted an interview with the Amir on the 29th December, when the report was discussed. His Majesty was satisfied that owing to transport difficulties it was not feasible to convey coal from beyond the Hindu Kush, and he expressed a wish that Mr. Hayden should examine the country west of Ghazni towards Herat for coal. He also consented to Mr. Hayden going to India to obtain equipment for a proper laboratory.

200. Mr. Hayden returned to India in February 1908 on leave; and was then almost at once compelled by ill-health to go to Europe and resign his appointment in Afghanistan. He was of opinion that the Amir no longer took a serious interest in the geological prospects of his country; and he also reported that the position of Europeans in Kabul was unsatisfactory, owing to the unfriendly attitude of Afghan officials towards them. The manner in which Europeans were treated there was most degrading. They were regarded as members of an inferior caste, and were subjected to every conceivable kind of petty annoyance and discourtesy. Information, received from other sources lent some colour to this report. Miss A. H. Bushby who was engaged by the Amir in March 1907 in the capacity of amanuensis and companion to his wives and instructress of his children, and who was dismissed a few days after her arrival in Kabul, stated that the Europeans there were practically prisoners. And Mrs. Van Ingen Winter, the lady doctor, who was dismissed from the Amir's service in February 1908, was said to have been badly treated.

201. The procedure for the payment of the Amir's subsidy which had obtained

**The Amir's subsidy.**

since first the subsidy was granted, had been for the Amir to send letters to the Government of India from time to time, asking that payments might be made to His Highness's agents or other persons specially mentioned. Much inconvenience had resulted from this procedure, owing to the uncertain nature of the Amir's drawings, and it was understood that His Highness was in favour of introducing some simplification of the system. Accordingly, with the approval of the Secretary of State, Lord Minto wrote to the Amir on the 14th May 1906, proposing a scheme which it was thought would meet His Highness's wishes in this respect, while putting an end to the inconvenience referred to. It was proposed to pay into the Bank of Bengal, Calcutta, to the Amir's credit, the subsidy money as it became due, leaving him to draw on it by cheque, each such cheque to be countersigned by the Foreign Secretary before presentation for payment. His Highness was informed that the Bank was prepared to meet, without any extra charge, his cheques at the following towns, *viz.*, Agra, Akyab, Allahabad, Benares, Bombay, Calcutta, Cawnpore, Chittagong, Dacca, Delhi, Hyderabad, Jalpaiguri, Lahore, Lucknow, Moulmein, Nagpur, Patna, Rangoon, and Serajunge. Should His Highness desire any other places to be specially included, an attempt would be made to arrange with the Bank to meet his wishes. His Excellency further said that, if the Amir preferred that cheques on the bank should be signed by his Envoy, there would be no objection to this course and orders would be issued accordingly on receiving His Highness's written authority. The Amir was asked to send an early reply.

202. On the 24th June 1906, the Amir wrote to the Government of India requesting that a sum of Rs. 1,70,000 out of the subsidy might be paid for the purchase of certain machinery required for the Kabul workshops. In this letter, His Highness acknowledged the receipt of Lord Minto's letter of the 14th May, and said that he would consider it, and send a reply later on. But no reply was received, and the Amir continued to draw against the subsidy in the usual way.

203. Some 2½ years later the Amir requested that a sum of Rs. 26,29,549-5-1 might be paid out of His Majesty's subsidy through his Envoy to the Afghan Postmaster at Peshawar, "for the expenses of the Afghan Government." The request was complied with, and the Amir was informed accordingly on the 6th November. On the 7th December, the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, reported that the Amir's Agent at Peshawar had demanded free carriage for conveying the treasure to Landi Kotal, and on the 28th of the same month forwarded a letter from the Agent asking that the whole amount should be left in the Peshawar Treasury for the next six months and drawn against from time to time. The Chief Commissioner remarked that the whole procedure in regard to this large sum of money had been extremely troublesome from the start. In addition to the free carriage, the Agent had demanded free boxes and bags; had done the counting of the money in a very dilatory manner to the great inconvenience of the treasury work; refused to attend more than three times a week; and, when all arrangements were finally made for the despatch of the treasure on the 19th December, he suddenly announced that the transport had not started from Kabul, and the despatch had to be postponed till the 5th of January, the money remaining in the treasury

to the great inconvenience of the British officials. On the 1st January, the Chief Commissioner reported that the Agent had received a *farman* from the Amir ordering him to remove the whole treasure himself on the 5th January and to take it to Kabul, and that this had been arranged.

204. This incident revived the question of the inconvenience resulting from the existing procedure for the payment of the Amir's subsidy, regarding which His Excellency the Viceroy had written to His Majesty on the 14th May 1906. Accordingly, on the 26th January 1909, His Excellency again wrote to the Amir, reminding him of the previous correspondence, and suggesting that the arrangement proposed in 1906 might conveniently be brought into effect from the 1st April 1909. His Majesty replied on the 11th February 1909, and enquired whether the Government of India would be responsible to the Afghan Government for any loss of the subsidy money while in the Bank; whether, under the proposed arrangement, any delay was likely to occur in meeting urgent demands for payment out of the subsidy money, and whether the Bank would pay interest at current rates. On the 16th March, it was explained to the Amir that the Bank had raised difficulties, and was unable to meet what it was understood were His Majesty's wishes. In the circumstances, it was not proposed to pursue the matter, and the Government of India were quite content that the existing arrangements for the payment of the subsidy should continue.

205. In June 1906, suspicion having been aroused by the movements of one Amir Abdulla, who wished to visit Kabul, and had applied to the Afghan Envoy for a passport for that purpose, enquiries were made from which it appeared that Amir Abdulla, while posing as a commercial envoy of the Emperor Menelik of Abyssinia, was really the bearer of a message from the Mulla and notables of Somaliland, to the Amir, whom they proposed to recognise as *Khalifa* and who was to be asked to authorise a *jihad* by the Somalis, and to provide gunsmiths for them. It also transpired that the Amir had sent his Envoy a *firman* permitting Amir Abdulla to visit Kabul, and directing that he should be described as an ordinary trader and not as a political emissary. It appeared to the Government of India that Amir Abdulla was a dangerous person, and he was accordingly, with the approval of the Secretary of State, removed from British India and sent *viâ* Aden to Harrar. The Government of India did not consider it necessary to make any direct communication to the Amir on the subject of Amir Abdulla's deportation, as they had reason to suppose that their action would be satisfactorily explained to His Highness by his Envoy.

206. Other incidents of a similar character had occurred which had some bearing on the attitude adopted by the Amir towards such emissaries. The Government of India accordingly addressed the Secretary of State in a despatch, dated the 27th September 1906, mentioning the names of certain persons who had visited Kabul from Turkey and Baghdad. It was observed that there might be nothing serious in these visits. On the other hand, it was quite possible that the Sultan might be intriguing with the Amir, who, there was reason to believe, did not discourage such advances, and whose intimacy with one of the persons, named Mir Hassan Effendi, a brother of the Nakib of Baghdad, was somewhat significant. On the whole, however, the Government of India had decided, in the absence of any proof of the political character of these emissaries, not to make any formal reference on the subject to the Amir, who would learn from the action which had been taken in the case of Amir Abdulla that the Government of India were on their guard against any signs of political correspondence between himself and Foreign Powers in contravention of his treaty obligations.

207. In a despatch, dated the 26th October 1906, the Secretary of State approved of the Government of India's resolution to make no reference to the Amir, and recognised that the question was one that might require very delicate treatment. Should circumstances arise to induce the Government of India to consider further the advisability of addressing the Amir, Mr. Morley requested that he might be informed of the course of their deliberations before steps were taken to give effect to them.

208. In January 1910 Major Tyrrell, Military Attaché at the British Embassy at Constantinople reported that he was convinced that there was an idea among the

extremists of the young Turk party to depute officers to preach "a sort of Neo-pagan-Islamism" in Asia, and specially in Afghanistan.

200. In December 1908, the following information was supplied by the North-West Frontier Province. An idea of introducing efficient Turks into Afghanistan for employment in posts of responsibility and

**Employment of Turks in Kabul.**

trust had originated with Sardar Nasrulla Khan and been approved by the Amir. The Sardar preferred Turks to natives of India, and the Amir was inclined to share his views. It was intended that the Turkish element should be brought into Afghan service gradually and in a limited measure, so as to avoid exciting the jealousy of Afghan officials in Kabul, and should only be confined to training purposes. There was no intention of employing Turks permanently either in the Military or Civil Department; when Afghans had been trained, the Turks employed for training purposes would be discharged.

210. On the 7th January 1909, Major P. M. Sykes, His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General and Agent of the Government of India in Khorasan, wrote to the Government of India, referring to reports which he had made of the visit of Turks from Constantinople to the Court of the Amir, where they were given high posts. Major Sykes thought that, under the altered conditions which prevailed, the employment of Turkish subjects might be made "a most valuable instrument for the sorely needed education of the Afghan ruling class." He suggested that the Turkish Government should be confidentially approached to arrange to send selected officers to Kabul. As Afghans looked to the *Khalifa* alone with any readiness, this matter could, Major Sykes thought, be arranged, even if the Turks had been engaged privately, for the reason that the Turkish Government would feel its prestige and influence augmented by adopting such a course. Major Sykes was of opinion that, unless the leaders of the Afghan people were educated to adopt saner and more reasonable views, "an explosion" was only a matter of time, and it seemed to him at least possible that the regenerate Turk might well be the teacher of his fellow Sunnis, and cause a strong revulsion of feeling in favour of the English nation. The Government of India informed Major Sykes that they were of opinion that it was not practicable to give effect to his suggestion, and that the disadvantages inherent in such a course of action would quite outweigh any advantages that might accrue therefrom.

211. In December 1909, nine Turkish officers were stated, according to a report in the Russian Press, to be about to proceed to Afghanistan, at the request of the Amir to reorganise the Afghan army; and shortly afterwards six Turks, including, it was said, a doctor and three officers of artillery, were reported to have actually arrived at Kabul.

212. In July 1907, the Agent to the Governor-General forwarded a representation from the English clergy and missionaries of Quetta regarding the

**Ill-treatment in Afghanistan of a Native Christian of Quetta.**

alleged ill-treatment in Afghanistan of a native Christian of a village near Quetta. He had shown signs of weak intellect for some time, and the medical officer of the Church Missionary Society reported that his symptoms indicated brain fever. He wandered off towards Kandahar in March 1907, was arrested at Baldak, and after long confinement there was sent to Kandahar. Various reports of his ill-treatment reached the Church Missionary Society, and on this being brought to notice, enquiries were made regarding him from the British Representative at Kandahar, whose accounts of the affair showed that the reports of Abdul Karim's severe ill-treatment were not unfounded, and that he was sent to Kabul in June.

213. On the 8th August 1907, the Viceroy wrote to the Amir, stating the particulars of the case as reported. His Excellency said that he was unaware what charges might have been brought against this unfortunate person, but an assurance had been received from the doctor attached to the Church Missionary Society that Kazi Abdul Karim was undoubtedly of unsound mind. The Amir was, therefore, requested to direct that Abdul Karim should be brought to the British border and handed over to the British frontier officers, when steps would be taken to have him carefully looked after in future. Subsequently reports were received that

Abdul Karim was in a sad condition at Kabul, where he was kept in chains, and threatened with torture, and even death, unless he renounced the Christian faith. This he declined to do, and died in the Sherpur jail on the 12th July 1907. The Amir, in replying to the Viceroy's letter on the 29th September, said:—

“ When I made an enquiry from the Governor of Kandahar regarding Kazi Abdul Karim, he represented to me that, as the said Kazi had entered Afghan territory without a Government paper or passport, he had sent him to Kabul. On the road to Kabul the Kazi became ill, and on his arrival at Kabul he was overtaken by fate, and died a natural death. Therefore, as he is now dead, I write and inform Your Excellency that he died a natural death.”

214. Sardar Ayub Khan, the victor of Maiwand, came to India originally in 1887 under an agreement with the Government of India to be allowed to live at Rawal Pindi and Murree as an “ honoured guest.” During Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty, the Sardar's place of residence was changed from Rawalpindi and Murree to Dharmsala and subsequently to Lahore; and the Sardar in consideration of this modification of the original agreement with him, was granted an increase to his allowances of Rs. 12,000 a year.

215. On the 22nd April 1907, Major J. F. Whyte, Political Officer with Sardar Muhammad Ayub Khan, revived the question of the Sardar's place of residence. He represented that the Sardar would like to live at Lahore during the winter and go to Murree for the summer, and continue to draw the extra allowance of Rs. 12,000 a year which was granted to him in 1902 in consideration of his change of residence. The Political Officer, however, thought that this would be an unreasonable proposal, and that the Sardar would no longer have any grounds of complaint if he was allowed to live at Rawalpindi and Murree, in accordance with his original agreement with Government in 1887. It was suggested that the Amir might be disposed to acquiesce in this arrangement.

216. The Political Officer was informed on the 13th May 1907 that the Government of India declined to allow Sardar Ayub Khan to resume residence either at Rawal Pindi or at Murree, and that they looked to the Political Officer to make this quite clear to the Sardar. Major Whyte was also told that he should at the same time do everything in his power to minimize the Sardar's disappointment, and to reconcile him to the decision of Government.

217. With reference to the remark that the Amir might acquiesce in the Sardar and his family being allowed to return to Rawalpindi and Murree, the Political Officer was informed confidentially that in March 1906, the Amir had written strongly on the subject, and said that if permission were granted to Ayub Khan to reside at Murree or Rawalpindi, he (the Amir) would be obliged to make a complaint to Government. Again, at Agra in January 1907, the Amir had written privately to the Foreign Secretary (Sir L. Dane) expressing astonishment at Ayub Khan having been allowed to leave Lahore just at the time of his own visit. In these circumstances, it was not likely that the Amir would acquiesce in the proposal put forward, and the Government of India were not prepared to address him on the subject.

218. In April 1909 on the occasion of Lord Minto's visit to Lahore, Sardar Ayub Khan was invited, with His Excellency's permission, to luncheon at Government House, Lahore, by the Lieutenant Governor. The Sardar discussed no business nor made any sort of request to His Excellency. He subsequently expressed himself as extremely pleased with the manner in which His Excellency had received him.

219. In February 1909, Sardar Ayub Khan put forward quite unexpectedly a formal request to the Viceroy to be allowed, while foregoing all his allowances and other assistance from Government, to withdraw himself and party from India, and pass the rest of his days as a free man wherever his fancy might lead him. The Sardar undertook not to proceed in the direction of the frontiers of India abutting on Afghanistan.



220. The Sardar was informed that His Excellency regretted he could not accede to the request which had caused him much surprise. Lord Minto, however, thought that possibly there might be grounds, unknown to His Excellency, which had prompted the Sardar to put forward his request; and he was accordingly invited to represent fully what he had in his mind for the consideration of Government.

221. The Sardar thereupon (May 24th) put forward three requests, which briefly stated were as follows:—

- (1) that a secret promise be given him, that if occasion arose, he would be made use of in Afghanistan by the Government of India;
- (2) that he should be allowed to reside, as formerly, at Rawal Pindi and Murree;
- (3) that some suitable provision should be made for his sons.

222. The first request, he said, was his main request; the other two were of less importance.

223. The Political Officer with Ayub Khan, Major Windham, thought the Sardar, in view of his general shrewdness, and long residence and experience of affairs in India, could not possibly be serious about his first two requests, which were merely revivals of old questions deliberately decided in the negative by the Government of India some years previously; and gave it as his opinion that the Sardar's real wish was contained in his third request—*viz.* a provision for his sons. On this point the Political Officer pleaded for favourable consideration of the Sardar's case. The Sardar had now completed twenty-one years as a refugee in a foreign land; and had throughout loyally performed his obligations towards Government and given them what might fairly be called a minimum of trouble; in fact in 1902 the Viceroy had formally expressed to the Sardar, His Excellency's "appreciation of the loyalty and good faith with which he had observed for fifteen years the terms of the agreement made with him at the time of his transfer to India"; it was perhaps therefore generous to think that Government might now express their appreciation of the Sardar's conduct in some tangible form. The long period of his sojourn in India had of course brought to him many changes and unforeseen circumstances. He had come to India originally with one son; he now had twelve, ranging in age from twenty-one down to eight years, who were costing him a great deal of money.

224. The Government of India accepted these views (October 14th, 1909). They were quite unable, they said, to comply with the Sardar's first two requests; but they thought it was "politically most desirable to keep the Sardar contented," and they quite realised that owing to his growing family, his expenses had increased; and they accordingly sanctioned an increase of Rs. 1,000 a month to the allowance of Rs. 7,500 a month which the Sardar already enjoyed.

225. These proceedings were approved by the Secretary of State.

Sardar Musa Jan, eldest son of the ex-Amir Yakub Khan of Kabul, who had cut himself adrift from his creed and countrymen, and had adopted European dress and habits, was allowed in 1907 to

**Sardar Musa Jan's visit to England.**  
pay a short visit to England, privately at his own expense, in order to arrange for the education of his daughters. The Sardar was accompanied by his wife, and his five daughters.

226. After placing four of the latter at a girls' school at Eastbourne, the Sardar and his wife and remaining daughter returned to India. He was reported by the India Office to have conducted himself in a most becoming manner in England, and to have been much liked by those with whom he had been brought into contact.

227. In the spring of 1909 the Sardar asked to be allowed to return to England, with his wife and daughter; and his request was granted. He sailed on 15th May from Bombay. While at home he asked for an increase to his stipend of Rs. 1,600 a month, which he received from Indian revenues; but Lord Morley refused the request. He also asked to be allowed to reside permanently in England; but it was considered that his present mode of living in England was in excess of his ostensible

means, and likely to land him in debt and difficulties; he was accordingly advised to place himself in the hands of the Political Aide-de-Camp at the India Office, and regulate his expenses according to such advice as would be given him, otherwise the Secretary of State would probably advise the Viceroy that it would not be desirable to allow him to reside permanently in England.

228. The Sardar, however refused altogether to reduce the expenditure he was incurring on his daughters' education, or to alter his present style of living in England.

229. But before any decision was come to by the Secretary of State in regard to the question of Sardar Musa's permanent residence in England, Sardar Musa returned of his own accord to India in January 1910.

230. In March 1910, Major Windham wrote saying that Sardar Musa Jan had a letter from Colonel Sir Charles FitzGerald, formerly of the Hyderabad Contingent, to Colonel Sir Afsar-ul-Mulk, Commander-in-Chief of the Nizam's forces, and wished to go to Hyderabad to present the letter with a view to obtaining employment in that State. As an essential preliminary to his securing employment, Major Windham suggested that the Sardar should be provided with some sort of credentials to show who he was, and that he had gone to Hyderabad with the knowledge and consent of the Government of India. The Resident at Hyderabad, who was consulted, replied that he had no objection to Sardar Musa Jan presenting the letter of introduction, but that it should be made quite clear to him that neither the Government of India nor the Resident could recommend him for employment in the State. Major Windham was informed accordingly and told, in the event of the Sardar asking for a letter of introduction, to inform him that it was not customary to grant one.

231. In May 1910, the Sardar came to Simla and submitted an application to the Foreign Office asking for exemption from payment of income-tax in England, whither he wished to return shortly. In 1890 he had preferred a similar request, but was informed through the Political Officer that it could not be entertained and that the decision was final. In replying to his present application Sardar Musa Jan was reminded of this previous ruling, and informed that the Government of India regretted that they were unable to grant the exemption asked for. Permission was, however, granted him to return to England on the understanding that he would abide by the advice which had been given him on the occasion of his last visit to that country by the Political Aid-de-Camp at the India Office to curtail his expenditure and live within his income. Up to the end of July 1910 nothing had been heard as to whether the Sardar had proceeded to England.

232. Mr. G. Fleischer, a German subject, who was in the Amir's employ as Superintendent of His Highness's arms factories, was shot, by the commander of his Afghan escort near Dakka, while on his way to India in 1904. The murder was due to a quarrel which arose in consequence of abusive language used by Mr. Fleischer to the commander, Naib Risaldar Abdul Karim Khan.

233. The latter was executed at Dakka under the orders of the Amir, who expressed himself as much grieved at the occurrence, and signified his intention of offering Mrs. Fleischer a pension in favour of her son, until the boy came of age. Some delay occurred in the payment of the pension, with the result that the German Consul-General signified that he had received instructions to ask the Government of India to help to bring the case to a speedy settlement.

234. On the 15th April 1907, the Viceroy wrote to the Amir, informing him that, with a view to a definite settlement of this case, the German Government had suggested that Mrs. Fleischer be granted a lump sum of £5,000. His Excellency while thinking that this sum was larger than the strict fulfilment of the Amir's promise required suggested that he should pay £3,000 in full settlement of all claims by Mrs. Fleischer against the Afghan Government. The Amir replied on the 29th May, acquiescing in this proposal; but he maintained that the heirs of the late Mr. Fleischer had no claim as of right to blood-money or compensation, and he wished it to be clearly understood that the payment must be regarded as a free gift, in consideration of his sympathy and compassion for them. The Viceroy, in acknowledging with thanks the Amir's letter, informed him that Mrs.



Fleischer had accepted, with an expression of her gratitude, the amount which he had been pleased to grant her, and that, it had been made clear that the payment was a free gift, and was not made as compensation or blood-money.

235. This case originated during the administration of Lord Curzon. Certain gun-forgings were imported under the orders of the late Amir, by Messrs J. Buchanan Guthrie & Co., for despatch to Kabul in 1901: for political reasons, the Government of India ordered their detention, and they were placed in the Peshawar Fort, where they still remain. The matter had in the past been the subject of considerable correspondence, but nothing transpired during Lord Minto's administration until April 1906, when Mr. T. F. Guthrie enquired whether any move was being made with a view to a settlement of his accounts with the Amir. Mr. Guthrie alleged that his business with the Amir had been broken up by the action of the Government of India in forcibly taking from him the 200 mountain gun-forgings which he had stored in his own godowns in Peshawar, and as the Government of India had interfered with his commercial arrangements with the Amir, Mr. Guthrie asked that the Government might still further interfere and assist him to recover from His Highness the heavy amounts outstanding on account of both salary and goods supplied. He also asked for payment for the gun-forgings.

236. In reply, on the 19th May, the Government of India drew Mr. Guthrie's attention to previous correspondence in which it was stated that the Government of India could not entertain the proposal that they should pay for the gun-forgings; that they were not concerned with the firm's other claims against the Amir; and that they disclaimed all responsibility whatever for the stoppage of the firm's business with His Highness, and for any loss which the firm might sustain through the action of the Government in respect of the consignments of warlike material. In conclusion, the Government of India said that they saw no reason for modifying this decision.

237. Later Mr. Guthrie asked if he might approach the Amir in the matter on the occasion of His Highness's approaching visit to India. This request the Government of India conceded, on the understanding that His Highness agreed, and that nothing was done to interfere with his comfort while he was the guest of Government. Mr. Guthrie's agent did not, however, approach the Amir at Peshawar, and although the former wrote twice to the Afghan Envoy asking him to call and discuss Messrs. Guthrie's claim, the Envoy did not comply with the request.

238. On the 24th January 1907, His Majesty's Secretary of State in a telegram to the Government of India asked whether it would be possible for Sir H. McMahon to explain the position to the Amir and ascertain if he was willing to take over the gun-forgings. There could be no question as to their having been ordered by the late Amir, and as there was now no objection to their delivery, possibly His Highness might still be willing to take them. In replying the Government of India pointed out that, in accordance with the instructions of the Home Government, they had carefully abstained from discussing business with the Amir in India, and that if they were to mention Messrs. Guthrie's case they would probably be compelled to take up other similar cases. The Amir knew that the forgings were at his disposal, at any time, but he had never claimed them, and had repudiated any liability to the firm on his own account. The matter had been mentioned to the Itimad-ud-Doula by Sir L. Dane at Kabul in March 1905 when a promise was made that the affair would be settled. The Government of India further stated that it might involve them in trouble with Messrs. Guthrie & Co., if the Amir were given the forgings before he settled accounts with the firm. They were, therefore, averse from raising the question again before the Amir left India. The Secretary of State replied that he agreed in the views expressed by the Government of India, and was informing Messrs. Guthrie in accordance therewith.

239. The Amir returned to Afghanistan in March, and, on the 3rd May 1907, the Secretary of State addressed the Government of India, with a view to a further attempt being made to arrive at a settlement. He considered that the best solution of the question was for the Government of India to purchase the forgings.

The only alternative was to inform the Amir that the goods were still lying at Peshawar, and to ask him whether he wished to take delivery of them. The Secretary of State thought that this course was open to the objection that the Amir might regard the action as reopening a controversy. The Government of India replied on the 7th June that the military authorities were unable to make use of the forgings. In these circumstances, it was proposed to adopt the alternative of addressing the Amir. It was explained to the Secretary of State that the action would hardly amount to a controversy, as long as the communication referred only to the forgings, and not to Guthrie and Co.'s other claims. On the 19th June, the Secretary of State gave his assent to this proposal, but directed that the communication to the Amir should be limited to the subject of the forgings, and that it should be so worded as to make it clear that there was no desire on the part of the Government of India to influence his decision.

240. On the 5th July 1908, His Excellency the Viceroy wrote to the Amir stating the facts of the case and informing him that Messrs. Guthrie & Co. had again addressed the Secretary of State representing the grave pecuniary difficulties into which they had been plunged over the transaction. The Amir was, therefore, asked to inform the Government of India what answer should be sent to the firm. The Amir replied on the 11th September that he was then touring in his dominions, and that, on his return to Kabul at the termination of the tour, he would send an answer regarding this business. No answer has been received.

241. In July 1906, Messrs. Martin & Co., Contractors and Architects, Calcutta, drew the attention of the Government of India to the fact that in the year 1900 the Amir of Afghanistan applied to the Government of India for help and advice in the matter of the long outstanding accounts between the Government of Afghanistan and their firm. Accordingly, in March of that year Messrs. Lovelock and Lewes, Chartered Accountants, Calcutta, had been appointed to investigate the accounts with the object of submitting an authenticated statement. All books and papers had been made over to the accountants. The audit was duly completed, and a report had been submitted to the Government of India on the 26th February 1901. In that report a history of the case, as disclosed by the agreements and papers made over to the accountants, was given, which showed that the firm's transactions with the Government of Afghanistan were regulated by an agreement, dated the 6th August 1891, and were in respect of the supply of machinery and materials, and also in respect of certain expenditure which had been incurred in England on behalf of Sardar Nasrulla Khan in 1895, and, under written orders from the Amir, had been included in the general accounts against the Government of Afghanistan. Messrs. Martin & Co. further pointed out that the Amir had stated that his desire was to come to a settlement with the firm, and that whatever was certified to be due to them by the accountants nominated by the Government of India would be forthwith paid. The present Amir on coming to the throne stated in writing that whatever had been promised by his father, the late Amir, would be fulfilled by himself, and that the accounts would be paid. The time had come when the firm felt it incumbent upon them to seek the advice of the Government of India, as the promises of payment had not been kept and none of the letters, which they had addressed to the Amir during the year 1906, had been acknowledged.

242. The Government of India replied, on the 20th August 1906, that the Amir's Envoy, to whom the matter had been referred, stated that the examination by Messrs. Lovelock and Lewes of the accounts submitted to them in 1900 was not complete, as they had not examined certain papers and accounts, which the Envoy had made over to them; that the decision was a one-sided one; and that the Amir was waiting for further information from the firm in regard to certain items of dispute, which had been referred to them by the Envoy for explanation. The Government of India, while unable to undertake any responsibility for the settlement of the firm's claim, expressed their willingness to give such assistance as might be reasonably expected from them towards removing the misunderstanding which appeared to have arisen between the firm and the Amir, as soon as the points in dispute had been settled.

243. On the 1st September, Messrs. Martin & Co. forwarded an explanation from Messrs. Lovelock and Lewes repudiating the statements made by the Envoy, and

contended that everything possible had been done both by the accountants and themselves to give effect to the orders conveyed for a thorough examination of their accounts. The Envoy, on being informed of the purport of the reply received from Messrs. Martin & Co., adhered to his opinion that the decision of the accountants was a one-sided one, and signified his intention of personally calling on the firm to discuss matters with a view to arriving at a settlement. The Envoy's letter having been communicated to Messrs. Martin & Co., the latter said that they could not attach any importance to the Envoy's promise, as if he had had any authority or wish to come to a settlement, he would have taken steps long ago to do so. The Envoy was the last person from whom the firm would expect to obtain satisfaction, and discussing matters with him would only prolong the business still further, and place the firm at a greater distance from a settlement than ever; Messrs. Martin & Co., therefore, asked whether the Government of India would represent their case to His Highness direct and acquaint them of his decision. If, for political reasons, such action could not be taken, they would consider themselves at liberty to decide whether it would not be possible to force the Amir to take some notice of their claims by an appeal through the Chamber of Commerce, or, by an exposure in the public press, to bring the matter prominently before the trading community of India.

244. The Government of India replied on the 21st November 1906 that they were unable to make any direct representation to the Amir on behalf of the firm. In view, however, of the latter's belief that their communications were withheld from the Amir, the Government of India would, as a special case, undertake to have a letter written by the firm delivered personally to His Highness through the British Agent at Kabul. Messrs. Martin & Co., accordingly, prepared a letter and sent it to the Government of India for transmission to Kabul. The Amir received the communication in December through the British Agent at Kabul, and, after reading it, said that the claims would be considered after his return from India. No further communication from the Amir having been received, Messrs. Martin & Co. addressed the Government of India again in September 1907 requesting that the Amir might be reminded of the promise made by him in December 1906 to consider the firm's claims on his return to Kabul from India. The British Agent at Kabul was instructed on the 25th September to inform the Amir on some convenient occasion of this further communication from Messrs. Martin & Co., and to enquire from His Majesty what answer should be returned to the firm. The Amir was at that time touring in his own country; and the British Agent addressed a letter to him on the 14th October in pursuance of the Government of India's instructions. But no reply was received to this communication, and Messrs. Martin & Co. again approached the Government of India in the matter, with the result that His Excellency wrote to the Amir on the 30th March 1910, informing him of this further representation from the firm and asking to be informed of His Majesty's decision in the case. But no reply has been received.

245. In November 1906, it was reported that Khan Bahadur Mian Rahim Shah, Mian Rahim Shah, Kaka Khel; and the Kaka Khel, had been negotiating with the timber contract in Kafiristan. Hakim of Kafiristan, for the timber contract in that country, and had received a *firman* from Sardar Nasrulla Khan authorising him to proceed to Kabul to conclude preliminary arrangements. Mian Rahim Shah was at one time the principal contractor for the forests in Dir, and, in consequence of the reckless and wasteful manner in which he had been destroying those valuable forests regardless of everything but his own profit, he was expelled from Dir under severe penalties in the event of his attempting to return there. On the 19th December, the Viceroy wrote to the Amir bringing these facts to His Highness's notice, and saying that before sanction was given to Mian Rahim Shah to proceed to Kabul, His Excellency regarded it as a duty in the interests of friendship to acquaint His Highness with the Mian's antecedents. If His Highness should, in spite of the information conveyed to him, still wish that Rahim Shah should proceed to Kabul, the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province would be instructed to put no obstacle in his way; but, meanwhile, orders had been issued that the Mian must not be allowed to cross the frontier.

246. The Amir replied on the 2nd January 1907 expressing his obligations for the information supplied and the action taken in preventing the Mian from going to

**Afghanistan.** His Highness had, however, no intention of giving any contract for the Kafirstan forests, and he had decided that the Mian should not go to Afghanistan.

247. In March 1909 the Afghan Envoy forwarded a letter (addressed to him by the Amir) regarding the arrest at Kabul of Counterfeiting of Afghan coins in British India. an Afghan subject in possession of Kabuli and Persian counterfeit coins, which he alleged had been manufactured in Calcutta. The case was sent to the Criminal Intelligence Department, with the result that 1,218 Kabuli counterfeit rupees were seized in Calcutta, and two Punjabis—Atta Muhammad and Nazir Ali—were sentenced on 21st August 1909 to rigorous imprisonment for one and three years respectively. A third accused in the case was discharged.

248. In February 1910 a second case of the same nature occurred, and the Calcutta Police succeeded in obtaining the conviction of one Sheikh Hummat for being in possession of counterfeit Kabuli coins. He was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment.

249. In addition to these cases the Baluchistan authorities also succeeded in arresting at Quetta three Afghan traders, who had sold a large number of counterfeit Kabuli rupees. The men were found guilty, and each sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000, or in default to a further term of six months' imprisonment.

250. In April 1910 the Amir addressed the Foreign Secretary referring to one or two specific cases of reported illegal coinage of Kabuli rupees in Calcutta, and asking the Government of India to "award such punishment as may uproot this evil and put a stop to such acts." In reply His Majesty was informed (August 2, 1910) in the sense of the information given above, regarding the action that had been taken in Calcutta, and was assured that "every effort will continue to be made to detect and punish persons guilty of this offence."

251. In October 1909, on the statement of a Turk recently released from jail in Kabul, the Russian Government represented to His Majesty's Government that five Russian subjects, imprisoned without trial, had been in confinement for over three years. One of these men was said to have been imprisoned for thirteen years. The Russian Government asked that information on the subject might be obtained, and measures taken to secure the release of these men.

252. The Viceroy accordingly addressed the Amir by *Kharita* (November 13) informing him of the Russian Government's statement, and asking for information regarding the men in question; and His Excellency added that if the facts were as stated, he trusted that, in view of the long terms of imprisonment which the men had already undergone, His Majesty would take their cases into favourable consideration and sanction their early release.

253. The British Agent at Kabul was also told of the matter, and asked if he knew anything about the men in question. In March 1910 he reported that two of the men had died, one had been discharged, and two still remained in confinement.

254. The Amir, however, never replied to His Excellency's letter, until reminded on the 7th March 1910, when he wrote (April 3) saying that owing to the extraordinary cold recently experienced in Kabul, nothing had yet been done; but giving an assurance that the cases of the men in question would now be tried according to rule, and the result communicated.

255. On the 2nd May the Viceroy wrote again to the Amir, asking for a decision of the question at His Majesty's earliest convenience. No reply had been received from the Amir up to the end of July 1910.

256. This matter is sufficiently explained by the following letter addressed by His Excellency to the Amir on the 29th October 1909:—

Correspondence with the Amir regarding certain refugee Marwats of Bannu residing at Kabul.

"I write to acknowledge the receipt of Your Majesty's letter No. 122, dated the 10th Ramazan 1327 Hijra, corresponding to the 26th September 1909, in which

Your Majesty asks that certain persons of Bannu and Marwat, temporarily residing in Kabul, may be accorded a letter of recommendation to the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu, so that when they proceed to their homes to fetch their families and near relatives with a view to settling in Afghanistan, they may not be molested.

□ On receipt of Your Majesty's letter, I addressed the Chief Commissioner in the North-West Frontier Province, who reports that the persons named are disloyal subjects of the British Government, and that some of them are offenders already liable to arrest on criminal counts.

The leader of the party, Haji Siryani, whom Your Majesty mentions, is a notorious evil-doer in the Bannu district, where he is generally known as Malik Surana. During his stay at Kabul, he has been persistently sending inflammatory messages to his own tribe, the Marwats, and also to the Mahsuds and Wazirs. On the departure of the Malik to Kabul with his sons and nephews, orders were issued in Bannu laying an embargo on their immovable property, and it is probably because of this that he has asked for Your Majesty's intervention.

Dost Muhammad, who is also mentioned in Your Majesty's letter, is a deserter from the Northern Waziristan Militia, and is liable to arrest if ever found in British territory. This man is a nephew of Malik Surana, and it is well known that it was the influence of the latter which induced Dost Muhammad and his brother Resaldar Sher Ali Khan to prove faithless to the Government they were serving. Some of the other persons mentioned in Your Majesty's letter have not yet been identified, but the majority consist of Malik Surana's relations and followers, orders for whose arrest, if ever they visit British territory, have already been issued.

Your Majesty will see that there are grave objections to these persons being granted permission to revisit their homes, and I much regret that I am unable to meet Your Majesty's wishes, greatly as I should have been pleased to do so, in other circumstances."

257. In April 1910 a letter was received from the Afghan Envoy representing

Expulsion from Killa Abdulla of certain employees of the Amir's Agent at Karachi.

that certain employees of Dost Muhammad Khan, the Amir's Agent at Karachi, had been expelled from Killa Abdulla in the

Baluchistan Agency.

258. The following reply was sent to the Envoy on the 27th June:—"Enquiries have been made from the Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, who writes that orders were issued for the removal of these men, because there was good reason to believe that Dost Muhammad Khan had been granted a contract for the collection of Afghan customs duties on the Kandahar-Chaman border, and was about to place Afghan Customs Agents at Killa Abdulla and Chaman. Dost Muhammad Khan has now explained that he requires the services of the two men in connection with his private business, and the Agent to the Governor-General has authorised their re-employment on the distinct condition that they are engaged for private trade only. The Government of India cannot allow the collection in British territory of any Afghan State dues whatsoever, and should Dost Muhammad Khan's servants attempt to levy such dues, or interfere with other traders in any way, they will not be allowed to remain either at Killa Abdulla or Chaman."

259. On the occasion of the death of His Majesty King Edward the Seventh

Death of His Majesty King Edward VII.

on the 6th May 1910, His Excellency Lord Minto on the following day directed that the following message should be communicated to the Amir through the Political Agent in the Khyber, by the quickest means at his disposal.

"It is my painful duty to have to announce to Your Majesty the death on the 6th May, after an illness of only two or three days, of the august Sovereign of the British Empire, King Edward VII, Emperor of India. I am confident that this sad intelligence will be received by Your Majesty with a sorrow as profound as that which the death of my Sovereign has excited amongst his friends and allies throughout the world."

260. And five days later His Excellency informed the Amir through the same channel of the proclamation of His Most Gracious Majesty King George the Fifth as King of Great Britain and Ireland and Emperor of India.

261. The Amir replied to both these communications by letter. Regarding the earlier His Majesty expressed his sorrow at the sad news, and asked the Viceroy to telegraph his sympathy to His Majesty the King and the Royal Family ; and regarding the later communication, His Majesty wrote that the news contained in it had made him greatly pleased ; and that he hoped His Majesty the King would be the friend of his friends, as His Majesty King Edward VII had been.

262. Both these messages from the Amir were communicated to the Secretary of State, and subsequently, at His Majesty the King Emperor's request, the Amir was thanked in suitable terms for the same.

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263. The following matters, with which Afghanistan is concerned, have as a matter of convenience, been dealt with elsewhere, as indicated below :—

- (1) The Seistan Water Award (Seistan Summary).
- (2) Traffic in arms from the Persian Gulf (Persian Gulf Summary).
- (3) The Zakha Khel Expedition (North-West Frontier Summary).
- (4) The Mohmand disturbances and expedition (North-West Frontier Summary).
- (5) The Kabul River Railway (North-West Frontier Summary).
- (6) The Kharlachi Incident (North-West Frontier Summary).



## APPENDIX I.

## MEMORANDUM BY SIR LOUIS DANE, FOREIGN SECRETARY, OF HIS INTERVIEW WITH THE AMIR HABIBULLA KHAN ON THE 9TH FEBRUARY 1907.

"Yesterday, the 8th of February, I received a message from Sir H. McMahon that the Amir wished to see me this morning in regard to some matter connected with his arms. With the permission of His Excellency I waited on the Amir accordingly. He received me in a very friendly manner, and took me to his private study where we sat and talked from 9-30 to 11-15 A.M. Only Azimulla Khan was present. The point on which he wished to see me was the inspection of the arms which he is going to purchase in England. He suggested that the best way of meeting the difficulty about opening the cases for the Customs in India would be that Custom Officers should see the cases closed up at the factory and seal them there. It would then be unnecessary to open them at all in India. I told him that this was practically the suggestion made by His Majesty's Government, and that as he now expressed his concurrence in the measures proposed, they would be put into force. The Amir went on to say:—"I have another object in view. Afghanistan is the bulwark and shield of India, and I am sure that, now your Government has confidence in me as shown by the way in which they have treated me during my tour in India, they will be anxious that the arms placed in the hands of my troops should be of the best quality, so that they may be of some real use for the defence of Afghanistan and India. I want you to obtain the sanction of Government to the examination and testing of all arms purchased by me in England by the same experts as are employed to test arms made by or purchased for the British Government. The testing could presumably be arranged at the manufactory. The officer would test 10 per cent. or as large a proportion as is customary in the case of arms purchased for Government. The test should extend not only to the quality of the materials used in making the weapons, but also to the character of the shooting. Similar tests should be applied in the case of all ammunition purchased by me, as I propose to secure cordite ammunition, and am very anxious that only the best quality of cordite should be employed, and that the bullets should not be Dum-Dum or soft-nosed or any other character to which objection could be taken. The Amir said that he was very anxious for an early decision on this point, as he had selected a pattern of weapon and proposed, if possible, to place a large order in Bombay. He added that he was prepared to pay the fees for the experts employed, or anything up to Rs. 2 a rifle for testing. I pointed out the danger of keeping cordite as shown by the Multan and Ferozepur explosions. He said—"I know this, but the cartridges which I have had for 12 years in Kabul are all right, and I am quite prepared to take this risk." I then said we would if the arrangement is approved, do our best to secure full tests, but could not accept any liability for results. He replied, do as you would do for yourself. That is enough for me." I told him that I would put the matter before His Excellency as soon as possible.

"His Majesty the Amir, in addition to talking over the question of the testing of arms purchased by him in England, spoke to me about a good many other subjects.

"He said that he had been immensely pleased by the kindness shown to him by everybody in India, from the Viceroy downwards, and that if his friendship for the British Government before his coming had been only as great as a mosquito, it was now as strong as an elephant; if before it had been a native lamp, it was now a sun. He promised that on his return to Kabul he would do his best to explain the real position of affairs in India to his people, and he hoped that in time he would be able to give them a more correct idea of what the English were really like. He said that at any rate one thing was certain, that as long as he is alive his friendship to the British Government will be so close that it will be quite impossible for any third person to come between them. *A propos* of this, he said that some years ago an Afghan subject was arrested as a spy by the Russians on the Pamirs, and goods to the value of Rs. 20,000 had been taken from him. On his complaining to the late Amir Abdur Rahman gave him Rs. 20,000 compensation and represented the case to the British Government. Recently three letters had been sent by the Russian authorities to his employes about this case. One was sent to Haji Gul Khan, Commandant in Badakhshan, and two others were sent to his Agents in Bokhara for the purchase of skins. In these letters the Russians said that they had found that the Afghan merchant was not a spy, and that the value of the property taken from him was lying at the Bokhara treasury, and could be taken by the Amir at any time. He had compensation paid to the merchant and so the money was his. The Amir said:—"As you know, I have promised that I will have no dealings whatever of any kind with the Russian Government except through the British Government. I have therefore sent no answer to these letters, and if I decide to proceed any further in the matter, I should probably either ask you to act or merely send word that I have referred the case to the British Government, and that it rests with them to act on my behalf." I understood from the Amir, though he did not actually say so much in so many words, that he had no desire to alter his arrangements about dealings with the Russians, and I therefore did not consider it advisable on this the last day of his stay in Calcutta, to raise the question. I merely thanked him for the information that he had given, and said that it



seemed somewhat curious that the Russians should only have found out their mistake in the matter of the merchant after so long a period as 14 years.

"I mentioned to him that we had heard some rumours of Russian activity in connection with the doubling of the Khushk line. The Amir said that he had also heard the report, but that it took so long at this time of the year to get news from Herat that he had no recent intelligence. I said that of course our information had come all the way round from Meshed, but we had done our best to verify it, and it did appear for some reason or other the Russians were improving that particular railway. He said:—'Oh! of course, what they want to do is to show me that though I may visit India and make friends with the British Government, I still have to reckon with them. At the present time, however, I think that their struggles to detach me from the British Government are like the involuntary reflex actions of a dying man.'

"He mentioned that he had just heard that at last it had snowed at Kabul, and that his letters were now reaching in five days. This brought us to the subject of rapid communication with Kabul, and I took the opportunity of asking him what he thought of the wireless telegraph installation which he had seen at Landi Kotal. He said he thought it was a wonderful invention, and probably would meet his purposes very well, but unfortunately there was nobody at Peshawar with whom he could talk himself. On his way back he proposed to send a man on in advance to Landi Kotal, and to talk to him from Peshawar, so that he might satisfy himself as to the utility of the arrangement. I told him that in some countries distances up to 200 miles had been covered without intermediate stations, and he replied the distance to Kabul was about 180 miles so that the arrangement ought to suit well.

"The Amir said he knew all about the trade in arms from Maskat and that many had reached Afghanistan. The rifles of English make were very bad, but those from Belgium were better, though not very good. While talking on the subject of arms he said he particularly wished his cartridges to be examined, as he had reason to believe that our frontier officers had very carefully contrived that cartridges containing a very high explosive should be sold instead of the ordinary cartridges to the Afridis and others. The result was that from two to

I have ascertained from General Mahon that some time ago some cartridges of this class were made, but they were never issued, and were destroyed. Perhaps, some of them were sold by dishonest employes of the Arsenal or other.

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three hundred rifles of the Afridis had been burst by these cartridges. Some of them had been sent to him, and except for a very small mark there was nothing to distinguish them from the ordinary cartridges. He said—'Of course, I know that you do not like good rifles and ammunition passing into the hands of frontier tribes, and I quite understand your reasons.' I said that it was quite true that we preferred to keep our good arms and ammunition in the hands of our own regular troops. I did not know anything about the explosive cartridges, but if any officer had been clever enough to pass this off on the Afridis, who were very intelligent in such matters, he must have managed very acutely. The Amir said—'At any rate, as I promised you, I have never allowed any of my rifles or ammunition to be given to the frontier tribes. Of course they may have got a few by theft from my soldiers and from my workshops, but I have taken the most stringent measures to prevent such thefts. My punishment is to shoot the thief with the rifle he stole. In fact the other day two men stole four rifles which were unfinished. I had the rifles completed, and then shot the thieves.' I said these tribesmen were very ignorant and undoubtedly played one Government off against the other, with the result that they cause inconvenience to both. I said that, as you will remember, the British Agent spoke to you about the misconduct of the Zakha Khel on your way down, and there have been further offences committed by them since you arrived. It is very difficult for us to deal with them as they will probably run away into Afghanistan. The Amir agreed that they were like a pigeon with two dove-cotes and sometimes went to the one and sometimes to the other, or a calf with two mothers. He said—'I know they are very troublesome and I have nothing to do with them'. I then thought it best to drop the matter, as it might have led us to some inconvenient discussion upon frontier policy.

"In discussing our friendly relations, the Amir said—'Of course, before I only knew you by letters, but now I have seen you and understand you all better'. I replied: 'Yes, these long official letters are apt to become argumentative, and when a number collect it is hard perhaps for you to know what matters are of importance from our point of view and what are not. Of course, in writing these official letters upon all sorts of petty matters a good deal of time is wasted and really important questions are apt to be overlooked in the mass of papers that accumulate'. The Amir quite agreed, and said that he was most anxious to deal with unimportant things in a less formal manner than by letter, but he said—'No doubt, you could send a good man with whom I could so deal. My difficulty is as regards my own Envoy. At present I do not know anybody of the same disposition as myself, whom I could appoint to the post, and whom I could trust to dispose of all small frontier affairs with you. I have many patriotic subjects, but some of them are fanatical and others are stupid. The first class even proposed to brand as a Kafir any one who said it would be well for me to come to India. The second are like the bear who killed his master with a stone, intending only to kill the flies on his face. However,

since I have been down here my views have been so changed, that I am determined to try and get over the difficulty and appoint a really reliable Envoy to whom I could trust such matters.'

"The Amir then passed to the question of trade with Afghanistan. He said that the high duties and the State monopolies had also killed it and instanced the case of pistachios. He had now abolished the monopoly and the imports were rising. I fully agreed in his view. He then added 'the loss in exchange on the Kabul rupee is also a serious handicap for my traders. I am thinking of starting a bank in Peshawar, where I would always pay a favourable rate of exchange to my men, and so save them from loss owing to the constant fluctuations which exist at present.' I said that it was difficult to fix exchange by order, but that if he did keep a large cash balance at Peshawar in British rupees he might help the Kabul rate. He said he would think over it, and he would certainly reduce the present customs duties still further.

"The Amir thanked me for not having troubled him with any business matters whilst he was down here. I said that the Viceroy had told him that his wish not to talk about business would be fully respected during his stay, and that we were glad to hear that he thoroughly enjoyed himself and that he was carrying away such excellent impressions of India and of ourselves. I added that we trusted that those impressions would be lasting, and in that case his visit

The Amir spoke to same effect to Sir A. Fraser at Belvedere on 7th February.

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to us would be infinitely more useful to himself, to Afghanistan, and to the British Government than the mere settlement of a certain number of cases that were still pending between us. He replied that he was perfectly certain that the effects of the tour upon him were a hundredfold more useful than any form of discussion that we could possibly have engaged in, and that in future he felt that he would be much better able to realise our position and our real wants than he had hitherto been when he had to depend entirely upon formal written communications. He said—'you know I shall probably come again quietly, so I do not feel that I am leaving India for good, and I only trust that when I do come that nothing will have occurred in the interval to render my welcome less hearty and friendly than it has been on the present occasion. If ever I do come, I shall come quietly.' I said that I was very glad to hear him talk in this way, as it was always pleasing for a host to learn that his guest was so pleased that he wished to repeat the visit, and no doubt in the course of the long reign that we earnestly hope was before him, a suitable opportunity would be found for him to renew the friendships that he had formed in India.

"He said that he was sorry that he had not seen more of myself whom he regarded as one of his oldest friends while in India. I explained that of course my duties kept me in constant personal attendance on His Excellency, that I should have really enjoyed to have seen more of him, but there was also this point which had to be considered, that if I, who had been with him in Kabul, had travelled all over India with him, people might possibly have been foolish enough to have attributed in some small measure the tactful attitude which he had adopted towards all brought in contact with him, to the official suggestions of the Government of India. Whereas all now recognised that the kindly and considerate acts which he had done throughout his tour were entirely of his own notion and his own idea. The consequence was that all persons and all creeds in India were thoroughly pleased with his conduct, and were only grieved at his departure. The play upon the words amused the Amir, who after again thanking me most warmly for all that the Government of India had done to make his stay a pleasant one, and for the part which I had personally taken in inducing him to come to India, bade me a most cordial farewell.

"I could no doubt have gone further into the discussion of business matters, but neither the time nor the occasion seemed altogether suitable, and I thought it better to adopt throughout merely an attitude of friendly expectancy rather than of active suggestion of topics of conversation."

"Under His Excellency the Viceroy's instructions a copy of the Note was sent to the Political Secretary, India Office, London, and an abstract of the portion regarding Russian relations was telegraphed to the Secretary of State in reply to an enquiry from him whether the Amir had discussed any business question during his stay in Calcutta."



## APPENDIX II.

As stated in the text (page 11) the Secretary of State communicated to the Government of India for their opinion the following two articles extracted from a draft Convention regarding Afghanistan which M. Isvolsky, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had handed to Sir A. Nicolson at St. Petersburg on the 15th May 1906 :—

## ARTICLE III.

“ Great Britain engages not to annex or occupy any portion of Afghanistan or its dependencies, or to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. The British Government will only exercise their influence in Afghanistan in a pacific sense and will neither themselves take, nor encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures which may be considered as threatening the Russian frontier.

## ARTICLE VII.

“ Russian trade, traders, and subjects shall be placed on the same footing in Afghanistan as British or British Indian trade, traders, and subjects, and will profit by the same facilities as the latter enjoy at present, or may acquire hereafter. It is understood that a uniform customs tariff shall be established along the whole of Afghanistan.”

On the 25th May, His Excellency the Viceroy replied that, after discussion in Council, the Government of India, though they endorsed the views held by His Majesty's Government on the general questions of the British political position in Afghanistan, and the treatment of British and Russian trade in that country, considered that the two articles went far beyond what was originally contemplated, and that they regarded Article III as quite impossible. It was opposed not only to the line of policy which they held to be essential to the safety of India, but also to their treaty engagements which had so recently been renewed with the Amir; and it was calculated to cause the greatest possible friction with Afghanistan which would probably end in the Amir throwing the British over for the Russians. They therefore suggested that Article III should not be accepted in its present form, and proposed the following revised Article :—

“ Great Britain engages to exercise her influence in the cause of peace. The British Government will not assist the Amir or the Government of Afghanistan in any unjust or unprovoked aggression on the frontiers of Russia or Persia, but will discountenance such ideas, and only actively aid Afghanistan against foreign aggression. Nothing in this article, however, in any way modifies or reduces the existing special rights of Great Britain in Afghanistan, and the Russian Government acknowledges Afghanistan as being outside the Russian sphere of influence and under British guidance in all matters of external policy.”

With regard to Article VII, the Government of India considered it was mandatory in form, and that under it they might be held liable for direct action with the Amir on behalf not only of Russians traders, but even of all Russian subjects; and they earnestly deprecated any article which could be construed as involving them in any way in a liability for interference with the Amir's fiscal policy, a matter about which he was peculiarly sensitive.

The Government of India could only regard both the articles, as they stood, as an attempt on the part of Russia to alter the status of Afghanistan from that of a country under British influence as regards all external relations and entirely without the political orbit of Russia, into that of an independent buffer state in which both Russia and England would have similar rights and interests; they felt sure that so complete a reversal of former policy, and so absolute a destruction of the position which they held in Afghanistan would never commend itself to His Majesty's Government, and they hoped that they would have an opportunity of expressing an opinion on the whole of the papers before decisive negotiations were entered upon.

The Secretary of State replied on the 28th May, forwarding the text of a counter-draft Convention which was suggested for presentation to the Russian Government, and asking for the views of the Government of India thereon. The text is sub-joined :—

“ The high contracting parties, in order to assure perfect security to their respective frontiers in Central Asia, and to maintain there a solid and lasting peace, have agreed as follows :—

“ *Article I.*—The Russian Government recognise Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence and engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of His Majesty's Government.

“ *Article II.*—The British Government having, in the treaty signed at Kabul on the 21st March 1905, recorded that they recognise the sovereignty of the Amir and that they have no desire to interfere in the internal government of his territories, Great Britain engages not to annex any portion of Afghanistan or to interfere in the internal administration of the country, provided that the Amir fulfils the engagements already contracted towards His Majesty's Government under the above-mentioned treaty. Great Britain further undertakes to exercise her influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense towards

Russia, and will not herself take in Afghanistan, or encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures which may be considered as threatening the Russian frontier. On the other hand, the Russian Government undertake not to annex any part of Afghanistan, nor to take any measures either involving interference with the internal government of the territories of the Amir or such as may be considered as threatening the Afghan frontier and calculated to provoke retaliatory measures. It is understood that the British and Russian Governments maintain the right to carry out such railway projects as may seem desirable to them within their own frontiers.

*"Article III.*—Russia engages not to send any agents into Afghanistan. If in the future the development of commerce clearly shows the utility of commercial agents, the two Governments will agree as to what measures should be taken in this sense.

*"Article IV.*—The Russian and Afghan authorities specially designated for the purpose may, with the consent of the Amir, which His Majesty's Government will endeavour to obtain, establish direct relations with each other for the settlement of local questions of a non-political character.

*"Article V.*—The Governments of Great Britain and Russia affirm their adherence to the principles of the 'open door' and of equality of commercial opportunity, and with a view to the same facilities being accorded to Russian trade and traders in Afghanistan as British and British Indian traders now, or may in the future, enjoy in the territory of the Amir, His Majesty's Government will undertake to exercise their influence to secure the reciprocal observance of these principles in Afghanistan."

The Secretary of State observed that Article II of the counter-draft went far to attain the objects aimed at in the draft Article III proposed in His Excellency the Viceroy's telegram of the 25th May. There seemed, he said, to be a distinct advantage in getting a pledge from Russia, if possible, not to annex or take measures involving internal interference, or a menace to the Afghan frontier. His Majesty's Government could not ask Russia to give a pledge against occupation, unless they were prepared to give a similar pledge on their part. The Secretary of State added that Articles IV and V of the counter-draft had been so worded as not to make it necessary that the Amir's adhesion should be obtained to proceed further with negotiations with Russia, and he asked whether, in the opinion of the Government of India, it would vitally increase the difficulty of obtaining the Amir's adhesion if the matter were not mentioned to him till after an agreement had been signed by the British and Russian Governments.

In replying to the Secretary of State on the 1st June, His Excellency the Viceroy said that the counter-draft removed many of the objections of the Government of India; but certain further modifications were suggested. The Government of India also expressed the opinion that it would not be treating the Amir with the confidence and candour which he had a right to expect from Government and which Government undoubtedly expected from him, if this agreement affecting his dominions were signed between Great Britain and Russia without his knowledge. They considered that such action would probably vitally affect his adhesion to the agreement.

On the 19th June, the Secretary of State telegraphed certain amendments which had been made in the counter-draft, after consideration of the Government of India's views contained in their telegram of the 1st June. The amended counter-draft ran as follows :—

*"Preamble.* The high contracting parties, in order to assure perfect security to their respective frontiers in Central Asia and to maintain there a solid and lasting peace, have agreed as follows :—

*"Article I.*—The Russian Government recognise Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence and engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of His Majesty's Government; they further undertake not to send any agents into Afghanistan.

*"Article II.*—The British Government having, in the treaty signed at Kabul on 21st March 1905, recorded that they recognise the agreement and the engagements concluded with the late Amir Abdur Rahman, and that they have no desire to interfere in the internal government of his territories, Great Britain engages not to annex or to occupy in contravention of that treaty any portion of Afghanistan or to interfere in the internal administration of the country, provided that the Amir fulfils the engagements already contracted towards His Majesty's Government under the above-mentioned treaty. Great Britain further undertakes to exercise her influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense towards Russia, and will not herself take in Afghanistan, or encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures threatening the Russian frontier. On the other hand, the Russian Government undertake not to annex or occupy any part of Afghanistan, nor to take any measures involving interference with the internal government of the territories of the Amir.

*"Article III.*—The Russian and Afghan authorities specially designated for the purpose may, when the consent of the Amir shall have been obtained by His Majesty's Government

and communicated to the Russian Government by them, establish direct relations with each other for the settlement of local questions of a non-political character.

*“ Article IV.—The Governments of Great Britain and Russia affirm their adherence to the principle of equality of commercial opportunity, and agree that any facilities which may have been, or shall hereafter be obtained for British or British Indian traders, shall be equally enjoyed by Russian traders. Should the progress of commerce establish the necessity for commercial agents, the two Governments will agree as to what measures shall be taken, due regard being had to the Amir’s sovereign powers ”.*

The Secretary of State said that Sir A. Nicolson had been instructed to communicate the amended draft to the Russian Government, and to state that His Majesty’s Government hoped to learn, as soon as the draft agreement had been accepted, the points on the frontier to which it was proposed to appoint Russian officials to be designated for the purpose of settling non-political and local questions with Afghan officials. Until terms were definitely settled with Russia, no communication was to be made to the Amir.

In pursuance of the instructions sent to him, Sir A. Nicolson communicated to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 17th June the counter-draft of the Convention regarding Afghanistan, and urged him to give a reply without prolonged delay. M. Isvolsky said that he would do his best, but as he would have to consult again with others, he feared that some little time would elapse. Sir A. Nicolson pointed out that the sense and main principles of M. Isvolsky’s project were maintained. The latter admitted this, but said that the project had undergone considerable re-arrangement.

On the 21st June, M. Isvolsky, referring to Article III in the draft Convention, asked Sir A. Nicolson what guarantee he could give that the Amir would consent to local questions being arranged by his frontier officials. Sir A. Nicolson replied that His Majesty’s Government would do their best to obtain his consent, but it was clear that they could not bind the Amir beforehand. From a remark or two let drop by M. Isvolsky, Sir A. Nicolson thought it just possible that the Russian Government might like to leave Article III over for subsequent arrangement, and sign the Convention without it. His Majesty’s Government informed Sir A. Nicolson that they would raise no objection if the Russian Government proposed to omit Article III, leaving it for subsequent agreement, but they would hold that, without their previous assent, no direct communications should take place.

On the 3rd July 1907, M. Isvolsky told Sir A. Nicolson that he (the former) would not be ready with his replies for eight or nine days, though he was pushing on matters. On Sir A. Nicolson pressing M. Isvolsky as to where the difficulty lay, the latter mentioned the following points :—

(1) The British Government required Russia unconditionally not to annex or occupy any part of Afghanistan, while they gave a similar undertaking, but on condition that the Amir fulfilled his treaty obligations.

(2) The British Government made the article on intercourse between frontier officials dependent on the consent of the Amir, and this meant that, though the British Government had control of the Amir’s foreign relations, they could undertake nothing without his consent, which M. Isvolsky seemed to consider a strange and inconvenient condition of affairs.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Isvolsky positively that His Majesty’s Government could not bind the hands of the Amir, or agree to obligations being laid upon him without consulting him. M. Isvolsky repeated his sincere desire to hasten on to a conclusion. On the 8th July, Sir A. Nicolson reported that M. Isvolsky had again asserted that he was most anxious to terminate the negotiations, but that he had to discuss all Afghan matters once more with the General Staff, and he feared the negotiations would take some time yet.

In order to meet, as far as possible, the objections pointed out by M. Isvolsky in the British counter-draft Convention, His Majesty’s Government informed the Government of India in a telegram, dated the 15th August 1907, that, after consultation with Sir A. Nicolson, it had been decided that certain modifications and explanations of the counter-draft should be made to Russia. Among the proposed modifications was one relating to Article II. The Russian Government had raised an objection to the proposed unconditional undertaking on their part not to annex or occupy any portion of Afghanistan, while the same undertaking on the part of the British Government was conditional on the Amir fulfilling his treaty obligations. His Majesty’s Government, considering that the special pledge by Russia in Article II against annexation or interference was covered by Article I, were willing to agree to the last sentence of Article II beginning with the words “ On the other hand ” being deleted. In the event of the Russian Government being unwilling to accept this solution of the difficulty, Sir A. Nicolson was instructed to propose as an alternative that Article II should be maintained as it stood with the addition of the following sentence:—“ Should any change occur in the political status of Afghanistan, the two Governments will enter into a friendly interchange of views on the subject ”.



With reference to the above, the Government of India telegraphed to the Secretary of state on the 20th August as follows:—"Your telegram of 15th August has been considered by us in Council. We recognise fully the desirability of arriving at a friendly settlement of terms of Convention with Russia, and we have no wish to question the further concessions which have been already announced to Russia by Sir A. Nicolson. We are, however, unanimous in respectfully but most earnestly deprecating his informing Isvolsky of the alternative ending to Article II of the Convention, as this, in our opinion, would go far to render nugatory the renewal by Russia in Article I of her often repeated pledge that she recognises Afghanistan as outside the sphere of her influence, which is our only direct gain from the proposed Convention. The condition suggested is almost identical with the saving clause proposed by Russia to the effect that their engagement held good, provided that no change occurred in the actual state of things in Afghanistan, which His Majesty's Government have already declared to be quite inadmissible. We deem it our duty to represent our strong conviction that the insertion of such a clause should be provided, as we feel that it would probably lead to the *de facto* assertion by Russia of an equality of rights and interests with us in Afghanistan. Since Article I is held to cover the special pledge by Russia in Article II against annexation or interference, could not this view be extended so as to make Article I, as amended, cover our pledges mentioned in the second Article by adding to Article I the sentence beginning 'His Britannic Majesty further undertakes' down to 'Russian frontier'. It would then be possible to omit Article II. If this were done, all mention of occupation or annexation would be left out, and this would make matters easier for us with the Amir, while we should not be bound by awkward engagements from which Russia is free."

On the 23rd August, the Secretary of State telegraphed that His Majesty's Government fully recognised the force of the Government of India's objections to the introduction in the Convention of any clause providing, in the event of a change in the political status of Afghanistan, for the interchange of views between the two governments; but His Majesty's Government were confronted with the fact that, without such a clause, the Convention would not be agreed to by the Russian Government. On the 31st August, the Secretary of State telegraphed that the Russian Government were unwilling to accept the proposed alteration of Article II; and on the same date a Convention in the terms given in the text (page 12) was signed on behalf of Great Britain and Russia.



**NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.**



# THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

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## THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

"Frontiers have been protected with unparalleled success and speed."

(Review of Lord Minto's Viceroyalty in Ministerial Statement on the Indian Budget in the House of Commons.—July 26, 1910.)

### INTRODUCTION.

Throughout the period of Lord Minto's Viceroyalty, the condition of affairs on the North-West Frontier may be said to have been normal. On the whole, the tribes remained quiet, though the misdeeds of the Mohmands and the Zakka Khel section of the Khyber Afridis necessitated the despatch of punitive expeditions against them in February, and April-May 1908, respectively. These expeditions, notwithstanding that the British forces were only nineteen days beyond the frontier on each occasion, were eminently successful, settlements having been effected in each instance, the results of which have been lasting. The position in Waziristan, which was menacing at the outset of the period under review, has never ceased to give anxiety owing to the evil influence of the truculent Mulla Powindah, but during the summer of 1910, the situation greatly improved, under what may be termed a policy of humanisation, and at the end of Lord Minto's term of office, a hopeful feeling prevailed that on the completion of schemes for increased enlistment of Mahsuds in the Indian Army, and the settlement of Mahsud families on the Paharpur Canal lands,—both of which schemes were strongly supported by Lord Minto—our relations with this refractory tribe would be on a better footing than they have been for the past quarter of a century. In July 1908, with the approval of the Secretary of State, a temporary appointment of Resident in Waziristan was created; Mr. J. S. Donald, C.I.E., was the first officer to hold it, and the result has justified a proposal being submitted for its continuance.

During the summer of 1910, outrages in British territory by bands of outlaws harboured in Afghanistan were of troublesome frequency, the local forces of the Frontier Militia Corps and Border Military Police being rarely able to intercept them, so secret and rapid were the movements of the gangs. In August-September, the evil had become so grave that it was necessary to send troops to the Tochi, to support the Militia, and the Amir was requested to issue orders for the control of the outlaws' movements. Apart from the crimes committed by outlaws, offences by Afghan subjects in British territory have been numerous, particularly in the Kurram direction; and, after various representations to the Amir on the subject, by arrangement with His Majesty, a Joint British-Afghan Commission for the adjustment of the long roll of outstanding cases, whether by British tribesmen in Afghan territory, or *vice versa*, assembled at the head of the Kurram Valley in May 1910; and substantial progress was made by the end of August, auguring well for a general settlement. The inadequacy of the Border Military Police for the duties required of them has been long recognized, and measures for their re-organization have been, and still are, under consideration. Hitherto financial considerations have prevented great progress being made. Much has been done to improve service in the Border Militia, *e.g.*, the grant of pensions and increased pay, and it is hoped shortly to see somewhat similar improved terms sanctioned for the Border Military Police. Representations having been made by the local authorities that the frontier villages, owing to their being unarmed, were unable to protect themselves, large numbers of Government rifles were distributed to exposed villages, with satisfactory results.

The leading events and measures on the various sections composing this portion of the frontier are mentioned below.

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### DIR, SWAT AND CHITRAL AGENCY.

1. The Mehtar of Chitral, with a small suite, arrived in Simla, on an informal visit, on the 5th September 1907. He was

Chitral.

accorded the honour of an interview with the Viceroy on the 6th, in the course

- (1) *Visit of the Mehtar of Chitral to Simla.*

of which His Excellency presented the gold Kaisar-i-Hind Medal to Mehtarjao Bahram Khan, the Mehtar's cousin, for his plucky rescue of a British officer from a leopard a few months previously. The Mehtar left Simla on 17th September.

2. On the 14th October 1907, at a full Durbar attended by all the troops in Drosh, the British officials of the Agency, the Mehtar of Chitral, a representative of Dir, and the leading native State officials,

(2) *Presentation of Albert Medals to a Chitrali and a Dir subject.*

Albert Medals were presented to Hasil, Chitrali, and Muhammad Ali of Dir, for their gallantry in saving life in an avalanche at the Lowarai Pass in the winter of 1905. A message was sent to His Majesty the King, on behalf of the Mehtar and the Khan of Dir, expressive of their high appreciation of the honour conferred on their respective subjects.

3. At the end of 1904 the Mehtar of Chitral applied for the loan of the services

(3) *Arrangements for working the Chitral forests.*

of a Forest officer to prepare a report on the Chitral forests and the best method of working them. A difficulty arose in finding a qualified man on the salary which the Mehtar was prepared to pay for his services, and eventually it was found necessary to tell the Mehtar that the work could not be satisfactorily done within the limit imposed (*viz.*, Rs. 1,500 for the total period of the officer's deputation). He agreed in January 1907 to pay Rs. 2,000 for the services of an officer, but, as the Secretary of State had recently cautioned the Government of India against taking any steps calculated to interfere with the policy of non-intervention in Chitral affairs, it was considered advisable to obtain his consent before deputing an officer to Chitral. This was accorded in May 1907, on the understanding that Indian revenues would not have to bear any portion of the cost; and Munshi Imam-ud-din, Extra Assistant Conservator of Forests, was sent to Chitral at the end of September 1907. His report was prepared in February 1908, and showed that the forests, though considerably damaged by fires, unskilful felling and the like, represented a potential source of revenue to the State.

4. In forwarding Munshi Imam-ud-din's report to the Government of India in November 1908, the Assistant Political Agent, Chitral, remarked that the object of the Mehtar with respect to his forests had been to start some system whereby he could secure a revenue from the sale of his wood to Government or to contractors in India, without oppressing his people by requiring forced labour from them, and without ruining the forests by reckless felling; that the Mehtar was anxious to keep the working of the forests in his own hands, and did not wish to resign this responsibility to Government, but that, at the same time, he was financially unable to maintain a forest staff, and desired to contract for the cutting of the timber: if this were permitted, he would see that the contractor carried out his work with due regard to the interests of the forests. By these arrangements the Mehtar hoped, in a few years' time, to realize sufficient profit to enable him to maintain a skilled forest staff of his own, and to dispense with the services of a contractor.

5. The Government of India, while anxious to render the Mehtar all possible help in the matter, considered it extremely undesirable that he should be allowed to enter into an arrangement with an Indian contractor for the sale of his timber. There was, further, the practical difficulty that the only means of transporting the Chitral timber to India was to float it down the Afghan water-ways. Owing to the remoteness of the Afghan subjects on the river from control at Kabul, it was improbable that any satisfactory arrangement could be made with the Amir in the matter, while difficulties would also arise with the Mohmands. The Chief Commissioner was accordingly informed in January 1909 that the Government of India shared his views that any arrangement for working the forests was outside the range of practical politics, and he was asked to express regret to the Mehtar that it was not possible to move in the matter.

6. The relief of the Chitral garrison was effected in October 1907, as usual, without any hostile demonstrations on the part of the tribes; but when the relieved

(4) *Chitral Reliefs.*

force were crossing the Lowarai pass on the 21st October, on the return to India, the rear-guard were caught in a blizzard and were compelled to return to Ashreth, the main body, which had crossed in safety, continuing their journey towards India. Eleven drivers and followers died of exposure, several mules were lost, and some loads had to be abandoned. The Mehtar of Chitral and the Dir and Chitral officials and villagers rendered willing and efficient help, and the conduct of all concerned was estimable. The pass was eventually crossed, when the snow had cleared, on the 20th October.

7. As a result of the loyalty displayed by the tribes on the Chakdarra-Drosh road during the disturbances on the frontier, it was arranged that the escorting regiment which had hitherto moved with the reliefs should be dispensed with, two additional mountain guns accompanying the relieving troops to Drosh, and returning with the relieved troops, that the Malakand Movable Column should not go beyond the Malakand, and that the whole force moving each way should consist of one battalion, four guns and one section of sappers. Owing, however, to the outbreak of cholera on the Dir-Chitral road, in September 1908, and to interruptions to the road in consequence of floods, the relief of the troops was postponed till the spring of 1909, and subsequently till September-October 1909.

8. The troops relieving the Chitral garrison marched from Chakdarra on the 26th September 1909, and arrived at Drosh on the 6th October. The relieved force left Drosh on the 11th, and arrived at Chakdarra on the 21st October. Nothing unusual occurred during the movement, though snow fell on the Lowarai pass the day after the troops had crossed it. The Nawab of Dir accompanied the troops, and the Mehtar of Chitral met them at Lowarai. The Movable Column in support of the relief operations remained in the field a while longer to support a force of Sappers and Miners engaged in repairing the Panjkora Bridge, but began to return to their permanent stations on 26th October, on the Nawab of Dir accepting responsibility for the safety of the Sappers and Miners.

9. Mehtarjao Bahadur Khan, Governor of Mastuj, visited the Political Agent at Malakand during June 1909, and submitted a representation suggesting that he should be granted complete and unfettered control of Mastuj in total independence of the Mehtar of Chitral. In reply, two alternatives were presented to him—(1) to return to Mastuj and resume his position on the conditions laid down by former Mehtars, and (2) to resign his Governorship and retire to Oyun. He accepted the former, and returned to Mastuj.

10. In 1904 a private telephone line was constructed by the Political Agent, Dir, Swat and Chitral, between Malakand and Chakdarra. In 1905 the line was transferred to the Government of India and extended to Dargai and Robat. These small extensions were found to be so useful that in September 1905 it was proposed to extend the line from Robat to Chitral. The local Khans undertook to supply the labour, poles, etc., free of charge, and it was proposed to purchase the insulators and wire from the military stores at Chakdarra at a cost of Rs. 5,390. It subsequently transpired that the class of wire obtainable at Chakdarra was not suitable, and eventually the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, was authorized to obtain the necessary material from the India Office and proceed with the construction of the line. This involved certain difficulties which had not existed in the original scheme, under which the Political Agent was to make his own arrangements subject to a total expenditure of Rs. 100 per mile of the line. The project was eventually abandoned.

11. Affairs in Dir were in an unsettled state when Lord Minto assumed office.

Dir.

(1) *Dir Affairs.*

They were, to quote the Political Agent's words, "a fairly tangled knot of tribal politics." The old internecine quarrels between the Khan, Badshah Khan by name, and his brother Miangul Jan, and the partisans of each, which had been rampant throughout Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty, and which had been temporarily composed in June 1905, now broke out again, and continued until June 1906, when, mainly through the intervention of the Native Assistant at Dir, all parties concerned came to an agreement at Chakdarra that they would regard Badshah Khan as their Chief. The Government of India expressed their gratification at this settlement, which was, however, not destined to last long. Hostilities soon broke out between the Khan of Nawagai and his son; and whilst the Khan of Dir's brother was away supporting the Nawagai Chief, the Khan of Dir himself, disregarding the Chakdarra settlement, took advantage of his brother's absence and seized the forts of three of his Khans. He was warned that the Government of India could not approve of his aggression, and that

they would hold him personally responsible that the safety of the Malakand-Chitral road was not in any way impaired by his actions.

12. In March 1907 hostilities between the two brothers in Dir recommenced, and resulted in the Khan of Dir sustaining a severe reverse at the hands of his younger brother; while universal disorder seemed about to spread over the entire Dir-Chitral border. However, on the 22nd and 23rd April a conference of the leading Khans was held at Chakdarra, and the Nawagai Chief was reconciled to his son, while Miangul Jan submitted to and was forgiven by his brother, the Khan of Dir. Engagements were made that the Khan of Dir should not invade Jandol, that the Bajaur Khans should not interfere in Dir affairs, and that all parties should retain their present holdings, settle disputes by arbitration and not interfere or fight with one another for six months.

13. The peace did not last long; for in June desultory hostilities recommenced, between the Dir Chief and his brother, and between the Nawagai Chief and his son. At the same time the Swat tribes subject to the Khan of Dir expressed their desire to be free of him. They were told that Government would accept no responsibility in the matter, but that if, by *jirga* negotiations or agreement with the Khan of Dir, they established their independence of Dir, it would be recognized.

14. In December efforts were made at Chakdarra to effect some settlement between the various contending factions, but no definite understanding could be come to, either at this conference or at a subsequent meeting held in Peshawar, though eventually a six months' truce was concluded between all parties, which remained unbroken during January, February, and March 1908.

15. In April 1908, the Khan and all the Chiefs of the rivefain clans re-established the Chakdarra agreement of 1906. Certain safeguards of tribal rights were insisted on by the clans and agreed to by the Khan. The agreement was reduced to writing, and signed by all concerned, in the presence of the Political Agent.

16. On the 5th June 1908 the Khan was given the title of Nawab in recognition of his services during the Mohmand disturbances (see page 11).

17. Differences next arose between the Khan of Dir and the tribes on the right bank of the Swat river, who wished to break away from the Dir yoke. Early in August news was received that the Nawab of Dir had collected a *lashkar* for the invasion of Upper Swat. As this was in direct contravention of the agreement which he had signed at Chakdarra on the conclusion of peace between himself and Miangul Jan, at the request of the Political Agent the campaign was countermanded.

18. Early in December a fight took place between the Khans of Robat. The Nawab of Dir was advised to interfere, and as the matter affected the Chitral road, the Native Assistant of the Malakand Agency went, with a strong escort, to Robat. He reported on the 12th December that the *lashkars* at Robat had been dispersed, and peace re-established, certain Painsah Khel elders remaining at Robat to guarantee the peace. The cause of the disturbance was a dispute between the Ausa Khel and Nura Khel over the question of a new mill. The Robat Khans came to the Malakand to make a settlement with the object of preventing further fighting on or near the road. The Nawab of Dir signified his willingness to agree to any arrangements that might be made with the Khans for the safety of the road, and a satisfactory settlement was effected with them in January 1909.

19. About the same time the Nawab asked the Political Agent to use his good offices in effecting a settlement between himself and the Upper Swat tribes, with whom his relations had for long been unsatisfactory. The Nikpi Khels submitted similar requests. The Political Agent accordingly met the Nawab of Dir and the Nikpi Khel *jingas* at Chakdarra on the 2nd February. The Nikpi Khel proved to be hopelessly divided, and it was not possible to effect a satisfactory settlement.

20. In May 1909 the Khan of Dir, at the Political Agent's invitation, visited the Malakand, and the Political Agent reported that renewed efforts would be made to devise some settlement between the Khan and the recalcitrant Upper Swat tribes; but, in spite of this and other efforts to the same end, the feud remained until, in the spring of 1910, a serious fight occurred between the Painsah Khel, acting obviously under the orders of the Nawab of Dir, and a combined *lashkar* of the right bank Swatis, who inflicted a serious defeat on their opponents.



21. A deputation of some of the Maliks of the right bank Swatis then waited on the Political Agent (April 26th) and asked that Government should intervene between them and the Nawab, while the Nawab also approached the Political Agent asking him to exert his influence on the right bank Swatis, in order to induce them to come to an amicable settlement.

22. In reply, the Nawab was told that the matter would receive due consideration, but that he must first show that he could control the Painsda Khel and prevent them from breaking the peace in an attempt to avenge their defeat.

23. In April 1908, extensive floods caused great damage to crops, house property and levy posts in the Dir State, and dislocated the postal service for upwards of a week. The Chitral road was impassable for three days. Similar floods occurred in August, obliterating several hundred yards of the road near Chakdarra and washing away the Chakdarra bridge. Again in September, considerable damage was done to roads and posts by floods, all the bridges between the Lowarai Pass and Dir were washed away, and communication across the Panjkora was interrupted. In March 1909, a further heavy fall of rain severely damaged the Chitral road and several Dir levy posts.

24. In June 1908 cholera appeared in an epidemic form in Upper Swat, and continued till the end of the year.

25. In the foregoing account of Dir, the hostilities between the Nawagai Nawab and his son have been mentioned. In June 1907 Muhammad Ali, elder son of the Nawab, made himself paramount in Nawagai; but a month later the father, after some fighting, in which surrounding tribes joined, managed to come to terms with his son, and get himself publicly reinstated as Nawab.

26. Muhammad Ali subsequently again usurped the rulership, and in January 1909, the Nawab visited Peshawar and preferred a request that Government would intervene in regard to his family troubles, and lend troops to remove his son, Muhammad Ali, from Nawagai. He was informed that such a request could not be complied with, but that, if he and his son conjointly should ask for a settlement on the advice of the Khans and elders of the country, the Political Agent would be glad to use his good offices to that end.

27. Subsequently, the Nawab continued to inform the Political Agent that he was being detained and treated as a prisoner by his son, but no replies were returned to his letters.

28. After a feud between the Salarzais and the Khan of Khar, the former were defeated and a truce was come to between the parties, which they appear to have observed till 1909, when the Salarzais, in co-operation with the Khan of Barwa, recommenced hostilities against the Khan of Khar, who was assisted by allied *lashkars* of the Usman Khel, Muhammad Ali of Nawagai, and the Mundah Khan, with a Mamund contingent. After some fighting the parties of both sides gradually dispersed, without any decisive result.

29. His Excellency the Viceroy visited Malakand and Chakdarra in April 1906. At Dargai and Chakdarra His Excellency granted audiences to the jirgas of the neighbourhood, and at Chakdarra he received the Khan of Dir and the Nawab of Nawagai. The jirgas expressed much satisfaction at the visit; and the way in which the country is settling down under British control may be judged from the requests of the Sam Ranizai jirgas for the maintenance of their tribal system of local self-government under the tribal law; for the inception of the projected Swat-Malakand canal; for a daily return railway service between Dargai and Mardan; and for the extension of the broad gauge railway to Dargai. The Swat valley tribes subsequently sent to Simla, with a deputation, two war standards, for His Excellency's acceptance.

30. With reference to their petition for a daily return railway service between Dargai and Mardan and the extension of the broad gauge to Dargai, in June 1906 the

The Nowshera-Dargai Railway.

Sam Ranizai jirgas were informed that the train would henceforth leave Dargai early in the morning and return there the same day, instead of, as before, remaining for the night at Mardan. The object of this change was to admit of vendors from the Malakand Agency starting from Dargai for the market towns of the Peshawar district early each day and returning home the same evening.

31. The request for the conversion of the line to broad gauge was strongly supported by the Chief Commissioner, both from the political and commercial points of view. His arguments were accepted by the Government of India, but, as there was no urgent necessity for the conversion, it was considered that the project should give place to schemes of a more pressing nature. The Chief Commissioner was therefore informed in October 1907 that the conversion could not be taken in hand for at least two years. In November 1909, the Railway Department stated that estimates for the conversion of the line were awaited from the Manager of the North-Western Railway. The Foreign Department has received no further information on the subject.

32. Survey operations were carried on during the cold weather of 1906-07 in the Dir, Utman Khel, Ranizai and Swat territories, without misadventure, except at Spin-kharra, always a jealously regarded tract, where, owing to the interference of the Laman Utman Khel, the work had to be abandoned.

33. The operations were completed by June 1907, and resulted in the mapping of 700 square miles of tribal territory. Except at Silai Patti no serious incidents occurred, and the tribesman co-operated willingly. The Ranizai and Sam Ranizai, however, stipulated that their tribal boundaries should not be marked on the maps.

34. An attack was made on the survey camp at Silai Patti on the 25th April by a band of Asil Utman Khel. One survey khalasi and also one of the Sam Ranizai pursuit party were killed. The neighbouring Utman Khels took due action against the gang. The incident was devoid of political significance, being merely the result of an isolated outburst of fanaticism.

35. Particulars in regard to the construction of the Upper Swat River Canal will doubtless be found in the Public Works Department summary.

The first indication of the canal proving a source of possible political troubles, was afforded in September 1908, by a protest made by the Khan Khels of Batkhela against the canal being taken through a graveyard. No sooner had this incident been settled than the Alizai Khans raised objections to the employment of imported labour on the canal, and in December 1908, a general representation on the subject was made to the Political Agent by the Ranizais.

36. In January 1909, the Chief Commissioner reported the existence of serious friction between the canal authorities and the tribesmen, and also between the former and the political officers—work having been put in hand without regard to the special conditions obtaining in tribal territory. Sir George Roos-Keppel anticipated further trouble with the tribesmen in connection with water rights and, though he was hopeful that he would be able, in conference with the Chief Engineer of the Canal, to smooth over the present difficulties, the more important political bearings of the canal project had, in his opinion, never been properly considered, and work had been started without sufficient regard to the feelings and apprehensions of a suspicious, ignorant and fanatical people.

37. In a note, dated the 29th January, Mr. Mullaly, the Chief Engineer for Irrigation, North-West Frontier Province, reported that, at a conference with the Political Agent, the measures to be taken to combat the difficulties to which the Chief Commissioner had referred (the most important of which were the encroachment on graveyards and places of sanctity and the exclusion of the tribesmen from work on the canal), had been settled and arrangements had been made for the due co-operation of the Political Agent in matters affecting the tribesmen.

38. The Chief Commissioner was asked, on the 28th February, to report fully as to the attitude of the tribesmen towards the canal, the extent to which existing water rights would be affected, the degree of interference in the affairs of Lower Swat which the distribution of water would involve, and the political effect of discontinuing work on the canal altogether. Reports, subsequently received, showed that an alignment, which avoided graveyards, had been settled, the acquisition of

land had been commenced, the political and canal officers were working together and past difficulties had been tided over. Colonel Godfrey, Political Agent, Dir, Swat and Chitral, was of opinion that, if the leaders of the people were conciliated, Swat would raise no trouble; but, if an attempt was made to turn the country into the Punjab, annexation would follow, which could not end at Lower Swat. If due consideration were paid to tribal customs and to the attachment of the people to the internal administration of their own concerns, all might be well.

39. In his report, received in May, the Chief Commissioner explained that, according to the scheme which it was originally proposed to follow, the first half of the eight or nine miles of the canal's length would have passed through rice lands, which the people were most unwilling to part with, and would have crossed the Amandarra Pass, which is looked upon as a sacred place, and contains a large number of graves, the disturbance of which would have been unavoidable. The course of the second half of the canal was more favourably situated, as it passed only through *barani* lands, where the question of irrigation did not arise, and where it was possible to avoid all graveyards. He added that a new alignment had now been selected, which obviated many of the dangers and difficulties of the original line, and removed all real grievance from the cultivators of the country through which the canal passes.

40. It was reported in June 1909, that all land required for the Upper Swat River canal-bed south of Malakand had been acquired and paid for, and the jirgas had been invited to apply for contracts in their respective limits.

41. By March 1910, the rentals, etc. of the land required for the Upper Swat River Canal between Amandarra and the Malakand tunnel had been determined and accepted by all parties concerned.

42. In August 1908, a Committee, which had assembled on the Malakand to discuss the location of canal and other buildings, recommended the creation of an armed force to protect the canal works and depôts. The Chief Commissioner was accordingly asked, in October, to submit proposals for such protective measures as he might consider necessary. In December 1908, he applied for sanction to the enlistment of a force of Khassadars which, as the necessity for protective arrangements was urgent, he had authorised the Political Agent to raise in anticipation.

43. On the 13th April 1909, sanction was accorded (in anticipation of the Secretary of State's sanction, which was subsequently applied for) to the entertainment of 200 Khassadars, with the necessary establishment, at an initial cost of Rs. 1,565 and an annual expenditure of Rs. 51,108 during the period of construction of the canal. A slight increase to this establishment was subsequently found necessary, and sanctioned.

44. In July His Majesty's Secretary of State confirmed this provisional sanction of the Government of India. His Lordship observed that the attitude assumed by the tribes emphasised the necessity for caution and tact in dealing with them, and he directed that it should be impressed on all concerned that the carrying out of irrigation would be much too dearly purchased at the cost of irritating or alarming the tribes. Necessary instructions were issued to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, on the 18th August 1909.

#### HAZARA BORDER.

45. At the conclusion of the Black Mountain Expedition of 1891, the Government of India approved the recommendation

##### Black Mountain Affairs.

of the Punjab Government that Ibrahim Khan should be acknowledged as Khan of Seri in place of the deposed Hashim Ali Khan. Ibrahim Khan was, however, never acceptable to the tribes concerned, and, as a result of the constant complaints of the Hasanzai, Madda Khel, and Akazai jirgas, the Khan's allowance was reduced. The Black Mountain tribes, however, made no definite efforts to oust Ibrahim Khan till November 1905, when Isa Khan, who had been a Subadar in the Border Military Police and was a cousin of Ibrahim Khan (with whom, however, he was on the worst of terms), was murdered in Seri. There was no doubt that the murder was instigated by Ibrahim Khan and his son, and this was the view taken by the tribes, with the result that

the Isazai clans, in accordance with tribal practice, burnt Seri and other villages belonging to the Khan, whom they formally disowned.

46. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, on the 26th May 1906, recommended that the tribes should be informed that Government agreed to the deposition of Ibrahim Khan, and that it was immaterial whom the tribes might select as Khan, provided that they did not select one of the persons precluded by the agreement of 1891, and that the Khan should observe the agreement himself. In the meantime, affairs had undergone a change on the border. In August 1906, Ibrahim Khan's faction were strong enough to reinstate him as Khan, but in September the Hassanzais again drove him from Seri and destroyed his crops and some of his property. Ibrahim Khan accepted the situation and fled to Agror, where he was to all intents and purposes an exile. On the 4th November a party of Hassanzais, led by Sikandar Khan and Torabaz Khan, brothers of Hashim Ali Khan, both proscribed persons, killed Ibrahim Khan, his nephew, and some servants, in a mosque near the Karun Border Military Police post at Seri. The Chief Commissioner pointed out that no overt act of hostility to Government was intended, as shown by the fact that the murderers allowed two British subjects to leave the mosque unharmed, while the four Government Enfield rifles taken by the Hassanzais from Ibrahim Khan had been eventually returned by Hashim Ali Khan; and furthermore, as the visit of the proscribed persons was engineered by a small faction only of the tribe, he considered it would be sufficient that the matter should be gone into fully with the Isazai jirga, and that, if necessary, a portion of the Hassanzai allowance should be withheld as a mark of the displeasure of Government at this contravention of the agreement. The Government of India acquiesced in Sir Harold Deane's views, and a small fine was inflicted. The question of a successor to the Khanship was not settled, though the Chief Commissioner was instructed that, in the event of the tribes being unanimous in electing a new Khan, Government would probably accept the nominee, provided that he was capable of managing the affairs of the tribe, that his appointment did not involve the return of Hashim Ali Khan, and that he was not one of those proscribed.

47. The Khanship remained vacant from November 1906 till the middle of May 1907, when Sher Ali Khan, son of Hashim Ali Khan, (deposed in 1891), was formally recognised and installed by a party of the Isazai as Khan of Seri. The Hassanzai, Akazai, and Madda Khel, however, protested against this action and declined to recognise any Khan save Ghulam Ahmad Khan, son of Ibrahim Khan. The Government of India, adhering to the policy of only recognising as Chief one who was elected by general consent of the people and was able to maintain his position, did not interfere in the matter.

48. In October 1908, the Mada Khels withdrew their opposition and petitioned for the recognition of Sher Ali Khan (son of Hashim Ali Khan) as Khan of Seri and for the continuance of the allowances which were fixed for the Khan. In accordance with established policy, a reply was sent to the effect that Government would only recognize a Khan who was unanimously accepted by all the clans concerned; and up to the end of Lord Minto's term of office there appeared to be no hope of the Hassanzais agreeing upon the election of a Khan.

#### PESHAWAR BORDER.

49. Some references to the misdeeds of the Utman Khel and the difficulty of punishing them will be found in Appendix I relating to raids.

Settlement with the Utman Khel.

50. A representative *jirga* of the Ambahar Utman Khels was interviewed at Peshawar on the 3rd January 1910, and a satisfactory settlement was arrived at in respect of all outstanding offences. The *jirga* of this section gave a written agreement that they would not commit raids in British territory; that they would be responsible for the future good conduct of certain raiders; and that they would use their utmost efforts to effect the release of a Hindu who had been kidnapped by the Asil Utman Khel.

51. The Asil Utman Khels also showed indications in March 1910 of a desire to make peace with Government; while a full *jirga* of the Ambahar Utman Khel came to Peshawar on the 30th March 1910, and was granted an interview by the Chief Commissioner.

52. On the 21st March 1910, owing to the coincidence of the *Holi* and the *Bara-wafat*, some rioting commenced between Hindus and Muhammadans in Peshawar city. There was loss of life on both sides, and considerable looting of shops and property. Troops from Peshawar Cantonment were called out on the 22nd; and order was gradually restored, and the city reported quiet on the 24th.

53. Foreseeing a possibility of some such outbreak, the Deputy Commissioner had a month previously convened a meeting of the leading Hindu and Muhammadan gentlemen of the city, in order to concert a joint policy with the object of preventing any *fracas*; and certain resolutions were passed with a view of minimising as far as possible any chance of collision between the processions or display of the two escorts. Amongst other measures, the ordinary celebration of the *Holi* festival, which fell on the 24th March—the last day of the *Bara Wafat*—was postponed until the 25th. But both parties broke away from their engagements, with the result already mentioned.

54. As a punishment to the city as a whole, a punitive police post was instituted, the Bench of Honorary Magistrates and the Municipal Committee were remodelled, and various Hindu and Muhammadan ringleaders of the disorder were removed from the district. In addition to these measures the Chief Commissioner recommended the permanent location of a detachment of regular troops in, or quite close to, Peshawar city, to enable them to maintain order and suppress incipient disturbance until assistance could be obtained from the troops in Peshawar Cantonment.

55. The Government of India rejected (June 20, 1910) this proposal. They considered that it was the duty of the Police and Border Military Police to deal with disorder in the city, in the first instance, and that the regular troops should only be called out in emergency. The Chief Commissioner had reported that he considered the existing Police force to be inadequate in numbers and not altogether reliable at times of general disturbance, and had promised to prepare a scheme for an increase to the force; and the Government of India now intimated that they would await the submission of this scheme. In conclusion, they stated that the incident pointed to the necessity for closer co-operation between the civil and military authorities at Peshawar and for improved means of inter-communication between them. They asked the Chief Commissioner to take the necessary steps to secure the former requirement; and as regards the latter, they intimated that a scheme for the provision of a combined civil and military telephone system at Peshawar was under consideration.

56. Nothing further had been done in the matter, within the period comprised in this summary.

#### MOHMAND COUNTRY.

57. On the 25th November 1907, Mr. Johns, an engineer who had been deputed to examine the possible routes for the Kabul river railway (see page 21) was engaged in examining the left bank of the river between Smatsai and Shinpokh,

Mohmand disturbances.

(1) *Attack on Mr. Johns' party.*

when 100 Kuda Khel Mohmands from across the river opened fire on Smatsai, 200 Kuda Khel and Khwaezai Mohmands similarly firing on Shinpokh. Mr. Johns went on to Kuz Ugda on the 26th, but his party was fired on by 300 to 400 Mohmands. Their fire was not returned, but reinforcements of Khyber Rifles were sent up from Landi Kotal. The numbers of the Mohmands increased until, on the 29th November, some 700 of them were holding the river bank from Palosi to Kuz Narai, and keeping up a desultory fire on Shinpokh. They stated that they would not permit "Feringhees" to use the river, and it was reported that they were fed and encouraged by the Afghan Hakim of Lalpura. As Mr. Johns' work in the locality was finished, and it was considered that the retention of the Khyber Rifles in the neighbourhood would merely result in keeping hostile forces in existence which would probably melt away if they had no one to oppose, the escorts left Shilman on the 30th November, when the Mohmands dispersed, going on to Lalpura. Here they were incited by the Hakim to renew hostilities, and on 3rd December some 200 of them re-appeared



opposite Smatsai and kept up a brisk fire, causing the people to evacuate the village and take to the hills beyond. The Mohmands were opposed by the Smatsai and Shilmani *lashkars* and, as their numbers were not reinforced, they dispersed by the 6th December without having actually come into collision with any of the people on the British side of the river. The Mohmand Khans and the people of Smatsai and Shinpokh behaved well throughout the incident, and the Sarhang of Dakka appears to have exerted his influence to prevent his Khassadars from taking part in the disturbance. The whole incident was ascribed to the inflammatory speeches made by the Hakim of Lalpura, who not only fed the Mohmand *lashkar*, but promised them ammunition.

58. The operations against the Zakka Khel Afridis (see page 27) caused

(2) *General course of the disturbances.*

some excitement among the Mohmands and about 100 of them joined the *lashkar* which assembled on the Afghan border to help the Zakka Khel, while Mullas (among them the Sufi Sahib of Batikot) went about endeavouring, without success, to work up a general rising of the Mohmand clans. The Inzarai Mulla, with 80 men, was, early in March 1908, refused passage by the Halimzai section; but on the 24th, 25th and 30th March, gangs consisting of Bara Khel, Isa Khel, and Kuda Khel Mohmands, Kandahari Safis, and Ambahar Utman Khel, raided the villages of Marozai, Mirzadher, and Chikkar, near Shankargarh, killing two Hindus, wounding a third, and carrying off a fourth (who was returned soon after by the Burhan Khel Mohmands), in addition to looting and burning several Hindus' houses. Military detachments were sent to reinforce Shankargarh and Abazai, and to relieve the Border Military Police in the vicinity. Early in April a large hostile gathering, consisting of Utman Khels and various Kandahari, Bara Khel, Isa Khel, and Kuda Khel Mohmands under fanatical Mullas, assembled in the vicinity. The Kuda Khel Mohmand *Kaddas* left their country and took refuge with neighbouring clans, and Mullas, headed by Hazrat Sahib of Charbagh, who had been preaching in Ningrahar, crossed the river at Lalpura on the 10th April. They were joined by Sufi Sahib of Batikot with 1,500 men, the total strength of the two forces being estimated at over 3,000. The *ghaza* was said to be general, and villagers were joining in masses; the reported object being to attack Dheri Shabkadr, and to punish Malik Ghulam Khan of Pindiali for arresting two Kuda Khels and releasing a Hindu who was kidnapped during the raid on Mirzadher. On the 17th April, the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, telegraphed that the gathering was suspected to be due to a rumour that the British intended invading the Mohmand country, and that steps were being taken to reassure the clans through the Mohmand Chiefs.

59. On the 19th April, the tribal *lashkar*, which had increased to about 10,000 men, including about 2,000 Afghan subjects, headed by Hazrat Mulla and a son of the Sufi Sahib, reached Kamali. On the same day, a band of Mohmands fired on a patrol near Matta Moghal Khel within the British border and on a party of troops between Garhi Sadar and Matta. On the 21st April, a party of Mohmands crossed the border, and fired on the standing patrol in the British camp. A very large proportion of the assembled *lashkars* comprised well-armed subjects of the Amir, and their leaders were, almost without exception, Afghan Mullas. On the 23rd April, His Excellency the Viceroy wrote to the Amir informing His Majesty of the sudden outbreak of hostilities on the part of the Mohmands, and requesting him to send distinct and peremptory instructions for the immediate recall of the armed bodies of his subjects who were taking part in the affair, and to take such measures as His Majesty might think expedient to prevent the recurrence of so grave a violation of British territory.

60. In the meantime, the fanatical feeling spread to Bajaur and other tribal areas, and a force of Bajauris led by Mullas started for Shabkadr. On the night of the 22nd April, the tribesmen attacked Matta and the Garhi Sadar post (also the bridge-head at Adazai on the Peshawar-Shabkadr road) and looted a village five miles within the British border. The attack was repulsed, and, on the following day, Major-General Sir J. Willcocks, Commanding the Peshawar Division, was authorised to cross the border, if, for military reasons, he considered it necessary to occupy certain points, or to follow up the repulse of the enemy; but he was informed that the policy of His Majesty's Government against any permanent occupation of tribal territory should be carefully borne in mind. On the



24th April, orders were issued for the mobilisation of a field force for operations against the Mohmands, and an attack was made on the *lashkars*, which had taken up a position to the west of Shabkadr and Matta. The tribesmen offered a determined resistance, but were driven out of their sangars with severe loss. Afghan Mullas continued to preach *jihad*, and overtures were made to the Afridis and to the Dir and Swat tribes to join the hostile forces, but without success. On the 28th April, General Willcocks summoned jirgas of the Mohmands and the Safi tribes and Ambahar Utman Khels to attend at Shabkadr on the 4th May. Replies were received on the 30th April from the Burhan Khel and Ambahar Utman Khel, the former saying that they would obey the summons, and the latter that they would follow the Mohmands in any settlement made by that tribe with the General Commanding, and that, for the rest, they were Muhammadans.

61. General Willcocks was instructed on the 2nd May not to announce any definite terms to the Mohmand jirga, but to call on them to explain their conduct and to report the result to Government for orders; the attitude of the tribesmen might, it was hoped, be such as to render an expedition against them unnecessary. The reply sent by the Baezai Mohmands to the General's summons was truculent and offensive, that of the Kamali Halimzais was evasive, while the Isa Khel, Utmanzai, Dawezai, and some of the Safis definitely refused to attend the jirga. Their attitude was mainly due to the machinations of the Mullas, of whom Hazrat Sahib of Butkak appears to have been the most prominent in preaching resistance.

62. The Gandab Halimzai and Pindiali sections alone actually attended at Shabkadr, and, on being told that they could not be dealt with separately, they, on their own initiative, went round in jirga to the absent sections to try to induce them to come in. The remaining sections assembled at Lakai to discuss matters, but eventually decided not to obey the summons. As this behaviour made it impossible to effect any peaceful settlement, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India was asked, on the 9th May, to agree to an expedition being sent against the tribe. This decision was arrived at after obtaining the views of the loyal Maliks and Khans of the Khyber and Malakand Agencies, who were all agreed that no course was open save that of instant and drastic punishment. The proposal was sanctioned on the 10th May.

63. On the same day, General Willcocks saw the jirgas of the Gandab and Kamali Halimzai and the Pindialis, and told them that, as they were not representatives of the Mohmand tribe, he could not announce the terms of Government to them; but, as all except the Gandab-Halimzai were concerned in attacks on British territory, Government would take such measures against them as appeared suitable.

64. On the 11th May, the 1st and 2nd Brigades concentrated at Shabkadr ready to advance into Mohmand country, the 3rd Brigade occupying the posts on the Peshawar border, and, on the following day, the 1st and 2nd Brigades advanced to Hafiz Kor in the Gandab valley (which was friendly territory, the Tarakzai having accepted responsibility for their limits as far as Kharappa). Instructions were conveyed to General Willcocks, on the 13th May, to effect the submission of the Mohmands as soon as possible, to make it known that there would be no annexation of territory or change in existing relations with the Mohmands, to treat leniently any sections who had shown a disposition to submit, to avoid complications with Afghan tribes or sections, and to announce no terms without previous reference to Government. (Subsequently, on the 17th May, he was empowered to treat with each jirga as it came in, on the understanding that he reported his action in each case.)

65. The 12th and 13th May were occupied in the advance up the Gandab valley. The force was accompanied by the Tarakzai and Gandab Halimzai jirgas, who rendered friendly services. Nahakki was reached without molestation on the 14th, but a party reconnoitring the Khapak Pass (which was found to be strongly held) was fired on. Punitive measures commenced on the 15th: some Kamali Halimzai and Khwaezai hamlets were destroyed and the former section were summoned to submit. On the 16th the Khapak Pass was taken without much opposition, and more Khwaezai and Kamali hamlets were destroyed.

66. The same night a determined attack was made by a combined *lashkar* of Kuda Khel, Baezai, Khwaezai, Safis and Kamalis, on the camp at Darwazagai. The *lashkar* was beaten off, the British losses being 9 killed and 24 wounded. On the following day the punishment of the Kamalis was reported to be complete. Operations were then commenced against the Kandahari Safis, and were completed on the 18th. On the same day detachments went out to punish the Khwaezai and the Kuda Khel Baezai. On the night of the 18th, the Utmanzai and Dawezai attacked the camp at Nahakki, but were dispersed with heavy loss, the British casualties being very slight. The 2nd Brigade was strongly opposed by the Khwaezai and Baezai at Zanawar China. The enemy were dislodged with a loss of some 6 killed; three British officers were wounded and six rank-and-file killed and wounded. The Mitai Musa Khel jirga came in on the 19th, and were directed to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000 and surrender six English rifles. Again that night a determined attack was made on the camp at Nahakki, in which, however, though the fighting was almost hand-to-hand, the British casualties were insignificant.

67. On the 20th the 1st Brigade, with General Willcocks, advanced to Umra Killi, which was found to be strongly held by Dawezai, Utman Khel and Safis, who offered a stubborn resistance, and, though dislodged after some 200 had been killed, made several attacks on the camp during the night, the losses on the British side being five killed (including two British officers) and 17 wounded. On the 21st the 1st Brigade advanced to Chingai, where the Kandahari Safi jirga came in, but refused the terms demanded. After some of their towers had been destroyed, the Gurbuz and Mahsaud Safis came in and agreed to a fine of Rs. 4,500 for the whole Safi clan. On the 22nd the Lakarai Kotai was taken. It was held in great strength by the Safis and Mamunds, but they surrendered without much resistance. The Utmanzai were punished during the day and they and the Dawezai were ordered to come in at Mulla Killi. On the 24th, the Musa Khel and Safis furnished hostages for the payment of their fines, and the 1st Brigade marched down the Pipal valley without opposition, burning some Dawezai villages *en route*, till it reached Kargha (on the Ambahar river) where 2,000 Utman Khel and Bajauris opposed the advance; these were shelled out of their entrenchments, with a loss of 140 killed. On the same day, the Kamalis and Pindialis proffered their submission at Nahakki. The latter were ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000 and surrender six breech-loaders. The Ambahar Utman Khel were severely punished by the destruction of their hamlets and grain, with the result that during the march to Mulla Killi, which was reached on the 25th, no opposition was offered. The two brigades joined forces at Mulla Killi.

68. Sufficient progress had by this time been made towards the settlement of affairs to admit of General Willcocks being authorised to announce to all the "assured" Mohmand clans that, though outstanding allowances would be forfeited, the account with them would be regarded as settled and the payment of the customary allowances would begin to take effect forthwith. This decision was announced at a jirga of the subsidised clans at Nahakki on 27th May and was received with satisfaction.

69. By the 27th May, General Willcocks had visited and punished all the Mohmand sections (except the Baezai and Pindiali) as well as the Safis and the Ambahar Utman Khel; all sections, except the Baezai, had submitted, and had either paid up their fines or given hostages for early payment. The Baezai had refused to send in jirgas or pay the fines imposed on them, and accordingly, on the 27th May, General Willcocks, with the 2nd Brigade, advanced towards the Bohai Dag to punish them. The Kuda Khel towers were destroyed by the 29th May and General Willcocks, with the 2nd Brigade, commenced his return to the Peshawar District on the same day and arrived in British territory on the 31st. The 1st Brigade had, meanwhile, started on its return journey on the 27th May and arrived in the Peshawar District on the 30th May.

70. On the 30th, a jirga of all the "assured" clans and the Khwaezai met General Willcocks at Ghalanai, and presented to him a document signed by the leading Maliks to the effect that they intended to refuse passage to Baezai raiders and thieves and even to prevent the Baezai entering their country at all. They ascribed the punishment which they had received to the conduct of the Baezai. General Willcocks reported on the 31st May that all fines had been paid in and hostages had been released.

71. The foregoing is an account of the main operations against the Mohmands and their allies proper. The incident, however, was not without its effect on the areas bordering on Mohmand country.

72. News was received on the 29th April that a Khugiani *lashkar*, from 4,000

(4) *Effects on Khyber Agency and Afghanistan.*

to 6,000 strong, had arrived at Peshbolak in Ningrahar, and that a council, consisting of the Sufi Sahib, Mian Sahib of Tsappar, Colonel Ali Ahmed, Commandant of Kahi, and Mulla Naib, the leader of the Shinwaris, had decided to move the *lashkar* to Tanda China in Mirjan Khel Shinwari country, and to make an attack on the Khyber on the 30th April or 1st May. Later news stated that some of the leaders of the *lashkar*, which was estimated at between 7,000 and 8,000 men, were in favour of moving through Bazar, and not *viâ* Landi Kotal, and that the Sufi Sahib, before finally deciding, was awaiting replies to a proclamation which he had sent to the Afridis. The whole *lashkar* was fed by the Commandant of Kahi on the 29th, and supplies on a large scale were collected for the *lashkar* by Afghan officials of Ningrahar. An influential Mulla of Ningrahar informed the Political Agent, on the 30th April, that he had seen an autograph letter from Sardar Nasrulla Khan to the Sufi Sahib ordering him to raise Ningrahar against the English. The Mulla further reported that the Sufi Sahib's *lashkar*, which was encamped at Gullai near Peshbolak, had increased to about 10,000, the whole country between Kabul and Gandamak being up. Khassadars from Khurd Kabul, with their officers, had joined the *lashkar*; also contingents from Hissarak, Nimla, and Jagd Ilak. Inayatullah Khan (Zakka Khel), son of the refugee ex-Malik Khawas Khan, had also joined the *lashkar* from Kabul. The Sufi Sahib was said to be much disappointed at the very discouraging replies he had received from the Afridis, and threatened them with forfeiture of the allowances which they received from Kabul, unless they joined the hostile rising. He was undecided whether to proceed to the Kajurai plain *viâ* Bazar with the object of threatening Peshawar, or to the Khyber. Many Zakka Khels visited the Political Agent, and said that their tribe and all the Afridis wished to keep aloof from the disturbances, though, at an early stage of the Mohmand disturbances, endeavours were made to induce them to join.

73. On the 1st May, the Sufi Sahib's *lashkar*, estimated at between 10,000 and 16,000 strong, arrived at Tor Kham. A detachment had left for Sassobai, with the intention of inducing the Zakka Khel to join, while a second detachment went forward to demand the submission of the Loargai Shinwaris. On the 2nd May, a force of 12,000 camped near Landi Khana, while two standards appeared between Khargali and Darband, and a detachment entered Bazar to attack Malik Yar Muhammad Khan of Chura (who had helped the British during the Zakka Khel expedition). In consequence of these hostile demonstrations, General Willcocks' 3rd Brigade, with two guns, was sent from Peshawar to Jamrud, while the Seafortths, the Guides Infantry and a Mountain Battery were sent from Shabkadr in support. The *lashkar* had, in the meantime, occupied Khargali and Bagh and exchanged some shots with the Michni-Kandao garrison. The Loargi Shinwaris, by holding the hills north of the Landi Khana, forced the *lashkar* to approach from the south, the most strongly fortified side. On approaching Landi Khana, the leaders of the *lashkar* promised to let the garrison depart in safety if they surrendered the post and paid a fine of Rs. 60,000. At night the *lashkar* made repeated efforts to take the Michni-Kandao block house—the attack lasting 17 hours. They were, however, repulsed by the Khyber Rifles under Subadar Tor Khan. At 10 p. m. fire was opened on Landi Kotal from several directions, but the enemy, having sustained many casualties, retired to Khargali at daybreak on the 3rd. Simultaneously with the above attacks, attempts were made to occupy the hills commanding Landi Kotal from the north-west, but were frustrated by the Loargai Shinwaris. On the following day, General Willcocks drove the *lashkar* (which was reported to consist entirely of Afghans and to contain no tribesmen from the British side of the border) back to Afghan limits. The remnants hovered about the border for a day or two and then disappeared. The Sufi Sahib accompanied the *lashkar* which went to Bazar and summoned the Afridi jirga to meet him. On the failure of his efforts he and his following returned to Afghanistan.

74. Afghan animosity was excited against the Afridis by their loyalty to the British. Several Afridi traders were seized in Afghan limits, and an Afghan Mulla brought letters to the Afridis, which purported to come from Sardar Nasrulla Khan, upbraiding them for cowardice and, those in receipt of Afghan allowances, for ingratitude, and threatening to exclude all Afridis from Afghanistan. The Mulla endeavoured to incite the Zakka Khel to raid in British territory, but was ordered out of Bazar. The Zakka Khel wrote to the Commandant of Kahi complaining of the seizure of their traders and disclaiming their belief in *ghazas* which were led, not by a King, but by Mullas and minor officials who could be repudiated, as had happened in the case of the Mohmands. They also wrote to certain Afghan Mullas to the effect that they wanted no more of them in Tirah to stir up trouble and then desert them.

75. Ningrahar was for some time in a disturbed condition, and an informant at Kabul expressed the opinion that, had the British troops sustained any reverses, *jehad* would have been preached in Afghanistan, and the Mohmands would have secured many recruits. The excitement had died down by the end of May.

76. Sardar Nasrulla Khan was correctly reported to have been the author of all the mischief. His behaviour was ascribed to various motives, *e.g.*, a desire to show the unity of Islam and the power of Afghanistan, a dislike of the Anglo-Russian Convention and a marked hatred of the British. Various opinions were expressed as to the Amir's attitude in the matter. It was asserted that he left the conduct of affairs entirely in his brother's hands, devoted himself exclusively to pleasure and amusement and was deliberately kept in the dark as to what was transpiring: other reports said that he was perfectly cognisant of what was happening and, though he did not actively encourage his subjects to join the disturbances, he at first made no efforts to prevent their doing so. However this

(5) *Correspondence with the Amir.*

may be, on receipt of the Viceroy's message of the 24th April His Majesty replied (on the 5th May) that he had issued strict orders to his officials to prevent his subjects crossing into British territory, though on account of the innumerable and little known routes which led from his to the British dominions and the obscurity of the boundary in some places, it would not be possible altogether to prevent Afghans crossing the border. He accounted for the presence of Afghans with the Mohmand *lashkar* by stating that some of his Shaikhs had, as usual, gone to the Mohmands to collect tithes and were detained in the country, owing to the outbreak of the disturbances. Concurrently with the despatch of this letter, the Amir peremptorily recalled the Afghan Mullas from the Mohmand and Afridi tracts, and caused it to be publicly announced that he disapproved of his subjects going to join the Mohmands, while he ordered several Mullas, who had taken part in the fighting, to be sent to Kabul, where the more important of them were kept under surveillance. As a result of this attitude, but few Afghans joined the Mohmands when the punitive expedition was sent against the latter. The Mohmands' appeal to the Afghans for help met with so little response, that they informed the Amir that they would hand over their country to the British unless they received assistance.

77. In replying, on the 19th May, to the Amir's letter of the 5th, His Majesty was informed that a number of Afghan tribesmen and khassadars had raided British territory near Shabkadr, and that an Afghan *lashkar*, assisted by Afghan officials, had made an unprovoked attack on Landi Kotal and he was requested to impress on his officials that it was absolutely necessary to prevent the recurrence of these violations of the frontier of a friendly Government.

78. The Amir had been informed, on the 16th May, of the despatch of an expedition against the Mohmands. In his reply, dated the 22nd May, he assumed that the expedition was not being sent against the entire Mohmand tribe, but only against such sections of it as were under British jurisdiction: and he drew attention to the fact that the boundary of the Mohmand country was undemarcated and emphasised the necessity for the British troops to take care not to encroach on reputed Afghan territory, "lest such action may lead to some disturbance."

79. On the 2nd June, His Excellency sent a telegraphic message to the Amir informing him privately of the return of the British troops from the Mohmand

country, and expressing a hope that the troops had not interfered with any of His Majesty's subjects near the frontier. His Excellency also thanked the Amir for the assistance he had given in restraining his tribes. On the 12th June, the Viceroy replied to the Amir's letter of the 22nd May regarding the punitive expedition sent against the Mohmands. His Excellency said that he fully realized the difficulties with which His Majesty had to contend in dealing with the unruly conduct of some of his subjects, and thanked him for the effective steps he had taken to prevent any recurrence of the regrettable incidents which had recently occurred on the frontier. The Amir was informed that those of the Mohmand tribes subject to the British Government, who had been guilty of unprovoked attacks on British troops and garrisons on the Peshawar border, had been duly punished, and had tendered their submission.

80. On the 21st June, the Amir acknowledged the receipt of His Excellency the Viceroy's letter of the 19th May 1908, and referred to His Excellency's telegraphic message of the 2nd June. His Majesty expressed himself as perfectly convinced that the Viceroy had given stringent orders that there should be no interference with Afghan territory: nevertheless, he pointed out that "action was taken and damage done by the said troops in the limits of Khawajazai, which had been fixed as belonging to Afghanistan," in accordance with the correspondence which took place between Lord Elgin and the late Amir in 1896-97. The Amir concluded by saying:—"Your Excellency will, of course, call to account the persons who may have taken these steps in spite of Your Excellency's instructions and prohibitions."

81. The disturbances in the Mohmand country were not long in spreading to Bajaur, where a nest of malcontent Mullahs, outlaws, and rifle thieves, sheltered in the Babukarra and Chaharmung valleys, lived secure in the anarchy that had resulted from the family quarrels among the Tarkhanre Khans. The Nawab of Nawagai and the leading men of Bajaur remained loyal to Government, but the Chaharmungis and Mamunds joined the hostile factions. In consequence of this, the Dir levy post of Panjkora Bridge was reinforced, and as it transpired that the Chaharmung Mulla was in negotiation with the Sartor Fakir and the Upper Swat tribes, and that the Salarzais, Mamunds, Shamozaïs and Utman Khel were advancing to destroy the bridge, the Khans of Dir, Jar, and Nawagai, with *lashkars* from Dir, Jandol and Swat, undertook its defence. The Khans were offered the assistance of troops, but unanimously expressed themselves as able and willing to defend their own borders. They were permitted to do so, not only because they considered their tribal honour was involved, but also because the absence of British Government troops would make it impossible for the hostile element to treat a conflict against their own co-religionists as *ghaza*—as indeed, some of the Swat Mullahs were the first to point out.

82. The Bajaur *lashkar* (reported to be 12,000 strong) advanced to Mian Killi, near Khar, at the end of April, but, finding the Panjkora bridge strongly defended, dispersed. The Bajauris appear to have been instigated in this attempt by the Hazrat Sahib and Sufi Sahib, whom some of their Mullahs had recently visited. On the failure of this first attempt, the Bajaur Mullahs tried to tamper with the Upper Swat tribes, but, though the Sartor Fakir endeavoured to raise a *lashkar*, Gul Shahzada Miangul refused to assist the malcontents and this effort failed, as did also a similar attempt on the part of the Sartor Fakir, at the beginning of May, to raise the Khan Khels, Ranizais and other tribes of Lower Swat.

83. On the 3rd May, the Political Agent received instructions that the commendations of the Viceroy should be communicated to the Khan of Dir and the Khans of Swat for the part which they had played in the holding of the Panjkora, and their steadiness in the face of fanatical movement. His Excellency's orders were telephoned to the Panjkora bridge, where the Khan of Dir and his Chiefs immediately assembled and asked that a reply might be sent, saying that the receipt of the news had increased their strength threefold and that no Bajauri or Afghan Mulla should have access to the Chitral road. The Khans of Swat, to whom the message was conveyed personally by the Political Agent at Chakdarra, asked that the Viceroy might be informed how much His Excellency's message had pleased them.



84. Early in May the Mullas endeavoured to incite the Mamunds, Salarzais, Chaharmungis and other Bajauris to go to the assistance of the Mohmands. These efforts had no effect and the Mohmands made a fresh appeal to the Babarra Mulla, but up to the 18th May no response was made, partly because harvesting operations were engaging every one's attention and partly because, having taken part in raids into the Peshawar District, the Bajauris feared the wrath of Government, and, moreover, apprehended that, if they left their territories undefended, the Khans of Khar, Mundah and Barwah might take possession of their lands. By degrees, however, small parties of Shamozaïs, Salarzais, Mamunds, people of Nawagai, Mandals, and Chaharmungis joined the Mohmands, till eventually there was a force, estimated at 6,000 men, in the Mohmand country, under the leadership of the Babarra, Inzarai and Doda Mullas. These *lashkars* sustained heavy losses at Yakhdand on the 20th May and Ambahar on 24th May and were dispersed, the Shamozaï subsequently offering to pay any fine to avoid invasion of their territory.

85. Considerable excitement was caused on the Kurram border by the occurrences in the Mohmand country, and emissaries were deputed by Mullas to stir up the Jajis, (7) *Effects on Kurram Border.* Massozais, and other tribes. The situation was regarded by the Political Agent as serious; and an invasion of Kurram seemed to be imminent, when news was received that, under the Amir's orders, the local Governors had been directed to prevent their people from taking any part in the hostile proceedings initiated by the Mullas. On the 16th May, the Political Agent telegraphed that excitement among the tribes round Upper Kurram had practically ended, and that intercourse between Parachinar and Ah Khel had been resumed.

86. On the 2nd May the Viceroy expressed his appreciation, both of the manner in which the Political Agents, Khyber, and Malakand were meeting the difficulties which had arisen, and of the loyalty and steadfastness under temptation of the Afridi Maliks, and Dir and Swat Khans. Substantial rewards were sanctioned for all concerned, including, besides the Afridis, Swatis and men of Dir, the Loargai Shinwaris, the Shilmanis, and the Mullagoris.

87. Early in July reports were received on the political operations and results of the Mohmand expedition. The Government of India considered that the object of the expedition had been realized with conspicuous success, in the course of operations exceptionally short in duration; that due punishment had been inflicted on all offending sections of the Mohmands; and that, as far as could be judged, no bitterness had been left in the minds of the vanquished tribes.

88. In September 1908, Sir George Roos-Keppel submitted proposals for the creation of a Political Agency for the charge of the Mohmands. He remarked that, by their composition and traditions, the Mohmands were more easy to control than any of the Pathan tribes of this border, as they were less rabidly democratic than the Afridis, Orakzais, and Wazirs, and they had the remnants of an aristocratic constitution, due to their subordination to the Khans of Lalpura, which only ended in 1879, and of which the traditional feeling remained. In spite of the conspicuous failure of their efforts to induce other tribes to give trouble, the Afghans had not lost hope of using the Mohmands as a catspaw, and the Chief Commissioner looked upon the present position *vis-à-vis* the Mohmands as dangerous, as they were in closer touch with Kabul than with India. A conflagration in the Mohmand country was not only likely to be fanned from Ningrahar, but might involve the tribes of the Malakand Agency to the north and those of the Khyber Agency to the south. Although the Mohmand tribe had been nominally under the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, its management had in practice been neglected, owing to the latter officer being overworked. Sir George Roos-Keppel accordingly proposed to entrust the charge of the Mohmands to an independent Political Agent directly under the Chief Commissioner, and had no doubt that such a measure would be popular with the Mohmands, who had frequently expressed a wish to be separated from the Peshawar District. The Political Agent's principal duty would be to make friends with the Mohmands, to get to know them thoroughly, and to work up in the tribe a "Government party" such as existed among the Afridis.



89. The Government of India, in reply, reminded the Chief Commissioner that a considerable number of Mohmands was settled in the Peshawar District, and that there was close connection between them and the Mohmands in independent territory : a fear was expressed that there might be confusion if the relations of the Political Officer to the Deputy Commissioner were not clearly defined, and the Chief Commissioner was accordingly asked to submit his own views, together with those of the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, as to the manner in which the relations in question should be adjusted. In reply the Chief Commissioner expressed the opinion that to define at the outset the relations between the two officers in question, by means of hard-and-fast rules or instructions, would be a mistake. He thought that experience would soon show how far and where any confusion might arise, and that it would then be an easy matter to devise remedial measures. He was informed in February 1909 that the Government of India considered that the proposal to establish a Political Agency had much to commend it. He was, however, asked to state to what extent it was possible to effect economies as a set off against the proposed expenditure, which was estimated not to exceed Rs. 35,000 a year. The further consideration of the proposal has been postponed for the present.

90. In June 1908, some Halimzai Mohmand elders applied to be taken under the Amir's protection; while several Khwaezai and Baezai families, who had taken refuge at Lalpura, applied to the Amir for pecuniary assistance. The Amir sent an agent to the Mohmand country to assess the damage done by the British troops during the expedition, and it was reported in August that arrangements were being made to compensate the Mohmands accordingly. It does not appear that any actual payments were made to the Mohmands, but they were exempted from tolls and taxes in Afghan limits. In June the Amir sent 40 rafts of logs from Kunar to enable the Kuda Khel Mohmands to rebuild their houses, and the Sufi Sahib and other Mullas summoned the Mohmand Maliks to Jalalabad to induce those who had not suffered in the expedition to help those whose houses and crops had been destroyed.

91. At intervals between July 1908 and January 1909, *jirgas* of various sections of the Mohmands visited Afghanistan, were well treated, given rewards and evasive promises. The local Governors were said to have extolled the valour of the Mohmands in their encounter with the British, and to have recommended their leaders for rewards and honours, but the only Mohmand who was known to have received any special marks of favour was Sardar Khan of Girdab, who was given a cash reward and a robe of honour by Sardar Nasrulla Khan in October 1908, and an increase of allowance by the Amir in March 1909. For the rest, the Amir rejected a proposal from Sardar Nasrulla Khan to issue free ammunition to the Mohmands to help them in their fights with the British, and an evasive reply was given to their request to the Amir either to be given active assistance against the British or to be taken under Afghan protection.

92. From June 1909 onwards the Amir continued to make overtures to the unsubsidised sections of the Mohmand tribe.

93. On the night of the 18th August 1908, a raid was committed at Adizai on the Peshawar-Shabkadr road. The original objective of the raid was said to have been Shankargarh, but this scheme was found impracticable owing to the Khybari nullah being in flood, and the raiders therefore decided to loot the Hindus of Adizai.

(1) *Raid on Adizai.*  
Four Hindus' shops were looted, and three persons were carried off by the raiders, *viz.*, a Hindu named Gurmuk, and his son and daughter. The precise number of the gang is uncertain, but it included a small party of Afghan Mohmands of Kuda Khel, a large number of Kandahari Safis and also some Ambahar Utman Khel. Muhasil (Kuda Khel), and an outlaw named Danur Shah, were identified and Muhasil was seen with the captured Hindus near the Khapak pass.

94. The *jirgas* of the Tarakzai, Gandab Halimzai, Kamali Halimzai, Burhan Khel, and Isa Khel Mohmands, to whom the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, explained their responsibility, undertook to concert measures for the restoration of the Hindus, and to prevent further raids through their limits. The Chief Com-

missioner reported on the 8th September that the Mohmand *jirga* had brought the Hindus in unconditionally and without payment of ransom.

95. On the 12th September, the Chief Commissioner had an interview at

(2) *Chief Commissioner's interview with the Mohmand jirga.* Peshawar with a representative Mohmand *jirga*, including the Tarakzai, the Gandab and Kamali Halimzai, the Isa Khel and

Burhan Khel Pindiali, the Utmanzai, the Dawezai and the Maimund Khel section of the Khwaezai. The demeanour of the *jirga* was all that could be desired. They put forward a number of petitions for arrears of allowances, for an increase of allowances, for the release of prisoners, for the appointment of an officer who would stay long enough for them to get to know him, etc. The Chief Commissioner told them that, but for the Adizai raid, he would have granted some of their petitions at once, but that he would not do so now in reply to a raid and a threat of others; that they should show the genuineness of their promises to do service by giving raiders to understand that they would not only not help them, but would, if necessary, attack them. They promised that they would do their best, but pointed out that raids were so openly encouraged from Kabul, and the rewards of raiding so high, that it would not be easy to stop them. As regards their petition about a permanent officer, the Chief Commissioner told them that the matter was under consideration. The Chief Commissioner, in communicating this information to the Government of India, remarked that after the close of the expedition, the Mohmands were never told definitely that peace had been made; in consequence of this omission, they did not know whether they were at liberty to visit British territory or not, whether hostilities were formally at an end, or whether the punishment they had received was only an instalment, and they were still liable to further invasion. The Chief Commissioner definitely assured them that the British Government were at peace with them, and had no hostile intentions towards them, though, of course, they would be punished if they misconducted themselves again; also that the recent expedition had wiped out all claims, and that all were now free to move and trade freely in British territory. This much relieved their minds; they said quite openly that they had believed, or suspected, that the British intended to attack them again, and that, when they received warnings (from Kabul) to the same effect, assurance was made doubly sure. At the conclusion of the interview, the *jirga* went off reassured and in a very good temper.

96. On the recommendation of the Chief Commissioner, sanction was accorded, in February 1909, to a re-arrangement of the Mohmand allowances, involving an additional annual expenditure of Rs. 10,900.

(3) *Re-arrangement of the Mohmand allowances.*

97. It was reported in November and December 1908 and January 1909, that

(4) *Mohmand unrest.*

various Mullas were wandering about in Mohmand territory, preaching *jihad*, and exhorting the people to defend their country against the *kafirs*. Efforts were also made, at the instigation, it is said, of Afghan officials, to raise a large Mohmand *lashkar* to raid in British territory. These efforts have, so far, been fruitless and the peace of the country has not been disturbed.

98. In November 1909 the Mullas again began to show considerable activity in Mohmand limits. The Mitai Musa Khel wrote to say that they wished to attend at Shabkadr, but feared the Babarra Mulla, Mian Sahib of Sarkani, and the Badshah Sahib.

99. The Babarra Mulla of Chaharmung was reported in October 1909 to be

Relations between the Khan of Nawagai and the Kandahari Safis.

collecting a force of 5,000 Mohmands and Bajauris with the object of settling certain disputes among the Kandahari Safis. Thereafter he intended (apparently on the invitation of the Halimzai) to proceed against the Tarakzai. The Tarakzai appealed to the Baezai and Khwaezai not to join the Mulla's forces. The Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, warned the Halimzais against allowing the Babarra Mulla to enter their limits.

100. The *lashkars* of Muhammad Ali Khan, son of the Nawab of Nawagai, and the Khan of Khar attacked the Kandahari Safis on the 15th November, and retired after a severe fight. Six Kandahari villages were burnt by Muhammad Ali Khan.

The Utmanzais, Dawezais, and other Mohmand clans, to whom the Kandaharis appealed for help, negotiated for an amicable settlement. Muhammad Ali Khan's desire was to make the Kandaharis acknowledge the chieftainship of the Khan of Nawagai and as a practical proof of submission he wished them to pay to him a nominal share of produce. The Khans of Bajaur, with a small force, came in jirga to the Kandaharis to advise them to acknowledge the chieftainship of the Khan of Nawagai; but shortly afterwards all the Mohmand jirgas, with the exception of the Baezais, assembled in Kandahari Safi territory and took an oath on the Koran to help the Kandahari Safis if the Khan of Nawagai tried to enforce his claims against them. The Khan and the Kandahari Safis agreed to a truce for two months.

101. The feud recommenced in April and the Isa Khel Mohmands actively helped the Kandahari Safis.

102. In May the Kandahari Safis built towers on the lands in dispute between them and the Khan of Nawagai.

### KHYBER AGENCY.

103. On the 4th January 1906, the Government of India reported to the Secretary of State the arrangements that had

#### Kabul River Railway.

River Railway. The Mohmand Tarakzai jirga were prepared, in return for increased allowances, to undertake all responsibilities regarding the protection of the railway, the construction of which, up to mile 300, had been sanctioned by His Majesty's Government on the 11th July 1905. In the event of increased allowances being granted, the jirga were prepared to furnish necessary escorts, and to give, for service in the Border Military Police at Michni, men who would patrol the line and assist the tribe in carrying out their engagements.

#### (1) Protective arrangements.

104. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, accordingly proposed to negotiate with the Tarakzai Mohmands on this basis, and to conclude an agreement, in return for the payment of additional allowances, not exceeding Rs. 5,000 a year to the tribe, and Rs. 4,800 a year to the two ex-Khans of Lalpura, for the protection of the line up to mile 300. In addition to this, an annual expenditure of Rs. 5,675 was recommended on account of the Mohmand tribesmen whom it was proposed to employ in the Peshawar Border Military Police. On the 9th November 1905, the Government of India sanctioned these proposals, provided that the Tarakzai undertook in writing the complete responsibility for the protection of the railway and all works connected with it, and for the safety of the river, if used for carriage, etc., up to mile 300 or tribal limits, whichever was furthest, and that it was open to Government at any time to cancel or revise the arrangement, if in their opinion it was unsatisfactory, in which case the extra allowances would drop.

105. Should it eventually be decided to continue the railway line on the Kabul River route, further tribal allowances would be necessary, and the Halimzai section of the Mohmands would have to be included in the arrangements.

106. Reports were received that the construction of the line up to mile 300 was

#### (2) Alternative routes.

progressing favourably, and its completion up to that point was expected by the beginning of April 1907. The alignment of the railway from mile 300 onwards had not, however, been settled, there being two possible routes:—

(1) The Shilman Ghakke route.

(2) The Kabul River route.

107. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, pointed out to the Government of India in May 1906, that, in the event of the former route being selected, the absence of water at the Ghakke and the fact that no road existed and that heavy material to assist the railway could only be brought up with great difficulty, were very serious considerations which would have to be faced; whereas the advantages of a railhead at either Shimpokh or Smatzai—which would be secured

in the event of the river alignment being followed—seemed apparent since, in addition to the absence of the difficulties of the other route, work could be pushed forward more rapidly in case of necessity from either of these places than from the Ghakke.

108. The military authorities, while admitting that the river line appeared preferable from an engineering point of view, both as regards its construction and extension, pointed out that the question of its protection in time of war was one the importance of which could not be over-estimated, and that all considerations of ease, cost, or rapidity of construction, must give way to that of safe and uninterrupted working, and that this consideration must be the deciding factor in settling the alignment to be adopted.

109. The Government of India again addressed the Chief Commissioner on the subject in October, and stated that, in order to enable them to arrive at a definite decision on the points in question, they proposed deputing a railway expert who would examine the possible railheads at Shinpokh and Smatzai and would, if possible, survey the western slope of the Shilman Ghakke Pass. At the same time they asked for the Chief Commissioner's opinion as to the defensibility of these routes in time of war. The latter, while showing, in his reply of November 1906, that there would be no great difficulty in defending either route—an opinion which was also held by the Political Agent, Khyber—stated that he had no hesitation in advising the alignment of the railway by the river route. The military authorities did not consider that the Chief Commissioner had thrown much light on the comparative defensibility of the two lines, and still held the opinion that the Shilman Ghakke route would be the safer. Accordingly, on the 7th January 1907, Mr. Harington was selected by the Government of India as railway expert to advise them on the question of a possible alignment for a railway down the western slope of the Shilman Ghakke Pass.

110. Mr. Harington visited Shilman Ghakke, Smatzai, Esagai, the Shilman

(3) *Mr. Harington's report.*

Nulla, Shahid Miana and Warsak, and submitted his report in April. He came to the

conclusion that an alignment along the Kabul River would be commanded at several points from the opposite bank, and, in time of war, would be exposed to attack along the greater portion of its length; he advocated alternative lines *via* Loi Shilman and Shilman Ghakke or Esagai, and he indicated that Smatzai would make an extremely good rail-head. His views were strongly supported by the military authorities, who condemned the river route as positively indefensible in war, and recommended that the construction of the portion of the line common to Mr. Harington's alternative projects (*i.e.*, from mile 300 to Tor Sappar) should be proceeded with.

111. The Civil Departments of the Government of India, on the other hand, noted that the river route presented easier gradients and curves than the "overland" routes, would admit of the haulage of heavier loads and would be cheaper and quicker to construct. Consequently, from a commercial and economical point of view, the river route was held by these departments to be preferable to Mr. Harington's alternative routes.

112. His Excellency Lord Minto, after an exhaustive study of the case, noted in August 1907 that Mr. Harington's report had been hurriedly drawn up and was practically valueless. His alternative routes were prepared after a bird's-eye view from the crest of a hill and an extremely short visit to some of the localities concerned, and he quite overlooked natural difficulties which were known to be present. His Excellency, moreover, was by no means convinced that the river route was as dangerous as it was generally considered to be. His Excellency quoted Sir Harold Deane's statement that the Tarakzai and Halimzai Mohmands would undertake the protection of the line up to Sara Tiga, and expressed the view that, probably, nothing worse was to be apprehended than small raids by *badmashes*, and that a river, which could be swept by search-lights and patrolled by boats, could be much more easily guarded than could the broken ground surrounding a railway on the mountains. The Viceroy was, finally, of opinion that there was already sufficient evidence to justify the acceptance of the river route, but proposed that the route should be examined in detail by a railway expert and that full information should be furnished as to the possibilities of water transport afforded by the Kabul River.

113. Accordingly, in October 1907, Mr. Johns, Superintending Engineer, was deputed to report on the following points:—  
 (4) *Mr. Johns' report.*

- (1) the comparative cost of the two alignments from mile 300 to Smat-zai: (a) *viâ* the Kabul river, (b) *viâ* Esagai;
- (2) the gradients and haulage capacity of either route;
- (3) the comparative vulnerability of either route and the possibility of readily repairing damage to the line;
- (4) the risk of railway accidents on either route; and
- (5) the utility of the Kabul river as a waterway.

114. Mr. Johns devoted November to an examination of the routes, but owing to the opposition of the Mohmands, mentioned on page 9 above, was not able to go down the Kabul river. He returned to Peshawar on 2nd December.

115. Mr. Johns' report, which was received in January 1908, indicated that an "overland route," with a gradient of between 1 in 25 and 1 in 30, could be obtained; but that, to admit of the steep gradients having the same carrying power as the rest of the line, it would be necessary to construct a double line in the steep parts and use ghât engines. He estimated the cost at about 150 lakhs, *plus* the cost of ghât engines.

116. The river route, according to Mr. Johns, would have a ruling gradient of about 1 in 200, would cost only 120 lakhs, its carrying capacity would be rather more than double that of the overland line, and it would be immune from the accidents incidental to working heavy traffic on steep gradients.

117. Mr. Johns was of opinion that the high bridges and retaining walls on Mr. Harington's "overland route" rendered it specially liable to serious damage by hostile forces; he did not consider either the river route or the 1—25 to 1—30 double line to be liable to damage which could not quickly be remedied by the temporary employment of trestles, sleepers, and the like; he thought that the 10 miles already constructed could be made perfectly secure from attack, and he did not regard the rest of the line as in particular danger from hostile forces. Both routes were, in Mr. Johns' opinion, on much the same footing in regard to liability to damage from natural causes, the rocks being sound and solid on both.

118. Mr. Johns favoured the river route on grounds of economy, carrying capacity, and relative invulnerability, and his conclusions were emphatically endorsed by Sir Harold Deane.

119. His report included data as to the rise and fall of the Kabul river, and established the fact that the existing railway works were well above the level of even abnormal floods, except at Shahid Miani, where, however, no damage need be apprehended even by the most abnormal flood, everything being on solid foundation. His examination of the river showed that the average depth of the water was about 20 feet except at the rapids, and its velocity was from 2 to 7 miles an hour. There were rapids every 2 miles or so. Mr. Johns pointed out that the question to what extent the river could be used as a water-way was really a question for an expert in river navigation; he strongly urged, however, that, if the river route were adopted, 5 lakhs should be set aside for thoroughly investigating the possibilities of a waterway.

120. In consequence of the disturbed state of the frontier, troops were despatched to Shahid Miana in April 1908 to guard the Loi-Shilman Railway, and orders were issued for the withdrawal of working parties; while it was decided in June to defer resumption of work on the railway till the autumn, and the military guard which had been placed over the railway was withdrawn.

121. In January 1909, a report was received from the Executive Engineer, Kabul River Railway, to the effect that the position as regards the work on the railway was practically the same as when work was closed in May 1908. The rail-head was six miles above Warsak, but tunnels and cuttings had been



partially done up to mile 300. The Executive Engineer remarked that to complete the line up to mile 300 would take at least two years from the time that work was resumed.

122. On the 3rd February, His Majesty's Secretary of State telegraphed that he noticed that certain survey parties had been detailed for surveys beyond mile 300 on the Loi Shilman Railway. He pointed out that such surveys would be inconsistent with the instructions in his despatch of the 25th December 1908, postponing further expenditure on the line. In reply, the Secretary of State was informed that enquiries regarding the survey parties had already been made; that the surveys were merely confined to adding some contours, not marked on existing maps, for a mile or so beyond mile 300; that the local railway officials had put the work in hand without reference to higher authority; that the survey parties had been withdrawn, and that strict instructions had since been issued that no work of any kind was to be done beyond mile 300, without specific orders.

123. Their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales (now His Majesty King George V and Queen Mary) and suite, accompanied by the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, and escorted by the Khyber Rifles, visited the Khyber Pass on the 4th December 1905. The Afridi Malik offered sheep to the Royal party at Ali Masjid on return from Landi Kotal, and everything passed off quietly. Previous to the visit several deputations of Afridis waited on the Political Agent and offered their services.

124. In July 1907 commenced the usual annual visits to Kabul of Afridis in receipt of allowances from the Amir. The (2) *Visits of Afridis to Afghanistan.* Zakka Khel are said to have been particularly well received by Sardar Nasrulla Khan and they returned with handsome presents, while almost all the Afridis returned with arms purchased at Kabul—the sales were not only conducted openly but the arms were exempted from tolls on the way back. Dadai (Anai Zakka Khel) was given a purse of Rs. 1,000, a valuable shawl, and a horse, and was said to have been appointed the Sardar's Agent in Bazar and Tirah. Mulla Saiyid Akbar (Aka Khel) was reported to have been granted Rs. 5,000 for political expenditure and given a handsome reward in addition to his allowance. Usman (Khusrogi) was given Rs. 800. Many of the old allowances were increased by the Sardar, several new allowances were granted, and all were loud in praise of the Sardar's generosity and sympathy.

125. A large number of Afridis went in March 1908 to Jalalabad to pay their respects to the Amir. They were received by the Shahghasi and paid the usual *rukhsatana*. Multan (Anai Zakka Khel) is said to have received a *lungi* and a larger *rukhsatana* than the others, and to have been given permission to settle in Nakhtarnao in Afghan territory, with a permanent allowance of 5 *kharwars* of grain and Rs. 280 a year. The Shahghasi told the Afridis that he would be pleased to arrange for an interview with the Amir if a representative Zakka Khel jirga came to Jalalabad before His Majesty's departure for Kabul. The Shahghasi praised the pluck of the Zakka Khels in fighting against the British troops, and passed unfavourable remarks on what he styled the cowardly conduct of the other Afridis in arriving at such an early settlement. On the other hand, Mulla Saiyid Akbar who, during the Bazar valley expedition, did much to restrain the Afridis, took part in the recent punishment of raiders by the Afridi chiefs and elders, and used his great influence to help the latter, is said to have received a message from Afghanistan to the effect that, as he did not join the *ghaza* and did not go to Jalalabad to pay his respects to the Amir, he need not trouble to go to Kabul for his allowances in the summer.

126. The Afridis asked Sardar Nasrulla Khan when they should come for their allowances; the Sardar replied in June that he did not want them for the present. He was annoyed with them for not helping the Sufi Sahib in the *ghaza* against the British Government.

127. Notwithstanding the above, in response to summonses from the Commandant of Kahi, small parties of Zakka Khel, Aka Khel, and Kuki Khel started for Kabul early in August—the maximum number present being estimated at only



240 men. On the 17th August, the Afridis were accorded an interview by Sardar Nasrulla Khan, who made the customary anti-British exhortations and upbraided the Afridis for not having helped the Zakka Khel and Mohmands in their recent troubles. He then referred to the possibility of trouble in Waziristan, and expressed a hope that the Afridis would not abandon the Wazirs to their fate. Finally, the Sardar said that he had opened markets for the sale of arms and ammunition throughout Afghanistan, and that he hoped full advantage would be taken of the prices which had been fixed, which, though moderate, he was prepared, if necessary, to reduce still further. The Afridis did not see the Amir, were paid only half their allowances, and were told to return after the *Ramzan* for the *ba'ance*.

128. Seventy-two representatives of the Tirah Afridis submitted a petition to Sardar Nasrulla Khan in August, stating that they had been directed by the members of their tribe to make the following requests:—

- (i) that they might be allowed to offer four battalions of infantry, each composed of one thousand men of their tribe, for service under the Amir. The pay of the men to be the same as that given to other Muhammadans and two battalions at a time to be granted leave to visit their homes; and
- (ii) that they might be supplied with three guns, with artillerymen, for purposes of defence against the British.

They offered to bring Afridis and other tribesmen, who were in British employ, over to the service of the Amir, provided that the men were granted protection under the Afghan Government.

129. In September and November, more parties of Afridis arrived at Kabul to receive their allowances. The British Agent in Kabul reported that the ostensible reason of the visit of these Afridis to Kabul was to get allowances, but that their real object was to purchase arms. In connection with the visit of these tribesmen to Kabul the British Agent observed that they fell into the hands of Mullas of the worst type; they daily visited the house of Khawas Khan, who was one of the chief agents of Sardar Nasrulla Khan, and listened to fanatical speeches; they visited the mosque and associated with the "spiritual guides" of these institutions. All this, the British Agent remarked, tended to combine the various tribal clans, and thus to be a menace to the peace of the border.

130. Multan was in Kabul throughout July 1908. He paid several private visits to Sardar Nasrulla Khan, and on the 27th July the Amir offered him and his party, houses, lands and allowances in Kabul or Jalalabad. They are said to have declined to settle in Afghanistan, whereupon the Amir gave them robes of honour and fixed allowances for them (varying from Rs. 400 per annum for Multan himself, to Rs. 200 or less for each of his followers) and referred to them as his "powerful arms." Multan and his party took advantage of being in Kabul to buy a large number of rifles.

131. In May 1909 the Governor of Jalalabad invited the Afridi elders of Tirah, Bara, and Bazar, to send their *jirgas* to Kabul.

132. Mulla Saiyid Akbar and some other Mullas and Afridis visited Kabul in June and were asked by Sardar Nasrulla Khan what they had done in the matter of punishing Mir Ahmed Shah of Barg for his complicity in the raid on the village of Sultanpur in Ningrahar. The raid was committed, for personal and private reasons, to discredit Usman and Dadai (Anai Zakka Khel) in the eyes of the Afghan Foreign Office. Mulla Saiyid Akbar promised to take Mir Ahmed Shah to Kabul, or to send him there with Dadai. In the meantime, Dadai's efforts to induce Mir Ahmed Shah to go to Kabul failed, and the Mir visited the Political Agent at Landi Kotal. The Political Agent remarked that Mir Ahmed Shah had become "a valuable asset to us." Overtures were made by Dadai, through Malik Yar Muhammad Khan (Malikdin Khel) to submit to the Khyber authorities, with a view to his being reinstated in his former position in the tribe.

133. In July large numbers of Afridis and Orakzais visited Kabul. The Afridis asked the Amir to enlist some of their tribe in the Afghan Army. They were told that the experiment had been tried, but had failed, owing to their untrustworthiness.

134. In November the Governor of Jalalabad sent a message to the Afridi elders and Mullas in Tirah, Bara and Bazar, informing them of the Amir's forthcoming visit to Jalalabad, directing them to send their *jirgas* to pay their respects to His Majesty and urging them to effect peace between the Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel.

135. Mulla Saiyid Akbar (Aka Khel) sent a message, in the same month, to some Zakka Khel informers in Tirah, exhorting them to cease from giving news to British officials and promising them permanent allowances from the Amir. The Afridi Mullas in Tirah and Bara held a *jirga* to discuss the question of punishing informers in British employ.

136. During his visit to Kabul, Kazi Ghulam Habib, Zakka Khel of Bara, who was in receipt of a permanent allowance from the Amir, was asked by Sardar Nasrulla Khan if he could find any active members of the clan ready to follow in Multan's footsteps. The Kazi after his return was said to have approached various notorious characters with promises of wealth and honour at Kabul.

137. Four letters, purporting to be from the Amir, were delivered at Halwai in Bazar in January 1910 by a messenger from the Governor of Jalalabad. They were addressed to Mulla Saiyid Akbar (Aka Khel), Kazi Mir Haider (Malikdin Khel), Mulla Abdullah (Kambar Khel), and Dadai (Anai Zakka Khel), all recipients of permanent allowances from the Amir. They dealt mainly with the subject of organization among the Afridis, the necessity of effecting peace between the Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel and the encouragement of the service of Islam. Mulla Saiyid Akbar and Dadai agreed to combine their efforts, and endeavoured to enlist the sympathies of influential elders among the Afridis. The Mulla recommended Ghulam Kadir Khan and Ain Khan (Pakhais) of Bara and other leading Zakka Khel elders to the Amir for the grant of a permanent allowance.

138. Usman and Chaman (Khusrogis), with a following of about ten men each, proceeded to Jalalabad to pay their respects to the Amir.

139. Saiyid Akbar, on return from Kabul in June, announced that he had been ordered by the Amir to bring a representative Afridi *jirga* (composed of 20 elders from the Zakka Khel, and 10 from each of the other clans) to Kabul by the beginning of July.

140. Dadai, Mirza Khan, Chaman, and other recipients of permanent allowances from the Amir among the Zakka Khel, were preparing at the end of June to proceed to Kabul.

141. In September 1904 the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, brought strongly to the notice of the Government of India the attitude of the Zakka Khels, and warned them of the possibility of a general rising of the Afridis. At that time the Mission to Kabul under Sir Louis Dane was on the point of starting, and the Government of India decided to defer taking any immediate action, in the hope that the despatch of the Mission would have a pacifying effect on the tribesmen, whose unsatisfactory attitude was attributed to the liberal allowances granted to them at Kabul. The conclusion of the Convention at Kabul was followed by a cessation, for a time, of serious raids upon British territory, and no further action was, therefore, taken, in the hope that the tribesmen would behave, in the future, with more regard for their engagements. In this hope the Government of India were disappointed so far as the Zakka Khels were concerned. Visits of the tribesmen to Kabul, though perhaps not in such large numbers as before, continued, and though the Amir had not himself seen the representatives, they were believed not to have been discouraged by his officers. The conduct of the Afridis as a whole had, generally speaking, been good, but the Zakka Khels had become more and more troublesome and defiant.

142. In December 1906, the Chief Commissioner submitted a report by the Political Agent, Khyber, to the effect that, owing to the accumulation of unsettled offences, it was necessary to take drastic measures against the tribe. He explained that, in order to avert measures which might lead to punitive operations

on an extended scale, he had directed the Political Agent to effect a settlement on the usual lines, and to induce the Zakka Khels, by political action, to mend their ways. The efforts made in this direction, however, though creditable to the Political Agent, had brought about no satisfactory result and the state of affairs had gone from bad to worse. The climax was reached by the perpetration of the following raids by various members of that tribe :—

- (1) On the 5th December 1906 the village of Badhber was attacked and 2 ponies, 14 camels and 7 men, including 2 policemen, were carried off.
- (2) On the 15th December 1906 a gang looted Pabbi Police post and carried off 5 rifles.
- (3) On the 11th January 1907 four bullock-drivers and eight bullocks were seized on the road between Peshawar and Matanni, the men being eventually released.
- (4) On the 14th January 1907 the same gang attacked Matanni serai and carried off 31 camels and other property.

143. The property carried off in these raids was taken to Nakhtarnao near Nazian in Shinwar (Afghan territory), where the kidnapped persons were held up to ransom, and the stolen property, or so much of it as was not redeemed by the rightful owners, was openly exposed for sale. In addition to these specific offences, the clan had violated the agreement made by them in 1905 not to allow certain outlaws to return to Zakka Khel limits and to prevent the passage of raiders from Afghanistan.

144. The Government of India, through the British Agent at Kabul, brought the general misconduct of the Zakka Khels to the notice of the Amir in December 1906, and asked him to cause the immediate restitution of the persons carried off, as well as of the stolen animals. The Amir replied, through the same medium, that the Afridis were under the Government of India, that he had no concern with them, and was not responsible for their acts. He promised to institute urgent enquiries into the matter, but took no measures for the restitution of the kidnapped persons or stolen property.

145. The Government of India, in their secret despatch to His Majesty's Secretary of State, dated the 7th March 1907, reported very fully on the conduct of the Zakka Khels, and pointed out that the clan owed, in the shape of fines and compensation for raids, the sum of Rs. 33,546—an amount which would not be covered even by the stoppage of their allowances for three years, a measure which would be undesirable as tending inevitably to lead to further disturbances. It was explained that a mere punitive expedition would not have a permanent effect and would probably fall heavier on the better disposed inhabitants than on the real evil-doers. It was accordingly proposed to effect a sharp reprisal, followed by the occupation of the Bazar Valley and the location of posts to cut off the retreat of raiders into Afghanistan. This was recommended as the only possible course, even at the risk of other Afridi clans assisting the Zakka Khels. In the event of these proposals not meeting with the Secretary of State's approval, it was stated that it would not be possible to make adequate arrangements to protect British territory from raids by the Zakka Khels, and that the only course to follow would be to wait till they had, by their acts rendered military operations inevitable. The Secretary of State replied, in April 1907, that he was not convinced of the immediate necessity of punitive measures. As the cold weather was past it was considered advisable to defer operations till the ensuing October, and the Secretary of State was so informed.

146. It was brought to the notice of the Amir, on the 10th May, that several raids had been committed in British territory by outlaws whose sanctuary was in Afghanistan, that stolen property was openly sold within Afghan limits, and that British subjects had for months been held to ransom in the Amir's territories. The Amir was asked to take steps to remedy the matters complained of, but in his reply of the 29th May His Majesty hinted that false reports in the matter had been furnished to the Government of India, though he promised to have full enquiries made and to take suitable action. No further communication on the subject was received during the period under review, though the Amir took some measures to restrain outlaws residing in Afghan territory.

147. In May the Zakka Khel offered to discuss the situation with the Political Agent, and on the 2nd June a representative *jirga*, which, however, did not include the leading raiders of the tribe, came to Landi Kotal. As they assumed an impossible attitude, nothing resulted from the conference. In the following months the Zakka Khel remained quiet, but from October 1908 commenced a succession of raids, of which the more important are tabulated below :—

Date.	Place.	Parties concerned.	Details.
5th October 1907 ..	Sumari, Kohat district	Anais, Paridais, and Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel.	1 man murdered, 2 Hindus abducted, property worth Rs. 600 looted. Abducted men restored on 5th ; one died on 10th October.
24th October 1907 ..	Patwar Bala, Peshawar district.	Zakka Khel ..	Armed dakaiti, some property looted.
28th October 1907 ..	Pabbi, Peshawar district.	Zakka Khel, Aka Khel, Shinwaris, and Sturis.	Dakaiti, attempted abduction of Revenue Assistant and Revenue subordinates, wounding of 4 sepoy.
13th November 1907 ..	Lachi, Kohat district..	Zakka Khel, Orakzai, and Aka Khel.	1 villager killed, 4 wounded. Hindus' houses looted, 3 Border Military Police sepoy killed, 1 wounded, 4 rifles taken.
20th November 1907 ..	Bara, Peshawar district	Zakka Khel ..	Border Military Police ambuscaded, 2 killed, 2 wounded.
24th November 1907 ..	Marai, Kohat ..	Zakka Khel ..	Attack in force on village (unsuccessful).
25th November 1907 ..	Matanni, Peshawar district.	Zakka Khel ..	400 goats carried off, police post unsuccessfully attacked.
5th December 1907 ..	Masho Khel, Peshawar district.	Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel	Shop looted, bania killed.

148. In consequence of these raids, some of which indicated a positive defiance of Government (being directed against Government officials and police posts) the military were called in to co-operate with the Border Military Police.

149. The Chief Commissioner reported in November 1907 that the situation had become much worse during the previous 12 months and demanded prompt and vigorous treatment, and on the 25th November the Secretary of State was informed that it would be necessary to punish the Zakka Khel very soon, though it was desirable to suspend operations till the Amir had returned to Kabul.

150. In the meantime the question of the measures to be taken against the section was further considered, and on the 9th January 1908 the Secretary of State was told that unless the Afridis undertook to restrain and punish the Zakka Khel, it would be necessary to send a force into the Bazar Valley to enforce a fine on the Zakka Khel, disarm them, capture those implicated in raids and construct a road to contain the section and prevent their escape to inaccessible regions. While a reply was awaited to this communication, matters became worse, and the following further raids occurred in January :—

Date.	Place.	Parties concerned.	Details.
4th January 1908 ..	Jalozai, Peshawar district.	Zakka Khel; Aka Khel, and Peshawari outlaws.	Transport post attacked, 2 men killed, 41 mules carried off.
24th January 1908 ..	Kacha Garhi, Peshawar district.	Anai and Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel, Aka Khel, and Sturi Khel	Attack on railway station, 1 man wounded, 1 abducted but released.
28th January 1908 ..	Peshawar city ..	Zakka Khel ..	Bankers' shops looted, property to the value of a lakh of rupees stolen, 1 policeman killed, 3 wounded.

151. The raid on Peshawar City induced the Government of India to express to the Secretary of State on the 31st January

(4) *Zakka Khel Expedition.*

their conviction that it was necessary to vindicate their authority at once and to show their determination to protect life and property in British territory. It was therefore proposed to send an expedition to the Bazar Valley without unnecessary delay. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, was accordingly directed to summon the Afridi Maliks and inform them that, while Government intended to punish the Zakka Khel, no harm was intended to the other sections of the Afridis. The Secretary of State replied the same day to the despatch of the 9th January, but, as circumstances had changed, he was again addressed by telegram on the 1st February. It was explained that, in deference to his wishes, operations would, for the present, be purely punitive. In his reply, dated the 2nd February, the Secretary of State agreed to the proposal for immediate action, but reiterated injunctions which had been contained in his previous message, prohibiting annexation and occupation of territory and restricting the operations to the shortest possible time.

152. On the 12th February, the Afridi *jirga* assembled at Peshawar, and the Chief Commissioner conveyed to them the instructions of Government and advised them to endeavour to induce the Zakka Khel to come to terms as soon as possible.

153. On the 13th, a force consisting of about 1,900 British and 4,800 native troops, with artillery, under the command of Major-General Sir James Willcocks, and with Lieutenant-Colonel G. O. Roos-Keppel as Chief Political Officer, started towards the Bazar Valley. The first brigade arrived at Walai and the second brigade at Chora on the 15th, having taken the enemy by surprise, though there was some heavy sniping *en route*. Colonel Roos-Keppel, with a wing of the 2-5th Gurkhas and Khyber Rifles, reached China the same day without opposition. On the 17th and 18th the fortified towers of China were destroyed, considerable opposition being met with. On the 20th, the towers at Khwar and Surmondo were destroyed. On the 21st February a strongly-held position at Halwai was carried with great dash. On the 22nd a determined night attack was made on the camp and on the 23rd a *lashkar* was driven off the China hills. On the 24th the country near Jabagai was searched, few of the enemy being seen, and the Jabagai towers were destroyed. From the 25th to the 28th February no active reprisals were undertaken, and all was quiet except for night sniping at the camp.

154. During the operations the Zakka Khel were joined by several Sangu Khel Shinwaris, Afghan Khassadars, and other Afghan subjects, and a few Mohmands (the whole force numbering at the least about 1,500), while large supplies of flour and ammunition were sent daily from Afghanistan to the border and sold at nominal prices.

155. On the 23rd February the Afridi *jirga* came to the camp with an offer to mediate on behalf of the Zakka Khel. They left on the 25th for Halwai, where the Zakka Khel were assembled. The combined *jirga* were surrounded by a force of about 1,500 Sangu Khels, Afghans, Mohmands, and others, who constantly disturbed the proceedings by abusing the visiting *jirga* and urging the Zakka Khel to continue the fight. In spite of this, however, the Zakka Khel (who had sustained very heavy losses during the preceding few days—there being hardly a family which had not had to bury some of its members) agreed to submit and took an oath to combine with the rest of the Afridis in punishing the raiders. On the 27th February the combined *jirgas*, numbering 1,100 men and including some 300 Zakka Khel, came to General Willcocks' camp near China and were met by Colonel Roos-Keppel, who brought them in. On the following day they drafted an agreement, which was approved by General Willcocks and signed by him and the 322 Maliks, who represented every section of the Afridis. Under this agreement the Afridis held themselves jointly and severally responsible for the future good behaviour of every section of the Zakka Khel; they undertook to punish all the men concerned in the recent raids and, as evidence of their sincerity, they deposited 53 rifles, valued at Rs. 20,000, to be retained until they should have fulfilled their promise; while, in regard to the future, they undertook, under penalty of fine, exclusion from British territory, or other punishment, to restrain the bad characters of the Zakka Khel sections.



156. On the conclusion of the agreement, the elders sent round messengers to announce the restoration of peace and to warn the people against firing on the troops. As a result of this message, the force marched from China to Chora on the 29th February and from thence to Ali Masjid on the 1st March, without a shot being fired at them.

The British casualties during this brief campaign were :—

British officers killed	..	1	wounded	..	..	3
„ troops „	..	1	„	..	..	6
Native officers „	..	..	„	..	..	..
„ troops „	..	3	„	..	..	26
		<hr/>				<hr/>
		5				35

157. Among the Zakka Khel it is calculated that there were about 70 killed and about 130 wounded. Their heavy casualties, coupled with the rapidity with which the troops moved and the inability of the Zakka Khel to make any impression on the British forces, were regarded as having been important factors in hastening the settlement with them.

158. The behaviour of the Afridis, during the expedition, was exceedingly praiseworthy. Not only did they restrain their clansmen from joining the Zakka Khel, but they worked with determination to effect a satisfactory settlement and voluntarily saddled themselves with an onerous responsibility in guaranteeing the future good behaviour of the Zakka Khel. Malik Zaman Khan (Kuki Khel) took the foremost part in the negotiations with the Zakka Khel, and as these services formed a fitting climax to the consistent and active loyalty which had marked the Malik's relations with Government for many years past, he was rewarded by the grant of an allowance of Rs. 1,800 a year for life.

159. The satisfaction of Government at the speedy and satisfactory conclusion of the operations was expressed in a letter to the Chief Commissioner, dated the 24th March, and the services rendered by General Willcocks, Colonel Roos-Keppel, Sahibzada Abdul Kaiyum (the Native Assistant in the Khyber), and the Khyber Rifles were acknowledged, the report on the expedition, together with the remarks of Government, being forwarded to the Secretary of State on the 2nd April.

160. The services of the loyal Afridi Maliks were recognised by the distribution among them of Rs. 25,000 as rewards and in order to mark the appreciation of the Khyber Rifles' behaviour in the operations, service in that corps was made pensionable (*vide* page 64).

161. In February 1908, the Afridis accepted responsibility for the Zakka Khel, undertook to punish the men concerned in the (5) *Fulfilment of obligations by Afridi jirga.* raids which had taken place prior to the expedition against the Zakka Khel, and promised to restrain the bad characters of the Zakka Khel sections. News was received early in April 1908 that the jirga proceedings were progressing satisfactorily, and that some recoveries had been made from the Zakka Khel raiders. On completion of their work in the Bara valley, the jirga proceeded to Maidan, where they dealt with the Zakka Khel bad characters, imposing punishments upon them, and taking security for the future. The jirga arrived at Jamrud on the 4th April, bringing in all the raiders with them, except Multan, who was in Afghanistan. They at once commenced settling cases with the Zakka Khel, and took advantage of the presence of their complete jirgas at Jamrud to settle some of their private disputes also. On completion of the details connected with the Zakka Khel settlement, the whole Afridi jirga, composed of the Maliks and elders, was received by the Political Agent on the 23rd April, and dismissed with suitable rewards.

162. In June the Afridi jirga assembled on several occasions to discuss the question of bringing pressure to bear upon the relations of Multan to bring him to his senses, but their efforts were frustrated by Afghan influence. At the end of June, the leading Afridi Maliks informed the Political Agent, Khyber, of the reasons for their failure to keep to their pledges, but volunteered to endeavour to settle Multan's case later on. In October Multan offered to furnish security



for his future good behaviour if the Zakka Khel relieved him of the fine imposed on him by the Afridi jirga. This proposal was not favourably entertained. On the 14th November the Political Agent, Khyber, interviewed a selected Afridi jirga, and it was agreed that the Maliks and elders should hold a jirga with the Zakka Khel in Bazar and try to induce them to take action against Multan and his relations, and that, if the Zakka Khel refused to do this, the Afridis should raise a *lashkar* to punish them. It was further arranged by the Afridis among themselves that, until Multan's case was settled, no *kaddas* should be allowed to come down to British territory, and that the Political Agent should be asked to withhold the payment of allowances. The jirga left Peshawar on the 14th and assembled in Bazar on the 18th November. They discussed the question of the punishment of Multan and his party with the Zakka Khel elders at Halwai, but arrived at no definite decision. On the 1st December, a deputation of Zakka Khels visited Multan at Nakhtarnao and called upon him to settle his case. He returned evasive replies, but the question was unexpectedly settled in January 1909 by Multan being killed in the circumstances detailed elsewhere (Appendix I).

163. The Bazar Zakka Khels held jirgas in June 1909 to discuss the position of

(6) *Subsequent behaviour of the Afridis.* the tribe in relation to Government, and to the rest of the Afridis. All agreed that the existing security arrangements, which had placed them in political subordination as wards of the Afridi tribes, were incompatible with their tribal honour, and that a representation should be made to the Khyber authorities.

164. The Kamrai Afridis, who, under the agreement of February 1908, were sureties for the Khusrogi, sent a deputation to them in August 1909 to demand the restoration of the two rifles, which had been carried off by Khusrogi deserters from the 28th Punjab, during the Mohmand expedition. The Khusrogi refused to take up the case against the offenders without the co-operation of the Kamrais. Pressure having been brought to bear on the Kamrais to act up to the spirit of their agreement, the Maliks despatched a punitive *lashkar* against the offenders, whom they brought to terms without resorting to violent measures. The Political Agent remarked that this was a satisfactory ending to a troublesome case, in which the obligations incurred under the settlement referred to had been successfully enforced.

165. Combined jirgas for the settlement of cases between the people of the Khyber Agency and those of the Peshawar district met on the 28th, 29th and 30th March 1910. The majority of the cases were compromised, and the work of the jirga generally was most successful.

166. The Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamrai and Zakka Khel jirgas were interviewed during the week ending the 30th April 1910, and their allowances for the half-year ending 31st March 1910 were distributed. All pending cases against them were satisfactorily settled. The Political Agent remarked:—"In these cases the territorial responsibility of the Afridis was insisted upon, but the settlement was facilitated by undeniable proof that certain Pakhais of Barg had secretly assisted the Sangu Khel kidnappers. The treaty obligations of the Afridi clans for the better control of the Zakka Khel sections were fully enforced, a process which has been rendered more easy by the truce between the Malikdin and Kambar Khel. The burden of this security for the Zakka Khel is keenly felt when it takes the form of a diminution in the sureties' allowances, and there is every prospect that pressure will be brought to bear on the Zakka Khel bad characters." The Sepah and Aka Khel jirgas were interviewed during the following week, and their allowances for the half-year ending 31st March were distributed. All pending cases were satisfactorily settled.

167. The long-standing feud between the Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel

(7) *The Malikdin Khel-Kambar Khel feud.* clans of the Afridi tribe need not be described in any detail in this summary as it was purely inter-tribal in character and till quite recently had no bearing on the British administration of the frontier. Throughout the feud (the reason for which is obscure) both clans maintained an attitude of friendliness towards the British authorities and the long continued hostilities were attended with no incidents worthy of mention.

168. In December 1909, the Malikdin Khels, while visiting the Political Agent, Khyber, urged that, as the Kambar Khels had settled in large numbers in the Peshawar border villages and would doubtless send out armed parties into Kajuri, using British territory as a base of operations, some measures should be devised to check such action, lest the peace of British territory be violated. The Kambar Khels were interviewed on the 16th December, and an agreement was arrived at in regard to this matter.

169. The other Afridi clans, as well as some Afghan officials, tried repeatedly, but without success, to effect a reconciliation between the two parties; but the feud continued with undiminished ardour, till a jirga of the Malikdin Khel elders appeared before the Political Agent, Khyber, on the 20th April 1910 and asked his assistance in establishing a truce between them and the Kambar Khel. After long discussion a truce was effected until the next Id-uz-Zuha (December 1910), and a formal agreement was drawn up and verified by the Political Agent. The terms of the agreement embodied the maintenance of the *status quo* during the period of the truce.

170. The duplication of the Khyber road, which was commenced in 1905, was distasteful to the Afridis and was the topic of heated discussion among them. The work was, however, pushed on without any untoward incident and finished.

171. The survey of the Mullagori, Shinwari, and Shilman countries, of the Khyber Valley and of the Lashora Hills, was completed in June 1906. This work also excited some suspicion among the Afridis, but was not openly resented.

172. In April 1906, His Excellency the Viceroy visited Peshawar and drove up the Khyber Pass to Landi Kotal.

Question of Khyber tolls and of removing restrictions on the use of the Khyber Pass.

173. In December 1905 proposals were received from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to—

- (1) open the Khyber Pass for daily traffic instead of allowing caravans to traverse it twice a week only;
- (2) abolish the system of granting permits to Europeans to visit the Khyber Pass;
- (3) abolish the Khyber tolls.

174. It was not considered desirable, on political and other grounds, to withdraw the restrictions on Europeans visiting the Khyber; nor was it held to be advisable to abolish the tolls without some corresponding advantage, as the measure would not materially increase trade; but the Chief Commissioner was told, on the 16th July 1907, that there was no objection to the Khyber being opened for daily traffic should he consider this desirable and safe. He replied on the 9th September that the closing of the Pass, except on specified days, was the only means of gathering traders in one spot to collect tolls from them, and he dwelt on the advantages of abolishing these tolls.

175. The Government of India, replying in October, said that, as the Chief Commissioner was of opinion that the opening of the Khyber to daily traffic should be conditional on the abolition of the tolls, the existing system, under which the Pass was open only twice a week, might continue; they adhered to the view that the tolls, which constituted a powerful commercial lever, should be maintained.

#### KURRAM AGENCY.

176. On the 21st February 1906, a party of five Ghilzais were returning to Afghan territory with Rs. 700 worth of cloth which they had purchased in Parachinar. After a brief halt at a point midway between the village of Kharlachi and the militia post, they started off again, but were almost immediately accosted by a band of 12 armed men, who seized the three men carrying the loads and dragged them off to the militia post, the remaining Ghilzais making good their escape. The latter made

unsuccessful enquiries as to the fate of their three companions who had been carried off. On the 4th March, however, certain maliks and villagers reported that some dead bodies had been found in the hills  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the post; the bodies were at once identified as those of the missing men. A jirga, consisting of eight of the most reliable and impartial Khans of the Peshawar and Kohat districts, was accordingly convened, to make a searching enquiry into the case. The result of their investigations led them to the unanimous conclusion that the offence of robbery was committed by the whole militia post at Kharlachi, with the help of some outside persons, while the subsequent murder of the Ghilzais was the work of the Jemadar and certain named members of the garrison of the post, together with some villagers. The Political Agent accepted the finding of the jirga, and sentenced the accused to periods of imprisonment varying from 7 to 24 years and to various fines. The sentences were confirmed by the Chief Commissioner, and, with the approval of the Government of India, blood-money and compensation were disbursed to the relatives of the deceased.

177. When the matter was first brought to the notice of the Government of India in a telegram from the Chief Commissioner, dated the 4th May 1906, His Excellency the Viceroy ordered that, as soon as the rights of the case had been definitely ascertained, Government should express their regrets to the Amir, if, in fact, the militia were proved guilty. His Excellency considered that the frequent changes in the personnel of the militia under the existing system might be answerable for what occurred. He had a long conversation with Major Roos-Keppel on this subject, and was of opinion that the officering of the militia required careful consideration. The Chief Commissioner submitted a full report by letter on the 29th May 1906, which confirmed the guilt of the militia.

178. On the 27th June 1906, the Viceroy wrote to the Amir, expressing his sincere regret for this deplorable occurrence. His Excellency assured His Highness that all those who had been found guilty of participation in the crime had been suitably punished, and that blood-money and compensation would be paid to the relatives of the deceased. The Amir replied on the 20th December, expressing his thanks to His Excellency.

179. Apart from the very serious aspect of this case from the point of view of militia discipline generally, a very unpleasant feature of the affair was disclosed in the friction shown to exist between the local civil and militia officers. Another case, investigated at the same time, was that of the theft of six rifles from the sowars' bells of arms at Parachinar on the 26th April 1906. The enquiry into the latter case threw fresh light both upon the relations of the civil and militia officers in the Kurram Valley, and on the general condition of discipline in the local militia. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, gave it as his opinion that, though the officers of the Kurram militia had acted throughout according to their belief, they had shown themselves entirely wanting in an appreciation of the circumstances of these two cases in which their men were concerned, and incapable of exercising proper judgment in dealing with them, and, instead of co-operating with the Political Agent in sifting the cases, had constituted themselves into counsel for the defence, with the result that the men of the militia were encouraged to fabricate evidence in favour of their accused comrades, thereby rendering it most difficult to ascertain the true facts of the case. He pointed out that the want of discipline in the militia during the previous six months, coupled with these cases and the open breach between the militia officers and the Political Agent which had resulted, called for a radical change in the officering of the corps. The friction then existing had been a fruitful source of trouble during the past six months, and must, of necessity, have had an injurious effect, both on the discipline of the militia and on the civil administration of Kurram. All the officers concerned were eventually allowed to revert to military duty and were replaced by others. The Political Agent was found to have been wanting in tact in his dealings with the militia officers; but, as he was then about to be transferred, it was considered that in his case nothing further was required.

180. In October 1906, detailed reports were received of the scheme for convert-

The Kurram Valley Railway and road ing the metre gauge railway line from communications in the Kurram. Kohat to Thal to broad gauge and for constructing a broad gauge line from Thal to Parachinar or Kharlachi. The cost

of the conversion to Thal was estimated at Rs. 30,31,536. The total estimated cost of the Thal-Parachinar line was Rs. 85,21,916. The section from Thal to Sultan was estimated to cost Rs. 69,65,087. From this point onwards two alternative routes were suggested :—

- (a) from Sultan to Parachinar, estimated to cost Rs. 15,56,829 ;
- (b) from Sultan to Kharlachi (on the Kurram Afghan border and 8 miles south of the Peiwar Kotal), estimated to cost Rs. 16,38,657.

181. It was decided in December 1906 that the alignment beyond Sultan should follow the best direct route towards the foot of the Peiwar Kotal and should there terminate wherever the best ground existed for ample railway terminal accommodation. It was not considered essential that the line should pass through or near Parachinar. The alternative line from Sultan to Kharlachi was not regarded as of immediate importance. Sanction was accorded to the conversion from Kohat to Thal, but work had not up to the end of the year been started, though material had been collected.

182. There was some doubt as to the best measures to be adopted at Thal in connection with the defensive and traffic arrangements for the line and a Committee consisting of Railway, Military, and Political officers was ordered to assemble at Thal on the 2nd February 1907 to examine the question on the spot. On the 12th February 1907 His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, by telegram, ordered all work on the conversion and extension to be suspended. In a despatch dated 15th February Mr. Morley pointed out that the revised estimates for the two projects in question exceeded by 68 and 27 per cent., respectively, the original estimates which he sanctioned in December 1905. The inadequacy of the original estimate for the Kohat-Thal conversion was attributed to wrong data in regard to the formation and bridges of the existing lines and Mr. Morley asked for an explanation of the error and for the names of the officers responsible for it. He repeated his instructions that, in the meantime, work on the Kohat-Thal conversion and the Thal-Parachinar Railway should cease.

183. Accordingly nothing further was done, and the question of communications in the Kurram was not raised again until July 1910. On the 21st of that month the Government of India informed the Secretary of State that on strategical, commercial and political grounds alike, it was very desirable that these communications should be improved. From the rail-head at Thal (the Government of India wrote) a metalled road ran for a distance of only three miles up the Kurram valley. For the remaining 53 miles to Parachinar there was merely a rough, unmetalled country road, which had been improved, from time to time, in a rough-and-ready manner, with such material as was readily at hand, but was still, in many places, in bad condition, rough and narrow in parts, with many abrupt turnings. Portions of the track, moreover, traversed low-lying country which became soft and boggy in wet weather, while several unbridged water-courses crossed the tract, rendering portions of it difficult after falls of rain. This rough road was the only means of communication with the head-quarters of the most prosperous of the frontier Agencies ; it failed to meet the requirements of the ordinary wheeled traffic of the neighbourhood, and was not up to military requirements.

184. The Kurram Agency (it was added) was the only portion of the North-West Frontier Province which was administered up to the border of Afghanistan. The people were loyal, paid revenue, and were entitled to expect a full measure of protection. The position of the Kurram Valley exposed it to incursions from two sides simultaneously and, in the event of such taking place (either as the result of a general rising of the tribes in the vicinity or of a compact between the Jajis of Khost—the hereditary foes of the Turis of Kurram—and the tribes of Western Tirah), the valley could only be supported from its base at Thal. That an attack from the west was not only possible, but not unlikely, was demonstrated on the occasion of the disputes at Kharlachi during the summer of 1909. If the support of troops had become necessary, as at one moment seemed more than probable, they would have had to traverse the 56 miles which separated the scene of the disturbances from the nearest military base. The desirability of the road from the commercial and political standpoints scarcely needed comment. The valley was fertile and prosperous and the existence of a good road would greatly

benefit trade with Kurram, while its political effect would be to bind still closer to Government a people already loyal, affording, as it would, another indication that the Government of India had their well-being at heart. The need for such a road had been brought prominently to the notice of His Excellency the Viceroy during his visit to the Kurram Valley in March 1910.

185. For the above reasons the Government of India proposed to improve the present track by re-aligning portions liable to be flooded, widening narrow portions, improving sharp turns, constructing culverts or "Irish bridges" for water-courses and metalling the unmetalled portions. They desired to carry out the project with the strictest regard to economy, and estimated that the entire work would not cost more than Rs. 2,51,916. They proposed to commence upon the improvement of the first 35 miles of the road, from Thal to Sadda, estimated to cost Rs. 1,50,344, and to spread over some three or four years the total expenditure involved. As the cost was beyond their powers of sanction, they invited the Secretary of State's approval of the project as a whole, and suggested that it should be carried out as funds became available—the expenditure being debited to the military estimates.

186. On the expiry in 1904 of the ten years' term of the summary settlement of the Kurram valley, a re-settlement of the valley was undertaken, and proposals were received in December 1905 from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, for a new assessment, which, with the approval of the Government of India, was introduced from the *kharif* of 1904-05, the term of the settlement being fixed at 20 years. In December 1906, the Chief Commissioner submitted a supplementary chapter, explaining in detail the results arrived at and the action taken to prepare and keep up a complete and correct record of rights. Subject to a reservation of the right of Government to make a separate settlement of the waste lands in the valley, the Government of India, in March 1907, confirmed the settlement proceedings.

187. The land revenue demand under the new settlement came to Rs. 88,000, involving an enhancement of 150 per cent. on the former assessment. A portion of the demand, equivalent to 3 annas in the rupee was, therefore, deferred for five years, and the actual revenue demand in consequence was only Rs. 71,500 a year.

188. In April 1909 the Chief Commissioner recommended, on political grounds, the total remission of the deferred portion of the demand; and the Government of India sanctioned the proposal for the remainder of the term of the settlement. This decision was announced to full jirgas in Upper and Lower Kurram, and gave "enormous satisfaction," the leading men of Kurram asking that their most grateful thanks might be conveyed to Government.

189. In December 1909, Mr. Merk, Acting Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, reported that, during a visit he had recently made to the Kurram, the people had unanimously petitioned him for an extension of the term of the current settlement. Mr. Merk thought the request reasonable; stated that there were obvious and strong grounds of policy why it should be granted; and recommended that the term should be extended to 30 years with effect from the *kharif* of 1904-05. The concession was sanctioned (January 28, 1910), by the Government of India and was announced personally by the Viceroy to the people of Kurram, during His Excellency's visit to the valley in April 1910.

190. For many years past, a feud had existed between the people of the border villages of Kharlachi in Kurram and Pathan, Istia, etc., in Afghanistan, which, so far as the Kharlachi people were concerned, was mainly due to the persistent efforts of the Afghans to prevent them from irrigating their fields. News was received on the 4th, April 1908

**Relations between the people of Kurram and the tribes of Afghanistan.**

*The Jaji-Turi feud.*

that one Khangul, a Mukbil of Pathan, a notorious thief who had committed many burglaries and murders in Kurram, had organized what appeared to be a local anti-Shia *jehad* from the neighbouring Afghan villages and declared his intention of waging war on the Turis round Kharlachi. After an ineffectual attempt to drive off the cattle of Burki, the Afghan *lashkar* took up a position within



the Kurram border, threatening Kharlachi and Burki. From this they were ejected by the Turis, some of whom, the same night, raided Khangul's house and killed him and another man. Desultory fighting followed, in the course of which the Afghans on several occasions crossed the British border, while the Turis invariably contented themselves with turning out the Afghan aggressors without crossing into Afghan territory.

191. The fighting continued at intervals throughout the month, and on the 10th May a large *lashkar* of Afghan subjects, including contingents from Chakmani and Hariob, participated in the hostilities. They were backed by the Afghan sepoys, who fired from their posts, not only at the Turis who were defending themselves in British territory, but at the Kharlachi Militia Post. On the next day, however, some Mukbils of Ghozgari, who are *hamsayas* of the Turis, intervened and started negotiations for peace. On the 16th May, the Political Agent in Kurram reported that there was no further fighting at Kharlachi, where terms of peace were under discussion. The Pathan Khel were prepared to make peace for six months, but the terms were such as the Duperzais could not accept. The Afghan Governor of Khost subsequently visited Pathan and ordered the people of that place to observe an eight days' truce, pending further investigation. The truce was only partially observed, inasmuch as, though the Afghans did not cross the border, they shot at anyone within rifle range on the British side. Consequently, as the head of the Kharlachi water-supply is within a few yards of the border, irrigation operations were suspended, and great damage to the Turi crops was imminent.

192. On the 6th June a *lashkar* of about 1,500 men collected, and, after making a false attack on the hills above Burki, descended to attack the Kharlachi villages. They were repulsed by the villagers, who were supported by the Militia. The people of Pathan occupied *sangars* in British territory in front of the Afghan posts and were supported by the fire from these posts. The Political Agent reported that the Afghan authorities were aware of what was going on, and apparently encouraged their people. The Governor of Hariob was twice addressed by the Political Agent on the subject, and Brigadier Ghulam Jilani of Khost visited Pathan to enquire into the matter. On the morning of the 11th a strong *lashkar* advanced to the hill above Kharlachi and fired on the people who were cutting crops.

193. In view of the possibility of matters becoming serious, sanction was accorded to the re-armament of the Kurram Militia with 303 rifles. These orders were, however, cancelled before the arms were issued, and instructions were issued for the arms to be stored at Parachinar and not supplied to the militia without the sanction of Government.

194. On the 23rd June, the Political Agent telegraphed that *jirgas* of the Duperzais of Kharlachi, Shingak, etc., and of the Afghans of Pathan, Istia, etc., had entered into a truce for two years on the same lines as that concluded between the Turis and Maidan Jajis in June 1907. The water channel of Kharlachi was repaired and opened without any further friction. Its opening, however, was too long delayed to enable the autumn harvest to be sown. The truce continued till February 1909, when a *lashkar* from Istia, Danda and Pathan set out to raid the Burki flocks. They were stopped by the Governor of Chakmanni, who put some of the ringleaders in jail. The Political Agent warned the Kharlachi people to be careful not to do anything to precipitate further fighting. In the following month a strong demonstration was made from Khost against the British borders of Kurram and Tochi, and, on the 31st March, the Political Agent, Kurram, reported that fighting had taken place between the people of Kharlachi and Pathan and that a small raiding party from Khost had entered Lower Kurram near the village of Uchat. News was received at the same time that the Afghan Governor of Khost had dispersed the *lashkars*.

195. On the 6th February 1909 a *lashkar* from Khost, numbering over 500 men, attempted to surprise and carry off some Malli Khel flocks near Zarakhi Kamr in Kurram. The Malli Khel received information, laid in ambush, and completely surprised the *lashkar*, which retreated with loss. Other raids followed; and on the 25th March the Chief Commissioner telegraphed that the situation was



most obscure, and that there was believed to be serious unrest in Khost. Under the orders of the Government of India, troops were despatched to hold the Militia posts from Mirzail to Idak in the Tochi and the garrison of Thal was augmented.

196. In the middle of April, a party of Mukbil and Khostwal raiders, numbering between one and two hundred men, attacked the Kharlachi militia post, but were beaten off. On the 25th April, the Afghan commandant of the post opposite Kharlachi told the native officer of Kharlachi that orders had been received from the Brigadier of Khost to stop hostilities between the people of Pathan and Kharlachi, and that security had accordingly been taken from the Pathan Maliks. It was reported from another source that a *firman* had issued from the Amir to put a stop to the fighting, and that the Hakim of Khost had imprisoned certain people who were inciting the Pathans to attack the British Government, and was making earnest efforts to prevent a breach of the peace.

197. In spite of the above, the Pathans refused to open the Lewanai water channel for the use of the Duperzais, whose crops, in consequence, were reported, on 26th April, to be in imminent risk of being destroyed for want of water; and the captain of the neighbouring post declined to see the Naib Hakim of Kurram when the latter attempted to settle matters.

198. On the 12th May, a *lashkar* numbering between 2,000 and 3,000 men from Afghan territory crossed the border into Kurram, and attacked a cattle guard near the village of Burki, killing one of the guard, and carrying off an Enfield rifle and were prevented from doing further damage by the militia of the Kharlachi post. On the 18th May, the Afghan Hakim of Chakmanni visited Pathan, and sent a message to the native officer at Kharlachi that the Amir had given orders to stop fighting. The Hakim, however, took no steps to prevent the people of Pathan from molesting the Duperzai Turis of Kharlachi, while the latter were engaged in repairing the dam of the canal which irrigated their lands. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, in reporting the matter, on the 19th May, to the Government of India, stated that, whenever the Turis attempted to repair the dam, they were driven off by heavy fire from the neighbouring Afghan villages and fields, and that, unless the canal was opened immediately and kept open, the Turis would lose all the year's rice crops, and it would be necessary to pay them compensation. Frequent appeals had been made to the Afghan officials, but it was obvious that they had no real intention of restraining their people. In these circumstances, the Chief Commissioner proposed to direct the Political Agent, Kurram, to utilise militia to defend the Duperzais employed on the dam, and to prevent the Afghans from demolishing it again. The militia would receive strict orders not to cross the border. The Government of India agreed to this proposal, on the understanding that the dam was entirely on the British side of the border, and that strict orders were issued that the militia should not cross the border.

199. On the 30th May, the Political Agent, Kurram, reported that 500 militia and 2 guns had arrived at Kharlachi on the night of the 29th, and that, on the morning of the 30th, the people of Istia and Pathan, and the Captain of the Afghan posts, were informed that the dam would be constructed, and were warned not to molest the Duperzais. But fighting occurred notwithstanding.

200. In consequence of these disturbances, orders were issued on the 31st May for two squadrons of cavalry, a battalion of infantry, and four mountain guns to be held in readiness to move immediately to the Kurram valley, if required; and the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, was told that politically it was of the first importance that the incident should not develop, and that the Political Agent should lose no opportunity of stopping active operations.

201. On the same date, the Political Agent in the Khyber was instructed to despatch a letter from the Viceroy to the Amir, with reference to a communication, dated the 12th May, which His Majesty had addressed to His Excellency, drawing attention to the disturbances on the Kurram border. The Amir was informed of the facts of the case, and a hope was expressed that he would at once issue orders to restrain the tribesmen on his side of the frontier. "I am hopeful," His Excellency added, "that the matter may be adjusted in a friendly way, but, as Your Majesty will well understand, I cannot allow the rights of my people to be violated."

202. Fighting continued during the 1st and 2nd June. On the 3rd, the Political Agent arranged a truce with the Afghan captain of the post opposite Kharlachi. On the 5th, the Chief Commissioner arrived at Kharlachi, under instructions from the Government of India, and His Excellency the Viceroy informed the Amir (by telegraphic communication on the same date) that Sir G. Roos-Keppel had proceeded to Kharlachi in order to effect a settlement of the quarrel between the Afghan and Turi tribesmen. His Majesty was invited to co-operate in effecting a settlement, and to depute an experienced officer of suitable rank to meet the Chief Commissioner.

203. On the 6th June, Sir G. Roos-Keppel reported that he had visited the dam at Kharlachi, and found that no part of it touched Afghan territory, its head being in mid-stream one and a half yards inside the line between the two nearest boundary pillars, and the point where it takes off from the bank being about 70 yards inside the boundary.

204. On the 8th June, it was reported that the dam had been completely repaired, without obstruction, by the Turis; that the Turi *lashkars* had been disbanded and dismissed to their homes, and that the Kurram Militia, with the exception of a detachment left to guard the Kharlachi village and dam, had returned to Parachinar. On the 9th, the Political Agent received a letter (dated the 8th June) from the Afghan Brigadier at Hariob, in which it was alleged that the hostilities on the Kharlachi border arose out of a claim on the part of the Turis in respect of a canal known as the Lewanai canal. In forwarding the Brigadier's letter to the Government of India, the Chief Commissioner explained that the present dispute was not connected in any way with the Lewanai canal, the head of which was situated in Afghan territory, and which had been closed for many years; but that it related to the Titam channel, which lay entirely within British limits.

205. A letter from the Amir, dated the 3rd June, communicated to the Viceroy reports of the local Afghan officials to the effect that British troops, with cannon and war materials, had shelled and destroyed an Afghan military tower and part of the Pathan fort, and that, owing to the Amir's orders, the Afghans had not retaliated. The Amir requested that the parties concerned might be called to account, and punished "severely and rigorously for such dreadful and malicious acts of theirs", and that His Majesty might be informed of the result at an early date. In a letter dated 7th June the Amir replied to His Excellency the Viceroy's letter, which was communicated by telegram on the 31st May, and forwarded further reports by Afghan officials, in which it was stated *inter alia* that British troops had entered Afghan territory for about six or seven miles, and that the Turis had put forward a claim to the Lewanai canal. The Amir, in commenting on these reports, laid stress on the alleged invasion of Afghan territory, and referred to correspondence between the Government of India and his late father regarding the canal dispute. In conclusion, His Majesty requested that British troops and subjects should be recalled as soon as possible from Afghan territory, and that the guilty parties should be adequately punished. In a third letter dated the 9th June the Amir referred to a report received by him regarding the withdrawal of British troops and subjects from Afghan territory and concluded with a request to be informed of the punishments awarded and of the measures adopted for the maintenance of peace in future.

206. At the request of the chief Maliks of the Jajis of Maidan, the Political Agent met a large *jirga* of the tribe, towards the end of August, with a view to a settlement of outstanding cases between them and the Turis of Kurram. A settlement was, however, found to be impossible, owing to the unreasonable terms demanded by the Jajis.

207. It was reported in December that the Maidan Jajis were restless, and had held several *jirgas*, and discussed the question of making a big raid into Kurram. During January 1910 serious raids were committed by Afghan subjects in both Upper and Lower Kurram; and the Afghan Governor of Khost and the Amir were each addressed on the subject.

208. In his reply the Amir stated that he had received no report of the events in question from his officials; and that he had issued orders to the Governor of the Khost district to endeavour to restrain the people, and, if they had really

committed raids and interfered with British subjects, to threaten them with punishment from their King. His Majesty promised to communicate the Governor's report to the Government of India. The Jaji raiding parties continued to be active; and early in May 1910, a particularly serious raid was committed by a Jaji *lashkar*, believed to have numbered over a thousand men. 24 rifles from the Lakkatiga militia post and 30 rifles from the Drewatkai post, also a party of 30 sowars from Parachinar under Lieutenant Curtis, aided by Lieutenant Shepherd from Chapri, went out and encountered the Jajis, and eventually, with the aid of Turis, Bangashes and Wattizais, who turned out readily, drove them back.

209. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1909 some correspondence, which is noticed in the following pages, had started between the Amir and the Viceroy regarding the settlement by a Joint Commission of the various border disputes between Afghans and British subjects in the Kurram. The Viceroy accordingly now (May 10, 1910) sent a telegraphic message to the Amir on the subject of the recent Jaji raid and concluded thus:—

“I bring this matter at once to Your Majesty's notice, as it shows the great desirability of the Joint Commission commencing its labours with the least possible delay.”

210. The Amir in reply observed that the information supplied to the Government of India regarding the Jaji raid was at variance with the reports of his own officials; but he agreed to the case being settled by the Joint Commission.

211. Mention has been made on the foregoing page of Sir G. Roos-Keppel's visit to Kharlachi in June 1909 to effect a settlement between the Afghan and Turi tribesmen; and of the Viceroy's invitation to the Amir to depute an officer to meet the Chief Commissioner and co-operate with him.

212. On the 22nd July 1909 the Amir wrote to the Viceroy proposing the appointment of a joint Afghan-British Commission for the settlement of border offences. He forwarded a long list of offences alleged to have been committed by British subjects against Afghans, and suggested that “able officers” might be appointed by both Governments “to settle, with the consent of both parties, the acts of aggression, which have been committed on both sides”, and that they might be given “directions and instructions on proper principles, with the sanction of both parties, so that they might make such permanent arrangements for the future as might prevent the perpetration of such injurious acts by the frontier subjects of both sides, and enable them to live in peace for ever.” His Excellency the Viceroy replied, on the 18th August, that he appreciated His Majesty's friendly suggestion, and would send an answer to it at an early date. Meanwhile, the Amir was assured that the Viceroy welcomed any arrangement which would reduce the causes of friction between the frontier subjects of the two friendly Governments. The promised reply was sent on the 14th October. A list of about 700 offences, which had been committed by Afghans and outlaws since 1904, was enclosed with the Viceroy's letter, which drew the Amir's attention to the fact that some of these offences had been directed against military posts and Government servants. His Majesty's proposal to institute a Joint Commission was accepted, Mr. J. S. Donald, Resident in Waziristan, was nominated as British Commissioner, and it was suggested that the Commission should meet at Spinwam, on the Kaitu river, as soon as possible after the 1st November. It was further proposed that the Commissioners should work according to the principles which guided the Joint Commission of 1903, save that they should take no cognizance of offences which were committed prior to December 1903; and finally it was suggested that the Commissioners should be instructed to consider some arrangements for permanently preserving peace and harmony on the frontier. Various details, relating to the staff, establishments, escorts, etc., of the British Commissioner were settled independently.

213. The Amir, in his reply, dated the 9th November 1909, said that he was trying to select an officer for the work, and would intimate his name, and the date of his departure, as soon as possible. His Majesty objected to the place of meeting of the Commissioners being at Spinwam, and suggested that a central place should be fixed in each district, each Commissioner remaining on his own side of the frontier and meeting for discussion on the boundary line, and that, when the cases in one district were settled, the Commission should move on to the next. In regard to the proposal that the Commissioners should take no cognizance of claims prior

to the settlement of 1903, the Amir said that if the claims were such as had already been abandoned or settled by the Joint Commission of 1903, he agreed that no cognizance should be taken of them. His Majesty, however, remarked :

"There may be cases which originated before the appointment of former Commissions, some of which remained unsettled and others were not brought forward at all. It will be necessary for the present Commissioners to take up and settle such cases, for, if they are not settled, the frontier subjects of both sides will not be satisfied, and they will be obliged to take retaliatory measures against each other."

214. With regard to the request that the tribesmen of Khost should be restrained, the Amir said that he had already sent his officers orders, but that the bulk of frontier raids were those committed by tribesmen on the British side of the border on British forts, sepoy, outposts and villages, and that British frontier officers made in those cases untruthful reports in order to shield themselves from blame. His Majesty trusted that strict orders had been issued to the British officers.

215. His Majesty was informed (in a letter dated the 15th January 1910) that the Government of India were quite willing to accept his suggestions that the Joint Commissioners should fix a central place in each district, that each party should remain on the side of his own frontier near the boundary line, and that the Commissioners should meet on the boundary line for the discussion of cases, and after having concluded the disputes in one district should move on to the next. The Amir was further told that if he would communicate to the Government of India the name of his representative, Mr. Donald would be instructed to enter into correspondence with the representative as to the date and place of their first meeting; and that, as at present advised, the Government of India were inclined to think that some spot on the Kurram border might be suitable. With reference to the Amir's proposal that the Joint Commissioners should take up and settle claims which originated prior to 1903, and remained unsettled, His Majesty was told that the Government of India, in their desire to see a settlement effected of these frontier disputes, accepted his suggestion, but that the enquiry into cases, some of which might be over sixteen years old, might be a matter of difficulty and delay the labours of the joint representatives. Further, the Amir was thanked for having issued instructions to the Governor and officials of Khost to restrain the frontier tribesmen on the Afghan side of the border, and was assured that the British officers would exert their best endeavours to reciprocate in this respect.

216. The Amir replied (February 20) naming his representatives; and the first meeting of the Joint Commissioners took place on the 26th May at Pathan. The Afghan Commissioners said that the Amir was desirous of settling speedily and thoroughly all disputes between the people on both sides of the frontier, and they thought that the procedure adopted by Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan and Mr. Donald in 1903 was the most suitable, with any necessary modifications. They said that the Commission would move along the frontier to Urgun, as soon as the Kurram cases had been settled.

217. On the 28th May, the Afghan Commissioners visited Mr. Donald, and steps were taken to convene Turi and Jaji *jirgas*, for the selection of arbitrators and representatives.

218. Reports received from Mr. Donald, in June, showed that satisfactory progress had been made in the settlement of disputes between the people of Kurram and Afghan subjects on the Kurram border. Nearly all Upper Kurram claims on the British side, and Hariob, Chakmanni and Pathan claims on the Afghan side, had been adjusted, and every effort was being made to induce the parties to compose their differences amicably.

219. On the 15th July, the British Commissioner reported that he had not seen anything of the Afghan Commissioners for the preceding ten days. This inactivity, he thought, was either due to an accident which had happened to Brigadier Mirza Mahmud Khan on the 4th July, or to the fact that certain important questions had been referred to Kabul, whence orders were awaited.

220. Meetings were held on the 13th and 14th July between the Turi and Jaji Maidan *jirgas*, resulting merely in acrimonious recriminations. The deadlock was removed at the end of July and the Khostwals, Jajis, Turis and Bangashes commenced adjusting their claims and settling their disputes. The Commissioners met again on the 8th and 11th August and discussed several cases. Throughout July and August the tribesmen held meetings, which were

supervised by the Head Mirza of the British and the Sartip of the Afghan. Commission, and on the 27th August Mr. Donald reported that nearly all disputes had been settled and the settlements attested by the tribal jirgas, who had departed after prayers for peace in the future.

221. On the 13th September Mr. Donald's detailed report on the settlement of Kurram cases was submitted. It showed that 2,796 claims had been dealt with—1,592 against British subjects and 1,204 against Afghan subjects. All except 170 were dismissed by consent of the parties, settled on oath, or compromised. In the remaining cases compensation was awarded: Rs. 8,305 in favour of the Afghans and 6,576 to the people of Kurram, who were also due Rs. 670 awarded at the Commission of 1903. This left a balance in favour of Afghan subjects of Rs. 1,104. Arrangements were made to pay to the injured Turis, in advance of the recovery of the amount from the persons from whom it was due, the Rs. 7,246 to which they were entitled. Four important cases were reserved for the orders of the two Governments concerned, but one of these was withdrawn for further enquiry.

222. The Government of India considered the result very satisfactory and at the end of September expressed their appreciation of the work done by Mr. Donald and his assistants. For reasons mentioned below, the settlement was not signed by the Commissioners.

223. But some orders which were issued to Mr. Donald about this time may be noticed. News had reached that officer that outlaw gangs from Khost were moving across the Durand line into the British sphere of influence. He was accordingly instructed to take up, at the earliest convenient opportunity, the whole question of the outlaw gangs in Khost, and frame, jointly with his Afghan colleague, proposals for dealing in future with them. In August the Afghan Commissioners definitely stated their opinion that their instructions precluded them from going into such cases, and Mr. Donald admitted that, in the earlier stages of the proceedings, he had himself been unaware that it was intended to do anything more in regard to outlaws, than to remove them 50 miles from the border, as proposed by the Amir; and, as a result, he had admitted to the Afghan Commissioners that certain specific cases against outlaws were non-cognizable. It was intended to address the Amir on the subject, but this admission somewhat weakened the case and action in this direction was accordingly deferred. In the meantime, Mr. Donald submitted his report (above referred to) on the settlement of Kurram cases, and remarked that it had not been signed, because the Afghan Commissioners had objected to his proposed proviso that the settlement should not operate against outlaw cases being taken up subsequently, if necessary; while he objected to the omission of the proviso, as likely to prejudice the case.

224. The Afghan Commissioners in July gave effect to a promise made by them to open to Turi pilgrims the route through Afghanistan to Meshed: this removed a long-standing grievance.

225. It was reported on the 16th October 1909, that a Jaji Malik, named Saiyid Karim, had arrived in Parachinar with a number of *firman*s from Kabul, appointing him trade agent and preventive officer for Afghan traders in Kurram, Thal and Bannu. He stated that he had been appointed by the Amir to put an end to the smuggling which was being carried on from India, and he proposed to make his head-quarters at Parachinar, and place agents at Thal and Bannu. He had with him a man named Mian Abdur Raof—a well-known follower of the Masai Mulla—who was to be one of the agents. Saiyid Karim was informed that the matter would be referred for the orders of Government, and he consequently left for Hariob.

226. The Political Agent, in reporting the incident, pointed out that the presence of such an agent would have a disastrous effect on the large exports of salt and soap to Afghanistan, and imports of grain from Khost; that Saiyid Karim intended exploiting the deodar forests on the Afghan side of the Peiwar, which would soon cause the deforestation of that tract, and that the Turis would strongly resent any interference with their trade. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, accordingly issued instructions that no Afghan agents were to be per-



mitted to establish themselves in the Kurram Agency. This action was subsequently approved by the Government of India.

227. In the course of his autumn tour, His Excellency the Viceroy paid a visit to the Kurram Agency, arriving at Parachinar on the afternoon of the 9th April. On

Lord Minto's visit to Kurram.

the following day, His Excellency received in *jirga* the leading Turis, and other inhabitants of Parachinar and the neighbourhood. After welcoming His Excellency, the leading Maliks made the following petitions:—

- (1) that the Kurram settlement should be extended to 30 years;
- (2) that the sum of two annas in the rupee of revenue taken from the occupants of Crown lands should be remitted;
- (3) that arrangements be made with His Majesty the Amir to re-open the Lewanai canal;
- (4) that the Amir should restrain the Jajis and Khostwals, or that the petitioners should be allowed to counter-raid;
- (5) that a school up to the entrance standard should be provided at Parachinar, and that it might be called "The Minto School" in honour of His Excellency's visit.

228. The Viceroy replied in a short speech, announcing the grant of the first request; refusing the second, as the imposition was of old standing and reasonable; ignoring the third request; referring the petitioners, with regard to the fourth request, to Mr. Donald, Resident in Waziristan; and expressing his pleasure as to the fifth, and his readiness to allow the school to bear his name. In conclusion, His Excellency thanked the tribesmen for their most cordial and friendly welcome, and announced that, in honour of his visit, a remission of 4 annas in the rupee of the current *kist* would be made. The visit was marked throughout with the greatest cordiality and was of peculiar interest to Lord Minto, as recalling the scenes and associations of more than 30 years ago, when he was quartered in the Kurram, during the Afghan War of 1879-80.

#### WAZIRISTAN AGENCY.

##### NORTHERN WAZIRISTAN.

229. In 1897, a settlement had been made with the Madda Khel Wazirs of the

The Madda Khel Wazirs.

Tochi Valley, under which the Maliks, who had formerly been in the enjoyment of allowances, had been ignored—an allowance being paid to the tribe only. The Chief Commissioner reported, early in 1908, that, as a result of this settlement, the Maliks made no effort to help the Political Agent, and as a rule took no active steps to control the bad characters of the tribe. In order to secure the co-operation of the Maliks, an allowance of Rs. 3,000 per annum was sanctioned for them in March 1908 in addition to the existing allowances enjoyed by the tribe, which amounted to Rs. 1,500 per annum, subject to their executing a written agreement, one of the conditions of which was that all the roads between the Tochi Valley and Afghanistan, passing through the Madda Khel country, should be kept open and safe for travellers, another condition being that the tribe should concede to Government the full right to make roads, build posts, and send troops, anywhere in the Madda Khel country. The agreement was signed on the 10th July 1908 by all the leading Maliks of the tribe, who, however, made the following representation:—

- (i) that the tribe should be allowed to take *badragga* (escort) fees from travellers as heretofore; and
- (ii) that, unless special emergency arose, and as long as the tribe kept to the agreement, no posts or roads should be constructed by Government in Madda Khel country.

230. As regards (i), the tribe were informed that orders had been passed allowing the usual payments to the Maliks or other people, who actually accompanied travellers as escorts; and with regard to (ii) the tribe were re-assured that the policy of the Government of India was one of non-interference with tribal independence, until this were rendered absolutely impossible by the actions of the tribes themselves.



231. In July 1909, the Resident in Waziristan interviewed a *jirga* of Madda Khel, Mangar Khel and Khiddar Khel Wazirs, also some Dauris. The Madda Khel asked for additional allowances. They were told that they need not expect any allowances, until they could show that the Malik had the power to control the tribesmen. There were several cases of offences outstanding against the Madda Khels which had been settled by *baramta*, and by appropriating their allowances in payment of compensation for damage done by the tribesmen.

232. The Madda Khel Wazirs collected a *lashkar*, in January 1910, under Malik Sadda Khan, with a view to realizing fines from the bad characters, who had been bringing the tribe into disrepute. They realised a fine, which had been imposed by Government on the Macha section of the tribe, and took heavy security against further trouble from this section.

233. On the 28th May 1908, a murderous attack was made by outlaws in the Tochi Valley on Captain D. A. Graves, R.E., Garrison Engineer, Bannu. The assailants, who were about 30 in number, attacked the tonga in which Captain Graves was driving near the Shinki Militia post, and wounded him in the chest by a bullet. Captain Graves recovered from the wound.

234. A new assessment of revenue was introduced in the Tochi in 1903, involving an enhancement of 600 per cent. on the former demand. The new settlement was however, practically an original settlement, since the former assessment of Rs. 6,000 was levied in the form of a house-tax, and was merely nominal. The percentage sanctioned in the new settlement for *muafis*, *inams*, etc., compared very unfavourably with the percentages for the same purpose in the Kurram Agency and the Bannu district; and the Chief Commissioner accordingly recommended (April 24, 1909) an increase in the percentages from  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. to 15 per cent. of the revenue, an arrangement involving a loss of revenue of Rs. 3,900 a year. This proposal was sanctioned (August 25, 1909) by the Government of India, subject to the proviso that the enhancement of *muafis*, etc., should be deferred till the financial year 1910-11.

235. In communicating this decision, the Government of India inquired whether the Chief Commissioner recommended any extension of the Tochi settlement of 1903, which had been fixed at ten years. The Chief Commissioner in reply stated that the material circumstances of the valley were much as they were in 1903, and that it seemed improbable that any marked change would be brought about for some years to come. He accordingly recommended an extension of the settlement from ten years to twenty. The Government of India sanctioned this recommendation on the 19th October 1909.

#### SOUTHERN WAZIRISTAN.

236. On the 16th November 1905 Captain J. W. E. Donaldson, Brigade-Major, Bannu, while riding at the head of the 31st Punjab Infantry, was shot by Gulla Jan, a Marobai Sultanai Shabi Khel Mahsud.

##### Mahsud Affairs.

##### (1) Murder of Captain Donaldson.

The murderer was apprehended and promptly tried and executed. It was ascertained that he was a deserter from the Northern Waziristan Militia, that he belonged to the same clan as was closely related to, and was a pupil of, the notorious Mulla Powindah; that his relatives were on terms of close intimacy with the Mulla, and that two of his relations had been imprisoned for complicity in the murder of Lieutenant-Colonel Harman, late Commandant, Southern Waziristan Militia, who had been assassinated early in 1905. Captain Donaldson's had been the third murder of a British officer in Waziristan within fifteen months, and though the first murder, that of Captain Bowring, Political Agent, Southern Waziristan, had been ascribed to individual fanaticism, evidence had been obtained that Colonel Harman's murder was the result of a fairly widespread plot among the Mahsuds. The enquiries made in connection with Captain Donaldson's murder confirmed the view that these murders were the result of concerted action, and in regard to Captain Donaldson's murder it was reported that Gulla Jan's relatives had instigated the deed out

of revenge for the punishment inflicted on the members of the family who were concerned in Colonel Harman's murder, and that the Mulla Powindah was implicated in this and probably in the two previous murders as well, possibly directly, but certainly as having had knowledge of the intended murders, and power to have prevented them if he had chosen to exert his influence. It was held essential, as the only means of safeguarding the lives of British officers in Waziristan and of making the position in that area tenable, to call the tribe to task for the occurrence. Accordingly, with the Secretary of State's approval, the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, was authorised, on the

(2) *Punishment imposed by Government.* 15th February 1906, to announce to the tribes that they would be fined Rs. 25,000

and that the entire tribal allowance would be stopped for a year or more, unless they cleared themselves by general good conduct and by surrendering certain specified suspects.

237. The terms of Government were announced to the Mahsud jirga, about 3,000 strong, at Jandola on the 28th February. On the following morning the jirga refused to surrender the men demanded, on the grounds that they were innocent, and that a full jirga was not present; and some Mahsuds who proposed to give up the men were mobbed. On the 2nd March the Mulla Powindah visited the Political Agent and promised to do his best to obtain the surrender of the five suspects and sent off a *lashkar* to effect this, pending which the jirga remained in Jandola.

238. The Mulla's first attempt was unsuccessful, but on the 9th, he, on behalf of the Mahsuds, handed over *unconditionally* three of the five suspects demanded; and on the 2nd April a fourth man was surrendered.

239. The genuine desire of the Mahsuds to comply with the terms imposed upon them was displayed by the prompt surrender of these four suspects, by their efforts to capture the fifth, Pashakai, who had absconded, and by their action in burning Pashakai's house and laying waste his fields. The surrendered suspects were eventually tried by jirga, and two of them sentenced to 14 years' rigorous imprisonment. After genuine but unsuccessful endeavours on the part of the tribe to arrest and surrender Pashakai, the Mahsud jirga, on the 8th June, waited on the Political Agent and presented a petition asking that Government might pardon the tribe, and restore the allowances on the following conditions:—

(3) *Agreement with Mahsuds.*

- (1) The surrender of Pashakai and his sons if found in Mahsud country and of any one who harboured them.
- (2) The retention of Rs. 10,000, the balance of the last half-yearly allowances, by Government, until the tribe killed or surrendered Pashakai and, failing this, the forfeiture of the sum to Government.
- (3) The burning of Pashakai's *Kot* and the surrender to Government of any property found.
- (4) The surrender of any person guilty of a fanatical outrage and of any relation of such person, who might be demanded by Government. Further, the full acceptance of tribal, sectional and individual responsibility for the good behaviour of every man of the tribe, whether in Government service or not.

240. Sir Harold Deane, the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, gave it as his opinion that the conditions were reasonable and might be accepted by Government with honour. To make the actual surrender of Pashakai a *sine qua non* of settlement would, he pointed out, prolong the period of probation indefinitely, with the result that the tribe, exasperated by what they would consider an unreasonable demand, would sooner or later commit themselves and thereby force Government to adopt strong measures. He recommended therefore the acceptance of the petition and the restoration of the allowances in October, provided that the tribe in the meantime maintained the good conduct they were showing at that time. The Government of India sanctioned these proposals; but explained that, having regard to the events of the last two years, they were not prepared at the time to approve more than the very gradual increase of the number of Mahsuds in the militia. Further, in connection with the Mulla Powindah, the Govern-

(4) *Policy towards Mulla Powindah.* ment of India, while far from allotting to his friendship a high standard of fidelity, regarded him as a person whose services were worth buying, and a gift of land

in British territory, which the Political Agent had recommended, was accordingly sanctioned. Such a gift, it was held, might not only secure the Mulla's good-will, but might also tend to remove him from the paramount control he had so long exercised over the tribe, whilst it would certainly give Government a hold over him which, for the sake of his own interests, he could not ignore.

241. Lastly, sanction was given for a re-arrangement of the maliki allowances,

(5) *Re-allotment of allowances.*

by which, in place of the old system under which every householder, whether a man of influence or not, who received a share in the tumani allowance, became a vakil and took a share in the maliki allowance, only the really influential Maliks were to be given shares. It was hoped that this would prove an effective counter-balance in the tribe to the Mulla Powindah's influence, and that the interest of the latter in maintaining peace would be enhanced. The tribe as a whole approved of this redistribution.

242. While these decisions were being formulated, a serious raid was committed

(6) *Jalal Khel raid.*

by a force of 200 Mahsuds in the Bannu district, in which one British subject was killed and another wounded. Subsequent reports showed, however, that the raid was in no way a deliberate violation of British territory, but was the result of a long-standing feud between the Jalal Khel Mahsuds and the Jani Khel Wazirs. The affair took place at a point where the boundary was indefinite, and did not indicate a recrudescence of lawlessness. Beyond a nominal fine being imposed on the offenders no further notice was taken of the matter.

243. Early in November, Mr. Crump, the Political Agent, interviewed the

(7) *Jirga of November 1906.*

Mahsud jirga and announced to them the orders of the Government of India as regards the restoration of their allowances. He also informed the Mulla Powindah of the fact that the Government of India had approved of the grant to him of land in British territory, and he told the tuman of the proposed readjustment of the maliki allowances. The result of these announcements was not satisfactory. The tribe refused to be responsible for the conduct of their fellow tribesmen in the militia, with the result that the Mahsud Company in the Southern Waziristan Militia was disbanded; but, as the Mahsuds of the Northern Waziristan Militia petitioned against disbandment and asserted that they could produce securities for their good conduct, such steps were not considered necessary in their case. In refusing responsibility the tribe was undoubtedly influenced by the attitude of the Mulla Powindah; and the whole militia recognised this fact, while the men discharged from the Southern Militia regarded the Mulla as having deprived them of their livelihood. This result, coupled with his having accepted a reward from Government, against all his previous assertions that he would never do such a thing, affected the favourable impressions hitherto held of the Mulla throughout the tribe, and landed him in general disfavour. To avoid the annoyance of the tribe he fled temporarily to Kabul; whence he returned about a month later, and

(8) *Mulla's loss of prestige and visit to Kabul.*

tried to regain popular favour and the allegiance of the maliks by wild stories of what the Amir had done, and was going to do, for him. But, up to the end of March 1907, the Mulla had not regained his former supremacy over the tribe, while the Maliks were confident of maintaining their position. In April he made an unsuccessful effort to induce the Mahsuds not to visit the Political Agent for their half-yearly allowances, while he appears to have been particularly active in instigating raids and endeavouring to induce his shaiks to murder British officers.

244. In May, the Mulla commenced openly preaching *ghaza* and *jehad* and

(9) *Mulla's open hostility.*

inviting the Mahsuds to accompany him to Afghanistan, to receive 25,000 rifles which, he alleged, the Amir had promised to give them. Before, however, proceeding to Afghanistan, he announced his intention of collecting his dues from the maliks, and proceeded on a tour round Mahsud country. The maliks opposed his progress at various points, and eventually made a final effort to cope with him, and collected a large force at Kaniguram, but the Mulla's emissaries persuaded the people that the Chief Commissioner was supporting the Mulla, and the gathering melted away. On this the mulla tried to gather a *lashkar* to attack the maliks,

but did not succeed, as the people, uncertain which side had the support of Government, wisely decided not to commit themselves with either party.

245. Early in May, five shaikhs of the Mulla Powindah were arrested in Bannu, and a relative of one of these men, who was also connected with the murderer of Colonel Harman, was captured near Dera Ismail Khan, with a loaded pistol, early in June. On the 13th June a Mahsud, armed with a dagger, was seen in the verandah of an officer's bungalow at Dera Ismail Khan, but escaped capture. Another shaikh of the Mulla Powindah was captured near Bannu early in June. The mail was looted between Wana and Sarwekai on the 10th June and there were grounds for attributing this outrage to the Mulla Powindah.

246. In July the Political Agent, Wana, forwarded a statement which showed that the Mulla Powindah had been privy to, if not an active instigator of, the murders of Captain Bowring, Colonel Harman, and Captain Donaldson; that he had abetted almost every raid and robbery committed by the Mahsuds prior to the blockade; and that, either by direct instigation, as the result of fanatical preaching, or in virtue of his position and influence as the recognized leader of the tribe in both political and religious matters, he was personally or morally responsible for the entire misconduct of the Mahsuds—their raids, their fanatical murders, and their several attempts to kill British officers—between 1902 and the present time. Mr. Crump, the Political Agent, adduced a mass of details in support of these contentions, and added that the Mulla was conducting an organized campaign of fanaticism and despatching emissaries to British districts to spread terror from Bannu to Dera Ismail Khan. Sir Harold Deane was fully convinced of the truth of Mr. Crump's indictment, and added that tragedies had been averted in Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan only by the happy accident of the arrest of intended murderers. He described the situation as intolerable, and submitted various suggestions for coping with the evil.

247. In view of the above facts, the Government of India, on the 15th July, ordered that the grant of land and the cash allowance sanctioned for the Mulla should be withheld, and directed an announcement to be made to the tribe that they were held responsible for the visits of armed Mahsuds to British districts with suspicious intentions and that, if others came or outrages occurred, full tribal responsibility would be enforced, all tribal allowances would be stopped for as long as was deemed necessary, and such other measures would be taken as were considered suitable. The tribe were also to be reminded that as long as Pashakai, an active accomplice in Captain Donaldson's murder, was at large, full reparation had not been made for that crime, and for this and the recent visits of suspicious Mahsuds to British territory Government might even then find it necessary to forfeit part of the current allowances.

248. On this warning being conveyed to the tribe, the Mulla circulated a report, which was generally believed, that the Political Agent had issued the warning on his own authority and without the orders of the Chief Commissioner. He advocated the policy of frightening Mr. Crump, and with this object he sent out fresh batches of his emissaries and wrote to the Political Agent an offensive letter declaring that he had the support of the Amir, the Mahsuds, and the Wazirs, and would force Government to come to a settlement with him. On the 4th September,

(12) *Raid on Bakka Khels.* soon after the receipt of this letter, a raid occurred on the Bakka Khel in the Bannu district. The raiding party consisted of about 300 Mahsuds, comprising all sections of the tribe, and advanced in broad daylight to a point well within British territory. They fired on the grazing guard of seven men, wounding one, whom they subsequently stabbed, collected the cattle and made off, with drums beating. The tribal *chigha* and a force of Border Military Police intercepted and engaged them, the fight lasting till dark. Some 2,000 head of cattle were carried off, four of the *chigha* were wounded, and several Mahsuds were reported to have been killed. The tribe made an effort at reprisals on the Bakka Khel, but, owing to the Border Military Police being on the alert, no attack was made.

249. Towards the end of August, Lala Pir, an Afghan Mulla (who posed as having been granted extraordinary powers by Sardar Nasrulla Khan), visited the Mahsuds and, in the name of the Amir, promised them rifles and allowances. In these intrigues he was assisted by the Mulla Powindah, who started building a fort at Marohi and a camping-ground at Razmak for 2,000 Afghan troops—preparations

(13) *Lala Pir's visit.*

which roused great excitement among the Mahsuds. The Lala Pir's moves undoubtedly contributed largely to strengthen the Mulla Powindah's influence and he took advantage of his improved position to induce the tribe to return to their allegiance to him. He resumed the despatch of fanatics to British territory; he prohibited the Mahsuds from having dealings with the British officials or taking up service under Government; he ill-treated messengers sent by the Political Agent to summon Mahsuds who were required for the settlement of cases; he endeavoured to discredit the Political Agent by saying that he had not the Chief Commissioner's support, and finally, he despatched a shaikh to Wana to murder the Political Agent. This man was arrested and made a full confession. Further enquiries showed that the Bakka Khel raid had been planned by the Mulla Powindah and the Lala Pir and was intended to be an act of deliberate hostility towards Government.

250. Sir Harold Deane, in reviewing the situation on the 7th October, pointed out that the power of the maliks was broken,

(14) *Proposed expedition.*

that every effort to maintain peaceful relations with the tribe had been tried and had failed, and that matters had come to a deadlock. He accordingly advised the immediate despatch of an expedition against the Mahsuds, together with the opening up of roads and the establishment of posts in Mahsud country.

251. For various reasons the Government of India decided that the moment was inopportune for an expedition against the Mahsuds; but on the 22nd October

(15) *Policy of ignoring Mulla.*

the Chief Commissioner was authorized definitely to withdraw the Mulla Powindah's grant of land and allowance; to ignore the Mulla in all future dealings with the Mahsuds, and to withhold all Mahsud allowances till the tribe showed a desire for friendly relations with Government.

252. At the end of October 1907 the Mulla Powindah started for Kabul, in

(16) *Mulla's hostility.*

obedience, it was said, to a summons from Sardar Nasrulla Khan. Before his departure the Mulla was said to have given his shaikhs permission to do all the mischief they could to Government. As a result several petty raids occurred and fresh emissaries visited British territory, of whom one was arrested at Bannu and one at Miram Shah, while the Mahsud outlaws looted the dāk on the 1st November, and made a futile effort to waylay and kill the Political Agent's tahsildar. At the same time a further effort was made to assassinate Mr. Crump.

253. On the 17th November the Mahsud *jirga* assembled at Sarwekai, the orders

(17) *Sarwekai Jirga of November 1907.*

of Government were announced to them, and they were advised to get rid of the Mulla Powindah and settle up the cases standing against them, amounting to Rs. 44,600. Their reply was that, as the majority of the offences were committed by outlaws or the Mulla's shaikhs, they could not settle the claims without the whole tribe being present; but that, as the allowances were stopped, they would no longer hold themselves responsible for Mahsuds serving as coolies or *badraggas* or in the Tochi Militia. The net result was reported to be the alienation of the maliks from Government. Several small raids occurred immediately after the *jirga*, which the Political Agent regarded as a possible indication that the tribe considered that there was now no obligation to respect British territory.

254. The Mulla Powindah's return from Kabul in December synchronised with

(18) *Raids by Mulla's emissaries.*

a fresh outbreak of lawlessness. On the 29th December 1907 a contractor at Dial, near Dera Ismail Khan, was murdered by a dozen Mahsuds under Sohrab, outlaw, who carried off property valued at between Rs. 30,000 and Rs. 1,00,000. It is believed that the stolen property was deposited with the Mulla Powindah, with whom Sohrab frequently resided. On the 26th January 1908 some Shabi Khels committed a *dakaiti* at Shor in Dera Ismail Khan, carrying off property worth Rs. 500, which they took to the Mulla Powindah. On the 1st February a gang of Abdurrahman Khel and Shabi Khel Mahsuds, after looting a shop in Shaikh Uttar, attempted a burglary at Gumal in Dera Ismail Khan and wounded a *chaukidar*. On the 8th February a gang of Mahsud and Wazir outlaws attacked the coolies working near the Wana fort, imprisoned them in their huts, and made off with 16 donkeys and some property. At the same time several petty raids were committed in Wana and Tochi protected area, while there was quite an epidemic of



visits by the Mulla's emissaries to British territory. Two of these emissaries were captured—at Bannu at the end of December and at Idak on the 29th January respectively.

255. Beyond the fact that the Mulla was busily employed in inciting raids and sending out emissaries, there is not much information as to his doings during this period. On the 13th March 1908 the Political Agent's personal servant and *muharrir* (clerk) were found murdered and stripped, under conditions that showed that the outrage was not an ordinary raid, but a deliberate act of hostility to Government; the money and clothes of the murdered men being left behind, and their bodies treated with indignity.

(19) *Murder of servant and muharrir of Political Agent, Wana.*

256. Guided by this consideration, and in the belief that prompt measures were necessary for the safety of the lives of British officers, the Political Agent at once ordered a general *Baramta* (seizure) of Mahsuds within his jurisdiction, with the result that 379 Mahsuds and 1,884 head of cattle were captured and sent to Dera Ismail Khan for detention.

257. Subsequently the Chief Commissioner summoned a *jirga* which assembled at Tank on the 5th April. Sir Harold Deane announced the definite forfeiture

(20) *Tank Jirga of April 1908.*

of the past year's allowances, which would be regarded as cancelling past tribal cases, and stated that the question of the restoration of the allowances depended on the future good behaviour of the tribe. The attitude of the *jirga* was friendly, but the maliks expressed inability to control the outlaws and the Mulla Powindah. After the *jirga* all the prisoners seized by the Political Agent were released, except those against whom there were outstanding cases, while the cattle were liberated, save such as were required to meet cases of compensation for raids.

258. The Mulla Powindah remained unremitting in his endeavours to unite the Mahsuds, preaching *ghaza* and engineering raids. But nothing of particular note occurred until May 16th, when a serious conflict occurred near the Girni post, be-

(21) *The Girni Post disaster.*

tween a large gang of Mahsuds and a party of the Dera Ismail Khan Border Military Police, who lost 12 men killed and 14 rifles in the encounter. Sir H. Deane, in reporting the affair to Government, described it (June 2) as a direct act of hostility to Government, and as possibly the reply of the Mahsud tribe, instigated by the Mulla Powindah, to the reprisals effected by the Political Agent in March. He pointed out that Government were again confronted with an *impasse* in their dealings with the Mahsuds. All that could be effected by reprisal or by negotiation had been done, and by neither of these methods could Government hope either to settle the present case or secure peace for the future. Unless strong action were taken, he could only anticipate a still more serious manifestation of lawlessness in the autumn of 1908 and, in justice both to British officers and to the subjects of settled districts, Sir H. Deane recommended that punitive measures should be taken against the tribe, in the autumn, on the lines recently followed in the Mohmand country.

259. The Government of India, however, were not convinced that an expedition would be necessary in the autumn; but they accepted a proposal made by Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel, the Acting Chief Commissioner, that, as a temporary measure, while Mahsud affairs were in a critical state, the whole of Waziristan should be

(22) *Appointment of Mr. Donald as Resident in Waziristan.*

placed under the control of a senior officer in addition to the present staff. Mr. J. S. Donald, C.I.E., Deputy Commissioner, Hazara, was selected for the appointment and took up his duties early in July under the designation of Resident in Waziristan.

260. The Government of India, about the same time, sanctioned the payment

(23) *Restoration of Mahsud allowances.*

to the Mahsud Maliks, who had consistently done good service, of their share of the Maliki allowances which had fallen due on the 1st April 1908. The Political Agent in Wana was also authorized to promise to those sections of the tribe who had behaved well the restoration of their allowances in October 1908, provided that they continued to behave in the meanwhile.

261. On the 22nd July the Resident in Waziristan saw at Sarwekai a large and representative Mahsud *jirga* which had assembled of its own accord to welcome the

(24) *Sarwekai Jirga of July 1908.*



newly-appointed Resident. The Resident expressed his intention of supporting the Maliks and *tuman* in any endeavour they might make to set their house in order. The Maliks freely admitted the unsatisfactory state of affairs, and asked that they might again be tried for six months, and that if, with the assistance of the Resident, they should fail to restore the previous good relations with Government, they would acquiesce in whatever forcible measure might be necessary to reduce the tribe to order. The Maliks then submitted a petition containing the following requests:—

- (1) that the Maliks might be paid their allowances ;
- (2) that the allowances due to the *tuman* might also be paid, provided that the *tuman* followed the Maliks and abandoned the Mulla Powindah ;
- (3) that the Mahsuds should be re-enlisted in the Militia on the guarantee of the Maliks ;
- (4) that the Mahsuds be given all contracts on the Gumal road, and grazing and cultivating be reopened to them ;
- (5) that the present method of settling cases against Mahsuds be discontinued, and that cases be settled by *riwaj* and *jirga*, as before the blockade ; and
- (6) that the system by which the Maliks control the *bahirs* entering British territory be continued.

262. It was agreed that the Maliks should discuss the situation with their sections and possibly hold a *jirga* of the tribe ; and that the Resident should call a formal *jirga* at Sarwekai in August. The attitude of the *jirga*, led by men who had known the Resident well in former days, was distinctly friendly, and the Maliks were said to be sincerely desirous of influencing the tribe in the direction of friendly relations with Government. The only doubt was as to the ability of the Maliks to carry out their good intentions, and they themselves evinced no great confidence in their powers to do so. Mr. Donald's appointment was believed not to be agreeable to the Mulla Powindah. The latter sent a letter to the Political Agent saying that any settlement with the tribe should be made through him (the Mulla), otherwise trouble would ensue. No answer was returned. By the 1st September, some 4,000 Mahsuds, representative of all sections of the tribe, had assembled at Sarwekai. The Resident first interviewed the *jirga*, section by section ; on the 2nd September, he interviewed

(25) *Sarwekai Jirga of September 1908.*

the leading Maliks and on the 3rd, the full tribal *jirga*. The Maliks expressed their desire to live on good terms with Government and promised to reform and to restrain their bad characters. They asked for the restoration of their allowances and the removal of restrictions on their *bahirs* visiting British territory. They were told that mere promises were not sufficient, that they had broken their most solemn engagements with Government, that no allowances would be distributed till they fell due in October, and that, in the meantime, the Mahsuds were expected to make reparation for the murder of the Border Military policemen at Girni and for a certain *dakaiti* case which had occurred. The *jirga* dispersed after undertaking to combine against the evil-doers of the tribe.

263. There had recently been various indications of a professed desire on the part of the Mulla to be admitted to a *jirga*, and to be useful to Government in arranging a settlement with the Mahsuds ; but nothing had resulted, and in October he wrote to the Political Agent stating that he proposed visiting Afghanistan to collect *shukrana* (religious offerings) unless he was wanted to assist Government. He

(26) *Mulla Powindah's visit to Kabul.*

left his home on the 19th October and arrived at Kabul on the 26th idem with about 70 followers. On the 18th November, the British Agent at Kabul reported that the Mulla had not, up to that date, been presented to the Amir. The Mulla had taken some presents for His Majesty, and intended to submit a petition requesting that the Mahsuds might be taken under the control of the Afghan Government. He left Kabul on the 14th December. He was given Rs. 6,000 (Kabuli) and 3,500 rifle cartridges. The Amir declined to grant him an interview.

264. During the Mulla's absence a number of raids occurred, most of which were

(27) *Mahsud offences.*

attributed to outlaws. The most noteworthy of these offences were: on 21st October, the murder of two mail runners between Sarwekai and Tanai ; and on 22nd October an attack on the Tiarza post, in which two militia-men were wounded, one

subsequently dying; the latter outrage was committed in the hope of drawing out a militia patrol into a carefully prepared ambush.

265. On the 8th December 1908, the Political Agent, Wana, informed some of the Mahsud Malikhs that it was impossible for the present state of affairs to continue much longer, that there were several outrages for which the tribe had as yet made no attempt to give compensation, and that, as they had expressed a wish to be more law-abiding in future and to live on better terms with the *Sarkar*, the best mark of a guarantee of their good intentions would be the payment of a fine of sixty good Martini rifles. The Malikhs replied that they were ready to do so themselves but that, on the Mulla Powindah's return from Kabul, he would probably nullify all their attempts to collect the rifles. They were informed that they must show signs that they retained some authority in their hands; otherwise it was a waste of time their coming in as representatives of the tribe; the time had come for them to decide whether the Malikhs ruled the tribe, or whether they and the remainder of the Mahsuds were to be under the control of the Mulla. The Malikhs replied that every endeavour would be made to collect the rifles as a guarantee of their good intentions.

266. On the 12th January 1909, the Resident in Waziristan reported that the Mahsuds had surrendered sixty breech-loading rifles in token of their submission, and as a guarantee of their desire to resume friendly relations with Government. He remarked that the Malikhs and the tribe had apparently acted independently of the Mulla Powindah, who had returned from Kabul, but had either refrained from meddling, or had been ignored by the Mahsuds. All sections had combined in giving up the rifles. The Resident added that it was a hopeful sign that the *impasse* with the tribe was at an end for the present, and that a satisfactory and peaceful settlement of the outstanding cases would be arrived at without resort to drastic punitive measures. The Government of India informed the Chief Commissioner, on the 19th January 1909, that they had heard with the utmost satisfaction of the surrender of the rifles by the Mahsuds as a token of submission, and as a guarantee of the desire of the tribe to resume friendly relations with Government.

267. The behaviour of the Mahsuds continued to be satisfactory during January. Their Malikhs declined to obey a summons from the Mulla Powindah to meet him, and they asked for a big *jirga* for the settlement of all outstanding cases. They were informed that the *jirga* would be held in March. A representative *jirga* of the Abdurrahman Khel section, who had hitherto been the section most bitterly opposed to Government and responsible for the bulk of the serious offences committed, came to Khajuri Kach to see the Political Agent on the 3rd February. They expressed regret for their past misbehaviour and a desire to live on better terms with Government in future. According to tribal custom they presented the Political Agent with a sheep as an emblem of their good faith. They also returned 170 of the sheep they had raided. The Mulla Powindah called the Abdurrahman Khels to account for their submission, but was told in reply that they no longer had anything to do with him, and declined to admit his authority.

268. Soon afterwards the Mulla forwarded to the Resident in Waziristan a letter signed by a large number of persons, stating that the Mahsud Malikhs had no authority, and were incapable of controlling their respective sections, and that no settlement of any value could be made except through the Mulla, who alone could put a stop to raids. He also wrote to the Naib Tahsildar at Jandola suggesting that he should be summoned to the big Mahsud *jirga*.

269. A large Mahsud *jirga* of over 7,000 tribesmen was held at Tank about the middle of March 1909. The temper of the tribesmen was extremely good, and their behaviour excellent. As far as could be seen, it was the strong desire, both of the Malikhs and *tuman*, to live on good terms with the Government, and to deter, as far as possible, their young bloods from raiding. About two hundred outstanding cases against the tribe were settled, and the Malikhs and *tuman* were paid their allowances for the half-year which ended on the 31st March 1909.

270. The Mulla Powindah was reported to have been much annoyed at the success of the *jirga*, and at the *tuman* having deserted him and followed the *Maliks*. He had used every endeavour to get himself summoned to the *jirga*, and to dissuade certain sections of the tribe from attending, unless he was received with honour. Having failed to attain either of these objects, the Mulla held a counter-*jirga* at Kaniguram, which was attended by five hundred tribesmen.

271. Early in March 1909 the Mulla wrote to the Political Agent asking for the release of some of his (the Mulla's) *Shaikhs* who had been imprisoned, and for the payment of a certain sum of money owed to him by a Hindu in Tank, and expressing his desire to do any service within his power for Government. On the other hand, he was said to have sent a letter, signed by 400 persons, to the Amir, begging for assistance against Government.

272. On the 13th March 1909, the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, in submitting his views on the position in Waziristan, pointed out that the *Mahsuds* had made a formal submission; that the prestige of the Government of India had been upheld; that the settlement had left Government on good terms with the tribesmen; and that the legacy of hate, which usually follows a "burn and scuttle" expedition, had been avoided. At the same time, he considered that the position was most unsatisfactory, both from a strategic and a political point of view, and might lead to trouble at any moment; and that administration on the Kurram model afforded the only satisfactory solution of the question. He was, however, of opinion that the matter was not pressing, and that Mr. Donald's methods of conciliation and personal influence should be given a fair trial.

273. With a view to improving the existing position, the following proposals were made by the local officers:—

- (i) that *Mahsuds* should again be enlisted in the Southern Waziristan Militia;
- (ii) that separate *Mahsud Levies* should be raised; and
- (iii) that land in British territory should be granted to *Mahsuds* in order to give them a stake in the country, which could be withdrawn in case of misbehaviour.

274. The Chief Commissioner was unable to support schemes (i) and (iii); but he considered that the second proposition was worthy of a trial. On the 8th April the Government of India informed the Chief Commissioner that the opinions hitherto recorded against the entertainment of *Mahsud levies* had been very adverse, but that if Mr. Donald considered that a practical proposal for the entertainment of levies could be worked out at a moderate cost, the Government of India would not refuse to consider it. The sanction of the Secretary of State would, however, be necessary, and no statement on the subject should, meanwhile, be made to the *Mahsuds*. The Chief Commissioner was asked, at the same time, whether it was not possible to give employment in the militia to carefully selected men, on security, and whether he could recommend the extended enlistment of *Mahsuds* in the army, as suggested by the Political Agent, Wana, in addition to the proposals above mentioned.

275. With regard to the general question, it was said that it was the settled policy of the Government of India to endeavour to avoid active operations against the *Mahsuds*; that the conditions in Kurram were so different and so peculiar that the Government of India could not accept the view that the problem would be solved by Kurramizing Waziristan; and that for the present it was enough to endeavour to carry on and complete the good work done by Mr. Donald.

276. Some further correspondence on the subject of pacificating the *Mahsuds*, which it is convenient to notice here, necessitates somewhat of a digression.

277. With a view to establishing peace in the Mahsud country, a proposal was put forward in May 1908 that tribal service of the kind adopted in the neighbouring districts of Baluchistan should be introduced among the Mahsuds. The proposed scheme involved the grant of fixed sums monthly to selected Maliks, to maintain, for the service of Government, either in their own villages or in fixed posts, a certain number of sowars or footmen who would be the Maliks' own servants and by whose means it would be possible to enforce responsibility. Sir Harold Deane, when consulted, did not consider the scheme to be practicable. He observed that the conditions in the Mahsud country were widely different from those in the adjoining tribes of Baluchistan: the latter had a strong tribal constitution, at the head of which was one acknowledged chief; there were leaders *de facto* who, even without the support of Government, could control their fellow-tribesmen. The case with the Mahsuds was different. Split into a hundred factions, with no admitted tribal government, the Mahsud tribe as a whole acknowledged no leaders, the Maliks had neither individual nor co-operative authority; each had a small following, but no single one was a power outside his own immediate section. Sir Harold Deane considered that there was no body of Maliks in the Mahsud country upon whose strength and loyalty Government could depend sufficiently to make the experiment desirable. For these and other reasons, he was unable to support the proposed scheme, which it was accordingly decided not to pursue.

278. Then came the Government of India's present reference of the 8th April 1909, enquiring whether the Chief Commissioner recommended the enlistment of Mahsuds on an extended scale, and the grant to them of land in British territory; and this enquiry was followed up in the following November by a further communication stating that the Government of India were of opinion that it was desirable to try the experiment of placing certain Mahsud families on lands on the

(35) *Paharpur canal colonisation scheme.* Paharpur canal, and asking the Chief Commissioner to submit a scheme for the introduction of this measure.

279. The Chief Commissioner in his reply said that he was entirely in favour of a policy of civilization and humanization; and, in pursuance of this policy, was in complete accord with the views of the Government of India as to the desirability of settling Mahsud families on land situated on the Paharpur canal in the Dera Ismail Khan district, and extending the field of recruitment of Mahsuds in the Indian Army.

280. There was much opposition in the Department of Revenue and Agriculture to the colonization scheme, but the Commander-in-Chief and His Excellency the Viceroy both expressed approval of the idea. His Excellency noted:—

"In a military sense, our hands are tied by the policy of His Majesty's Government in dealing with the Mahsuds, and we are, under present conditions, condemned to suffer a succession of raids and loss of valuable lives. Though we are forbidden to take efficient military action, we are, I think, called upon to do something, and the scheme in question appears to hold out reasonable hopes of success and to be well worth trying."

The Chief Commissioner was instructed to work out a detailed scheme, and this was still awaited at the end of September 1910.

281. As for Mr. Merk's allied proposal for the enlistment of Mahsuds, it received the cordial concurrence of their Excellencies the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief; and the sanction of the Secretary of State to the enlistment of one thousand Mahsuds was accordingly applied for in September 1910.

282. To return now to affairs in Waziristan at the time of the issue of the Government of India's letter of the 8th April 1909. On this same date a telegram was received from the Chief Commissioner reporting an attack by a Mahsud *lashkar* on the military post at Jandola. It appeared that the Mulla Powindah, in order to signify his displeasure at having been ignored at a jirga held at Tank in March, and during the settlement with the tribe in January, took advantage of the presence of a large gang of outlaws in the heart of the country, and prevailed on them to take concerted action against the *Sarkar*. The gang,

accompanied by the Mulla's nephew and followers, first attacked the Bhattanni village of Kheti in protected area, on the 8th April, and then fired on the Jandola post for about two or three hours. The Bhattannis resisted the attack, and the *lashkar* retired. About 150 Mahsuds were said to have taken part in the demonstration.

283. On receipt of the above report, the Government of India ordered that the local officers should be given the most stringent and peremptory instructions to avoid any action likely to bring on a conflict.

284. On the night of the 27th April, Captain Keene, Commandant, Northern Waziristan Militia, was shot at and seriously wounded (though he recovered) by a Bakka

(37) *Attack on Captain Keene.*

Khel sepoy of the militia. Captain Keene was met by the sepoy outside the mess-house at Miramshah. The sepoy, who had his rifle in his hand, saluted Captain Keene, and then fired on him. The sepoy was eventually secured by Captain Moens and Lieutenant Mackenzie. Subsequent inquiries showed that the murderer, Sepoy Najib (Baka Khel) was a zealous soldier, and was possessed of considerable property in the Bannu district. No cause or motive could be assigned for the crime.

285. In the beginning of May, no improvement was observed in the situation in Waziristan. Mr. Donald, the Resident, reported that such Mahsuds as had been

(38) *Situation in May 1909.*

to see him were apprehensive that the Mulla Powindah was determined to push matters to an extreme. Raids had been committed in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts by gangs of Mahsuds, among whom was the Mulla's nephew, and reports had been received of fanatical emissaries having been despatched by the Mulla to kill officers. Mr. Donald was fully convinced of the Mulla's duplicity, and considered that there was no hope of his ever ranging himself on the side of peace and order. As to the Mahsud Malik and *tuman*, Mr. Donald stated that all that they asked for was employment, enlistment in the militia or as levies, grants of land, and increase in their allowances. All these matters, Mr. Donald observed, had already been considered, and for the present set aside as being outside the pale of practical politics: so that there was nothing more to tell the Mahsud *jirga* on these points. They would have to do the best they could, for what they had got, in keeping their lawless spirits in order. To carry this out, every reasonable assistance would, Mr. Donald said, be given to them, by making *baramtas* within British limits, as their own methods appealed very much more to them, and had the sanction of the law, as laid down in the Frontier Crimes Regulation.

286. On the 26th May, the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, was informed that the policy indicated in the letter from the Government of India, dated the 8th April 1909, regarding the position in Waziristan, was in accordance with the views of His Majesty's Government, and that it was the wish of the Government of India that all frontier officers, who had to deal with difficulties caused by the misconduct of tribesmen, should exercise the greatest care to avoid the use, except under special instructions, of language which might be regarded by the tribesmen as committing Government to an occupation of their country, or to punitive measures, should the offending members of their tribe continue refractory.

287. On the 15th May, the Resident in Waziristan interviewed a small *jirga* of Mahsud Malik, who asked that sectional, in place of tribal, responsibility might be

(39) *Jirga of May 1909.*

adopted, as an experimental measure, for a few months. The request was granted, and a certain sum, either in cash or in rifles, was fixed, on payment of which the section concerned would be again free to enter British districts with their *bahirs*. In accordance with this arrangement, several sections paid in their fines.

288. The following report was received from the Political Agent at Wana (dated the 29th May 1909) regarding the proceedings at a *jirga* held by the Mahsud Malik, at

(40) *Mulla Powindah's jirga.*

which the Mulla Powindah was present. The Mulla harangued the *tuman* and impressed on them that they did all the work and held the responsibility, while the



Maliks enjoyed liberal allowances from Government. He urged them not to help the Maliks in any way, until they gave up their allowances. The *tuman* applauded the Mulla's suggestion, and called on the Maliks to forfeit the money. To the astonishment of the Mulla, the Maliks decided to forego their allowances and hand them over to the *tuman*, provided that they, in their turn, agreed to commit no aggression on the *Sarkar*, to surrender offenders, and to recover stolen property. The Maliks suggested that they themselves should render service without pay, and that, if the *tuman* failed, the whole yearly allowance should be spent in maintaining a tribal levy. They went so far as to send a petition to this effect, signed by numerous persons, to the Resident, requesting sanction to the scheme. This unexpected action of the Maliks disconcerted the Mulla, who did not desire that the Maliks and *tuman* should be in accord. He consequently organised *lashkars* to raid in various directions. Several sectional *jirgas* interviewed him and begged him to desist from causing trouble, as they had adopted his suggestions. On this the Mulla announced a new scheme by which the Maliki allowance, Rs. 16,000, should continue to go to the Maliks and the remaining Rs. 54,000 be placed at his disposal to distribute at his will. On this the *tuman* became very angry and the Maliks left, seeing that it was hopeless to come to any understanding. The Maliks subsequently sent in several letters warning the political authorities that the Mulla was bent on causing serious mischief and that every precaution should be taken against his gangs and individual ruffians.

289. On the 4th June, some thirty Mahsud Maliks came to see the Political

(41) *Request for British occupation.* Agent at Sarwekai. Their spokesman, one Shah Salim, an old and well-known man, who had always done good work, stated that their country was now a regular hell and in utter chaos and confusion; that British occupation of Wana had done them no good, and had indeed tended to increase the lawlessness in their country; he begged, on behalf of himself and others, that Government would adopt one of the following courses: (a) occupy their country and establish good rule; (b) withdraw from Wana altogether and leave them alone; or (c) allow the Amir of Afghanistan to occupy and rule. The other Maliks concurred.

290. On the 12th June, it was reported from Kabul that Tor Gul, nephew of the Mulla Powindah, had arrived there with a letter from the Mulla to Sardar Nasrulla Khan, representing that the Mulla had made arrangements for raiding on the British border, but that he was short of ammunition. In a later report it was stated that the Sardar, with the Amir's consent, informed Tor Gul that 100,000 cartridges would be supplied to him, when he really needed them.

291. On the 19th June, the Political Agent reported that several Mahsud Maliks had been in to Wana to interview him. They declared that the malcontents of the tribes were in a large minority, and that the raids which had been committed were entirely the work of the Mulla and his band of hired cut-throats and young bloods, who regarded cattle-lifting as an ordinary occupation. They assured the Political Agent that every endeavour was being made to check the Mulla's gang, and to dissuade others from committing offences. They stated that it was not improbable that the Mulla would give one final sign of his displeasure in the shape of a raid or demonstration, and then leave the country.

292. During the week ending the 24th July, many Mahsuds visited the Political Agent, Wana, and stated that they were using every endeavour to stop raids, and to check the bad characters of the tribe. Forty-two rifles were surrendered as a fine for past offences.

293. On the 18th July, the Political Agent reported that the Mulla Powindah had sent to him two emissaries stating that he was very anxious for a reconciliation with Government, to be allowed to remain peacefully in his home, and for his nephews to be allowed to attend jirga. The messengers were informed that whether the Mulla could remain peacefully in his home or not depended on his own conduct, that his nephews could come in whenever they liked, that, in fact, their names were on the list of recipients of maliki allowances. The Mulla was



at this time making preparations to visit Kabul and some of his messengers arrived there, with a letter addressed to Sardar Nasrulla Khan and with presents from the Mulla.

294. During August the Mahsuds were engaged in hostilities with the Tori Khel Wazirs to the north of the Mahsud country in consequence of a raid committed by Shabi Khel Mahsuds on a Tori Khel flock. The Tori Khels sent a *lashkar* against the Shabi Khels, who appealed to the Mulla Powindah. The Mulla collected a *lashkar* of about 3,000 men and attacked the Tori Khels. A truce was eventually arranged by the Mulla, who was said to be anxious to stop inter-tribal fighting, as it might nullify the efforts which he had been making to obtain an alliance between the various sections of the whole Wazir tribe, with a view to consolidating their power, in the event of hostilities with the British Government.

(45) *Truce effected by Mulla between Mahsuds and Wazirs.* Khel Wazirs to the north of the Mahsud country in consequence of a raid committed by Shabi Khel Mahsuds on a Tori Khel flock. The Tori Khels sent a *lashkar* against the Shabi Khels, who appealed to the Mulla Powindah. The Mulla collected a *lashkar* of about 3,000 men and attacked the Tori Khels. A truce was eventually arranged by the Mulla, who was said to be anxious to stop inter-tribal fighting, as it might nullify the efforts which he had been making to obtain an alliance between the various sections of the whole Wazir tribe, with a view to consolidating their power, in the event of hostilities with the British Government.

295. Khwaja Muhammad and Kamil, two well-known Sheikhs of the Mulla Powindah, returned from Kabul in August and announced that the Amir had promised assistance in men and arms to the Mahsuds in case the Government of India should send troops to their country.

(46) *Alleged promise of assistance from Amir.* Khel Wazirs to the north of the Mahsud country in consequence of a raid committed by Shabi Khel Mahsuds on a Tori Khel flock. The Tori Khels sent a *lashkar* against the Shabi Khels, who appealed to the Mulla Powindah. The Mulla collected a *lashkar* of about 3,000 men and attacked the Tori Khels. A truce was eventually arranged by the Mulla, who was said to be anxious to stop inter-tribal fighting, as it might nullify the efforts which he had been making to obtain an alliance between the various sections of the whole Wazir tribe, with a view to consolidating their power, in the event of hostilities with the British Government.

296. On the 11th September, the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, communicated a report from the Resident in Waziristan that the Mulla had started for Kabul, with some followers, and on the same day it was reported that six hundred books on the subject of *jehad* had been sent to the Mulla from Kabul. The Mulla arrived at Kabul on the 14th September, and was interviewed by Sardar Nasrulla Khan. He stated that he had not come for allowances or money, but to ascertain if the Afridis and Mohmands meant to abide by the promise which they had made last year at Jalalabad, in the presence of the Amir and the Sardar, that they would help other tribes of the frontier in case of emergency, and to know whether he could rely upon them for help in case the British sent an expedition into the Mahsud country. The Sardar said that he remembered that a general promise had been made, and that, by paying allowances to the tribesmen, he intended to establish harmony among them, and to simplify the service of Islam in time of need. He also said that if they did not live in concord, and failed to prove themselves capable of doing service to him, he would withhold their allowances. He added that the question would again be discussed at Jalalabad in the presence of the Amir.

297. The Mulla Powindah returned from Kabul to Marobi in the Mahsud country on the 9th October. He received a present of Rs. 4,000, Kabuli, 4,000 cartridges and some rifles from the Amir. His followers were not over-pleased at the treatment they received at Kabul. His return was not characterised by a recrudescence of lawlessness: on the contrary, the Mahsuds remained unusually quiet for some time. In a report by the Resident in Waziristan this lull was ascribed to the amount of resistance shown by villagers, as a result of the improved armament of villages, and to the unprecedented losses sustained by Mahsud raiders during the early part of the year (it was estimated that 25 Mahsuds had been killed in raids since April 1909, no less than seven of these belonging to the Jalal Khel section). Various sections surrendered rifles by way of making amends for past misconduct, and the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, regarded the situation as more favourable than had prevailed at any time during the preceding five years. There was, notwithstanding, a long account against the Mahsuds for offences committed since April. The damage done by them during that period was roughly assessed at Rs. 25,000 and the tribal allowances were withheld, till the tribe made a definite effort to settle up outstanding cases.

298. Soon afterwards the Mulla Powindah invited all the Mahsud Maliks to meet him at Sararagha after the *Id*, to hear a message from the Amir, and he subsequently announced to the Kabul Khels that the 28th October had been fixed for the final settlement with Government, and that, if negotiations failed, he would again declare a feud. But this threat was not subsequently invested with

any appearance of actuality; and on the 26th November, the Government of India sanctioned a proposal made by the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, that the amount of compensation due from the Mahsuds for offences committed by them should be deducted from the tribal allowance accruing up to April 1910, that the balance should be paid to the tribe; and that it should be very clearly pointed out to them what they had lost by the offences committed by their malcontent tribesmen.

299. For the purpose of giving effect to this decision a jirga assembled at

(50) *Tank jirga of January 1910.*

Tank on the 9th January 1910. About 3,000 tribesmen were present, representing all sections but the Abdur Rahman Khel. A sum of Rs. 73,407 was found to be due from the Mahsuds on account of fines and compensation for crimes committed by members of the tribe since March 1909, as well as for two raids in 1908. The amount included Rs. 4,235 still outstanding on account of certain cases which had been previously disposed of. This fine was subsequently reduced by Rs. 750 which the Bhattannis admitted to be due from them on account of their complicity in a certain raid. The tribe agreed to their allowances being absorbed to make good the balance against them, and the amount available was distributed *pro rata* between the various claimants, who were told that the responsibility of the Government in the matter of awarding compensation did not extend beyond the allowances payable to the tribe. In the result, the allowances for the half-year ending September 1909 (Rs. 35,000) were paid in compensation, and a similar amount was to be paid from the tribal allowance which would become due in March 1910. Most of the Maliks expressed regret that Government had confiscated their allowances to pay for the misdeeds of raiders. The general feeling in all the sub-sections was that this arrangement would not hit the guilty persons, but would merely encourage the raiders to commit further offences.

300. In December 1909, Mr. Merk expressed the opinion that so long as

(51) *Proposed expulsion of Mulla.*

the Mulla Powindah was in power among the Mahsuds, there was no hope at all of any satisfactory solution of the Mahsud problem, and he suggested that an expedition should be sent to Marobi to expel the Mulla, and that, in the event of the latter taking flight to Afghan territory, the Amir should be requested to detain him in unmistakable confinement.

301. In replying (on the 3rd February 1910) to the Chief Commissioner, the Government of India observed that the situation in the Mahsud country had somewhat improved during the last twelve months: the Mulla Powindah, since his last visit to Kabul, had certainly not gained, if he had not lost, influence with the tribesmen. His efforts to convene a jirga at Kaniguram in November 1909 had resulted in failure, and he had equally failed in his endeavours to prevent the Mahsuds attending the jirga held at Tank in January 1910. In the opinion of the Government of India, there were no stronger reasons at the present moment than had existed any time during the past few years for sending a force into the country.

302. On the morning of the 11th March 1910 the Lamardar of Banda Ayaz

(52) *Capture of raiders at Pahar Khel.*

Khan, a hamlet of Pahar Khel near Lakki and about 28 miles distant from Bannu, telegraphed to the Deputy Commissioner that a gang of 32 raiders were in his village and asked for troops to be sent. Captain Harris, Commandant of the Border Military Police, Bannu, started at once with 20 men of the Border Military Police, and on reaching the village at about 5 P.M. was joined there by Mr. Baskett, Superintendent of Police, with 25 policemen from Lakki, where he was on tour. These officers surrounded the mosque in which the raiders were and held them up. Meanwhile, the General Officer Commanding, Bannu, had been asked for troops, and at about 3-30 P.M., two squadrons of the 14th Lancers and about 150 men of the 57th Rifles, under Major Swanson, 14th Lancers, started for the hamlet. The troops reached Banda Ayaz Khan about 7 P.M., and found that the Border Military Police and district police under Captain Harris had surrounded the mosque at very close range, and had prevented the raiders leaving the mosque. When the troops arrived, the 57th Rifles reinforced the Border Military Police, the 14th Lancers placing picquets round the hamlet. Every endeavour was made by the infantry to dislodge the raiders before nightfall, but without success. Finally it

was decided to form a strong cordon round the mosque and await daybreak. Guns were also telegraphed for. About 9 P.M., the raiders suddenly opened a sharp fire, in which Captain Stirling, 57th Rifles, was shot through the heart, and other casualties occurred, and under cover of darkness the gang charged from the mosque and broke through the infantry cordon, a number of whom they shot down. They were intercepted and pursued by the cavalry, but, getting among the wheat crops, they scattered and made good their escape in the dark. The gang consisted of Mahsuds under Kamal, a Sheikh of the Mulla Powindah. Eight of the raiders were killed, including Kamal; and three were wounded and captured. Five men of the 57th Rifles were killed and ten wounded, of whom one subsequently died; and three men of the 14th Lancers were wounded.

303. For the next few months there is little to record beyond the occurrence of several raids, including a rather serious attack on the Tormanda militia post. There were besides indications that the Mulla Powindah was endeavouring to bring about a Mahsud-Wazir coalition; and the Governor of Khost was reported to be working with the same object, and to be intriguing in a more than usually pronounced manner with the Daur and Wazirs of the Tochi Agency.

304. On the 13th June a large number of Mahsuds came into Sarwekai. In the *jirga* were influential men of all sections, and a full *jirga* of the Abdur Rahman Khel was present. This was the first time for some years that the Abdur Rahman Khel had come in, and they took the opportunity of stating that they wished to come to terms with Government, to drop raiding and to settle up the cases against them. They were taken at their word, and put on to settling their cases at once. The various sections of the *jirga* were seen individually. They all had the same story—that they were poor, that service in the Army should be further extended to them, and that the well-behaved sections should not be punished for the ill-behaved.

305. It is interesting to note the nature of the replies given to them by Mr. F. W. Johnston, the officiating Resident in Waziristan. As regards their plea of poverty, it was explained to them that they had had no allowances for some years, owing to the account that had accrued against them for offences; that if these accounts were examined, much of them would be found to consist of fines and blood-money, where the offences had benefited them nothing; that, in the case of thefts of animals and goods, it was notorious that the stolen property was generally disposed of at about a third of its real value and of the value subsequently charged in the account; consequently, if they would sit down and work out what had actually gone into the tribal pocket by raids, and what they had lost in allowances, they would see that they had in late years thrown away the best part of two lakhs, and it seemed useless for a tribe who could do this to plead poverty. This view of the matter appears never to have struck them, and is now being very seriously discussed. As regards employment in the Native Army, they were told that their petition would be sent on to Government. As regards the well-behaved paying for the ill-behaved, they were told that it was certainly in the interests of order that punishment should fall on the guilty, but that the duty of seeing to this rested on the tribe, and that, so long as they maintained their apathetic attitude towards evil-doers, they might expect to have to pay for them; if, however, they were prepared to co-operate, every effort would be made to get compensation out of the section actually implicated instead of writing it down to the tribe as a whole; however, should these efforts fail, the tribe must pay, as tribal responsibility would on no account be relaxed. The Mahsuds agreed that this was reasonable, and, led by the Abdur Rahman Khels, each section went into the cases against it. Some they were able to disprove as false or tribal cases; others they admitted and promised to settle. In some of the latter the property was actually restored.

306. On the 18th June, during the course of the proceedings of the large *jirga* at Sarwekai, just referred to, a gang of Mahsuds committed a serious raid on the village of Vihowa in the Dera Ghazi Khan district. A *bahir* of Gidi Khels and Dachi Khels was detained in Tank, and the Maliks and influential men of the

Manzais were called in to Sarwekai. It was strongly impressed upon them that they were responsible for the acts of the raiders, and that the road was open to them to substantiate their oft-repeated assertions of good intent and to clear themselves, by effecting the arrest of the ringleaders. They left Sarwekai at once, raised a tribal *lashkar*, captured the three leaders, who turned out to be Shaikhs of the Mulla Powindah, and handed them in unconditionally at Sarwekai. They also captured one of the chief agents of the Mulla, who warned them to desist from interfering with the Mulla's Shaikhs. The chief agent was only released by the *lashkar* on giving securities that he would in future entirely renounce all dealings with the Mulla, and fall in line with his section. Some of the stolen property was also recovered.

307. As regards the results of the *jirga* at Sarwekai, Mr. Johnston, the officiating Resident, reported that it was estimated that, if the Mahsuds adhered to their professions, the majority of the pending cases would be settled by October or November, by the people actually implicated, without having recourse to deduction from allowances. The Mulla Powindah, Mr. Johnston thought, could not view this state of affairs with equanimity; his influence in the tribe for evil was undoubtedly paramount, and if there were any falling off among his own adherents, he had merely to invite down the Ghazni gang of outlaws and provide himself with a fighting force of desperate ruffians, to deal with whom would tax an united Mahsud tribe.

308. As regards the state of affairs in the tribe generally, Mr. Johnston was of opinion that the tribe at heart was not ill-disposed to Government, and did not desire war. The sympathies of the men who could control the tribe had, however, been alienated, and if these persons could be brought in, there appeared to be no reason, in the Resident's opinion, why friendly relations should not be maintained. To the Mulla Powindah and his gang was attributed a very large share of the Mahsud offences. So far he had been working with the sympathies of the tribe, not against them. In most cases, the main portion of the gang had been drawn from all sides of the ordinary Mahsud population, not from any select body of followers.

309. About three months previously, two Abdullai Mahsuds had been sent by the Mulla to Sardar Nasrulla Khan with a letter, conveying a message to the effect that the Mulla was carrying out the orders given to him verbally by the Sardar, and that the desperadoes among the Mahsuds and Wazirs were ready to assist him in this object. The messengers returned with the Mulla's half-yearly allowance from Kabul, i.e., Rs. 2,000 Kabul, and about 1,000 Kabul-made cartridges. A report from Kabul stated that the Mulla himself arrived there on the 22nd July.

#### DERA ISMAIL KHAN BORDER.

310. The history of the Largha Sherannis being mainly a record of raids and reprisals, varied by the imposition of fines, no detailed account of our dealings with them seems necessary. Some account of their principal misdeeds will be found in Appendix I.

311. Under the orders of the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, political dealings with the Sheranni tribe, on the border of the Dera Ismail Khan district, which had hitherto been vested in the Deputy Commissioner, were, in December 1909, placed under the supervision and control of the Resident in Waziristan.

#### GENERAL.

312. During Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty, it had been decided to make an enquiry into the condition of the North-West Border Military Police. On the 16th January 1906, the Government of India addressed the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, pointing out some of the measures which had been sanctioned in the hope of improving the efficiency and utility of this corps. The history of certain raids showed that, in almost every case, there had been a want of vigilance, a lack of discipline, and, in some cases, a want of ordinary courage, on the part of the Border

Military Police concerned. The circumstances attending these cases indicated, in the opinion of the Government of India, that the discipline and efficiency of the corps were not what they had a right to expect. Accordingly they had decided to take further steps, with a view to placing the Border Military Police on a more satisfactory footing. Lieutenant-Colonel E. W. S. K. Maconchy, 51st Sikhs, was deputed to make a searching investigation into the state of the various police corps. He was to be associated, in his investigations, with Major Rawlinson, Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, who had been nominated by the Chief Commissioner. Subsequently, in consequence of Lieutenant-Colonel Maconchy's appointment to fill the post of Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Supply Department, Major Rawlinson was directed to complete the enquiry himself, as far as possible.

313. A report on the subject by Major Rawlinson was submitted by Sir Harold Deane, Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Government of India, on the 7th May 1906. Major Rawlinson, while frankly admitting many grave defects in the Border Police, was of opinion that they served a useful purpose and were, on occasions, of the greatest value. Their chief deficiencies he classed as—(1) some want of good discipline; (2) a want of resource, energy and perseverance when coping with raiders; (3) marked poorness in musketry; and (4) an imperfect acquisition of reliable information from across the border.

314. To remedy these defects he recommended—(1) that whole-time officers should be put in charge of the various Border Military Police Corps; that these officers should be members of the Punjab police, seconded for this service; that two extra officers should be provided for Dera Ismail Khan and Kohat and one extra officer for Bannu and Peshawar respectively. (2) That the men should be better trained, and that musketry should be encouraged by prizes and otherwise. (3) That numbers should be increased. (4) That telephonic communication between posts should be established as far as possible, subject to local exigencies. (5) That the Chief Commissioner's reorganization scheme, with certain reservations and modifications, should be put in force at once.\* (6) That a special "Intelligence" Branch for the collection of information regarding frontier crime should be instituted in the Border Military Police. (7) That all posts should be thoroughly inspected by the Military Works Department and a report submitted as to the defensibility of each.

315. In addition to these recommendations Major Rawlinson proposed certain amendments to the Border Military Police Act IV of 1904, and offered some suggestions regarding improvements to the posts in the Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, and Kohat districts.

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\* With regard to (5) Major Rawlinson pointed out that his immediate superior officer had given a final opinion upon the reorganisation scheme as a whole and in detail, after two years' careful consideration and discussion, and that, in being asked to report specially upon it, he was placed in a difficult position. The object of this scheme had been to abolish the different and anomalous conditions which at that time prevailed in the corps of each district, and with a view of introducing uniformity it had been suggested:—

- (a) that the pay of all sepoy should be Rs. 8 per mensem and of sowars Rs. 22 per mensem;
- (b) that there should be one Subadar-Major for each corps, and a suitable proportion of native officers and non-commissioned officers for the foot and mounted branches;
- (c) that good-conduct pay should be granted in all forces, the rates, etc., to be governed by paragraph 88, Army Regulations, India, Volume II;
- (d) that the Border Military Police service should be non-pensionable so long as service in the Militia was non-pensionable.

Major Rawlinson's views, with reference to (a) and (b), were that too much had been sacrificed to the desire for uniformity, and that the different conditions existing in the various districts had to a very large extent been disregarded; he held that if those proposals were to be carried out it would necessitate each Border Military Police Corps being managed generally upon the lines of a Native Infantry regiment, which, in his opinion, was neither desirable nor practicable. He considered (c) suitable. As regards (d) he recommended that the service should be pensionable.



316. The Government of India, in their reply, dated the 6th April 1907, considered that credit was due both to Colonel Maconchy and Major Rawlinson for the manner in which they had carried out a difficult task. They pointed out that, since the creation of the Border Military Police, circumstances had altered on the border. In some districts, the growing influence of better administration had rendered unnecessary the presence of an armed constabulary. In such localities the Border Military Police might, it was considered, be absorbed into the Civil Police of the district, of which they could form an armed reserve. Elsewhere the Border Military Police were unable, for a variety of reasons, adequately to prevent raiding from tribal areas into the adjacent settled districts. It was considered that this object would be better effected by increasing the strength of the militia and placing them in positions from which they could effectively protect the settled districts from inroads from across the border. The Border Military Police, or the useful portions of them, in districts liable to such inroads, might perhaps, it was suggested, be incorporated with the existing militia corps, or, in places in which it might be found preferable to do so, they could be utilised for the formation of new militia corps.

317. Detailed suggestions were given as to the steps which might with advantage be taken in the various districts, and finally, the views of the Chief Commissioner were invited on the subject, and, if these concurred with those of the Government of India, it was proposed to appoint a committee to work out the details of a scheme for carrying into effect the measures indicated above.

318. The Chief Commissioner replied in July 1907 that he considered the measures proposed by Government to be of too sweeping a nature, and that it would answer requirements if the efficiency of the Border Military Police were improved by appointing more British officers, increasing the strength of the force, affording greater facilities for training, and the like.

319. The Government of India reserved judgment on the case, and in January 1908 appointed a committee to deal with the question of the form in which the local force for watch and ward of the frontier should be maintained and organized, whether such force consisted of improved Border Military Police, Militia, or any other form of organization. The Committee was to consist of Colonel Maconchy, representing the Government of India, Colonel Barratt, Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps, and Major Blakeway, representing the North-West Frontier Province. Owing to Colonel Maconchy being on leave in England, the committee was not able to assemble till March 1908.

320. The Committee's report and recommendations, with Sir G. Roos-Keppel's views thereon, were received in May and July 1908 respectively; and in January 1909 the Government of India gave Sir G. Roos-Keppel the outlines of a scheme which they wished him to work up.

321. In July 1909, Sir G. Roos-Keppel reported that there were difficulties in the way of preparing such a scheme; but, as a first step, he requested sanction to the employment of six military officers "as a measure preliminary to complete the reorganization that is contemplated." He was told in reply that nothing could be done until the complete scheme was received.

322. In November 1909, Sir G. Roos-Keppel submitted the scheme in a complete form; and, after discussion of it with Mr. Merk, the Acting Chief Commissioner, the latter was asked in March 1910 to prepare a cheaper scheme. The cheaper scheme was received in May 1910, and the proposition statements to elucidate it, in the following month; and the case was under the consideration of the Army and Finance Departments at the close of the period dealt with in this summary.

323. Among the recommendations submitted by Major Rawlinson's committee of 1906 was one that the pay of the Border Military Police sepoys (which in some corps was Rs. 6, in others Rs. 7, and in others Rs. 8 *per mensem*) might be raised to an uniform rate of Rs. 8 *per mensem*. The consideration of this recommendation had been deferred with that of the other proposals; but, in view of the Chief Commissioner's representation that the Peshawar Border Military Police were heavily in



debt, and in a state of discontent owing to the inadequacy of their pay, and that a similar state of affairs to some extent prevailed in other corps, the introduction of the uniform rate of pay of Rs. 8 *per mensem* was sanctioned in March 1907.

324. In July 1907 it was pointed out that in some corps, in which the pay of a naik was only Rs. 10 *per mensem*, a sepoy with 10 years' approved service received, under the good conduct rules, more pay than a naik received for the first two years after promotion to that rank, and that, consequently, sepoys could not be induced to accept promotion. To remedy this anomaly, the uniform rate of Rs. 12 *per mensem* was sanctioned in October for the naiks of all Border Military Police Corps.

325. The question of instituting a system of reserves for the North-West Frontier Militia first came under consideration during Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty. In July 1905 the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, drew attention to the fact that the scheme for the reorganization of the Army contemplated the utilization of the irregular forces of the North-West Frontier Province for local defence and, in the case of the Khyber Rifles, to hold the line of communications in the Khyber. Sir Harold Deane commented on the power for good or evil which the frontier tribes would possess in the event of a war with Afghanistan and on the necessity for enlisting their sympathies on the side of Government. With this object he advocated the utilisation of the militia, not only on the lines of communication, but also with the field army in the front, a step which would have the result of engaging the sympathies of the tribes and giving them an incentive not to molest the rear of the Power for whom their fellow-tribesmen were fighting. But to send the militia to the front would be to create a gap in the defence of the frontier, which Sir Harold Deane proposed to fill by the institution of a system of reserves. He did not consider the time ripe for the formation of reserves to the Northern and Southern Waziristan Militia; but, with respect to the older corps (the Khyber Rifles and the Kurram Militia), he submitted a scheme based on the general principles adopted for the Native Army. Under this scheme he proposed to raise 600 reservists for each of the two corps mentioned above, at an initial cost of Rs. 18,000 and an annual cost of Rs. 23,537 per corps.

326. Lord Curzon and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief both expressed themselves strongly in favour of the institution of a system of Militia Reserves as apart from any other scheme, but the latter was of opinion that, as a *quid pro quo*, the militia should be made liable to serve, in war time, anywhere in the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan and to come under the Indian Articles of War. It was pointed out that the *raison d'être* of the militia was for service near their homes, that it was quite foreign to the entire purpose of their enlistment to render them liable to general service and to military law and that such measures would be exceedingly unpopular with the tribes and would tend to retard the success of the militia scheme. The various aspects of the case were put to Sir Harold Deane after Lord Curzon had recorded his opinion in favour of reserves but averse from the proposed obligations.

327. The Chief Commissioner expressed himself as strongly opposed to the proposal to make the militia liable for general service in time of war. Under existing conditions the militia obtained the pick of the tribesmen, who did not care to serve at a distance from their homes; under general service conditions these men would no longer enlist, while the political utility of the militia would be destroyed, since forces could no longer work under the local officers, and it would be necessary to raise fresh irregulars to take their places. The Chief Commissioner considered that the militia would readily volunteer for active service, but the reservists would only come forward to fill the posts vacated by the militia and would refuse to serve elsewhere. It was suggested to Colonel Deane that, by posting the reserves at a distance from their homes while the militia were at the front, they might serve as hostages for the good behaviour of their fellow-tribesmen in the fighting line. To this Colonel Deane replied that the reserves would certainly decline to come forward to serve in positions which they regarded as implying distrust of them. He added that, in any case, it would depend on the attitude of the tribe whether the reserves answered to the call to arms or not: if the attitude of the tribe was such as to render it desirable to hold the reserves as hostages it was extremely unlikely that the reserves would respond at all to the call and the question would thus solve itself.

323. At this stage of the case, Lord Minto assumed the Viceroyalty. His Excellency fully recognized the value of a militia reserve, and the good that would accrue from a hold thus given over men who had retired. Advantage was taken of the visit of Major Roos-Keppel, Commandant, Khyber Rifles, to Simla, in May 1906, to discuss the matter with him. He introduced several new factors into the case, such as the necessity for a more senior class of officer for the command of the militia. He expressed the opinion that service in the militia should continue in effect to be local, but that the men should be liable to general service in war-time and should be subject to some military regulations. He said, however, that such changes in their conditions of service could only be introduced with the consent of the men, and that they would only agree to the changes if service were made pensionable—a measure which would, moreover, increase the hold of Government over the tribes. The case was also discussed with Sir Harold Deane, who paid a short visit to Simla in June 1906, and, as a result, in July he submitted revised proposals for the formation of militia reserves, for pensions for the Militia, for the force to be made subject to the Border Military Police Act in peace and to the Articles of War in war-time, for the appointment of an Inspector-General of Irregulars, and for certain alterations in the rank and status of Commandants of Militia.

329. After a prolonged discussion of the points at issue, Sir Harold Deane was informed, in April 1907, that the Government of India approved of the following measures, which diverged somewhat from his proposals:—

- (i) that militia service should be pensionable (the pensions being at the rates for local corps) on condition of the men electing for local service in peace-time with a liability to general service in time of war or disturbance. (With a view to differentiating these pensions from military pensions and causing them to be regarded as political allowances granted to secure a hold on the tribes, it was ruled that the pensions should be liable to forfeiture in the event of tribal or personal misbehaviour);
- (ii) that (in view of the unsettling effect of bringing men, when war is imminent, under a regulation different from that under which they are accustomed to serve in time of peace) the militia should be subject to the same regulation in peace as in war, which regulation should be an adaptation of the Border Military Police Act.
- (iii) that a reserve be formed for the four Militia corps, to consist of 600 men per corps, at an initial cost of Rs.18,000 and an annual expenditure of Rs. 23,537 per corps, and that the men be specially selected and be subject to a code of rules to be framed by the Chief Commissioner on the lines of the rules submitted with his proposals of July 1905;
- (iv) that the command of a Militia corps be regarded as analogous to the command of a regular regiment and tenable for five years, that the Commandant be ordinarily, though not necessarily, of the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and that, on the expiry of his term with militia, he be given an equal chance of further military employment with ex-commandants of regular regiments.

330. The question of an Inspector-General of Irregular Forces was disposed of separately, as mentioned below. A proposal to give all four militia corps the uniform nomenclature of the "North-West Frontier Rifles" did not commend itself to Government. The measures approved by the Government of India were not introduced, as further details were awaited from the North-West Frontier Administration, in regard to the financial effect of the scheme.

331. In August 1907 the Chief Commissioner submitted draft rules for the formation and control of the reserve, together with tables showing that the cost of the scheme would eventually be about Rs. 27,874 a year for each corps.

332. In November 1907 statements were submitted showing the probable expenditure involved by the grant of pensions to the militia.

333. In February 1909, proposals for the formation of reserves, for the appointment of more senior officers as Commandants of Militia, for rendering the militia liable to general service, and for the grant of pensions at local corps rates, to the ~~Karram~~ Karram Militia and the Northern and Southern Waziristan Militia, were submitted to the Secretary of State for India. In May 1909 the Secretary of State (while ~~sanctioning~~ sanctioning the grant of pensions, *vide* paragraph 355 below), declined to sanction the first three proposals, on the ground that they tended towards the over-militia-

334. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, in June 1906, proposed to the Government of India that, instead of having a Staff Officer to the Chief Commissioner for Militia and Border Military Police—an arrangement which had been found unsatisfactory, as that officer had no power to inspect Militia, was not competent, on account of his junior rank, personally to control a corps in an emergency, and was therefore practically a Secretary without the necessary secretariat experience—the following arrangement might be substituted. An officer of the rank of Colonel should be appointed Inspector-General of Irregular Forces in the North-West Frontier Province. This officer would be responsible for all arrangements pertaining to the military efficiency of these corps, while the Chief Commissioner would, as before, dispose of all cases involving political or administrative considerations. The Government of India approved of the proposal, except in regard to the designation of the appointment, which they altered to "Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps," and forwarded it, in January 1907, for the sanction of His Majesty's Secretary of State.

335. The proposal was sanctioned on the 8th March, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barratt, who had been acting as Staff Officer to the Chief Commissioner, was, on the 13th May, appointed Inspecting Officer with effect from the 25th March. The Chief Commissioner was informed that the Inspecting Officer would be in command of the militia and responsible for their efficiency and discipline, and that he would be required to inspect them; but that the existing arrangement, under which Commandants were responsible for the drill, discipline, and interior economy of their corps, although in general and political matters they were subordinated to the Political Agent, would be undisturbed: as regards Border Military Police, the Inspecting Officer's duties were restricted to periodical inspections. The Inspecting Officer was also required to submit an annual report of the result of his inspections to the Government of India. The tenure of the appointment was, in January 1908, limited to three years.

336. Second-Lieutenant Khan Muhammad Akbar Khan, a passed Imperial Cadet, was appointed Orderly Officer to the Inspecting Officer in April 1907.

337. In January 1910, it was decided that in future the various corps of Frontier Militia should be inspected annually by the General Officers Commanding the areas in which such corps are situated; the inspections being informal and not concerned with the details of the interior economy of the corps.

338. In May 1907, with a view to stimulating interest in rifle-shooting, musketry prizes on the basis of those sanctioned for the Native Army were sanctioned for the Militia and the Samana Rifles, and orders were issued for the free supply to these corps of badges for efficiency in shooting.

339. On the 20th December 1907 proposals were submitted by Sir Harold Deane for the rearmament of the North-West Frontier Militia Corps with the Magazine Lee-Metford rifle. Sir H. Deane observed that the question of rearmament had become a matter of urgent necessity, as, owing to the influx of Government Martini-Henry rifles amongst the tribesmen, the Militia would, in the event of hostilities, find themselves opposed by an enemy better armed than themselves. The Chief Commissioner was informed on the 10th June 1908 that the Government of India were not in favour of any change in regard to the armament of the Frontier Militia Corps.

340. In June 1909, the Chief Commissioner put forward a proposal to re-arm the Kurram Militia with the service pattern .303 Lee-Metford rifle. Rifles of this pattern had been issued to the Kurram Militia during the Kharlachi disturbance of the previous month, from a stock stored at Parachinar to meet possible emergencies; and he now strongly recommended the arrangement, as a permanent measure.

341. After a full consideration of the question, the Government of India, in December 1909, addressed the Secretary of State on the subject

of the re-armament of the various Militia corps in the North-West Frontier Province, and of the Zhob Levy Corps. They pointed out that these corps were at present armed with Martini-Henry rifles; that the frontier tribes were now arming themselves with the modern weapons, obtained, by means of gun-running operations, from the Persian Gulf; and that, in consequence, detachments of Militia stationed at various posts on the frontier often had to face bodies of raiders not only numerically superior to, but also better armed than, themselves; while there had recently been instances of the Militia being unable to reply effectively to the fire of raiders, owing to the latter possessing rifles of a longer range than their own. The Government of India accordingly thought it essential to furnish the Militia with a weapon superior to their present one; and they accordingly proposed to provide them with a single shot rifle of the Martini <sup>Metford</sup> ~~Enfield~~ pattern, taking the .303 bore cordite ammunition. In making this proposal they had not, they said, lost sight of the expediency of keeping the Militia in the matter of armament on a lower level than the regular army; for this position would still be maintained by virtue of the superiority of the magazine rifle over the single-shot weapon; while, at the same time, uniformity in the ammunition of any units that might be required to work together in defensive operations, would be ensured. The new weapon would at first be issued only to units in exposed and dangerous positions, or on sudden and grave emergencies arising; the entire Militia would not be re-armed with it till the exhaustion of the present stock of Martini-Henry rifles, or the increased acquisition of modern rifles by the tribesmen, or some serious change in the politics of the North-West Frontier, rendered a complete re-armament unavoidable. They indented, however, for 7,632 rifles, a number representing the present strength of the various Militia corps, *plus* a reserve of ten per cent, at an estimated cost of £20,415, exclusive of transit charges; and they asked for the early orders of His Majesty's Government.

342. On the 5th January 1910 the Secretary of State telegraphed that the arms indented for could not be supplied, and could not be paid for, during the current financial year. He agreed however to provision being made in the next budget, but no expenditure was to be incurred until the proposal had been further considered and finally approved.

343. In May the Chief Commissioner was informed, with reference to his proposal for the re-armament of the Kurram Militia, that the Government of India agreed with him as to the necessity for a better weapon, and that they had accordingly indented for a supply of .303 single-shot rifles, which they expected would be received during the course of the year. But the reasons which rendered it desirable to re-arm the Kurram Militia, did not, in their opinion, operate with equal force in the case of the other Militia corps, who would continue to be armed with Martini-Henry rifles so long as serviceable weapons of that class were available, and no special circumstances arose to render necessary their re-armament with a superior weapon. The Government of India, however, expressed their willingness to consider any recommendations that the Chief Commissioner might wish to submit for the supply of single-shot .303 rifles to units or detachments required to serve in exposed and dangerous positions, where the possession of a good weapon was considered essential.

344. No further development of the question took place during the period comprised in the Summary, but a first consignment of about 2,000 of these rifles was expected to arrive in India towards the end of the year.

345. In 1906 General Sir E. Barrow inspected the Chitral Scouts and remarked in his report on them that they had a slovenly and unsoldierly appearance, and that the corps would be of far more value if they were slightly more regularised, given uniforms and better equipment. He also condemned their drill.

346. On this Sir Harold Deane, Chief Commissioner, submitted in January 1908 some proposals for reorganizing the corps. But before determining the necessity or otherwise for the proposed reorganization, the views of Sir G. Roos-Keppel (Sir Harold Deane's successor) were invited. Sir G. Roos-Keppel thereupon deputed Colonel Dick, Inspecting Officer of Frontier Corps, to Chitral to

make a careful inspection of the Scouts there. Colonel Dick's report expressed the definite opinion that the Chitrali Scouts as at present constituted were sufficiently good for practical purposes, and that no reorganization was necessary. This view being supported by Sir G. Roos-Keppel, was accepted by the Government of India, who thereupon abandoned further consideration of the reorganization scheme. In February 1910 sanction was accorded to the supply of havresacks and water-bottles to the Chitral Scouts, for issue on mobilization.

347. In connection with the construction of the Kabul River Railway, sanction had been conveyed, on the 28th August 1905, to an increase to the strength of the Khyber Rifles involving an annual expenditure of Rs. 85,000. It was found, however, that the expenditure had been underestimated, and the Government of India, in their letter to the Secretary of State, dated the 26th April 1906, pointed out this fact and asked for sanction to an annual expenditure of Rs. 99,542. This was accorded in June 1906.

348. The increase to the strength of the Khyber Rifles was necessitated by the measures requisite for the protection of working parties during the construction of the Kabul River Railway, and for the safeguarding of the line after its completion. It had, however, for some time been felt that certain changes were desirable in the organization and establishment of the Khyber Rifles, quite apart from those necessitated by the railway scheme; but, as it was important that the increases required in connection with the latter should be brought into effect as soon as possible, it was thought unnecessary to delay the case while details were being worked out as to the general requirements of the corps.]

349. The major changes considered necessary were :—

- (a) the reorganization of the corps, which at that time consisted of two separate battalions with a single commandant, but with two distinct organizations, into one battalion with two wings, and a single administrative staff,
- (b) the permanent transfer of the headquarters of the corps from Jamrud to Landi Kotal, the political and military centre of the Agency, and
- (c) the appointment of a commissioned medical officer to the Khyber Agency in place of the Assistant Surgeon who had been in medical charge of the corps.

350. Certain petty increases were also required in the salaries of officers, non-commissioned officers and establishments, and in the numerical strength of certain establishments. This latter item included a small transport branch, which was rendered necessary by the fact that the Kabul River outposts are connected with headquarters and with one another by mule tracks only.

351. More barrack accommodation was also required, on account of the increase to the strength of the corps, of its reorganization, and of the transfer of headquarters to Landi Kotal. Major Roos-Keppel, Political Agent, Khyber, undertook to have the necessary accommodation built at a cost of Rs. 68,000.

352. On the 15th February 1907, the Secretary of State sanctioned the reorganization of the corps, the transfer of its headquarters to Landi Kotal, the various increases in salaries and minor establishments, and the appointment of a commissioned medical officer to the Khyber Agency. It had, in the meantime, been found necessary, owing to pressing needs, to post a medical officer to the Khyber in anticipation of the Secretary of State's sanction to the creation of the appointment.

353. In response to a request put forward in May 1909 "at the very earnest desire of all ranks" of the corps, the Viceroy was pleased, in September 1909, to appoint the Hon'ble Lieutenant-Colonel Sir George Olaf Roos-Keppel, K.C.I.E., Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, to be Honorary Colonel of the Khyber Rifles.



354. In recognition of the good services rendered by the Khyber Rifles during the recent Zakka Khel expedition and frontier disturbances, it was proposed to place that corps, as regards pensions, on the same footing as the regular army. The cost of pensions, at full army rates, for the Khyber Rifles was estimated at Rs. 10,000 during the first year, rising to a maximum of Rs. 52,000 after thirty years. His Majesty's Secretary of State, who was addressed by the Government of India, while thoroughly appreciating the gallantry displayed by the Khyber Rifles, saw difficulty in granting them a special reward for performing satisfactorily the ordinary duties expected of them, and for which they received their pay; but, on a further representation from the Government of India, he sanctioned the proposal in September 1908. This concession, which was made as a special recognition of good services, was to be conditional on the acceptance by the men of certain terms of service, which were to include liability to serve away from the Khyber Agency. In March 1910, owing to the Secretary of State having objected to the Militia being made liable to general service, the condition was waived.

355. Subsequently, in March 1910, a similar concession, which had been sanctioned by the Secretary of State in May 1909, was extended to the other Militia corps on the North-West Frontier, *viz.*, the Kurram Militia, the Northern and Southern Waziristan Militia, and the Zhob Levy Corps. The authorities were told that, in announcing this important concession, it should be made unmistakably clear to the men of these corps that the pension would be liable to forfeiture in the event of tribal or personal misbehaviour.

356. On the 8th January 1906 the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, represented that the existing establishment of British officers with the Southern Waziristan Militia was inadequate, and recommended the appointment of an additional officer. The Government of India sanctioned the proposal in anticipation of the sanction of His Majesty's Secretary of State, whom they addressed on the subject in May 1906, pointing out that, in view of the uncertain situation in Waziristan, it was most desirable that the corps should have a full complement of officers. The Secretary of State's sanction to the appointment was received in August 1906.

357. In February 1906 the Commissioner, Multan Division, brought forward proposals, through the Punjab Government, for increasing the Dera Ghazi Khan Baloch Levy by 77 men. The Government of India, in July, stated that, so far as the duties of the corps were known to them, they considered that the main grounds for the recommendation were not sufficient to warrant the very considerable increase of expenditure involved by the proposal. The Punjab Government had also pointed out, in April 1906, that the post of Commandant of the corps was soon to be vacant, and, as this appointment demanded a considerable degree of technical military knowledge, a military officer was required, and, as military officers were no longer recruited for the Punjab Commission, it was suggested that steps should be taken to ensure a supply of military officers for the future command of the Levy; to solve the difficulty the Punjab Government submitted the following proposals:—

- (1) the employment of military officers, preferably from Baloch regiments for periods of from three to five years; or
- (2) the recruitment of military officers for the Punjab Commission on a scale sufficient to meet the requirements of this appointment.

358. In reply the Government of India observed, with reference to the latter proposal, that in January 1902 the Punjab Government had expressed the opinion that there was no longer any reason for the employment of military civilians in the Punjab, that the recruitment of military civilians had been deliberately abandoned, and that the mere retention of the Dera Ghazi Khan district under the Punjab did not necessitate the continuance of such recruitment. On these grounds the Government of India expressed themselves unable to accept the suggestion. As regards the former proposal, they pointed out that there was no immediate need for action since there was still a junior military civilian available and that, before his tenure expired, the constitution of the corps might be so altered as to do away with the necessity for a military officer as Commandant.



359. On the 17th May the Punjab Government brought to notice the fact that there was no legal authority providing for the discipline of this corps, or for the infliction of punishments on members thereof who were guilty of any of the offences enumerated in the North-West Border Military Police Act IV of 1904. They proposed, therefore, to extend the Act, with the necessary verbal alterations, to the Dera Ghazi Khan district, and to make it applicable to the Baloch Levy. The Government of India sanctioned this proposal in June 1906.

360. In November 1905 the Divisional and Sessions Judge, Peshawar, was appointed to act temporarily as Judicial Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, with the result that he was called upon

**Amendment of the North-West Frontier Law and Justice Regulation.**

to consider, in his new capacity, several appeals against the decrees and orders which he had himself passed in his capacity of Sessions Judge. Though this procedure was clearly opposed to all principles of justice, there was no power under any enactment under which the cases could be transferred to a High Court or Chief Court, or by which an Additional Judicial Commissioner could be appointed to dispose of them. To remedy this defect, the North-West Frontier Province Law and Justice Regulation was amended by means of Regulation I of 1906 (published in the *Gazette of India* of the 3rd February 1906) which empowered the Judicial Commissioner, in circumstances such as are described above, to transfer appeals of this class to the Chief Court of the Punjab, or to appoint an Additional Judicial Commissioner, with all the powers of the Judicial Commissioner, to dispose of them.

361. It was indicated in August-November 1906 that no adequate arrange-

**Question of legal advice for the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan.**

ments existed in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan for obtaining expert legal advice on behalf of Government.

Under the existing system both Provinces referred cases in which they needed technical advice to the Government of India, for transfer to the Legal Advisers of Government. This resulted in delay, while the Local Administrations hesitated to trouble Government on many matters which they would have referred to a law officer, had one been available. It was accordingly suggested that both Administrations should be empowered to refer legal cases to the Legal Remembrancer to the Punjab Government, whom it was proposed to remunerate for the extra work which would thus be thrown upon him. The Legal Remembrancer himself, however, represented that his time was fully occupied with business for the Punjab Government and that he could not, without detriment to his existing work, undertake any additional duties. The question of appointing a special law officer for the two provinces was thereupon considered, but it was held that there would not be sufficient work to justify the creation of such an appointment and the Administrations were accordingly told in July that existing arrangements would, for the present, be maintained.

362. It having been represented to the Government of India that insufficient

**Restrictions on private survey parties.**

control had been exercised hitherto over survey operations, conducted by parties of private travellers on the Northern and North-Western frontiers of India, in areas, the topographical details of which it was considered undesirable to render accessible to the public, instructions were issued on the 22nd September 1909, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan and the Resident in Kashmir, to the effect that permission to British subjects to visit certain specified areas should be given only on the proviso that no surveying should be done, and that applications from British subjects to survey, and from foreigners either to travel or survey, in such areas, should invariably be submitted for the orders of the Government of India.

363. Subsequently, in January 1910, it was explained by the Government of India, that the object of these orders was to place a check over geographical explorations undertaken by private parties in what are technically "secret" areas, and to render it impossible for detailed and large scale maps of such areas (showing routes, passes, and similar information which it was not considered desirable to

make public) to be published without the knowledge and consent of the Government of India. There was no desire, it was said, to impose any restrictions, beyond those already in force, over the movements of private individuals who were British subjects, or British companies, exploring, prospecting, or travelling for *bonâ fide* purposes of trade, sport or pleasure within the areas referred to, or over the preparation of plans and sketches which were required for business or legal purposes and had no military or political value.

364. Reference has already been made, in various parts of the preceding chapters, to raids committed by Mohmands, Afridis, Mahsuds, Khostwals and outlaws,

**Raids and Border Crime.**

during various periods of Lord Minto's Viceroyalty. While it is hardly possible, or desirable, in a summary of the nature of the present one, to mention all the raids which occurred on the frontier during the period under review, some particulars of a few of the more important raids, not already referred to are given in Appendix I, arranged according to the districts or Agencies to which they refer.

365. In a letter, dated the 27th August 1905, the Amir stated that he had

(1) *Lord Minto's first proposals to the Amir on the subject of border crime.*

arranged for the formation of a Committee of Afghan officials to enquire into cases of raids from Afghan into British territory and that, as soon as he received information from the Viceroy as to the locality on the frontier where the Committee should start work, they would commence operations. It was considered undesirable for the Committee to go into the general question of frontier disputes, and it was accordingly agreed to wait till some concrete case occurred, in which there was a certainty as to the facts of Afghan complicity, and to refer such a case to the Committee. It was held that the raids on Tangi and Jogini (referred to elsewhere) were cases of the nature contemplated, and the British Agent at Kabul was instructed, on the 14th April 1906, to lay the facts of these raids before the Amir and suggest to him that some of his Commissioners for the investigation of frontier crime might co-operate with the British frontier officials in the investigation of the cases, and in considering the best way to stop the occurrence of such raids. No reply was received to this reference, and no direct action was taken by the Amir in connection with the two cases mentioned. A reminder was conveyed to the Amir's Envoy on the 18th September 1906, but this also failed to elicit a reply. There was, however, evidence that the Amir had been endeavouring, for some time past, to put a stop to trans-border raiding. In September and October 1905, news was received that the Sarhang of Dakka had arrested certain outlaws of Hazarnao, including Shakar, the leader of the gang, and it was reported in January 1906 that the gang had been summoned to Jalalabad and warned by the Amir that if they raided into British territory they would be deported. It was at the same time stated that the Amir had issued orders to the Governor of Khost to put a stop to raids into British territory and to restore any animals which had been carried off by raiders.

366. In February 1906, a statement was compiled in the Foreign Department

(2) *State of the border in 1904-05.*

of offences committed on the North-West Frontier during the period from November 1904 to November 1905. It was observed that in many instances there was no record of any measures having been taken against the offenders, or of the result of such measures as were reported to have been taken.

367. The statement was sent to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, and to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, on the 28th March, to be checked and completed, so far as it concerned their respective jurisdictions. The Chief Commissioner's special attention was invited to certain cases which appeared to indicate that, during the period in question, a state of disturbance had existed on the northern part of the border, which was rare even in the history of the North-West Frontier. It was observed that, in the Administration Report on the North-West Frontier Province of 1904-05, these and other raids were ascribed to gangs of Afghans and outlaws from British territory acting with the moral and material support of the local Afghan officials. The Govern-

ment of India were disposed to doubt whether, in the light of subsequent events, the charges against the Afghan officials were fully warranted. Some of the cases were committed by Afridis and others not in any way connected with the Amir or his officials, and the omission to enforce tribal responsibility against the Afridis and other tribes concerned appeared to need some further explanation. The Chief Commissioner's attention was also invited to certain serious raids committed in February and March 1905, which had not been reported to the Government of India.

368. In a letter received from the Chief Commissioner in November 1908, it was remarked that a most important and troublesome question on the border was that of the outlaw colonies. There were some 750 outlaws on the border. Formerly they used to live amongst the tribesmen, but they had gradually removed to Afghan territory, except those in Waziristan who had an asylum with the Mahsuds. Multan had returned to Nazian where he had collected a gang; there were gangs on the Kurram border in Hariob and Khost; the Khattak outlaws of the Kohat district had established themselves at Zangoi Khula, a mile inside the Khost border; Bannu outlaws had found an asylum in the Ghazni District, and Dera Ismail Khan outlaws had found similar refuges in Urghun and Birmal. A feature of the recrudescence of raiding seemed to be attacks on Hindus in preference to Muhammadans. Under present conditions it was often impossible to settle these cases in a satisfactory manner. The colonies of outlaws were able to despatch and withdraw armed bands across the tracts intervening between Afghanistan and British territory, often without the knowledge of the independent tribes through whose territory they passed. On the Shabkadr-Abazai border there were a number of lawless men, such as Hakim and Mir Baz, the notorious outlaws, constantly on the move to give trouble. Every military and police precaution had been taken; the Mohmand *jirgas* had been very seriously warned of their responsibilities; the Pindiali allowances had been suspended; more rifles had been issued to the villagers; and the obligation of the villagers to protect the Hindu residents was being enforced. On the Kohat side, specific action was more difficult as there was little evidence forthcoming as to the constitution of the gangs of raiders. The Deputy Commissioner had been instructed to find out the constitution, as far as possible, in each case and the route followed by the gang, and then to enforce tribal responsibility and put severe pressure on the relations of any members of the gangs who happened to live in the vicinity of the route taken. In Bannu, action had been taken against the sections concerned generally for their share in outrages; frontier remissions had been confiscated; allowances had been withheld; and fines had been inflicted. In Dera Ismail Khan, arms had been issued liberally on security to the border villages, and the large land-owners, such as the Nawabs of Tank and Gandapur, had been permitted to make purchases of rifles for the protection of their followers.

369. In a later communication, dated the 21st December 1908, the Chief Commissioner stated that, after consultation with the local officers regarding the recent raids and kidnapping of Hindus, measures had been taken which, it was hoped, would result in the early release of seven Hindus held to ransom in Khost. A big *baramta* had been made of trans-border Wazirs, Ghilzais and Khostwals, and seven of the leading Wazirs of British territory had been arrested. By thus strictly enforcing territorial responsibility, the Chief Commissioner thought that not only would the captive Hindus be released, but that all concerned would be convinced that kidnapping was unprofitable.

370. In June 1909, steps were taken with the object of preventing the outlaws in Khost from raiding across the border, and, if possible, to have them removed to a distance from the border. Certain Maliks of the Darwesh Khel Wazir tribe, who were deputed by the Political Agent, Tochi, to Khost, returned and reported that they were hospitably entertained by the Hakim of Khost, who showed himself most anxious to do what he could in the matter. The Maliks were satisfied that, as far as the Tochi Agency and Bannu district were concerned, the raiding by outlaws would stop for a while. The Maliks wrote to the Amir, Sardar Nasrulla Khan, and Sardar Inayatulla Khan, regarding the depredations of the outlaws, and

appealed to His Majesty, as a King of Islam, to save them from this trouble. They pointed out that, if raiding was not stopped, and the Wazirs were made to suffer further for these outlaws, the Maliks would be unable to restrain their men from raiding across into the Amir's territory. The Hakim of Khost wrote also to the Amir, giving a list of all the raids that had been committed, and recommending that the petition of the Wazirs be granted.

371. The years 1908-10 were characterised by a general increase in the number of raids. The Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts suffered the most, (4) *State of the border in 1908-10.*

and though the number of really important raids was not unusually large, the attacks on cattle and attempts to raid villages were so numerous, as to keep the villagers in a constant state of unrest and alarm. In addition to these petty raids, there were a great many cases of kidnapping, while the resistance offered to raiding gangs resulted in numerous casualties. By far the greater number of raids was committed by outlaws residing for the most part in Khost, assisted by Afghan subjects and tribesmen on the British side of the border.

372. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, supplied the following information, in April 1910, regarding the gangs of outlaws, who were responsible for the kidnapping of Hindus on the frontier. There were four distinct bands of outlaws; they resided in Afghan territory, one lot being in the Nazian valley of the Sangu Khel Shinwaris, south of Ningrahar, and the remainder in Khost. The operations of the Nazian set had been confined to the Peshawar district; the Khost gangs kidnapped in the Kohat and Bannu districts and in the Tochi Agency. Afghan territory furnished them all with a secure and unassailable base of operations. Thence they could issue, in relatively small bodies, and take their chances of being caught in the network of uninhabited hills and desert country that fringes the British border, and extends into it. The outlaws found kidnapping a lucrative business, as the Hindus were held to ransom. The offences were not fortuitous occurrences, but were carefully planned; the outlaws being either employed by enemies of the Hindus, or acting on their own account with the aid of local bad characters, who shared in the ransom. Deputy Commissioners had been impressed with the importance of bringing to book the local aiders and abettors of these gangs of outlaws, and of punishing villages that were to blame. In consequence, a number of men had been convicted, and villages fined.

373. As already shown elsewhere (see the Kurram section) a joint Indo-Afghan Commission was appointed early in 1910 for the settlement of border crime; and it met for the first time at Pathan in Kurram on the 26th May 1910, and had made substantial progress in its work by the close of the period comprised in this Summary.

374. The Chief Commissioner having reported that the activity of Mahsud raiding gangs had created a state of alarm throughout the Dera Ismail Khan District, and that it was evident that the

(5) *Arming of villagers against raiders.* villagers were not sufficiently well armed to offer effective resistance to parties of raiders, sanction was accorded in June 1908 to 200 Martini-Henry rifles and 100 rounds of ammunition per rifle being distributed among the villagers.

375. On a representation from the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat that, in view of the increasing activity of Khost raiding gangs, arms were required for the protection of exposed Khattak villages and the Kohat District, authority was given in October 1908 for the supply of 400 Martinis, 600 Enfields, and 100 rounds of ammunition per rifle, to be issued, on security, to villagers.

376. At a *jirga* meeting held during a visit paid by the Chief Commissioner to the Tochi and Daur, the Maliks presented a petition praying for the issue of Government rifles to the villagers of the Agency. The Political Agent, after considering the number of arms at present held on security in the Agency, asked that more rifles might be issued to the villagers to enable them to defend themselves against raiders, especially from Afghanistan, where large numbers of outlaws from British and tribal territory had established themselves. As several requisitions for arms for villagers were received about the same time, it was considered desirable not to sanction the supply of any further arms to villagers till the position had been thoroughly examined.

377. Meantime the Chief Commissioner submitted proposals for the removal of the restrictions which were imposed in 1900 on the possession and carriage of rifles and rifle ammunition in certain portions of the frontier districts. The reasons urged were the defencelessness of the villagers against raiders, which had caused a sense of exasperation against Government and given rise to a general feeling of insecurity throughout the border. In replying to the Chief Commissioner, on the 11th February 1909, the Government of India observed that, at times when fanatics were preaching a religious war, and indeed, at other times, it might be of vital administrative importance to have a tract on the British side of the frontier free of arms, except such as might be held under due license and security. For these and other considerations Government were not prepared to reverse the present policy. They were, however, willing to develop the system of giving out rifles, on proper security, and to issue a better class of rifle to villagers on the frontier. The Chief Commissioner was accordingly asked to formulate a scheme showing exactly how many rifles were required for each district, and the reasons for supplying them.

378. The Chief Commissioner duly submitted his proposals, and after consideration of them, the Government of India sanctioned the following arrangements in September 1909:

- (a) that all Government arms now in the possession of districts shall, as far as possible, be withdrawn, and that, in lieu thereof, a fixed number of Martini-Henry rifles, sufficient for the needs of the district and for a district reserve, together with 50 rounds of ammunition for each rifle (20 for issue with each rifle, and 30 to be kept in reserve in forts under military charge), shall be issued to Deputy Commissioners. In ordinary times, the Deputy Commissioners will only issue rifles, together with 20 rounds of ammunition, for the protection of exposed or isolated villages, the remainder being kept in the district reserve in the fort at each district head-quarters;
- (b) that a provincial reserve of 2,000 Martini-Henry rifles and ammunition shall be kept at the Rawalpindi arsenal for issue in cases of emergency;
- (c) that, for these purposes, 8,000 Martini-Henry rifles and 400,000 rounds of ammunition shall be placed at the disposal of the Chief Commissioner;
- (d) that the rifles shall be issued to villages on communal village security of Rs. 250 for each rifle and that those issued in time of disturbance shall be withdrawn when usual conditions are re-established.

379. The Secretary of State noticed these proceedings, and directed (November 12, 1909) that in future all proposals upon this important subject, involving any material departure from existing practice, should be submitted for his approval.

380. In May 1910, the Chief Commissioner asked that he might postpone the withdrawal of the obsolete Government firearms, which had from time to time been issued to the villagers on the North-West Frontier, until there was a prospect of more assured peace on the frontier, but the Government regretted they were unable to sanction this proposal. The condition of the border, if not more satisfactory, was certainly no worse than it had been for years past; and the orders of Government were therefore to be carried into effect without further delay.

381. Mr. P. E. Billinghamurst, a mining engineer of Lucknow, arranged with several capitalists, in 1906, to form a syndicate for mining in Chitral. A draft agree-

#### Chitral Mining Lease.

ment between the Mehtar of Chitral and Mr. Billinghamurst was, after amendment, approved by the Government of India, and Mr. Billinghamurst was allowed, at the end of October 1906, to go to Chitral to commence operations. The Mehtar raised obstacles in the matter of signing the amended agreement, on the grounds that it differed from that to which he had provisionally assented in Peshawar on the occasion of the visit of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales. In the meantime the Secretary of State, to whom a copy of the papers on the subject had been forwarded, telegraphed on the 7th November 1906, ordering all action in the matter to be suspended. In a despatch dated the 23rd November he explained that, in pursuance of the existing policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Chitral, it was undesirable to allow large mining concerns, worked by Europeans, to be established in that country. Mr. Billinghamurst was



accordingly told that, in pursuance of a general line of policy and quite apart from any question of his fitness to work the concession, it had been decided not to allow mining concerns in Chitral of the nature contemplated.

382. Mr. Billinghamurst interviewed the Secretary of State on the subject in February 1907, and was told that his revised proposals did not appear to affect the policy which it had been decided to follow, but that he might refer again to the Government of India.

383. Accordingly in May he submitted amended proposals. He now proposed that he should enter the Mehtar's service as a Mining Engineer, the syndicate being permitted to purchase yearly from the Mehtar a certain quantity of ores at set rates, without preventing others from purchasing. After further discussion of his proposals, the Secretary of State was informed in August that the Mehtar had applied for Mr. Billinghamurst's services as his Mining Engineer and was anxious to develop the mineral resources of his country, and to dispense with forced labour at his mines. The Secretary of State replied that he did not object in principle to the proposals but required details as to the terms of the contract and of Mr. Billinghamurst's engagement by the Mehtar. Drafts of both were received in October; amended drafts were submitted in January 1908 and were forwarded to the Secretary of State on 12th March 1908. These were approved, with certain modifications, by the Secretary of State on the 13th April, and on the 21st April the Chief Commissioner was informed that Mr. Billinghamurst might be permitted to proceed to Chitral and to commence work forthwith, provided it were safe for Europeans to travel along the Dir-Chitral road.

384. Mr. Billinghamurst engaged to serve the Mehtar for four years on a salary of Rs. 500 *per mensem* without travelling allowance. His duties would be to extract ores for the syndicate, to meet such further contracts as the Mehtar might become a party to, and generally to develop the mineral resources of the country, to organize and train mining labour, and to abolish the system of forced labour. He gave a further engagement not to be connected, while in the Mehtar's service, with any syndicate purchasing ores or timber from Chitral.

385. The syndicate undertook to purchase 50,000 tons of ore from the Mehtar, at specified rates, to pay Rs. 10,000 as earnest money, in addition to expenses of extraction and transportation, to purchase 500 maunds of orpiment annually, if available, to refer all disputes to the Political Agent, with the Chief Commissioner as the final court of appeal, and not to transfer their interests to other persons or companies without the consent of the Mehtar and Chief Commissioner. They also agreed to pay the Khan of Dir for any special protection needed by their working parties while in his territories, and finally they exempted the Government of India from responsibility for the safety of those engaged in the work.

386. The Mehtar, on his part, undertook to furnish the stipulated amounts of ore, if available, or larger quantities, should both parties so agree, but he reserved to himself the right of selling ores to, or entering into contracts with, any other approved persons.

387. Mr. Billinghamurst was told in 1908, on two occasions, that it was undesirable, owing to the political situation, for him to go to Chitral, but he again applied for permission in January 1909. In the meantime Sir George Roos-Keppel had reported that the scheme was extremely unpopular among the Chitralis, who feared they would be "sold into slavery" and made to work at the mines at the point of the bayonet," and he expressed strong views against Mr. Billinghamurst being allowed to go up at all. In February, Mr. Billinghamurst wrote a strong protest against his being detained in India, and the Chief Commissioner, who was asked for his views in the matter, replied on the 20th March that mining was unpopular in Chitral, that voluntary labour would not be forthcoming, and that the Mehtar would consequently have to work his mines with forced labour. Owing to the known weakness of the Mehtar's position, it would be considered that this, like all the Mehtar's public actions, had the support of the British Government, and the employment of a European Mining Engineer would give special prominence to this view of the matter. Sir George Roos-Keppel added that the measure would be so unpopular that the Mehtar would not be able to force it on the people without the support of British troops, and the British



would thus incur odium merely in order to enrich the Mehtar and the Chitral Syndicate. The Chief Commissioner accordingly recommended that the sanction accorded to the agreement between the Mehtar and the Syndicate should be immediately cancelled at whatever cost, and that no similar concessions should be granted in the Dir, Swat and Chitral Agency till the political situation had entirely changed.

388. Mr. Billinghamurst was informed in April 1909 that, in view of the changed political situation on the frontier, the Government of India could not hold out any hopes that he would be permitted to proceed to Chitral. The matter was referred to the Secretary of State, who telegraphed on the 29th May that, in view both of the general situation on the frontier, and of the position in Chitral, any idea of allowing Mr. Billinghamurst to undertake the projected operations in Chitral must be given up.

389. A representation on the subject was received from Sir Allan Arthur on the 1st May. He expressed surprise at the decision that Mr. Billinghamurst would not be allowed at any time to begin work in Chitral, and stated that, as the Syndicate and Frontier Company had spent much time and money on the Chitral project, it was natural that they should be unwilling to accept the decision. The Frontier Company hesitated, Sir Allan Arthur added, to put into force their contract with the Mehtar by buying ores on this side of the frontier; but, if it were finally decided that the work was not to be controlled by a mining engineer in Chitral, the company would be driven to carry out their agreement with the Mehtar in the manner now followed by native contractors.

390. His Majesty's Secretary of State for India received a representation, dated the 9th June 1909, from Mr. Billinghamurst, appealing against the decision of the Government of India declining to allow him to proceed to Chitral to commence work in connection with the Chitral mining syndicate's agreement. He was informed in reply, on the 23rd June, that the decision had been approved by the Secretary of State, and that no hope that it would be modified could be held out to him, until the Government of India were satisfied, having regard to the political situation, that it would be safe to allow him to proceed.

391. The Secretary of State also received a letter, dated 9th June 1909, from one Shaikh Ahmad Hussain, who stated that he had been deputed to England by the Mehtar of Chitral to represent the latter's interests in connection with the mining concessions, and asked for an interview with the Secretary of State to discuss the matter. He was informed that his request could not be granted and that it was contrary to the established practice of the Secretary of State to consider representations from, or on behalf of, an Indian Chief, unless embodied in a memorial, which should be submitted through the Government of India.

392. A copy of the correspondence was forwarded by the Secretary of State to the Government of India, for any observations which they might have to offer on the points raised by Mr. Billinghamurst.

393. On the 2nd August, the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, was informed that the Government of India felt themselves compelled, in view of the general political situation on the frontier and the conditions at present prevailing in Chitral, to cancel the sanction which had been accorded in May 1908 to the draft agreement between the Mehtar of Chitral and the Frontier Syndicate, regarding the mining concession in Chitral. The Chief Commissioner was requested to convey this decision to the parties concerned, as the final order of Government, and to instruct the Political Agent, in communicating the decision to the Mehtar, to convey an expression of regret that political necessity and broad considerations of policy had made this decision inevitable.

394. On the 11th August, Mr. Billinghamurst was informed, in reply to an application for compensation on account of expenses incurred by him in connection with the proposed mining concession in Chitral, that the Government of India regretted that they were unable to entertain his claim for compensation.

395. In January 1910, Mr. P. Billinghamurst submitted an appeal to the Secretary of State against the above orders of the Government of India. It was duly forwarded and in March Mr. Billinghamurst was informed that the Secretary of State declined to interfere on his behalf.

396. In January 1910 a memorial addressed to the Government of India was received from the Frontier Company, Limited, praying for a reconsideration of the orders cancelling the sanction which had been accorded in May 1908 to the draft agreement between the Mehtar of Chitral and the Frontier Syndicate, regarding the proposed mining concession in Chitral. In February the Government of Bengal (through whom the memorial had been submitted) were requested to inform the memorialists that the Government of India saw no reason to modify the decision which was conveyed to the Company in September 1909.

397. The Company memorialised again in May 1910, but, as they had failed to comply with certain requirements of the memorial rules, their memorial was returned to them with the intimation that the Government of India could not transmit it to the Secretary of State, unless it was made to comply with the rules. The memorial was resubmitted in September and at the end of that month was about to be transmitted to the Secretary of State, with the remark that the Government of India had no recommendation to make on behalf of the memorialists.

398. The Chairman of the Frontier Company, Sir Allen Arthur, made a personal representation to the India Office, London, in June 1910, on behalf of the Company's claim. He was informed by the Under-Secretary of State that, in view of the political considerations which led the Government of India to decide that effect could not be given to the project—a decision which had the approval of the Secretary of State—it was impossible for the latter to take any steps in the matter, unless it was submitted to him in the regular official course by the Government of India.

399. Mr. R. A. Prideaux, on the 26th March 1906, made an application on behalf of Messrs. Graham and Company, Calcutta, for the grant of a mining lease for mineral oil in the Largha Sheranni country. It was found, however, that the firm in question intended to be associated in the enterprise with the Asiatic Petroleum Company, which is to a large extent foreign-owned. The Government of India, on the 29th January 1907, stated that, in the circumstances, they were unable to sanction the proposed concession, the grant of which would be in contravention of the established principle that oil concessions in territory under the control of the Government of India should be retained in British hands.

400. In April they asked for a mining lease in their own name and guaranteed that it would be worked by a purely British company. The Secretary of State, who was referred to on the subject, stated in August that, before anything was settled, he required an assurance that there would be no fear of the presence of working parties leading to attacks; but otherwise he generally accepted the proposed arrangements. A complication was introduced, before these assurances could be given, by the receipt of proposals from Messrs. Graham and Company to make over their claim to Mr. Prideaux, an engineer in their employ. This, for some time, caused a deadlock, but early in April 1908 the Chief Commissioner was instructed to draw up a lease recognising Graham and Company as the sole principals (irrespective of any parties to whom they might farm out the concern) and to obtain the requisite agreements and undertakings from the Sherannis in respect of protecting working parties and of waiving any rights in the oil fields in consideration of the receipt of a royalty.

401. The draft lease was received in July, and was generally approved, but the Secretary of State was informed on the 5th August that, though the Sherannis had accepted responsibility for the safety of working parties, the Chief Commissioner was unable to give the guarantee (for which the Secretary of State had asked in August 1907) that there would be no fear of the presence of working parties in Sheranni country leading to attacks. Accordingly, with the Secretary of State's approval, Messrs. Graham and Company were informed on the 25th August that, owing to the political situation, the Government of India were unable to proceed with the grant of the lease. In September, in reply to a reference from the firm, Messrs. Graham and Company were informed that, should the political situation render it practicable to proceed in the matter of granting a lease (as to which the Government of India could in no sense commit themselves), their application would receive first consideration.

402. In April 1909, an application was received through the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, from Mr. R. A. Prideaux, of the firm of Messrs. Graham and Company, Calcutta, for permission to proceed to the Sheranni country in the cool weather of 1909-10, with a view to testing the oil springs near Moghal Kot. If the test proved successful, the company would be willing to wait for the grant of a concession to prospect; otherwise they would abandon the scheme.

403. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, was informed in May that the Government of India were not prepared to sanction experimental borings in the locality in question, as recent experience had shown that such a proceeding would involve a certain amount of risk; while if, as a result of the tests being successful, further operations in connection with the extraction of the oil were sanctioned, grave political complications might ensue.

404. A further application was received in December 1909 from Mr. R. A. Prideaux for permission to make trial borings for mineral oil in the vicinity of Moghal Kot in Largha Sheranni country. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, informed Mr. Prideaux (in a letter, dated the 19th December 1909) that relations with the Sheranni tribe were not on a good footing, and that it would be risky for operations to be conducted at Moghal Kot. Mr. Merk, however, hoped that the situation would improve, and said that the application would be submitted to the Government of India.

405. In submitting the application, the Chief Commissioner recommended that as soon as a settlement had been effected with the Sherannis, permission should be given to conduct the trial borings, the company paying for protection. In reply to enquiries, Mr. Merk expressed the opinion that, if appropriate measures of precaution were taken, working parties would not be liable to attack, either during the period of the trial borings, or in the event of working parties being permanently employed in the tract as the result of a possible sanction to mining operations proper. "Our relations with the Sherannis (Mr. Merk stated) are taking a turn for the better. They are the poorest and most miserable tribe on this frontier. If they clearly understand, and I think that there can be no doubt that they can be made to understand, that, if oil is found, they will be assured of a steady income in the shape of a royalty, it would be contrary to human nature if they were not pleased, knowing, as they do, that they cannot possibly work and sell the oil themselves. If oil is found in large quantity, the royalty may for the Sherannis be a huge sum. If oil does exist and is worked there, it will be a perfect Godsend to that wretched part of the country. The demand for labour and the money locally expended in the operations will give ample employment and remuneration to the hungry clans of the neighbourhood. Besides, the Sherannis have already agreed to accept liability for protection in return for a share in the royalty."

406. The Chief Commissioner made certain suggestions in regard to the payment of royalty to the tribe, and the precautionary measures needed during the preliminary stage; and he observed that, if the enterprise should prove successful, it would go far towards ensuring the permanent pacification of that section of the border, and towards promoting the civilisation and humanisation of wild lans which Government had at heart.

407. On the 12th May 1910, the Government of India addressed His Majesty's Secretary of State on the subject, stating that they proposed to permit the trial borings to be proceeded with—the permission to be granted in the name of Messrs. Graham and Company, who had originally applied for the concession. If, subsequently, on the borings proving successful, Messrs. Graham and Company applied for a mining concession, the Government of India proposed to grant it, under suitable restrictions and safeguards, should the political situation at the time admit of their doing so.

408. In view of the satisfactory reports as to the political situation in the Sheranni country, His Majesty's Secretary of State (in reply to the Government of India's despatch, dated the 12th May 1910) approved, on the 6th July, of trial borings being undertaken by Messrs. Graham and Company for mineral oil, near Moghal Kot, subject to certain conditions. The Secretary of State requested that a reference should be made to him, before any mining concession was

eventually granted. On the 21st July, Messrs. Graham and Company were informed that the Government of India were prepared to accord permission to their agent or representative to commence trial boring operations, provided that they, as principals, would furnish certain guarantees in connection with the work. These guarantees had not been received up to the end of September 1910.

409. Railway extensions in the North-West Frontier Province during the period of Lord Minto's Viceroyalty will doubtless be treated in the summaries of the Army and Railway Departments.

410. It is sufficient to state here that the Secretary of State sanctioned, in December 1909, the construction of a railway on the 2' 6" gauge from Kalabagh to Bannu, a distance of 83 miles, with a siding 11 miles long to serve the Makarwal Coal fields. In April 1909 Sir G. Roos-Keppel advocated the construction of a narrow gauge railway from Kohat *viâ* Bannu to Dera Ismail Khan; but the Government of India rejected the proposal on the ground of the pooriness of the financial possibilities of the scheme. In May 1910 a survey was sanctioned for a 2' 6" gauge railway from Mardan to Swabi and from Mardan to Utmanzai and Charsadda, both of which projects would, it was thought, be of great public utility, as tending to develop the agricultural resources of the district—the fertility of which would, it was estimated, be considerably enhanced on the completion of the Upper Swat River Canal.

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## APPENDIX I.

(REFERRED TO ON PAGE 66 OF THE TEXT.)

The Ziarat Levy Post was attacked by thieves on the night of the 16th July 1909. The

### Chitral Agency.

#### *Raids on the Ziarat Levy Post.*

from Asmar territory.

levy jamadar, a dāk jamadar and one sepoy were wounded, while one of the raiders was killed and two were wounded. The gang consisted of 15 men, who are believed to be Mashte and Gujars

2. On the 28th August, some raiders appeared near Ziarat, and attacked two servants of the Mehtar of Chitral, killing one ; they are also suspected of having killed a levy sepoy on the same day.

3. On the 21st September, a band of twenty men attacked some coolies working on the road above Ziarat, killing one and wounding another. They then attacked a convoy proceeding from India to Drosh, and stole some boxes. Levies pursued the raiders, whose identity is not yet known.

4. Certain other raids having been committed in Chitral by Afghan subjects from Asmar, instructions were issued by the local authorities in November for the levies to be reinforced by armed villagers in order to cope with raiders, and for other necessary precautions to be taken.

5. Raiders from Asmar were again seen in Chitral territory during the following month, but no report was received of any offence committed by them.

6. On the night of the 22nd December 1905, an armed gang of outlaws from Hazarnao, led

### Peshawar District.

to the Peshawar cantonments and carried off property valued at Rs. 13,000. In the fight which

#### *Bhanamari raid.*

were harboured for two days in the territory of the Aka Khel Afridis, who, under the agreement made with them, are responsible for offences committed by members of their tribe, or by others who pass through their limits.

7. One of the most serious raids in the Peshawar district, during the period under review,

#### *Tangi raid.*

70 armed men entered the Tangi bazar, and, after killing four persons and wounding a head constable, carried off property to the value of Rs. 30,000. The responsibility for the offence was said to lie —

(a) primarily with the outlaws and Afghan subjects of Hazarnao, and the Khoda Khels who organised the raid and constituted the greater part of the gang ;

(b) with the Ambahar Utman Khels, who harboured and entertained the raiding party and some of whom joined it ;

(c) with the Laman Utman Khels, through whose limits the raiders passed ; and

(d) with the people of Tangi themselves, who not only failed to resist the raiders, but subsequently actively continued the plundering of the shops of the Hindus.

8. A similar raid occurred on the 21st March 1906 in the village of Jogini near Michni.

#### *Jogini raid.*

Mention was made of this raid in the last summary. The raiders consisted of a strong well-armed gang, and the village, which is a small one, was powerless to offer any resistance. Property to the value of Rs. 15,000 was stolen. Responsibility for the offence rested with outlaws and others residing in Afghan territory, and with the Tarakzai Mohmands.

9. The Tangi raid was committed while His Excellency the Viceroy was in the Peshawar district, during his spring tour of 1906. Several complaints had, in the past, been made to the Amir regarding the gang of bad characters and outlaws living near Hazarnao in Afghan territory, who were in the habit of raiding across the border, and on the 6th April 1906 Lord Minto sent a verbal message to the Amir, through the British Agent at Kabul, regarding the part taken by these outlaws in the raids at Tangi and Jogini.

10. As regards the responsibility of the tribesmen under British influence, the Tarakzai Mohmands investigated the case of the Jogini raid themselves, and surrendered the suspects of the tribe. Thus, they fully discharged their obligation to Government. In connection with the Tangi raid, the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, imposed fines of Rs. 1,500 and Rs. 8,000, respectively, on the Laman Utman Khel and the Muhammadians of Tangi. He did not consider that it would be possible to bring pressure to bear on the Ambahar

Utman Khels without having recourse to military force—a step which he did not then advise though he anticipated that the tribe might hereafter force Government to take decisive measures against them.

11. The Government of India approved of the Chief Commissioner's action, and agreed that nothing further could for the present be done. In view, however, of the possibility of punitive operations being undertaken against the Ambahar Utman Khels at some future date, the Chief Commissioner was requested to maintain a special list of the offences committed by this tribe, for which reparation might hereafter be exacted if and when a suitable opportunity offered.

12. On the 7th June, while Faizulla Khan and one Jai Mal, a Hindu, were proceeding from Peshawar to Abazai with some animals laden with fruit, they were set upon by seven armed men who carried them and their animals off to independent territory. The former was then released, but the latter was carried off to Afghan territory and kept as a prisoner in the house of one Mir Khwas, an inhabitant of Mirchai Nazian, Shinwar, Hazarnao. There was no evidence as to the exact spot from which Jai Mal was kidnapped, but it was on the British side of the Durand line. His Excellency the Viceroy addressed the Amir on the subject on the 3rd September 1906, and requested that His Highness would enquire into the matter and would take the necessary steps to effect the release of Jai Mal and the animals, and their restoration to British territory. Eventually, early in November 1906, a friend of Jai Mal, one Jai Singh, effected the former's release by paying a ransom of Rs. 472.

13. Shortly after this, news was received of a successful ambuscade, on the 26th July 1906, by the Khyber Rifles, of one of the Hazarnao raiding parties at Tandai in the Khajuraj Plain in the vicinity of the Peshawar border. On receipt of information that a part of the Hazarnao gang was on its way to raid in British territory, and would rest during the heat of the day at Tandai, a detachment of Khyber Rifles under Captain Bickford was despatched to intercept them. The raiders were encountered and a sharp fight took place in which the two leaders of the gang were killed and four others were taken prisoners. One sepoy of the Khyber Rifles was dangerously wounded. Major Webb-Ware, the Political Agent, Khyber, in reporting the facts of the case, observed that the successful issue of the ambuscade appeared to have made a marked impression in the country. A telegram was issued to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, on the 1st August, conveying His Excellency the Viceroy's congratulations to the Commandant, officers, and men concerned in the encounter.

14. On the 25th February 1908, whilst the operations against the Zakka Khel were in progress, a raid was committed by certain Zakka Khel on the Peshawar city railway station. The stationmaster and a *chaukidar* were wounded and Rs. 550 in cash was carried off from the railway cash chests. On the 6th March a number of irresponsible followers of an Afridi *virga*, which had come to Peshawar, looted certain *bantias*' and money-lenders' shops in the city, and carried off a considerable amount of money. Some 70 arrests were made.

15. In August 1908, a large gang of armed *dakaitis* broke into the house of a Hindu in village Pakha, killed the Hindu and carried off his property. The villagers turned out *en masse*, killed two of the *dakaitis*, and wounded several other members of the gang. The Chief Commissioner observed that the action of this village was in marked contrast with the apathy displayed by others in similar circumstances, and the conduct of the villagers was the more praiseworthy and creditable as there were no firearms in Pakha. On the recommendation of the Chief Commissioner the villagers were granted a remission of revenue amounting to Rs. 1,949-4-0.

16. On the 11th October 1908, a gang of about twenty men attacked Charsadda, killing two men and wounding one, and carrying off property valued at Rs. 6,000. The Chief Commissioner reported on the 14th October that the raiders appeared to have been a mixed gang of local and trans-border bad characters. Arrests were made of an Adam Khel, Kohat Pass Afridi, at Mitanni, and a Malikdin Khel Afridi in the Peshawar city, both of whom were found in possession of a considerable quantity of jewellery, while a Kambar Khel Afridi was subsequently arrested in Peshawar city, with property valued at Rs. 300, and considerable property stolen in the raid was discovered in the houses of two British subjects, residents of Musazai in the Peshawar District, who were also arrested.

17. On the 16th November 1908, a gang of 24 Ambahar Utman Khels, under Muhammad Sadik, attacked Chikkar, near Charsadda, looting some Hindus' houses. One of the raiders was wounded and captured by the Border Military Police. The Chief Commissioner, whose attention had been drawn to the fact that the recent raids appeared to have been directed against Hindus, replied that this was not ascribable to religious animosity so much as to the fact that the Hindus were the only people in the villages likely to possess much cash and valuables.



The Chief Commissioner added that efforts were being made to induce villagers to resist raiders and protect Hindus, by giving rewards and remissions of revenue to those who did so, and by punishing those who did not, but that these efforts were handicapped by reason of the people being disarmed and incapable of resistance.

18. On the 10th December 1908, the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, telegraphed that reliable information had been

*Multan's gang.*

received that a gang of sixteen Afghan Shinwaris, well armed, under the leadership of the outlaw Multan (Anai Zakka Khel Afridi) was at the Aka Khel caves, on the border of the Peshawar District, and intended to attack either the Nowshera tahsil, the quarter-guard of the 59th Scinde Rifles, or the Aman Kot Cavalry *rakh*. On the

*Jalozai raid.*

13th December, a raid was committed at Jolazai, near Cherat, in the Peshawar district, by a gang composed of Afridis led by Multan and some Nazian Shinwaris. The raiders were repulsed by the villagers, led by Honorary Captain Kallandar Khan, and one of the raiders was killed and one wounded. Troops and Police endeavoured to cut off the retreat of the gang, but without

*Amankot raid.*

success. On the 16th December, a raid was committed at Aman Kot, near Pabbi, in the Peshawar district. Two Hindus, named Dhuni Chand and Mitta Mal, were killed, two women were wounded, and some jewellery was carried off by the raiders, who were believed to belong to

*Capture of Multan's Gang.*

Multan's gang. News having been received of the presence of the outlaw, Multan, and his gang in the vicinity of Peshawar, on the 23rd January 1909, a force consisting of the 19th Lancers, under Colonel Biddulph, with a double company, 59th Rifles, formed a cordon to surround the gang. A portion of the cordon, under Lieutenants Curtis and Muir, first came into contact with the raiders, who opened fire in the Phandu Nulla, 7 miles south-east of Peshawar. The other sections of the cordon then closed in, and a fight ensued in which Multan and one of his men were shot dead. Seven of the raiders eventually surrendered, and two escaped. The seven men, who were captured, and the man who was killed with Multan, were Sangu Khel Shinwaris of Afghanistan. The two men who escaped were Peshawari outlaws. Two British officers were wounded. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, reported that the death of Multan (whose depredations for years past had caused him to be feared far and wide) had caused an intense feeling of relief to the people of Peshawar and the district.

19. The Sangu Khel Shinwaris of Nazian wrote to the Political Agent on the 13th February 1909 that the Sangu Khels who were captured when Multan was killed had no idea of raiding in British territory, and that, if they were released, the whole Sangu Khel clan would feel highly obliged to the British Government and would remain on friendly terms with them for ever, but that, if the prisoners were not set free, the Sangu Khels, who were about 2,000 strong, would be compelled to declare open hostilities against the *Sarkar*. No reply was sent to the letter. The seven raiders, Afghan subjects, who were captured, were hanged on the 22nd March. On the 24th March, His Excellency the Viceroy wrote to the Amir bringing to His Majesty's notice that Multan, as on previous occasions, had organised his recent raid from Afghan territory, and that he was apparently not checked in any way by the Afghan officials. Indeed, reports had been received that he had been assisted by them. It was further stated that seven Afghan subjects had been identified as members of Multan's gang. In conclusion the Viceroy said:—"It is contrary to all the agreements between us that your subjects should commit raids in British territory: and such action on their part is calculated to create difficulties and misunderstandings between the two friendly Governments. I trust that Your Majesty will, in accordance with the agreements that exist between us, and in pursuance of the friendship which unites our Governments and ourselves, issue stringent orders that Your Majesty's subjects should take no part whatever in raids into British territory."

20. On the 15th February 1909, the Chief Commissioner reported that Private Hands of the

*Murder of Private Hands.*

Royal Warwickshire Regiment had been found murdered that morning on the Jamrud road, two miles from Peshawar. A number of *talibs* of the surrounding villages were arrested, and a reward was offered for information leading to the apprehension of the murderers. The facts of the case were said clearly to point to a fanatical motive.

21. On the 5th October 1909, certain Ambahar Utman Khel (headed by Hakim Khan)

*Shahi raid.*

raided the village of Shahi in the Charsadda sub-division, and carried off three Hindus (*viz.*, Jiwan Mal, Sundar Das, patwari, and Indarsen) and a certain amount of property. Hakim Khan wrote to the relatives of one of the kidnapped men, demanding Rs. 4,700 as ransom money for the three Hindus. Jiwan Mal subsequently escaped through the instrumentality of certain Utman Khel Maliks, and the Ambahar Utman Khel (who were said to be annoyed at the raid, because it rendered it more difficult for them to come to terms with Government) were said to be insisting on the release of the other Hindus. Sundar Das, patwari, subsequently returned to his home.

22. On the night of the 8th March 1910, a band of raiders (believed to be outlaws from the Nazian Valley) entered the house of a Hindu *bania* of Kaniza, three miles east of Mathra, and carried off three Hindus and a *chowkidar*. One of these Hindus and the *chowkidar* were released near Palosi, but the other two were carried off to independent Territory.

*Kaniza raid.*

23. On the night of the 16th March, the house of Prem Mal, a Hindu, in Dheri Bhagwanan village near Peshawar city, was looted by a band of men, and some Rs. 2,500 worth of property was alleged to have been carried off. The gang was believed to have included Zakka Khel Afridis and Sangu Khel Shinwaris with local bad characters.

*Dheri Bhagwanan raid.*

24. On the night of the 15th June, a gang of raiders attacked four *tum-tums* conveying seven Hindus and seven Muhammadans, near Matanni in the Peshawar district. One of the Hindus (a child) and the Muhammadans were released; but the remaining six Hindus were carried off by the raiders.

*Matanni raid.*

25. The raid was led by Usman, a Jumal Khel Khusrogi Zakka Khel of China in the Bazar valley, and by Kalimula, an outlaw of Matanni, who acted as guide to the party. The rest, nine in number, were Sangu Khel of Nazian. The whole gang were well armed with breech-loading rifles. The country abutting on the border from Matanni as far as the Bara fort is a desert 20 miles in length, and about 20 in depth; the gang had an area of some 400 square miles of tangled ravine and hills in which to work. Directly the alarm was given, parties of villagers from Matanni and of Border Military Police from the Jani Garhi, Jula Talao, and Bara posts set out to search the desert. One party of Matanni men came upon the gang, resting at a spring near Sapri in independent territory, and opened fire. The gang replied, killing a villager, and, in the dark and confusion, drew off with their captives. The Border Military Police from Jula Talao were out for 36 hours in the desert, but saw nothing. The Hindus were taken to Nazian, and Usman sent in a message demanding a ransom of Rs. 4,000, *Kabuli*, per head, or Rs. 24,000 in all (Rs. 12,000, British). Under the Bazar valley settlement of 1908, the Malikdin Khel are sureties for the Jumal Khel Khusrogis. The Political Agent, Khyber, at once summoned the Malikdin Khel jirga, and the result of his action was that the six Hindus were delivered up, unconditionally, at Landi Kotal on the 25th June.

26. On the night of the 16th June, a dakaiti was committed on the house of a Hindu named Hakim Singh, at Tarnab in the Peshawar district. The Chief Commissioner reported as follows:—

*Tarnab raid.*

“The Tarnab dakaiti was one of the type that constantly occurs, not alone on the frontier, but all over India, *viz.*, an attack for plunder. A rich Hindu in Tarnab was marked down and a gang, composed of eight Malikdin Khel, and four Sangu Khel, very probably helped or guided by local bad characters, entered his house and commenced to pillage; the gang rather bungled their undertaking, for they neglected to put out pickets. An alarm was given and the villagers turned out with alacrity; in the firing that followed, one Hindu was killed and another wounded, and a raider was killed. The latter has been identified as Sahib Shah, a Malikdin Khel of Tirah. The Political Agent, Khyber, has taken up the case as against the Malikdin Khel.” Five Government rifles were carried off by the dakaitis from the house of the Hindus. The rifles had been issued on security to the Hindus for their protection. Instructions were issued by the Chief Commissioner for the withdrawal of all Government rifles supplied to Hindus who, if they wished, might be granted licenses to buy revolvers or pistols for self-protection. Mr. Merk observed that the Tarnab dakaiti was of no special consequence, except that it indicated, as did the Matanni raid, some intestine trouble among the Malikdin Khel.

27. The more noteworthy raids in the Kohat district during 1906 are those which occurred on the border between Kachai and Marai, and in the villages of Barrabas Khel and Dillimela. In the former, the gang consisted of nine raiders from Ningrahar in Afghan territory under the leadership of the notorious outlaw Multan (Anai Zakka Khel). They attacked five villagers of Kachai on the 6th July 1906, killing one, wounding another and capturing the arms of the victims. The raid on Barrabas Khel was committed on the 5th of August by an armed gang headed by one Ahmed, a notorious cattle-lifter, who became an outlaw some years ago, after murdering a constable in the Kohat district. An affray took place between the cattle thieves and the villagers, resulting in the death of the outlaw. For their plucky conduct, the villagers were, on the recommendation of the Chief Commissioner, granted a remission of one year's land revenue amounting to Rs. 1,313.

*Kohat district.*

*Raids on Kachai, Marai and Barrabas Khel.*

28. On the 28th February 1907, a serious dakaiti was perpetrated in the village of Dillimela in the Teri tahsil. The outrage was committed at the instigation of Anar Gul, lambardar of the village, who, owing to enmity previously existing between him and one Arsala Khan, enlisted

*Raid on Dillimela.*

the services of Khattak outlaws in order to take revenge upon his enemy. When the dakaitis entered the village, Arsala Khan, his three sons, and others barricaded themselves in their house. The dakaitis, after wounding a nephew of Arsala Khan, fired shots into the room in which the party had taken refuge and finally set fire to the house, with the result that all the inmates, six in number, were burnt to death, and, on the fire spreading, some of Arsala Khan's cattle were also destroyed. The raiders then decamped, but their tracks were followed up into the Bhangi Khel country in the vicinity of Shakardarra. Anar Gul absconded and joined the gang of outlaws, who were known to be hiding in the hills near Shakardarra. Strong patrolling parties were sent out in the Kohat and Bannu districts with the result that Anar Gul, the organiser of the dakaiti, Manawar Din, and Abdulla, Khattak outlaws, were shot and three outlaws and two peons of the Salt Department, who had deserted with rifles and ammunition, were captured.

29. Another raid, in which an outlaw, named Musalli, was captured, occurred on the 24th May near Latammar in the Kohat district. The leader of the gang was Ism Gul, the noted Khattak

*Latammar raid.*

outlaw. He, with a party of about twelve armed raiders, was seen near Latammar and pursued by the villagers and a detachment of District and Border Military Police. Besides Musalli, four other members of the gang were captured, including three Khostwals. Ism Gul escaped, only to be killed two months later in a raid in the Kurram.

30. On the 14th August 1907, some Khattak outlaws, assisted by a few Khostwals, made a raid on Gurguri, with the object of kidnapping some Hindus and holding them up to ransom. Two British

*Gurguri raid.*

subjects were killed in repelling the attack, and attempts were made to murder two others in a neighbouring village. The Teri levies and the *chigas* pursued the raiders, who escaped owing to the difficult nature of the country.

31. On the 7th November a gang of Khattak outlaws raided the village of Banda Daud Shah and carried off three Hindus and property valued at Rs. 2,300.

*Banda Daud Shah raid.*

32. The other serious raids into the Kohat district during 1907 were attributed to the Zakka Khel and have already been mentioned.

*Arming of villagers.*

Owing to the frequency of raids, an issue of arms for purposes of self-defence was made to the villagers on the Kohat border in December.

33. On the 28th May 1908 a raid was committed on the Torawari Border Military Police post in the Kohat district. A party of about 20

*Torawari raid.*

raiders (consisting of Khojal Khel Wazirs, Mahsud and Daur outlaws and other tribesmen, led by Mianji, Mahsud outlaw, and Aurangai, the leader of the Zangoi Khula band of Khattak outlaws) scaled the wall of the post by means of a ladder, unobserved by the sentry, who was believed to have been asleep. The garrison, consisting of ten men, who were also asleep, were shot, six being killed and one seriously injured; three escaped unhurt. The raiders then looted the magazine, and escaped up the Miranzai Valley, carrying away 14 Martini rifles, two other weapons, and a quantity of ammunition and miscellaneous property. The gang had spent two days in Zaimusht country prior to the attack on the post. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, observed, when reporting the raid, that there was little doubt that the raiders had friends in British territory, who helped them with information and possibly with supplies. It was, moreover, certain that the gang was helped and harboured by various Khoedad Khel villages in the vicinity. The Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, made a seizure of nineteen Khojal Khel and their cattle, in connection with the raid, in order to bring a certain amount of pressure to bear on the offenders. Efforts were also made to seize any relations or near clansmen of the suspected raiders who might come into British territory.

34. On the 1st August 1908, some camels were raided near Latammar in the Kohat District, and three camelmens were carried off by

*Latammar raid.*

a party of about twenty-two men, said to be Afghans of Khost and Khattak outlaws, under the leadership of the Hathi Khel outlaw, Aurangai of Zangoi Khula. The raiders proceeded with their spoil to the Gangi Khel (Darwesh Khel Wazir) country, north of the Kurram. The camelmens eventually escaped.

35. On the 12th December 1908, an attack was made on Babar-Banda and Kot-Banda in the Kohat district, by a gang of outlaws and

*Babar-Banda raid.*

Khostwals from Zangoi Khula, led by Asil and Mir Ahmad, outlaws. Two villagers were killed, and two women were kidnapped. The release of the women was subsequently effected by a patrol of the Samana Rifles, who intercepted the gang, and arrested Mir Ahmad, a particularly notorious raider.

36. On the 13th December 1908, a gang of Daur and Khattak outlaws from Matun in Khost raided the village of Darsamand in the Kohat

*Darsamand raid.*

district, wounding three persons and carrying off three children who were taken to Khost. The villagers attacked the raiders, wounded one of them and captured one, a Darwesh Khel Wazir named Mehr Dil.

37. On the 12th February 1909, the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, reported that Lieutenant A. F. Macaulay, R.E., Garrison Engineer, Kohat,

*Murder of Lieutenant Macaulay.*

had been murdered on the previous evening within about one mile of Sarozai in Upper Miranzai. Lieutenant Macaulay, while bicycling on the road, had been apparently stopped, bound and carried to an adjacent ravine, where he was shot. His gold watch was not stolen, but his pocket-book and hunting knife were missing. He had left Hangu by train, on the morning of the 11th, with Rs. 1,500, but got out at Kahi, sending the bulk of the cash by train to Gandiaur. It was not ascertained what amount of money he had with him when he was attacked near Sarozai, but it was believed that the sum was small. Some Sarozai villagers reported having seen the bicycle being carried and heard shots, and that they themselves had been fired on. They pursued the murderers, who disappeared over the Khattak hills. On the 15th February news was received from the Deputy Commissioner that the murderers, who were four men of Sarozai, had been arrested on the afternoon of the 14th, but that one of the men had unfortunately escaped. The object of the outrage was apparently robbery.

38. On the 26th February 1909, news having been received that a gang of raiders was expected near Jardrai on the Kohat-Bannu road, one

*Capture at Jardrai.*

native officer with twenty men of the Border Military Police and some civil police from Teri proceeded to the place and encountered the raiders. A desperate hand-to-hand fight ensued, with the result that ten of the raiders were killed, and one taken prisoner. One man of the Border Military Police was killed, and two wounded. The raiders were Khattak and Khost outlaws. The Jemadar of the Border Police and the Sub-Inspector of the Teri Police were rewarded for their bravery by admission to the Indian Order of Merit: four Border Military Policemen were granted the Indian Distinguished Service Medal, and a villager who had a hand-to-hand encounter with the raiders was suitably rewarded by the Chief Commissioner. His Excellency the Viceroy remarked that this case was noteworthy as being an instance of the Police acting solely on their own initiative. The above capture concluded, for the time, a long series of petty depredations by Khattak outlaws.

*The outlaw question.*

When writing on the subject on the 17th September 1908, the Chief Commissioner had remarked that the Khattak outlaws, living in Khost, were a serious nuisance on the Kohat border, but that pressure was being put on their friends in the district, who undoubtedly helped them in their raids, and it was hoped that this would have some effect; but the root of the evil was in Afghanistan, and some trouble with these men must be expected.

39. On the night of the 2nd August 1909, a gang of about 50 raiders, consisting of Afghans

*Booto Kila raid.*

from Khost, and Wazirs, raided a hamlet called Booto Killa near Thall, killing one villager, wounding another, and carrying off between 100 and 200 cattle and goats. Pursuit parties from Khatpianga and Thall made a strong resistance, and followed the raiders up to the Afghan border. Two of the raiders were killed, and two wounded Afghans were captured, with one Snider rifle.

40. On the 8th May, three Hindus were carried off from near Darshi. The gang, which kid-

*Darshi raid.*

napped them, consisted of fourteen men, led by the outlaw Shahaurang, and made off to Khost. One of the Hindus, named Ram Das, eventually managed to escape, or was set free. Elaborate arrangements were made for turning out village pursuit parties and searching the hills, but in a district so intersected with barren and desert ranges every facility of escape is offered to these gangs.

41. On the 7th November 1905, the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier

*Kurram Agency.*

Province forwarded a report by the Political Agent, Kurram, regarding certain reprisals made by the latter on Khostwals and Jajis on account of a series of offences committed by members of these tribes in the Kurram valley, and for the non-settlement of the claims of the Turis against

the Jajis. These reprisals consisted of the arrest of all Khostwals and Jajis, with their property, who happened to be in Kurram at the time (September 1905). After a short detention they were released, their property being retained, and were told to go back to the Governor of Khost, and try to induce him to redress the wrongs of the Turis. They one and all declared that they could not go back to the Governor, as they had come to Kurram without permission and had, moreover, smuggled salt, which was strictly forbidden. They were, however, made to leave Kurram, and were given clearly to understand that these reprisals had been made on account of the crimes committed in Kurram by their fellow-tribesmen.

42. The Chief Commissioner recommended that the property seized should be sold, the sale proceeds being kept in deposit pending a settlement of the cases between the Turis and Afghan subjects. The Government of India, while approving of this suggestion, on the 20th December 1905, disapproved of the reprisals, which were injudicious and contrary to orders, and requested that steps should be taken to prevent the repetition of such action without special reference to Government.

43. Towards the end of January 1906, persistent rumours were in circulation in Lower

*Afghan action to prevent raids.*

Kurram that the Jajis and Khostwals were holding meetings for the purpose of arranging a simultaneous attack upon the cattle of the Turis and Bangash of Kurram. Steps were taken to secure the safety of the Kurram cattle, which at that season of the year graze near the Jaji Maidan border. The Political Agent in Kurram addressed the Governors of Khost and Aryob, requesting them to notify to their people that in future they should not enter Kurram carrying arms, and to inform them that failure to comply with the order would render them liable to arrest and confiscation of any arms found on them.

44. On the 3rd February, the officer in charge of the Afghan post at Pathan visited the Kurram Militia Jemadar at Kharlachi, and informed him that the Governor of Aryob had issued a proclamation throughout the Chankanni and Jaji villages in Afghan territory to the effect that no raiding into Kurram would be permitted, and that security was being taken from maliks of villages to ensure obedience to the order.

45. Sardar Lal Gul Khan, Governor of Aryob, in replying to a reference made to him by the Political Agent in Kurram, concerning a small raid committed by some villages of Istia upon the Turis of Burkhi, stated that he hoped shortly to be touring near the border, and expressed a wish to meet the Political Agent in order that a mutual arrangement to put a stop to further raiding and counter-raiding might be effected. Reports from Khost alleged that the Governor of that province had received a severe reprimand from the Amir on account of the frequent raids committed by Khostwals into British territory.

46. On the 26th July 1906, Ism Gul, a notorious outlaw, with a raiding gang from Khost, attempted to drive off some Turi cattle grazing in the hills near Khurdand in Lower Kurram. The

*Khurdand raid.*

herdsmen was killed. An alarm was at once raised and strong pursuit parties from the villages of Jalmai, Chardewar, and Baghzai, turned out and caught up the raiders, when a general conflict ensued, resulting in the death of Ism Gul and other outlaws. The Foreign Secretary telegraphed to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, on the 2nd August, conveying an expression of His Excellency the Viceroy's satisfaction at the spirited action of the Kurram villagers; and saying that His Excellency would be glad if a message to this effect were conveyed to them. In a telegram dated the 1st August to His Majesty's Secretary of State, reporting this incident and the raid in the Kajuri Plain above mentioned, Lord Minto remarked that these spirited reprisals were eminently satisfactory, and should diminish raids from across the border.

47. A feud between the Jajis of Khost and the Turis of Kurram has long disturbed the peace of the border. The Khost authorities have been

*Jaji-Turi feud.*

either unable or unwilling to restrain the Jajis from raiding on the Turis, but during the latter part of 1906 the Turis several times defeated and repelled their antagonists, and early in 1907 the Jajis made overtures for peace. After some fruitless meetings the two sides concluded a formal agreement, on the 9th June, to observe absolute peace for two years. This engagement was observed by both parties and contributed materially to the peace of this section of the border.

48. Other inhabitants of Khost, however, continued to make petty depredations into Kurram, their raids culminating in a foray on the grazing-grounds of Balamain on the 5th September 1907.

*Balamain raid.*

They killed two graziers, wounded a third, and carried off two rifles, 776 cows, and 176 goats and sheep. This raid caused considerable excitement in Khost. It was reported that the Kabul Government winked at raids into Kurram and a general desire was manifested to emulate the deeds of the Balamain raiders. In November the people of Balamain attempted a counter-raid on Khost, but were unsuccessful as, though they carried off a few cattle, the principal malik of Lower Kurram was killed. Serious efforts were made in December to organise a raid on a large scale into Kurram, and the scheme is said to have had the active support of the Governor of Khost, who tried to bring pressure to bear on the Jajis to join in the enterprise. Their refusal to break their truce with the Turis considerably marred the success of the scheme. No raid of importance occurred till the 13th February, when a strong force of Ghilzais and Khattak outlaws from Khost descended on some Kuchi Turi encampments near Shobak, killed a Turi, kidnapped

*Shobak raid.*

two boys, and carried off cattle and property worth over Rs. 4,000. They were twice met by Turis and parties of militia and had seven of their number killed and seven wounded, but the pursuit parties were unable to rescue the stolen animals and property. The Khostwals shortly afterwards collected a force of several thousand men for the invasion of Kurram; but, probably for want of official support, it dispersed without effecting anything. At the end of March, however, an organised attack on Kurram was daily expected and a force of 100 militia was detailed for the protection of the Kuchis.

49. On the 15th July 1908, a raid was committed on the cattle of Khapianga in Kurram.

*Khapianga raid.*

The raiders were mainly Khattak and Daur outlaws and Khojal\_Khel Wazirs, led by Aurangī of Zangoi



Khula, Alai (Khojal Khel) and some of Lala Pir's men. The gang probably came from Khost through Wazir limits. Two Khapianga villagers were killed, 193 head of cattle, 420 sheep and goats, one Government snider, with other miscellaneous property, were carried off. The total loss was estimated at about Rs. 10,000. The raiders, on their return to Afghan territory, were stopped near the border by an Afghan official, who allowed them to proceed after depriving them of a portion of the loot. The Political Agent, Kurram, in furnishing particulars of the raid, remarked that there could be no question that the present policy of the Khost authorities was to allow such gangs entire freedom and encouragement to use Khost as a head-quarters for raiding, and that the gangs were entertained and largely recruited from the miscellaneous Wazir tribes inhabiting the tract between Thal and Afghanistan.

50. The Political Agent, Kurram, reported on the 24th September 1908, that a large gang of Ibrahim Khel Kharotas (Afghans of Ningrahar) had attacked the flocks of Milana in Upper Kurram and carried off about 600 sheep and one shepherd, and killed two men.

51. On the night of the 6th July 1909, a large raiding party from Ningrahar surprised some Bada Khel hamlets above Boghaki in Kurram, killed and wounded some villagers and carried off four women, who were subsequently sent back in exchange for the bodies of three of the raiders who had been killed. A large number of sheep and goats, some cattle and other property were also carried off by the raiders. The Political Agent, Kurram, remarked in 1908 that Ningraharis committed similar raids, and that the Turis had received no satisfaction for any of the outrages.

52. On the 6th February a large gang of raiders, composed mostly of Khani Khel Para Chamkannis, raided certain Mangal Kirris encamped at Tangal Sat, between the Shakurdarra and Topakai villages in lower Kurram. One Mangal was killed and two wounded, and about 600 sheep and goats were driven off. On the night of the 20th February, a raiding gang of Khani Khels destroyed a number of young trees which had been planted along the road, and cut the telegraph wires near the village of Ibrahimzai. This incorrigible section of the Chamkanni tribe openly declared that they would continue to raid into Kurram. Extra guards of Militia were despatched to Ibrahimzai, Hassan Ali, Koli, and Wuchadarra.

53. The Haji Khel and Khwaja Khel Maliks early in April told the Political Agent, Kurram, that their sections had taken no part in those raids and asked that they should not be held responsible for the actions of the Khani Khels. They were informed, however, that their sections, with the Khani Khels, formed the Para Chamkanni tribe and that in such matters Government dealt only with the tribal *jirga* and that if they were really desirous of maintaining friendly relations, it was for them to induce the Khani Khels to comply with Government's demands. This resulted in the tribal *jirga* writing to the Political Agent on the 14th April to the effect that they were prepared to come in with a view to arriving at a settlement of the cases against the Khani Khels. The hopes of arriving at a satisfactory agreement with the tribe were, however, disappointed, for on the 15th April a gang of Khani Khels attacked a party of women from the village of Jullandhar. Two boys who were with the women fired on the raiders, with the result that of the latter one man was killed and three others, including one Khairulla, were wounded. Khairulla was captured and brought into hospital. Besides this the Khani Khels committed a number of less serious offences. In spite of rumours to the contrary the Khani Khels did not comply with Government's demands, nor did the tribal *jirga* come in to conclude a settlement of the cases against that recalcitrant tribe.

54. The Khani Khel continued to commit raids into British territory. Between the 1st July 1906 and the 28th March 1908 they were concerned in about 16 such raids, most of which were, individually, of an unimportant nature, though resulting in the death of 10 British subjects. During this period approximately 22 persons were either kidnapped or seized and held to ransom by the Khani Khel, or captured by other tribes and made over to the Khani Khel for safe custody. A raid near Bughakki in Kurram in September 1906 was of a serious nature. In this raid a combined force of Khani Khel and Awi Darra Khel Parachamkannis and Ningraharis killed 8 shepherds and carried off 800 head of cattle.

55. The Parachamkanni *jirga* visited the Political Agent more than once and expressed their inability to control the Khani Khel, and in July 1907 they furnished security neither to commit offences themselves nor to allow the Khani Khel to cross their territory to commit offences, but they declared that they could not do more than this. In September 1907 the Khani Khel asked to be allowed to traverse Haji Khel country to raid in Kurram. Their request was refused and bloodshed was with difficulty averted by the intervention of the leading maliks. The relations between the two sections became strained, and the Haji Khel rescued and made over to the authorities two persons who had been kidnapped by the Khani Khel.

56. The Haji Khel and Khwajak Kaul sections of the Chamkannis, who had made submission in July 1907, continued to be of good behaviour. In May 1908, these two sections renewed for



another year the security which they had given against committing any offences in Kurram, or allowing Khani Khels through their limits, and were paid their allowances. The Khani Khels continued to be obdurate, and were guilty of a number of cases of kidnapping and thefts of cattle. In September, however, they attended a general *jirga* of Turis, Chamkannis, Massozais, etc., which was held to meet the Chief Commissioner, and petitioned that a settlement might be made with them. They produced, as security for their good behaviour, the Khwajak Kaul section, whose behaviour had of late been exemplary. From the attitude of the Khani Khels there was every reason to believe that they were genuinely in earnest in their protestations of good intentions, and the security was accordingly accepted and a settlement made. In token of their sincerity they restored all the kidnapped persons whom they still had in their custody.

57. On the 20th August 1908, one Hindu and ten Daur were carried off by raiders while cutting grass in Shnalgad on the northern boundary

Tochi Agency.  
Shnalgad raid.

of the protected area in the Tochi valley. One Daur escaped and reported that the raiders were a gang of Khostwals. A later report stated that the other nine Daur had been released; but that the Hindu was still with the gang. Pending a settlement of this case, the Political Agent detained at Saidgi a large *bahir* of Khostwals proceeding from Bannu to Afghan territory.

58. On the 10th July 1909, an attack was made on a picquet of the Northern Waziristan Militia near Kajuri at the lower end of the Tochi valley.

Raids at Kajuri.

The picquet, composed of one havildar and seven men, left the Kajuri post at about 6 A.M., and were proceeding along the road, when they were suddenly fired upon from the hills on both banks of the Tochi river. The seven sepoy were shot down at once, and the havildar was slightly wounded. The raiders were eventually encountered by other parties of militia from the post, assisted by a convoy of the 57th Rifles, and beat a hasty retreat, leaving three dead bodies on the spot. Two of the bodies were recognised as those of a Walli Khel outlaw, Zozai, a Daur outlaw, and a Painsa Khel. The attack was said to have been most carefully and daringly planned by about 200 men, who had also placed a firing party to command the gate of the Kajuri post. The Resident in Waziristan remarked that, had it not been for the opportune arrival of the escort of the 57th Rifles, the raiders would have probably got off without much loss, and the consequences would have been far-reaching. The raid was, the Resident states, undoubtedly organised in Khost; and it was believed that Mahsuds took part in it, as some of the raiders retreated in the direction of the Mahsud country. The Political Agent wrote to the Hakim of Khost informing him of what had occurred, and asking for the return of the rifles which had been carried off by the raiders. The Hakim granted a receipt for the letter, and informed the messenger that he would forward it to the Amir.

59. A considerable *baramta* of camels and other cattle belonging to the Tori Khels and Mohmit Khels, who were the tribes territorially responsible, was made on the 23rd July at Kajuri. The Political Agent remarked that the bands of outlaws who committed these offences against Government passed and repassed with the greatest facility through the country of these clans, and nothing whatever was done to stop them: on the contrary, the outlaws could not act as they did without the help and connivance of the tribes through whose territory they passed.

60. On the 25th April 1910, two men, Sundar Lal, contractor, accompanied by Muhammad Akram, sub-overseer, were kidnapped on the road near Kajuri, in the Tochi valley. They and Muhammad Akram's servant, named Khoradin, reached Ipi, near Kajuri from Miramshah, at 7 P.M., and were there attacked by eight raiders, who appeared to be Daur, of whom three well-known outlaws were recognised. The raiders carried off the whole party (as well as a Government revolver in the possession of Muhammad Akram). They released Khoradin on the way, telling him to bring Rs. 2,000 Kabul ransom for each of the prisoners. Khoradin returned with instructions from Sundar Lal to arrange for his release.

61. The night was cold and wet, and the raiders met no one except one Khojal Khel whom they seized and took with them part of the way to Spinwam, where they released him, with a warning not to make any report; from Spinwam they went over the hills to the Darweshta Sar, and thence *via* Titi Madda Khel country to Kozha. They do not appear to have been in any way harboured or assisted by any of the tribes through whose territory they passed—at least on the return journey.

62. Muhammad Akram and Sundar Lal were kept in stocks, and strictly concealed by the outlaws from fear either that the Hakim of Khost would feel obliged to interfere, in view of the Joint Indo-Afghan Commission, or that he would demand his share of the ransom. The Political Agent wrote to the Hakim of Khost, requesting him to make early arrangements for the release of the kidnapped persons. The Hakim mentioned to the messenger that no such people were in Khost. The Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, was authorised to bring the matter to the notice of the Afghan Commissioners.

63. Muhammad Akram escaped from Arangi's village in Khost on the 4th June, and arrived in Kurram on the 8th, having suffered severe privations. Contractor Sundar Lal also escaped and arrived at Miram Shah on the 9th June.

64. In consequence of certain outrages which had been committed in Wazir Utmanzai limits, resulting in some casualties among the Border Military Police, and in a Hindu being carried off, a *baramta* was made, under the direction of the

**Bannu District.**

*Baramta on Wazirs.*

Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, of 172 Wazirs, on the 28th February 1909. It was proposed to demand a fine of Rs. 1,000 from the Utmanzai Wazirs, who were suspected of having harboured the raiders, and to detain 100 of the prisoners till it was paid. The Deputy Commissioner remarked that, except the Utmanzai Wazirs, who had neglected their pass and territorial responsibilities, the Wazirs of the Bannu district had taken energetic steps to stop further inroads into the district. The *baramta* should, he thought, have a salutary effect on the tribe. The Resident in Waziristan, whose consent was obtained to the *baramta*, considered that this was the only way to check these outrages.

65. In answer to an enquiry from the Government of India, the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, reported in April 1909 that he had no reason to believe that the

*State of the Bannu District.*

Bannu district was in a disturbed state. There were many raids in the autumn of 1908, but drastic measures were taken and not only had the state of things much improved since December 1908, but most, if not all, of the Hindus who had been kidnapped by raiders from the Bannu district had been restored. For the preceding four months, the district had been unusually quiet.

66. On the night of the 30th April 1909 a raid was committed by a gang of Mahsuds on the village of Pahar Khel, opposite Bahindarra, in the Bannu district. One Hindu and his wife were killed, and property to the value of Rs. 1,500 was carried away.

*Raid on Pahar Khel.*

67. The mail tonga from Bannu was attacked on the night of the 4th August near Karakarina bridge, four miles north-west of Domel, by six

*Karakarina raid.*

men believed to be Wazirs. Abdus Samad Khan, Naib Tahsildar of the Tochi valley, and a Hindu named Sundar Dass of Bannu were carried off, and property said to be worth about Rs. 1,000 was looted. The mail-bags were opened, but the coachman arrived at Kohat with all the bags except one. Immediate arrangements were made to close the frontier and cut off the gang's retreat. Some pursuit parties of Wazirs, through whose limits the raiders had come, and who were, therefore, territorially responsible, overtook the raiders in independent territory beyond Barganattu, and released both the prisoners.

68. On the 2nd September, a gang of armed Mahsuds, numbering about 300 men, drove off the cattle belonging to the village of Wali and the surrounding Marwat and Bhattani villages, while

*Wali raid.*

grazing on the border. The villagers and Border Military Police pursued the raiders, and recovered the whole of the cattle, which numbered 1,600 head. Four or five Mahsuds were killed, and several were wounded. Five Bhattanis were wounded, of whom two subsequently died.

69. The pursuit party had one man killed and two wounded. It was stated that the raid was instigated by the Mulla Powindah.

70. On the night of the 16th September, the village of Shamshi Khel was attacked by a gang of about 12 men, under the leadership of a man

*Shamshi Khel raid.*

named Zarwali. Four Hindus were carried away, of whom two subsequently returned, and a third, named Thakurdas, a retired patwari, was murdered near the village of Nirmala, on the route taken by the raiders, who retreated along the bed of the Kurram river, through the Kurram Pass. The Muhammad Khel Wazirs, through whose territory the raiders had passed, made a determined attempt to recover the kidnapped Hindus. Their negotiations with the outlaws having failed, they made a night attack on the outlaw's village of Zangoe Khula, but were repulsed by the outlaws and the Amir's sepoys, and failed to effect their object.

71. On the night of the 29th May 1910, three Hindus, proceeded in a *tum-tum* along the Bannu-Dera Ismail Khan road, were carried off,

*Tutgarhi raid.*

with the driver, by raiders, close to Tutgarhi, five miles from Bannu. The driver and one Hindu were subsequently gagged and left behind. The raiders were believed to be a small Sadda Khel gang under Gullajan.

72. During May and June 1907, Mianji, the notorious Mahsud outlaw, whose exploits had for the most part, been confined to the Zhob district and Bargha Sheranni country, committed several raids in Largha Sheranni country, Dera

**Dera Ismail Khan district.**

*Mianji's raids.*

Ismail Khan, and Southern Waziristan.

73. On the 26th May three sepoy were stripped and robbed near Darra Darwaza ; on the 30th May a dâk-runner was shot dead near Drazinda ; on the 28th May a *dhobi* and a militia naik were murdered near Spalmai Khulla ; early in June 18 cows were raided from Murgha ; and eventually Mianji and his followers appear to have returned to Afghanistan through Mahsud country.

74. The complicity of Mianji in the murder of the private servant and the Muharir of the Political Agent, Wana, has been referred to above.

75. A surveyor (Yakub Ali) and two men were killed and two were wounded by Sheranni outlaws, at Shah Alam, near Chaudhwan, on the night of the 22nd November. The Chief Commissioner saw the Sheranni *jirga*, informed them that Government were determined fully to enforce tribal responsibility, and demanded ten hostages for the complete settlement of the case. The *jirga* were at first unwilling to acknowledge their responsibility or to give hostages, but eventually complied with the demand.

76. On the 7th December, an attack was made on some riding camels, escorted by Zhob levies, on the Chuhar Khel-Dhana road within the border of the North-West Frontier Province. *Chuhar Khel raid.* A levy sowar was wounded, his horse was killed, and his carbine carried off. The raiders were followed into the Largha Sheranni country, but escaped.

77. Mr. Macdonald of the Survey Department was murdered in the Sheranni country on the 11th March 1909. He was encamped near Walwasta and, leaving nearly the whole of his escort behind, started for a neighbouring peak with four Sherannis of Walwasta, whom he had himself engaged and who did not form part of the escort. Three of the Sherannis, who had previously plotted to murder Mr. Macdonald, assisted him to a very high summit, where they shot him and fled. The ringleader, named Muhammad Khan, was arrested on the 13th March, and executed on the 17th at Drazinda. He admitted that a fanatical motive prompted the commission of the deed. As the other culprits were not surrendered, their village was burned on the 22nd March.

78. On the night of the 5th November 1909, a raid was made on Hindus of the village of Mat near Chaudhwan. Six houses were looted and some were set on fire. The property carried off was valued by the owners at Rs. 8,000. The raiders were Sherannis and Azmarrais. *Mat raid.*

79. On the night of the 8th, Shaikh Sultan was raided, probably by Abdurrahman Khels. The occasion was well chosen, as practically the whole male strength of the village had gone off to a wedding with their rifles. The house of a Pathan, Daulat Khan, was looted and a menial was killed. The loss was estimated at Rs. 1,800. It is remarkable that though there were several Hindus' houses in Shaikh Sultan, no attempt was made to loot them. *Shaikh Sultan raid.*

80. On the 10th February 1910, a raid was committed on the house of a Hindu named Bidda Ram in the Tank city, and his son was killed. A *jirga* found the Shabi Khel Mahsuds responsible for the murder, and awarded Rs. 840 as compensation for loss of property, and Rs. 1,000 as blood-money. The Shabi Khels agreed to pay this amount in a month. *Raid in Tank.*

81. On the 2nd April, Surat Khan, Abdullai Mahsud, with a gang of 30 or 40 men, including Pyavi, a nephew of the Mulla Powindah, and Amal Khan, one of his Shaikhs, took up a position in the Bain Pass with a view to ambuscading a party of Border Military Police proceeding to relieve Chowki Fakir post from Bain. Information had been received that Surat Khan was out in that direction, in consequence of which the relief of the Border Military Police was postponed. The gang of outlaws was seen by a man cutting grass in the hills. He informed the post officer at Bain, who collected Border Military Police from Mullazai, and also turned out pursuit parties. The gang was surrounded, and firing continued on both sides from 2 p.m. to dark, when, under cover of darkness and a heavy thunderstorm, the raiders managed to make good their escape. One Mahsud was killed and Nawaz Jat, an outlaw in the Mahsud country, was taken prisoner with a Martini-Henry rifle. One Bhattani villager was killed, and one of the Border Military Police slightly wounded. *Attack on raiders in Bain Pass.*

82. On the night of 7th May, a gang of 20 Mahsuds descended on the village of Kot Sultan, six miles west of Kulachi. They carried off two brothers, Ram Chand and Killa Ram, Hindus of the village, and two other Hindus who happened to be staying the night with them. They took also four camels, a donkey and Rs. 700 worth of cash and jewellery. *Kot Sultan raids.*

83. The four Hindus were brought to Sarwekai on the 7th June, and released without payment of any ransom. The camels driven off in the same raid were also recovered. The Mulla Powindah was very averse to the Hindus being surrendered, and sent his nephew, Fakir Muhammad, to try and prevent their release.

84. On the night of the 18th June, a raid was committed on the village of Vihowa in the Dera Ghazi Khan district by a gang said to consist of about 30 Shiranis and Kesranis. Hindu shops were looted, and four Hindus were wounded.

**Dera Ghazi Khan.**  
*Vihowa raid.*

The Commissioner of the Multan Division stated that the raiders appeared to have come down the Kaura nulla in the Ustarana country, and to have returned in the same direction. A later report stated that the raiders had been traced to Appozai.

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**CHINESE TURKISTAN—GILGIT AGENCY.**

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## CHINESE TURKISTAN.

British interests were represented during the period of this summary by Mr. G. Macartney, C. I. E., Special Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir for Chinese Affairs, and by Captain A. R. B. Shuttleworth, I. A., Supply and Transport Corps, who officiated for him during his absence on furlough from the 1st July 1908 to the 5th November 1909, when Mr. Macartney resumed charge of the Consulate.

Early in 1905, Messrs. Barrett and Huntington, two American geographers, were permitted by the Government of India to proceed through India and Kashmir to Chinese Turkistan on an exploring trip. Towards the end of the year reports were received that the Russian officials at Kashgar professed to be much concerned about the movements of those gentlemen. Mons. Kolokolov, the Russian Consul, at Kashgar, informed the Yuen Taotai that they were English spies, and that they were erecting boundary-pillars (referring presumably to cairns erected for observation purposes), and Colonel Lastochkin, the Russian Intelligence Officer, followed them about to find out what they were doing.

Early in January 1906, a number of Sarikoli Begs visited Mr. Macartney and said that they had come into Kashgar, with some 150 Sarikolis, to complain to the Chinese authorities of their Amban, who had been so grasping, and put the people to such hardship by his excessive collection of straw, and by the sale of non-government lands, that the condition of things was no longer to be borne, and they were determined to have him removed. The Taotai had already received the deputation but refused to be coerced into any immediate action, and told the Sarikolis that their proper course was to have made their complaint to the Chih-fu of Yarkand. The Begs hinted that if the Chinese refused to give them justice they would look elsewhere. Mr. Macartney told them that the Taotai would no doubt do what was just without, however, allowing himself to be rushed. The deputation caused some anxiety to the Russian Consulate, and Mons. Kolokolov sent his Chinese interpreter to the Taotai to inquire whether the people of Raskam had rebelled against the Chinese. He also shortly afterwards asked Mr. Macartney if the British had occupied Raskam.

The differences between the Sarikolis and their Amban, which led to the Sarikoli deputation to Kashgar early in January 1906, were settled through the good offices of the Taotai of Kashgar. The reconciliation, however, proved the reverse of beneficial to British interests, as, in furtherance of the demands of the Sarikolis, by May 1906, most of the petty officers of the State who were well disposed towards the British Government had been removed from their appointments and replaced by Russian *protégés*.

In February 1906, information was received that orders had been issued by the Governor of Urumtchi that foreign subjects living in Yarkand should not be allowed to acquire land, and that anyone wishing to do so should be made to execute a bond declaring himself to be a Chinese subject. As a result of this order certain lands held by a Kashmiri were confiscated.

In March 1906, His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, at the request of the Government of India, granted permission to Dr. M. A. Stein, Inspector-General of Education, North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, who had been deputed by the Government of India to renew his archæological explorations in Chinese Turkistan, to travel through Afghan Wakhan on his way from Chitral to his destination; and His Highness furnished the necessary *firman* commending Dr. Stein to the good offices of the Afghan officials in that part of His Highness's dominions. Very satisfactory accounts were received from Dr. Stein of his

archæological explorations in Chinese Turkistan. During the course of the year 1907-08 he explored many ancient sites, and was rewarded with several important finds of ancient manuscripts on wood and paper, sculptures, etc.

The British Consul received a letter from Mr. Sokow, Russian Consul, announcing that by an Ukase, dated the 17th and 30th May 1910, he had been appointed

**The Russian Consul.**  
Consul-General at Kashgar. Mr. Macartney stated that the rank appeared to be a personal one, and that, so far as he knew, the Consulate itself had not been elevated to a Consulate-General.

In March 1906, a letter was received from Mr. Macartney, through the Resident in Kashmir, complaining of the action taken by the Russian Consul at Ili in

**Mr. Macartney's status.**  
the matter of the disposal of the estate of a deceased British Indian subject, who died at that place. In the absence of an official recognition by the Chinese Government of Mr. Macartney as British Consul at Kashgar (a question which formed part of the composite arrangement for the settlement of Anglo-Chinese differences in Central Asia, regarding which His Majesty's Government had been addressed by Lord Curzon's Government, and which was to be taken up by His Majesty's Minister at Peking as soon as the Tibet Convention had been ratified), the Russian Consul contended that he was the proper person to administer the estates of deceased British subjects, and to adjudge the claims of creditors; and in spite of representations Mr. Macartney had not succeeded in obtaining

\* Despatch to the Secretary of State for India, No. 43-Secret—Frontier, dated the 9th March 1906.  
possession of the estate. The matter was brought\* to the notice of His Majesty's Government for such action as might be deemed necessary, and a copy of the papers was also transmitted to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

In August 1907, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking, who had been waiting for some time for a favourable opening to obtain from the Chinese Government an acknowledgment of Mr. Macartney as His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Kashgar, seized the opportunity offered by Mr. Macartney's representation about the delay in the settlement of British cases by Peng Tajen, late Chih-fu of Yarkand, and, in communicating with the Wai-wu-pu, referred to Mr. Macartney as "His Britannic Majesty's Consul" and not as "British Agent" as had been the previous practice.

The Wai-wu-pu did not challenge the expression, but tacitly accepted it in their reply; and subsequently, during the course of an interview with the Ministers, Sir John Jordan referred several times to Mr. Macartney as Consul without provoking any comment. His Britannic Majesty's Minister accordingly suggested that Mr. Macartney should adopt the new title, and, at the request of His Majesty's Government, Mr. Macartney was instructed to do so in January 1908.

In August of the same year Captain Shuttleworth, who was acting temporarily for Mr. Macartney, was formally recognised by the Chinese Government as His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Kashgar; and shortly afterwards the Russian Consul at Kashgar received the instructions of his Government to recognize his British colleague.

The Russian Consul at Kashgar was much exercised in the movements of some British sportsmen who were shooting on the Pamirs during the summer of 1906. Ten soldiers were sent from Murghabi to Tagarmansu and ten to Kuktruk to watch and report on their proceedings. Much interest was also displayed in the movements of Dr. Stein who was conducting archæological explorations, two men being told off to shadow him.

In April 1906, the Resident in Kashmir submitted a proposal to facilitate bonded trade with Chinese Turkistan by the Hoshiarpur-Leh route. The proposal was based on a petition from many Central Asian traders, praying that an office, similar to that at Srinagar, might be opened at Hoshiarpur

**Proposal to facilitate bonded trade with Chinese Turkistan by the Hoshiarpur-Leh route.**

for checking the export to Chinese Turkistan of foreign duty-paid goods transmitted in bond to Hoshiarpur from the port of import. A bonded warehouse for *charas* already exists at Hoshiarpur, and the Resident in Kashmir suggested that the officer in charge of the warehouse might be able to undertake the proposed additional duty. The Government of India considered that it would be desirable to meet the wishes of the traders, if this could be done without much trouble and expense. They accordingly addressed the Punjab Government and having obtained their cordial concurrence to the proposal, decided (September 10th, 1908) to give effect to it. Certain rules were accordingly framed, and the opinion of the Kashmir Darbar invited regarding them. The Darbar had no objection to the arrangements suggested, provided that they had the assurance of the Government of India that it would not be obligatory on the Darbar to effect any repairs to the road falling within State territory, and that the British Joint Commissioner at Ladakh would exercise no jurisdiction over this road. The Government of India agreed to give this assurance; but informed the Darbar (a) that the Government of India trusted that the road would be kept in a state reasonably fit for traffic, and (b) that the British Joint Commissioner would be expected to pay the same regard to the interests of British subjects travelling by this route, as he did in respect of British subjects travelling *via* Srinagar, although he would not exercise the definite jurisdiction over the former route which he now exercised over the latter.

In May 1906, the Special Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir for Chinese Affairs suggested that the best way to prevent intrigues by Safdar Ali Khan, ex-Mir of Hunza, and his family in Yarkand, with his faction in Hunza, might be keep him absolutely under British control in India. He considered that, if it were arranged with the Chinese to give Safdar Ali the option to remain under control at Kuchar or to accept for himself and his sons an asylum and a pension in the Kashmir State, he might elect the latter. The Political Agent in Gilgit (Major Gurdon) and the Resident concurred in the Special Assistant's views, both being of opinion that our position in Hunza would be much stronger if it could be managed to get Safdar Ali Khan and his sons into our own hands, and referred the matter to the Government of India. The correspondence was communicated in June 1906 to His Majesty's Minister in Peking with the remark that it was not proposed to take any action in India, but that papers were forwarded in case it might prove advisable to include a settlement of the question in the negotiations which were about to be initiated at Peking for a general settlement of Anglo-Chinese differences in Central Asia. In March 1907, a petition was received by the Special Assistant at Kashgar from Safdar Ali Khan asking for permission to reside in Yarkand where the other members of his family were living. This request could not be granted and the Government of India directed the Special Assistant to inform the ex-Mir that he was unable to entertain his request or to render him any assistance in the matter.

In April 1909, the British Aksakal of Kuchar reported the arrival there of Safdar Ali Khan, ex-Mir of Hunza. In reply to an enquiry from the local Amban as to whether he was a British or Chinese subject, Safdar Ali said he was a Chinese subject. He was thereupon ordered not to leave Kuchar again without permission from the Yamen.

In June 1906, the Government of India issued orders in the matter of a proposal submitted by the Political Agent, Mir of Hunza's attempt to cultivate the Raskam lands. His claim to compensation. Gilgit, that a sum of Rs. 1,000 should be paid to the Mir of Hunza as compensation for the expense incurred by him in his attempt to cultivate the Raskam lands in 1899, in anticipation of the final settlement of the question of the boundary between Kashmir and the New Dominion and the severance of Hunza's connection with China. The Government of India considered that, as there seemed to be a reasonable prospect of the conclusion of a general agreement with China on Hunza affairs, there might be advantage in delaying a decision in regard to the point raised by the Political Agent until the general question could be dealt with as a whole.

In October 1907, the Resident in Kashmir recommended that the orders of the Government of India on the claim of the Mir of Hunza for compensation

for the expenditure incurred in his attempt to cultivate the Raskam lands in 1899, should be reconsidered.

As there seemed no prospect of the negotiations with the Chinese Government regarding Raskam being concluded for a considerable period, and as it was considered desirable to remove what, in the straitened circumstances of the Mir, was probably a sore grievance, the Government of India sanctioned the grant to him of Rs. 1,000 as compensation.

In September 1906, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir E. Grey) in addressing His Majesty's Minister at Peking (Sir J. Jordan) desired to be informed whether the moment was opportune for approaching the Chinese Government with a view to obtaining a settlement of the Kanjut (Hunza) question on the basis that the Government of India should abandon the Hunza claims to Raskam and to the Taghdumbash Pamirs, provided that the Chinese Government agreed to sever their connection with Hunza, to accept the frontier between Kashmir and the New Dominion as proposed by the Indian Government, and to recognise the appointment of Mr. Macartney as Consul at Kashgar.

His Majesty's Minister at Peking in reply pointed out certain objections to the question being then reopened and was not in favour of so doing. His Majesty's Government concurred, but shortly after, i.e., in January 1907, informed the Minister at Peking that although it had been agreed to allow the Kanjut question to remain in abeyance, as the matter was not of pressing importance, it was hoped that no favourable opportunity of regularising Mr. Macartney's position would be allowed to pass. As already shown above, His Majesty's Minister managed in the end of 1907 to obtain a tacit acknowledgment from China of Mr. Macartney as His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Kashgar.

A disturbance occurred at Yarkand towards the end of February of 1907 owing to the intrigues of Kashmiris and Afghans who incited the local Muhammadans against the Hindus, on the ground that the latter had made use of obscene language in respect of a mosque. A large crowd of angry Muhammadans marched to the Hindu *serai* and made a great uproar, and, but for the timely intervention of the Amban who dispersed the mob with the assistance of some Chinese, might have committed mischief. On the 18th March when Mr. Macartney reached Yarkand, feeling still ran high, and he was met at the gate of the city by a crowd of Muhammadans who behaved in a rough and disorderly manner and expected him then and there to hear their grievances against the Hindus. With some difficulty he managed to explain to the crowd that the case could not be settled on the spot, and they accompanied him to the Fu-Yamen where the Chih-fu persuaded the men to disperse. Owing to the weakness of the Chinese garrison of the city, serious disturbances were feared, but a telegram, subsequently received from Mr. Macartney, through His Majesty's Minister at Peking, reported that the incident had been settled.

Later reports showed that the case had virtually been settled by Mr. Macartney who brought the contending factions to a mutual understanding and agreement with conspicuous tact and ability, and so saved what might have been a most serious situation.

In December 1906, Mr. Macartney reported that owing to delays in the disposal of suits by British subjects in the Yarkand district, Yamen, he had asked His Majesty's Minister at Peking to cause the Wai-wu-pu to issue a telegraphic warning to the Chinese officials concerned to be diligent in the settlement of cases. Sir E. Satow replied that nothing could be done at the time, but if the new Amban, who was about to be appointed, pursued the old tactics, he would remonstrate with the Chinese Government.

In August 1907, Mr. Macartney reported that owing to the great delay in the settlement of outstanding cases of British subjects on the part of Peng Tajen, Chih-fu of Yarkand, who was about to be relieved, he (Mr. Macartney) had telegraphed to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking suggesting that His



Excellency should use his influence with the Wai-wu-pu to have Peng, after relief, detained at Yarkand on special duty for the settlement of the outstanding cases—an arrangement which would have an excellent effect on his successor. At the request of His Britannic Majesty's Minister, the Wai-wu-pu issued instructions for Peng's detention for two months for the purpose. Peng tried to evade the order and actually reached Uch Turfan, his new station, but was recalled and eventually went to Kashgar, where, after some intrigue, he managed to obtain permission from the Provincial Governor to return to Uch Turfan. The Governor, however, ordered the new Chih-fu of Yarkand, Kan Tajen, to settle the outstanding cases in two months. This did not have the desired effect, and in December Mr. Macartney was obliged to complain again to Peking, as a result of which the local officials took up the settlement of the cases; but progress continued to be slow owing to the apathy—if not actual opposition—of the officials, who were inclined to take too lenient a view of the dishonest tactics of the Chinese debtors in evading the claims against them.

The British Consul at Kashgar reported in April 1910, that he had received a great deal of help from the Chinese authorities in collecting money due to Shikarpuri money-lenders of Khanarik and Yangi-Hissar. It had, however, come to his knowledge that the business of money-lending was still going on in Yangi-Hissar and Kargalik; and he had taken steps to put a stop to it.

The Chinese authorities of Yarkand co-operated, with much effect, in the settlement of claims by British traders against Chinese subjects.

In April 1907, Captain Polovtsoff, of the Russian army, who was on a visit to India, applied for permission to travel to Chinese Turkistan *viâ* the Karakoram route. As it was considered desirable, in view of the negotiations in regard to Persia

Grant of permission to certain Russian officers to travel to Chinese Turkistan via the Karakoram route. Their proceedings on the Kashmir frontier.

and Afghanistan which were then proceeding between Great Britain and Russia, to meet reasonable Russian wishes, the necessary permission was granted, and Major Feilding, D.S.O., of the Coldstream Guards, Aide-de-Camp to His Excellency the Viceroy, who was proceeding to England *viâ* Kashgar, was detailed to accompany Captain Polovtsoff. In June permission was granted, at the special request of the Russian Consul-General at Bombay, for M. Andrieff to accompany the party.

In August, Major Feilding reported that on reaching the neighbourhood of the Kashmir frontier, the proceedings of his Russian companions suddenly became suspicious. When leaving Leh Captain Polovtsoff told him that from Yarkand he proposed to go to the Russian Pamirs to shoot *ovis poli*; but on arrival at Suget Khargan the two Russians questioned all the Khirgiz whom they could get hold of about the direct road from Shahidulla to the Mustagh pass and thence to the Taghdumbash Pamir; and also enquired whether they could get to the Mustagh pass by travelling *viâ* the Killian pass and thence marching west. They were told that these routes were impracticable, and the local Beg said that he refused to give them a guide although he was offered a large reward to provide a man for the purpose. They then proposed going on to Yarkand, and told Major Feilding that from there they would go to the Taghdumbash. Though this was their professed intention, Major Feilding subsequently heard that they had been enquiring the way to the Mustagh pass and he concluded his letter with the words:—"My belief is that they mean to examine the Mustagh pass and the Killik pass. Polovtsoff makes notes and sketches in his tent every night of each day's march, and I cannot help thinking he is studying the whole frontier up to the Killik pass under a pretence of going to the Taghdumbash."

On receipt of this information, the Resident in Kashmir was instructed that if either of the two Russians appeared in the neighbourhood of the Mintaka, Killik or Shimshal passes, they should not be allowed to re-enter Kashmir territory, or receive assistance from the local people.

Captain Polovtsoff and M. Andrieff arrived at Yarkand on the 15th August, a day in advance of Major Feilding, and proceeded thence to Sarikol, intending, as they said, to shoot on the way; and they were reported finally to have left the Taghdumbash for the Russian Pamirs *viâ* the Paik (or Bayik) pass about the 16th September.

In October a report reached Mr. Macarteny at Kashgar that while in Yarkand the Russians changed their European dress and walked about the city in so successful a disguise that the local people took them for Andijanis; and a little later the Political Agent, Gilgit, was informed that they had halted at Tashkurghan for four days, that M. Andrieff arrived there in English *khaki* uniform, which gave rise to a rumour that he was an Englishman, and that he made enquiries through some Russian *protégés* regarding affairs in Chitral and Kanjut, and recorded notes on the Chitral and Kanjut routes to India.

In January 1908, the proceedings of the two gentlemen were brought to the notice of the India Office, as the Indian military authorities had been placed in possession of evidence which conclusively showed that Captain Polovtsoff's movements, as well as those of certain other Russian officers who arrived in India at the same time, were, after arrival in India, controlled by the Head Quarters Department of the Russian General Staff at St. Petersburg; and though there was no direct proof that Captain Polovtsoff's suspected intention to visit the passes on the Kashmir frontier was due to instructions from the same quarter, there was little doubt, in view of his suspicious proceedings, that it was so. The India Office did not think it desirable to make a representation to the Russian Government on the subject, but said that, as Captain Polovtsoff had profited with great skill by the opportunity given to him, the moral seemed to be that in future more care should be taken in granting permission to foreigners to cross the Indian frontiers.

In April 1910, Captain Polovtsoff turned up in Simla and called at the Foreign Office, with the Russian Consul-General and asked permission to return to Russia by the Gilgit route. He very shortly afterwards arrived in Srinagar and was joined by a Mr. Troubetsky, of the Russian Civil Service. But he was informed through the Russian Consul-General that the Governor-General in Council much regretted that he was unable to accord the desired permission; and the Resident in Kashmir was told that neither officer should be allowed to proceed beyond the limits of ordinary travel for visitors.

In August 1907, the Government of India granted permission to Major Hino of the Japanese army, who was travelling from Peking to India *via* Ha-un-Ili, Kashgar and Yarkand, to enter Kashmir by the Karakoram route and Leh; and Mr. Macartney was instructed to afford the traveller all possible facilities for his journey in Chinese Turkistan. Major Hino arrived at Kashgar on the 8th August and reached Leh early in October.

In August 1907, Mr. Macartney reported that Mr. C. Clementi, Assistant Colonial Secretary, Hongkong, who was on his way to Hongkong overland through China, had some trouble in getting out of Russian Turkistan. Mr. Clementi's passport, which was of the kind usually issued by the London Foreign Office to British subjects going abroad, was *visé* by the Russian Consul-General in London, but was found unsatisfactory in Andijan, and Mr. Clementi was sent to the Governor of Marghilan, where the question of taking advantage of the relief of the Russian troops on the Pamirs to escort Mr. Clementi out of Russian territory to the Indian frontier was discussed; but an appeal to the British Embassy at St. Petersburg brought orders to allow him to cross the frontier into Chinese territory.

Messrs. Holmes-Tarn and Henderson, two other British travellers, who arrived at Kashgar from India about the same time, and had been informed by the British Embassy at St. Petersburg that permission had been granted them by the Russian Government to proceed to Europe *via* Irkishtam, had also to appeal to St. Petersburg before the Russian Consul at Kashgar, who said that he knew nothing about them, would allow them to enter Russian territory; and Major Feilding, who had received permission to proceed to Europe *via* Chinese and Russian Turkistan, was also detained for several days at Kashgar, pending a reference to the Governor of Tashkent, because the Russian Consul would not permit him to take his firearms and native servants into Russian territory,

although such restrictions are not imposed on Russian subjects entering India from Chinese Turkistan.

With a view to minimising the delay and inconvenience thus caused to British travellers, the Resident in Kashmir asked Mr. Macartney to ascertain from the Russian Consul at Kashgar the precise rules regulating the admission of British subjects, European and Indian, to Russian Turkistan from the Kashgar side. On the 15th November 1907, Mr. Macartney had an interview with M. Kolokolov, who informed him that there were no rules published for general information, but that the practice was that Chinese subjects could at all times cross the border into Russian territory on the simple *visa* of their Chinese passports by the Russian Consulate at Kashgar; that the Consulate had had the power to grant passes for Russia to Bokharan, Persian and Afghan subjects; but that the subjects of all other Powers—be they European or Asiatic—could only be admitted to Russian territory with the special permission of the Russian Government, who never granted such permission without consulting the War Office or the Governor-General of Russian Turkistan.

Mr. Macartney considered that this attitude was but part of the policy which was being pursued by the Russians to do all they could to prevent non-Russian trade from obtaining a footing in the New Dominion, so that the province might continue to be a preserve for the sole economic exploitation of Russia; and that in the event of a revision of the commercial articles of the Treaty of St. Petersburg the Russians would do their utmost to prevent Kashgar from being opened to general foreign commerce. A copy of the papers was furnished to His Majesty's Government, and to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking.

A Russian named Elias Levitov, who was deputed by some Russian Chambers of Commerce to inquire into the trade possibilities of Chinese Turkistan, arrived at Kashgar at the end of September 1907, and after having completed his enquiries left early in November. The Russian Consul informed Mr. Macartney that M. Levitov had devoted much attention to the study of the production of *charas*, and was of opinion that the Russian Government were making a mistake in prohibiting the export of this drug to Russian Turkistan—where 25 per cent. of the population were *charas*-smokers—as it was impossible to prevent smuggling, and the only result was a loss of customs revenue. M. Levitov intended to draw the attention of the Minister of Finance to this source of revenue, with a view to the necessary provision being made on the occasion of the next revision of the Treaty of St. Petersburg, under which, as it stands at present, Russia is precluded from levying taxes on Chinese produce.

Mr. Macartney subsequently reported that there were signs, such as the preparation, under the orders of the Taotai of Kashgar, of statistics as to the volume of trade between Kashgaria and India and Russia, that the Chinese themselves were contemplating a revision of the commercial articles of the treaty, but he had no means of knowing whether *pourparlers* had already commenced between China and Russia.

Mr. Macartney reported that, during 1907, several British travellers were put to inconvenience in obtaining transport when travelling in Kashgaria, owing to the nonchalance—and even obstruction—of Chinese officials; and that he did not see in the country the same "*empresment*" to help British travellers as was formerly noticeable. For this regrettable change, the Shikarpuri money-lenders appear to be to a great extent responsible; the Provincial Governor's statement, in regard to the operations of these men, that Kashgar was not a place open to British trade has been much discussed by officials, Begs, etc., among whom the impression was gaining ground that British interests are of no consequence in the eyes of the Chinese.

Signs have recently appeared of a genuine effort towards regeneration in the New Dominion as a result no doubt of the "spirit of renovation now so prevalent in China proper. There had been no appreciable change in military organisation, but on the administrative side

Regeneration movement in the New Dominion.

endeavours were being made to purify the administration of its grosser abuses ; the extortions of the officials had considerably diminished, taxes were levied with a light hand and according to the authorised scale, and *Wei-yuens* or secret emissaries of the Provincial Governor were continually travelling through the districts, visiting the villages, hearing what the people had to say about the local officials, and denouncing the latter to the higher authorities when necessary, as a result of which several officials had been dismissed their appointments without a chance of defending themselves.

On the economic side, the project of a railway from Lan-chow to Ili had been the subject of several memorials to the Throne, and it was considered not improbable that the next decade would see the province connected with China proper by the iron road. Trade organisations were springing up ; a Bureau of Mining had been opened at Urumtchi, the capital of the province, under the auspices of which the mineral resources of the country were being exploited ; a mining association was being formed at Kashgar for which the services of an expert mining engineer from Europe had been engaged ; and, under instructions from Peking, the district officials were busily engaged in drawing up reports on the topography, population and economic products of the country, probably for a general scheme of fiscal reform.

Public opinion was also manifesting itself, and the people were awakening to a consciousness of their civic rights. Finally, the opium restrictions were being enforced with more seriousness than was expected ; all opium lamps had disappeared from the Chinese barracks, and a recent fall of 30 per cent. in the price of the drug showed that the demand for it had been significantly reduced.

The disturbances at Yarkand, and the personal risk to which Mr. Macartney was exposed, led the Resident in Kashmir to propose that an escort of Indian troops should be furnished to the British Representative at Kashgar, which would add to his dignity, strengthen his influence and save him and his family from personal risk. This question was first raised in 1893 when Mr. Macartney was assaulted by a Chinese soldier in Yarkand, and the Resident suggested that he should be provided with a military escort. The proposal was negatived on the ground that his official position was unrecognised by the Chinese Government, but there were certain other factors which helped to this decision, namely, the difficulty of relieving the escort in such a remote locality, the probability of discontent among them, the danger of intrigue, and the possibility of conflicts with the Cossack escort of the Russian Consul.

The question was again raised in 1896 and 1900, and met with a like fate. In 1904, when the escort of the Russian Consul at Kashgar was being increased, the Government of India informed the Secretary of State that they preferred not to make any definite proposal regarding a consulate guard for Mr. Macartney until the matter of his recognition as His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Kashgar had advanced further, a view in which His Majesty's Government concurred. As no further advance had been made in the matter of Mr. Macartney's official position, the Government of India again decided to defer taking up the question of the escort, and the Resident in Kashmir was informed accordingly.

In August 1908, the British Representative at Kashgar was recognised as His Britannic Majesty's Consul both by the Chinese and Russian Governments, and the Resident in Kashmir proposed that the Consulate should be provided with a permanent escort of 25 men under a native officer. After full consideration it was decided that the permanent establishment of a guard at the Kashgar Consulate was not necessary, and the Resident was informed accordingly.

In December 1907, in a letter to the Private Secretary to the Viceroy, Captain Smith, Political Agent, Chitral, referred to the unsportsmanlike conduct of certain persons who had been permitted to visit the Pamirs and the Thian Shan from India.

His Excellency the Viceroy thought that it would be worth while to take the matter up, and the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, was accordingly asked to obtain from Captain Smith and furnish the Government of India with full particulars.

These were received in February 1908, and from them it appeared that the abuses alleged were offences against the canons of sport as understood by British sportsmen. As the tracts in question are within the limit of a Foreign Power, Captain Smith suggested, for the sake of the fair name of British sportsmen, that certain rules which are now in force in Gilgit and Chitral should, for the future, be binding on all sportsmen who visit the Pamirs and Thian Shan, with the Government of India's permission, *viz*:—

- that no shooting should be allowed except by the sportsman himself ;
- that no wounded head should be retrieved except by the sportsman ;
- that all payments must be made by the sportsman ;
- that no head should be purchased, and
- that no Kashmiri *shikaris* should be taken, as they have proved to be unreliable in the past.

On Captain Smith's suggestions being referred to the Resident in Kashmir, that officer stated that he was averse to laying down any hard-and-fast rules for sportsmen shooting in a foreign country, but he thought that, when permission was granted to a sportsman to shoot on the Pamirs, he should be invited, in the interests of sport, not to shoot more than four *ovis poli*; not to allow either his *shikari* nor any one connected with him to use a rifle; and not to make presents of rifles or guns to *shikaris*, servants, or people of the country. Further that sportsmen might also be advised to engage Gilgiti rather than Kashmiri *shikaris* on the grounds of the greater reliability of the former, and to make all payments to the country people personally instead of through their *shikaris* or servants.

His Excellency the Viceroy was of opinion that the Government of India should hold itself responsible for the behaviour of individuals to whom it granted permits to shoot, whether in a foreign country or not; and that the unadministered condition of the country shot over, though it was not British territory, justified action on our part. His Excellency, therefore, thought that the rules suggested by Captain Smith should be binding on all sportsmen who visited the Pamirs and Thian Shan with the sanction of the Government of India, and that the above conditions should be incorporated in the printed rules laid down for such sportsmen.

The Resident in Kashmir was accordingly instructed to incorporate the above rules in the Kashmir Visitors' Rules, with the addition of a clause to the effect that sportsmen are forbidden to give or sell arms and ammunition to natives of the country.

In March 1908, information was received that the feeling against Hindu usurers had led to an agitation against these men in Merket which culminated in a Hindu, named Soba Singh, being seriously assaulted by a mob. The officials of the place, encouraged no doubt by the attitude of the Provincial Governor towards the Hindu usurers, not only took no action against the offenders, but actually supported them in bringing a false charge of murder against the Hindu. Mr. Macartney had great difficulty in securing the punishment of the offenders.

Two expeditions under Dr. T. G. Longstaff and His Royal Highness the Duke of Abruzzi respectively proceeded towards the Karakoram mountains, for the purpose of exploration during 1909.

Dr. Longstaff and his party visited the Kumadan, Aktosh and Remo glaciers in August, going on to the Karakoram Pass on the 24th August. He was at the Siachen glacier near the Saltoro Pass on the 16th September.

The Duke of Abruzzi reported in August 1909 that he had ascended a peak, called Bride Peak by Conway, to a height of 24,000 feet, but was prevented by weather from reaching summit. K 2 itself he found quite impracticable. He made a detailed survey of Baltoro glacier.

Mr. Don C. Sowers, Magnetic Observer of the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism of the Carnegie Institute, America, and Mr. Fuson, Americans, arrived at Kashgar on the 28th July 1909. In November 1908, the Secretary



of State for India informed the Government of India of Mr. Sower's proposed expedition across China and Chinese Turkistan, and requested them to afford him any reasonable facilities in their power. Messrs. Sowers and Fuson intended returning to America *viâ* India. They were granted permission to enter India by the Karakoram-Leh route. They left Kashgar for Khotan on 4th August 1909, whence they were to return to Yarkand and proceed to the Karakoram in the early part of September. In October 1909, it was reported that they arrived at Leh on the 28th September and left for Srinagar on the 30th, whence they presumably returned to America.

In May 1909, a report was received of the arrival at Kuchar on the 10th March 1909 of three Japanese. Two of the Japanese travellers. men left Kuchar for Khotan, and the third

proceeded *viâ* Aksu to Kashgar.

Messrs. Tachibana and Nomura, two of the Japanese travellers referred to above, journeyed together through Mongolia, visiting Urga, Uliassitai, Kobdo, Guchen, Urumtchi and Turfan at which latter place they remained for two months. They then separated, Tachibana going on to Lob-Cherchen, Keria, Khotan, Yarkand and Kashgar, and Nomura proceeding direct to Kashgar *viâ* Kuchar, Aksu, and Maralbashi. Nomura arrived at Kashgar on the 11th June 1909, and asked for permission to return to Japan *viâ* the Karakoram, Leh, Kashmir and India. While professing inability to speak English, he possessed a library of English books of travel on the northern border of India. Tachibana came to Kashgar on the 13th July. The two received a considerable amount of correspondence, took sketches of various places, and endeavoured to obtain maps and records of Yarkand. They made themselves very unpopular in Yarkand and Kashgar by beating and ill-treating Chinese subjects, and, prior to their arrival in Kashgar, they announced that they were friends of the British Consul, although they were quite unknown to him.

Early in August permission was given to the two Japanese to proceed to India *viâ* Leh, whereupon Tachibana asked the British Consul at Kashgar for the loan of 2,000 taels. The loan was refused, as Tachibana had no letter of credit on the Russo-Chinese Bank, and because he had preferred the request at the eleventh hour, when it was too late for the Consul to obtain orders in the matter. The facts were brought to the notice of His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio and the Secretary of State. Lord Morley was also informed of the connection between Nomura and Tachibana and the other Japanese traveller, whose name was Ama, and was told that they appeared to be paying much attention to Chinese Turkistan and the neighbourhood, as evinced by the visits of several of their agents to the locality during 1908-09.

In a letter, dated the 7th December 1909, the Consul-General for Japan at Calcutta stated that Nomura had arrived in India, and asked that he might be permitted to return to China Proper *viâ* the Leh-Karakoram route.

In January 1910, a letter was received from the British Ambassador in Japan enclosing a letter received by him from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs in which it was stated that Messrs. Tachibana and Nomura were not officials of the Japanese Government, who had no concern with or cognizance of them or their movements. Thereupon the Consul-General for Japan at Calcutta was informed that the Government of India regretted that they were unable to grant Mr. Nomura permission to recross the British frontier *viâ* Leh and the Karakoram Pass.

Nothing further has been heard on the subject.

In November 1905, information was received from Mr. Macartney that the Chinese Provincial Governor, yielding to pressure brought to bear by the Russian Consul, had agreed to construct, under Russian supervision, a cart road from Kashgar to the Russo-Chinese frontier, to connect with the road to that point which had been constructed by the Russians earlier in the year; but that the Chinese had declined to discuss a second demand for the extension of the telegraph line from Irkistam to Kashgar; and that they



had rejected a third demand for the right to export grain to the Russian Pamirs for the use of troops stationed there.

Mr. Macartney proposed to demand the application of the first and third concessions to the Yarkand-Karakoram trade route, but as it has been the policy of the Government of India not to improve roads on the Kashmir frontier in such a way as to give them a strategic value in case of an invasion, Mr. Macartney was informed, through His Majesty's Minister at Peking, that it was not desirable to demand the improvement of the Karakoram route, but that he might press for the right to export grain by it.

During the latter part of 1906, and the early part of 1907, considerable activity was displayed by the Russians in improving communications between their territory and the New Dominion. In November 1906, the Chinese, yielding to pressure brought to bear on them by the Russian Consul at Kashgar, put in hand, under the supervision of the Amban of Sarikol and a Russian named Sazontov, the construction of a cart road from Kashgar to the Russian frontier at the Turgat pass to connect with the road from Naryn to that point which had been previously made by the Russians. In January 1907, the road, which is wide enough to permit of two carriages passing each other with ease, had been carried as far as Mirza Tiarak, and was to have been completed by March.

Seven post stations were to be established on the road, namely, at Artush, Chung Terik, Chakmak, Turgat, Akmayat, At Bashi and Naryn; and when the road is completed it will be possible for a tarantass, going night and day, to cover the distance between Kashgar and Naryn in two days and thence to the nearest station on the Tashkent-Orenburg railway in five days. It is likely that the journey will eventually be further reduced, as the Kugart and Yaosi passes on the Farghana range between Naryn and the railway are under survey with a view to the construction of a shorter road, and possibly a branch railway line from Andijan to Naryn.

At the time when the Russians secured their concession, Mr. Macartney proposed, as a countermove, that the Chinese should be pressed to improve the Yarkand-Leh route. As, however, it had long been the policy of the Government of India, for strategical reasons, not to improve this route so as to render it fit for use by troops, the proposal was not approved.

In May 1907, information was received that, under instructions from the Russian Consul at Kashgar, a Russian contractor was preparing a project for a 6-pier bridge, 300 yards long and 5 yards wide, over the Kashgar river on the north side of the city on the Naryn-Kashgar road, of which it was to be the last link. A later report stated that the Taotai of Kashgar had refused to allow the Russian Consul to commence work on the bridge until he had received orders from headquarters at Urumtchi, but judging from past experience, it was unlikely that the Taotai's obstruction would have the least effect.

In June, M. Kolokolov, the Russian Consul at Kashgar, informed Mr. Macartney that, on the completion of the Naryn-Kashgar road, the Russians proposed making a branch road to connect it with Andijan *via* Kizil Kurghan and the Shyok and Kugart passes. The portion of the proposed road between Kizil Kurghan and the Shyok pass would lie in Chinese territory, and M. Kolokolov told Mr. Macartney that he had not yet broached the project to the Chinese officials.

In January 1908, information was received that the officer in command of ~~the Russian post at Murghabi~~, accompanied by an engineer, had paid a visit to Tashkurghan with the object of preparing a project for a road from Kizil Robot through Murghabi to Rangkul.

With reference to the proposed extension of the Russian telegraph line from Irkistam to Kashgar, the Russian Customs Officer at Kashgar communicated the following information to the British Consul in March 1910:—Mons. Kolokolov, late Russian Consul at Kashgar, raised the question of the extension of the Russian telegraph line from Irkistam to Kashgar, with the Taotai of Kashgar. At the time, the Chinese thought well of the scheme; and had the Russians there and then taken action, no opposition would have been encountered. Subsequently the matter was again broached by Mons. Kolokolov, apparently after reference to

the Russian Turkistan authorities, but he was told by the Taotai that circumstances had changed.

In May 1907, information was received from Mr. Macartney, who had recently been on a tour to Khotan, that public feeling was very bitter against the Shikarpuri Hindu money-lenders; and that he was besieged at every halting-place by crowds of people complaining of the oppression practised by these men on the poor. From enquiries made into numerous cases, Mr. Macartney was convinced that the rates of interest taken by the Shikarpuris were generally exorbitant, and that if the debtor did not manage to escape the clutches of the money-lender by repaying the loan punctually, he practically became the slave of the latter for life. The position was, however, a delicate one: on the one hand, the Shikarpuri had, as a British subject, a certain amount of prestige and could make himself heard at the Yamen; his accounts were generally reliable, and he did not swindle the native by false entries, as was proved by enquiries into certain cases of alleged cheating by these men: on the other hand, the native was a careless individual who fell an easy prey to the money-lender, and, being thoroughly dishonest, he defended himself by repudiating his debts and by making false accusations against the Shikarpuris. Mr. Macartney punished a few of the money-lenders, and cautioned the others to be less exacting and harsh in their dealings with the natives, but he thought that a real improvement in the matter could not be expected with the existing weak administration of the Chinese, a state of affairs much to be regretted, as British prestige undoubtedly suffered in popular estimation from the business of the Shikarpuris.

In August, the Taotai of Kashgar showed Mr. Macartney a despatch which the Provincial Governor, alarmed at the ill-feeling aroused by, and the evil effects on the country of, the operations of the Shikarpuri Hindus, had recently sent him saying that, as usury was contrary to the law of the land, as it had not the sanction of China's treaties with Foreign Powers, and as Kashgar was not a place open to British trade, except by courtesy, the natives should be prohibited from borrowing from the Shikarpuris and the latter should be prohibited from carrying on their trade. Mr. Macartney was invited to make the necessary intimation to them.

The Resident in Kashmir, to whom Mr. Macartney referred the matter for orders, said that the Shikarpuris were a perfect pest in the country, and although they were British subjects, he doubted the wisdom of giving them any countenance or support beyond, of course, protection from mob violence, even if there were a duly recognised British Consul at Kashgar; in Mr. Macartney's precarious position he thought that it would be wisest not to interfere in the matter. The Resident therefore suggested that he should be authorised to instruct Mr. Macartney to let the Chinese authorities know, in reply to their communication, that he had consulted the Resident in Kashmir who had advised him to discourage extortionate money-lending in every way, and that, though it was not in accordance with the policy of the British Government to forbid money-lending among British subjects, the Resident did not wish him to raise any objections to the prohibition which the Chinese Government proposed to issue to Chinese subjects. The Government of India approved of the terms of the proposed instructions to Mr. Macartney. In March 1910 it was brought to the notice of the British Consul by the Indian Aksakal in Yarkand that merchants of Hoshiarpur in Yarkand were carrying on a money-lending business, similar to that carried on by Shikarpuris. Thereupon Mr. Macartney instructed the Aksakal to make it generally known to the Hoshiarpuris that, as such transactions were looked upon as illegal by the Chinese authorities, the British Consul would not entertain any petitions from money-lenders who might be unable to recover their debts.

In 1903 the Special Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir for Chinese Affairs at Kashgar suggested the desirability of inducing the Chinese Imperial Post Office to establish a branch at Kashgar embracing in it a money order system. The proposal was thoroughly considered, and eventually the position taken up was that—

- (1) there was no likelihood of regular mail communication between Gilgit and Kashgar being remunerative;

- (2) that no arrangement which had been suggested for the money order business was likely to be successful;
- (3) that our political and trade interests in Kashgar were not sufficiently extensive to warrant the expenditure and risk of loss which would be involved in remitting surplus cash from Kashgar to India by Government or other agency.

In May 1909, Sir Francis Younghusband, Resident in Kashmir, revived the question of the postal arrangements with Kashgar, and made certain proposals which may be summarised as follows :—

- (1) the establishment of a branch of the Imperial Post Office of India in Kashgar;
- (2) the transfer of the entire postal arrangements between Gilgit and Kashgar to the Imperial Postal authorities;
- (3) the introduction of a modified system of money order remittances to Kashgar with limited facilities for value-payable parcels;
- (4) a special Consular post bag for direct transmission between Gilgit and Kashgar, and *vice versa*.

But the Government of India were disposed to think that political considerations rendered it undesirable to establish a regular Indian Post Office at Kashgar, the supervision and inspection of which could not in any case be effected by postal officers. They sanctioned, however (September 1st, 1909), the proposal to allow a special Consular bag to be sent in both directions between Gilgit and Kashgar, without being opened *en route*; and they also agreed, as a tentative measure for one year, to certain arrangements for a limited money order and value-payable business, to be worked by the Mir Munshi attached to the Consulate, who already received an allowance from the Post Office for attendance to the mails to and from the Consulate.

These arrangements need not be further noticed here, for in the following May the Resident in Kashmir reported that it was found that they could not be usefully introduced. The conditions of trade, he wrote, were such that money would accumulate at Kashgar for which we had no use; and that it could only be disposed of by the risky process of sending gold from Kashgar to India, or by means of remittances through the Russo-Chinese Bank, who would probably only give such terms as would allow us to do the work, while they took the profit.

The Government of India accepted this view, and orders which had been issued by the Director-General of the Post Office for the introduction of the money order and value-payable services with Kashgar were accordingly cancelled. The system of special Consular mail bags was, however, allowed to remain.

In a despatch, dated January 29th, 1909, the Secretary of State informed the

Prohibition against journeys to regions of Asia in which Indian interests are concerned.

Indian Government that steps were being taken to ensure that, in all cases where it seemed necessary to do so, journeys of British subjects in those regions of Asia in which Indian interests are specially concerned should not be undertaken without the knowledge and consent of the Government of India. "His Majesty's Government," it was added, "have come to the conclusion that expeditions into these distant regions for purposes of sport or amusement should be carefully scrutinized, and that leave to undertake them should only be given when some special reasons exist for exceptional treatment."

These orders were regarded by the Government of India as erring on the side of being too rigid. All applications for permission to shoot and travel beyond the confines of India were already very strictly scrutinized, and under the limitations already prescribed and enforced, the Government of India did not consider that any serious political objections existed to journeys in Central Asia; which afford recreation to our officers, provide opportunities for gaining useful experience and information, and stimulate a taste for travel.

However, His Excellency the Viceroy decided for the present not to address the Secretary of State in the foregoing sense, but to deal with individual cases as they arose.

## GILGIT AGENCY.

## Personnel.

The following officers held the appointment of Political Agent, Gilgit, during the

period of this summary :—

From 1st April to 3rd October 1906, Major B. E. M. Gurdon, C.I.E., D.S.O.

From 4th October 1906 to 29th May 1908, Major A. F. Bruce.

From 30th May to 26th August 1908, Captain A. D. Macpherson.

From 27th August 1908 to 30th June 1910, Major A. B. Dew.

The most important matters to notice in connection with the Gilgit Agency during Lord Minto's Viceroyalty were in

## Tangir and Darel affairs.

connection with the affairs of Tangir and Darel, two adjoining Shinaki Republics on the northern or right bank of the Indus below Chilas.

On the 18th July 1906, the Resident in Kashmir reported that the state of affairs in Tangir had not been satisfactory as the people had been harbouring the perpetrators of a murder which had taken place at Thor during the previous year, and had stolen some ponies belonging to the people of Gilgit. The Governor of Yasin invited the Tangir *jirga* to meet the Political Agent, Gilgit, who had, under the orders of the Government of India, been instructed to demand the restoration of the stolen ponies and the eviction of the murderers and their families from Tangir, but not their surrender, unless he was satisfied that the *jirga* could and would effect it.

The *jirga* came in to see the Political Agent on the 27th July, bringing with them the stolen ponies, and they readily agreed to the eviction of the families of the murderers who had meanwhile left the country. Half the *jirga* went home to effect the eviction, whilst the remainder stayed at Yasin until the middle of August by which time the promises given had been fulfilled.

In May 1909, the Resident in Kashmir inquired whether the Government of India were prepared to reconsider their present policy of strict non-interference in the affairs of Tangir and Darel. Pukhtun Wali, of the Yasin branch of the Khushwakt section of the Chitral ruling family, had since the Chitral disturbances been residing in Tangir, and had slowly acquired a position of considerable influence in that neighbourhood; and it was anticipated that, if his influence progressed in the same ratio for the next few years, strong measures might have to be taken to protect the British frontier, and the long line of road from Chilas to Gilgit and Gupis. In the opinion of the Political Agent at Gilgit, Pukhtun Wali was the strongest man across the border, and lorded it over Darel as well as Tangir; and he had never been a well-wisher of the British Government. Major Dew further believed that Pukhtun Wali was one of the principal instigators in the troubles on the road to Chitral in 1895, and that he was a typically treacherous Chitrali, who might become as dangerous as Umra Khan was on the Bajaur frontier. The rapidly developing timber trade in Tangir had also been an important factor in increasing Pukhtun Wali's influence, for it had brought him large sums of money.

In connection with the foregoing information the Resident went on to state that Sifat Bahadur, who had been appointed Governor of Punial in 1895, was discontented with his position, and was anxious to be allowed to resign and proceed to Darel. He had for years desired to make a position for himself in Darel; and in fact had already made two attempts (in 1896 and 1900) to effect this; and only so recently as August 1908 had begged to be relieved of the Governorship of Punial so that he might be free to try his fortunes in Darel. But he had been advised to remain at Punial, and had accepted the advice. He was, however, still restive, and galled at the sight of Pukhtun Wali consolidating a position for himself. Sir Francis Younghusband stated that it would be practically impossible to let Sifat Bahadur go to Darel without supporting him; and that

if it was not against the policy of Government, he would unhesitatingly recommend that Sifat Bahadur should be permitted to go, and be given the support of levies and arms to establish himself.

But the Government of India, in reply, stated (June 19th, 1909) that they were not satisfied that there was sufficient reason for departing from the policy of non-interference in the affairs of Darel and Tangir, which had now been successfully followed for many years; and that as a necessary corollary to this policy, no promise of support from Government could be given to Sifat Bahadur, Governor of Punial, should he attempt to establish himself in Darel.

These orders were crossed by a further report from the Resident in Kashmir to the effect that the activity on the part of Pukhtun Wali was causing much unrest in the Agency.

The time had now arrived for Punial and Yasin to collect the tribute which they had for years taken from Darel and Tangir respectively; and the Political Agent anticipated that this might lead to trouble with Pukhtun Wali, and therefore asked for orders, which with the assent of the Government of India, were finally issued to the effect that the usual steps should be taken to collect the tribute, and that if trouble with Pukhtun Wali ensued, all grazing-grounds in the Agency should be closed to the Tangiris and Darelis. The tribute was eventually collected in both cases without trouble.

On the 20th August 1909 Sifat Bahadur again petitioned the Political Agent, begging that his affairs might be settled as he had again been invited to Darel, and as Pukhtun Wali was daily making his position in Darel stronger, though he had no claims there equal to those of Sifat Bahadur. Sir Francis Younghusband, the Resident, was of opinion that Sifat Bahadur had loyally accepted the advice of the Political Agent to restrain his natural impetuosity, and that it was unreasonable to expect him to sit still while Pukhtun Wali forced the Darelis to repudiate Sifat Bahadur's long-standing and well-recognised claims. After further correspondence, which dealt with the policy of non-interference in Darel and Tangir, the Government of India decided on the 6th October 1909 that "Sifat Bahadur cannot count on any support from Government. This should be made clear to him."

Meanwhile Major Dew had heard that Sifat Bahadur was making preparations for a visit to Darel, so he sent for him and his leading men, and informed them that it was against the orders of Government to make any preparations, and that on no account would anyone be allowed to go to Darel without the sanction of Government. And later Major Dew informed Sifat Bahadur of the orders of Government that he could not count on any support from them.

On the 4th November, Sifat Bahadur left for Darel. On hearing of this Major Dew called in the Chiefs of Hunza and Nagar with some levies and strengthened the military posts at Chilas and Bunji; in fact he took all possible precautions to prevent any feeling of unrest arising or spreading. Sifat Bahadur, who had taken with him about 140 men, armed with 14 breech-loaders and some matchlocks, was well received until he got to Gyal, where there was some difference of opinion among the Darelis. At this stage Pakhtun Wali, who was in Tangir, appears to have heard of Sifat Bahadur's proceedings; he sent his family to Kohistan and was prepared to flee himself, but finally a *jirga* was held at which the chief question discussed was whether Sifat Bahadur was acting with the approval of Government. This question being settled in the negative, a unanimous decision was obtained in favour of Pakhtun Wali, who himself started for Darel with 2,000 followers. When Pakhtun Wali with his following arrived at Gyal, the Darelis deserted the cause of Sifat Bahadur, who found himself practically a prisoner in the fort with no rations.

On the 15th November, Pakhtun Wali reported to the Assistant Political Officer, Chilas, that he had allowed Sifat Bahadur to leave Darel for Punial, and that he would hand him over to the Political Agent.

On the 19th it was reported that Sifat Bahadur had arrived at Gilgit under arrest. As Pukhtun Wali acted with sense and moderation in allowing Sifat Bahadur to return unmolested, and as Pukhtun Wali was obviously very



powerful and the Darelis unassisted were incapable of resisting him, and as it appeared to the Resident impolitic further to ignore Pukhtun Wali's advances, he instructed the Political Agent to reply to Pukhtun Wali acknowledging the receipt of his letter, and saying that he (the Political Agent) considered that Pukhtun Wali had acted rightly in facilitating Sifat Bahadur's return without hindrance, and that the latter had left Punial without the Political Agent's permission. The Government of India approved the action taken by the Resident.

Pending the orders of Government on the situation thus created, Khan Bahadur Sifat Bahadur was interned in the Gilgit fort.

The Resident in Kashmir, Colonel Ramsay, then reported the whole proceedings to Government, together with a review of Darel and Tangir affairs, and recommendations as to (1) the future policy of Government towards Sifat Bahadur, (2) the future administration of Punial, and (3) the future relations of the Government of India with Mehtarjao Pukhtun Wali.

Colonel Ramsay explained that Pukhtun Wali had now become paramount in Tangir, that he had considerable influence in the other small Republics on the Indus below Chilas, and that he had attained great power in Darel. The policy Colonel Ramsay observed, which had hitherto been maintained, of non-interference in the affairs of Darel and Tangir was based upon the fact that separate small and independent Republics existed in Darel and Tangir, and that, while this state of things continued, the Republics could never be a source of danger to our frontier districts or to our lines of communication; and he gave it as his opinion that the establishment by Pukhtun Wali of his supremacy in Tangir and his rising influence in the other Republics, demanded a reconsideration of the situation. In view, however, of the fact that repeated assurances of non-interference had been given to the Darelis and Tangiris, Colonel Ramsay deemed it important that, before any change were introduced, the Political Agent should summon the *jirgas* of Tangir and Darel, and discuss the situation with them. He accordingly suggested that the following action should be taken:—

That Major Dew should summon the *jirges* of Tangir and Darel to meet him at the most suitable place in the Gilgit Agency, in order to ascertain their views on the question of Pukhtun Wali's recognition as their Chief.

That Major Dew should communicate with Pukhtun Wali, at the same time either by letter, or by such means as he thought best, and say that the Mehtarjao had repeatedly made overtures to the Political Agent, but that it was difficult satisfactorily to understand what he wished without a personal interview; consequently, if he liked to come to see the Political Agent, he might be assured that he could do so with perfect safety to himself.

The Political Agent might say that he had summoned the Tangir *jirga*, and that it would be a good thing if Pukhtun Wali came in at the same time. In the event of Pukhtun Wali accepting the invitation, and coming in, the Resident proposed that the Political Agent should be authorised to admit his supremacy in Tangir subject to the rights of the Kashmir Darbar; but that Major Dew should endeavour to induce Pukhtun Wali to abandon his claims to Darel. The Resident also suggested that the need for suppressing the arms trade should be impressed upon Pukhtun Wali, and that he should be induced to promise that he would expel any fugitive, when specially requested to do so by the Political Agent, and to undertake that no fugitive should be allowed to commit offences in the Agency territories, while residing in Tangir.

The Resident recommended the grant to Pukhtun Wali of a cash allowance, not exceeding Rs. 1,200 a year, provided that he continued to be uniformly friendly to us, and that he always came to the Political Agent to receive his allowance; it was also suggested that no sanad should be granted to Pukhtun Wali, and that he should be given clearly to understand that his recognition by Government and the payment of the subsidy would be only continued as long as he behaved well. If Pukhtun Wali declined to come in on the Political Agent's invitation, the Resident thought that no further notice should be taken of him.



The Government of India replied on the 22nd July 1910. They agreed that, in view of the changed position that had arisen, owing to the influence and power which Pakhtun Wali had acquired, the policy of non-interference in the affairs of Darel and Tangir could no longer be adhered to with advantage, and that it was now desirable to make the best arrangement possible with Pakhtun Wali. They accordingly approved Colonel Ramsay's proposals, as summarised above, subject to the concurrence of the Kashmir Darbar, which he was asked to obtain. The Darbar were also to be asked to agree to bear half the expenditure involved in the grant of the allowance to Pakhtun Wali; and in the event of the latter insisting on maintaining his claim to Darel, Colonel Ramsay was to report what action he would recommend should be taken.

In regard to Raja Sifat Bahadur, Colonel Ramsay considered that his incursion into Darel, constituted a grave disobedience of orders, and that the displeasure of Government should be clearly evinced. But on this point, the Government of India, while agreeing that Sifat Bahadur's conduct was most reprehensible, were not disposed, in consideration of his past services, to deal too severely with him. He had already, they remarked, been detained as a prisoner in the Gilgit fort, for a period of six months, and they were of opinion that as soon as Pakhtun Wali had either come in to Gilgit, or refused to do so, Sifat Bahadur might, after he had rendered a humble apology for his disobedience, be reinstated as Governor of Punial, on slightly reduced emoluments, with the prospect of recovering favour. Colonel Ramsay had stated that this arrangement could be carried out, with slight administrative alterations regarding the power which Sifat Bahadur had hitherto exercised over his relatives; and he was accordingly requested to address the Kashmir Darbar on the subject, and to fix, in consultation with them, the amount of the allowance which Sifat Bahadur should in future receive.

In view of the arrangements thus sanctioned, the Government of India rejected a proposal which Colonel Ramsay had made for the direct administration of Punial, by the Political Agent, Gilgit, with the help of an Assistant Political Agent. In conclusion the Government of India expressed appreciation of the prompt manner in which Major Dew had taken steps to prevent the spread of disturbance at the time when Sifat Bahadur advanced into Darel.

Death of 25 coolies on the Burzil Pass from the fall of an avalanche. Measures taken to prevent hardships and loss of life amongst coolies employed in carrying the baggage of sportsmen, etc., in the wilder parts of Kashmir.

On the 11th April 1906, 25 out of the gang of 40 coolies carrying the baggage of Captain Tyndal and Lieutenant Davidson across the Burzil Pass were killed by the fall of an avalanche.

In order to avoid such accidents in future and owing to the scarcity of supplies and coolies it was decided that pass-holders for the Pamirs *viâ* Gilgit, and for the shooting grounds in the Gilgit Agency, should not be permitted to leave Bandipur until the 15th May, by which time the passes would be safe, and that their baggage should be limited to what the local officials considered a reasonable quantity. Further that the number of shooting passes for Ladak should be reduced to 45 per season, and that the number of permits to Europeans proceeding to Central Asia *viâ* Ladak should also be limited.

The Secretary of State having enquired about the accident, and what steps were being taken to obviate the risk of injury to the inhabitants of the outlying parts of Kashmir arising from the presence of sportsmen and others, was informed of the orders which had been issued.

About a year later another unfortunate accident occurred on the Zoji La

pass, when certain coolies carrying the baggage of Mr. F. Hadow, who was proceeding on a shooting expedition to the Pamirs *viâ* Baltistan, were killed by an avalanche. Owing to the special orders which had been issued in the previous year with the object of preventing accidents to coolies carrying the baggage of sportsmen and others in the wider parts of Kashmir, the Resident in Kashmir was asked to furnish a report on the occurrence.

From the report, which was made after a personal explanation had been given by Mr. Hadow on return from the Pamirs, it appeared that Mr. Hadow had arrived

at Dras from Pandras, only 8 miles distant, at 9 A.M. of the 19th March, and that the coolies after being paid up, started off from Dras to return the same day to Matayan—an easy march as the snow was hard and the going good. Mr. Hadow warned them to leave Matayan early in the morning on the 20th in order at least to arrive at Baltal at the foot of the Zoji La, 15 miles from Matayan, that day, and be in their homes by the 21st. Eighteen of the coolies conformed to Mr. Hadow's advice and safely crossed the pass on the morning of the 20th, but eleven others remained behind for some unaccountable reason and tried to cross the pass on the morning of the 21st, when it was snowing—a thing against which Mr. Hadow had warned them—with the result that seven of them were killed by the fall of an avalanche. The Resident also reported that the relatives of the deceased men had been suitably compensated by Mr. Hadow who, he considered, was in no way to blame.

The Government of India considered that, in the circumstances, the deceased coolies in not acting, like the majority of their comrades, on the advice given them by Mr. Hadow, were themselves to blame for the accident, and that no blame whatsoever attached to Mr. Hadow.

With reference to a recommendation made in 1904 by Major Gurdon, the Political Agent in Gilgit, for a system of compulsory watch and ward in Ghizr, the Resident in Kashmir, in October 1906, submitted certain proposals regarding the revenue and other payments recovered in the Yasin, Kuh and Ghizr districts of the Gilgit Agency. It was found that the Hashmat Dyak class in Yasin were too highly taxed, while the annual tribute payable by the whole tract (Yasin, Kuh and Ghizr) to the Kashmir Durbar was disproportionate to the means of these petty states. Sir Francis Young-husband accordingly recommended that the tax and the tribute should both be reduced. The Government of India in February 1907 sanctioned his proposals as a tentative measure, subject to the concurrence of the Durbar, and to a reservation of the right at any time to make a settlement in the district of Yasin, Kuh and Ghizr, as had been done to some extent in Chilas and elsewhere in Kashmir.

In February 1907, the Government of India sanctioned a proposal to reduce the garrison of the Gilgit Agency from 12 companies of infantry, one battery, and one company of Sappers and Miners, to eight companies of infantry, and one battery. It was decided, however, that the full amount of reserve supplies should be maintained without any reduction.

When submitting his proposals for the reduction of the garrison of Kashmir Imperial Service troops at Gilgit the Resident in Kashmir also proposed a development of the levy system in Gilgit on the lines adopted in Chitral, and suggested that an officer might be deputed to work out the scheme.

Owing to the fact that several large schemes involving changes in, and additions to, frontier militia corps and levies in other parts of the border were then under consideration, the Government of India were not at the time prepared to take up the proposal, and in communicating this decision to the Resident, informed him that, although they were of opinion that some advantage would be secured if the Gilgit levies were better trained and armed, they would prefer a more modest scheme than that which he indicated, and they asked him to submit such a scheme, at the end of a year; this could be prepared by the local officers, and there appeared no sufficient reason why a special officer should be deputed for the purpose.

In March 1908, a scheme was submitted by the Resident providing for certain additions to the Gilgit levies, and for their better organisation and training.

His proposals were briefly :—

- (1) to convert the majority of the civil levies into fighting levies ;
- (2) to re-arm all levies with Martini-Henry rifles in the place of Snider carbines ;
- (3) to increase the existing levies by 216 men.

These proposals involved an increased annual expenditure of about Rs. 15,800.

In reply, Sir Francis Younghusband was informed that the Government of India were not prepared to sanction any increase to the strength of the levies, but that there was no objection to the levies being armed with Martini-Henry rifles in place of the snider rifles at present in use; and the Resident was asked how many Martini-Henry arms would be required and whether the civil levies as well as the fighting levies possessed sniders at present. When replying the Resident, instead of confining himself to answering the question put to him, submitted (June 30th, 1909) a scheme prepared by Major Dew, the Political Agent at Gilgit, for the abolition of a great number of the existing more or less untrained or partially trained levies, and the formation of a regular Levy Corps of 428 men, under two British officers, and on the usual Frontier Militia Corps lines.

With this main proposal were combined several far-reaching suggestions with regard to the Kashmir troops in Gilgit, and other cognate subjects, mostly of a military nature; and the scheme was primarily based on military considerations. The principal political considerations put forward in favour of the scheme were (1) that it would furnish a means of settling the difficult problem of employment for the greatly increasing families of the better class amongst the population, and (2) that it was calculated to increase the loyalty of the people, and that it would put a stop to the idea that the garrison of Imperial Service Troops was quartered at Gilgit for the purpose of overawing the tribes, an idea which fostered the impression that the latter were distrusted by Government. The scheme involved, if passed, an annual increased recurring expenditure of Rs. 89,535 *plus* an initial expenditure of Rs. 25,640. Part of the latter, it was explained, would be recoverable; and Sir Francis Younghusband thought that by the successful establishment of a Levy Corps, it would be possible eventually to reduce the present Gilgit garrison, thus saving much expense to the Imperial Government and Kashmir State. Sir Francis Younghusband, however, was on the whole not very cordial in his support of the scheme, and only recommended it on condition that it should be carried out by Major Dew himself.

The Government of India after due consideration held (December 18th, 1909) that from the point of view of military policy the proposed reorganization was not required, and they were unable to regard the political reasons put forward as sufficient to justify the large expenditure involved.

The question of giving effect to the earlier proposal to re-arm the existing levies in the Agency with Martini-Henry rifles instead of sniders, was then reverted to; but no further progress was made with the matter within the period of this summary.

In April 1907, the Resident in Kashmir reported the formation of a dam in

Construction of a telegraph line from the upper waters of the Indus river, above Gilgit to Baltit in order to obtain timely notice of floods on the Indus river. Gilgit, by the movement of a glacier; and he recommended that, in order to obtain timely notice of floods, and so avoid the damage to bridges and property which had occurred in previous years by floods from a similar cause, a telegraph line should be constructed from Gilgit to Baltit (Hunza).

Orders were at once issued for the construction of a light telegraph line which was completed early in July; and it was subsequently decided that, as there was no likelihood of much damage to the line during the winter months from snow or from the inhabitants, it should be kept standing throughout the year, but that the offices which were opened at Gakuch, Chalt and Aliabad should be closed each winter and reopened in the next season. The annual cost of the line was estimated at Rs. 10,295.

In May 1907, the Resident in Kashmir recommended that the Khagan

Proposed opening of the Khagan valley route to Gilgit should be used as an alternative to the ordinary route *via* the Burzil Pass. He pointed out that the former route had many advantages over the latter, and recommended—

- (1) that the Khagan route should be used for the despatch of all stores, munitions, etc., required from India for the use of the Gilgit garrison;
- (2) that the Postal Department should arrange for the despatch of the Gilgit mails by this route;

- (3) that the Telegraph Department should resurvey the route with a view to its adoption for the telegraph line to Gilgit; and
- (4) that good rest-houses, well supplied with firewood, should be established at each foot of the pass.

The Khagan route had been used experimentally with some success a few times between 1896 and 1899 for the despatch of reliefs and stores to Gilgit, but after the withdrawal of the garrison of regular troops from Gilgit the further use of the route had been abandoned. Owing to the great cost of transport *viâ* the Burzil, and the hardships and dangers to which the villagers on that route are exposed in carrying the dâk and attending to the telegraph line during the winter, and of which the Resident in Kashmir had received several complaints, the Government of India considered that a further investigation of the possibilities of the alternative route was desirable. The Resident in Kashmir was accordingly asked to submit an estimate of the cost of making the Khagan route suitable for traffic and the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, was asked to submit an estimate of the relative cost of carriage by the two alternative routes; while the Director-General of Telegraphs and the Director-General of the Post Office of India were invited to give their opinions on the Resident's proposals so far as their departments were concerned. The Director-General of Telegraphs and the Director-General of Post Office of India condemned the change of route on the grounds of cost, labour difficulties and certain technical objections.

The necessary inquiries were accordingly instituted; and it was ascertained that the Director-General of Telegraphs, and the Director-General of the Post Office of India both condemned the change of route on the grounds of cost, labour difficulties and certain technical objections. It was also ascertained that the present or Burzil route had an advantage over the Khagan route, as regards rate of carriage, of about Re. 1 a maund; and that in order to make the latter route practicable as a military transport route a sum of some three to five lakhs would probably have to be expended; so for the present the proposal was dropped.











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